IT WOULD almost appear that functionalism has become an embarrassment in contemporary theoretical sociology. True, the functionalist perspective commonly figures in those guides to modern theory usable as textbooks,¹—though certainly not as a model or standard for approximation, but rather as a position held with decreasing conviction, subject to attack or evasion. Robert Nisbet, in a context noting the conservative implications of functionalism, comments on its decline.² The decline is scarcely one of interest in the functionalist canon, for the leading sociological journals, to the extent that they contain prose exposition at all, continue to publish articles attacking what—from that indicator—may be called “bad old theory.”

That the contemporary attacks on functionalism come commonly (though not exclusively) from sociologists with a self-identified “critical” or “radical” orientation is not surprising, given both the intrinsic relevance of value or ideological orientations to sociological theory at the level of concern with what we may call the “true nature of society,” and the circumstance that sophisticated or vulgar neo-Marxist orientations have had a strong recrudescence among young sociologists. (Value assumptions, which turn out also to be assumptions concerning the proper mission of the sociological discipline, will perforce engage our attention at several junctures in this discussion.) The paucity of current theoretical writing presenting a spirited defense of functionalism may be interpreted in several ways which are not mutually exclusive: that the attackers have well and truly found their target, leaving functionalism as defeated bad old theory on both scientific and ideological grounds, sullenly cherished by a dwindling company of ineluctably aging and unconstrained believers (and the continued attacks representing a kind of addiction to overkill); that the principal adherents and expositors of functionalism, represented, say, by the notorious “Harvard circle” at one time

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FUNCTIONALISM

WILBERT E. MOORE
revolving around Talcott Parsons, have turned their primary attention to other sociological concerns; that the proponents of functionalism are out of fashion in the current climate of radical rhetoric, have lost their power or influence, and thus—to indulge in the kind of conspiracy theory much admired in radical circles—simply cannot get published.

To the first of these interpretations we may now respond "Well, yes and no" or, better, "Only partly," leaving the untangling of that unsatisfactory situation to the ensuing exposition. The third interpretation we may dismiss as about as fanciful and unverifiable as most conspiracy theories. In support of the second interpretation we may cite some examples which will still leave a somewhat mixed judgment. Talcott Parsons can probably be fairly described as an unrepentant functionalist, but for a number of years he has been primarily concerned with developing a typology of societies from an explicitly evolutionary perspective, and with power as a generalized medium of exchange, analogous to money. Kingsley Davis, author of a general textbook from a functionalist perspective, coauthor with me of the enduringly controversial "functional theory of stratification," and author of a defense of functionalism in his presidential address for the American Sociological Association, has for years been primarily concerned with clarifying and verifying the social determinants of human fertility and mortality. Robert Merton, renowned for his formalization of functionalism, has in recent years returned to his early interest in the sociology of science. Marion Levy, whose work on The Structure of Society explores the "functional requisites of any society" at a level offering greater articulation with universal structures than does Parsons's unduly abstract fourfold scheme, has for years been primarily interested in the analysis of modernization. Since his analysis is set in the framework of "comparative statics," he might also be characterized as an unrepentant functionalist. I have described my own position as a "chastened, penitent, and somewhat reformulated functionalist," with explicit departures from functionalist faith in Social Change, and a principal and self-critical interest in the global process of modernization.

Lest a somewhat extended discussion of the history of functionalism and its current standing be regarded as an exercise in the futile attempt to resurrect dead doctrines, some further introductory comments are in order. I shall be noting in subsequent paragraphs the centrality of a systems perspective in all explicitly functional analyses, but also in much analytically work that may leave theoretical assumptions mainly unstated, and in some scholarly work that explicitly adopts some form of conflict orientation. This, it appears, is the tenable truth in Davis's insistence that functional analysis and sociological analysis constitute an equation. Almost all of those statistical reports that now crowd the sociological journals represent attempts to measure mainly atemporal relations. The statistical analysis is fundamentally correlational, however refined by factor analysis, analysis of variance, path analysis, or regression equations. The manipulation of so-called empirical observations—a semantically improper bit of jargon substituted for the accurate terms numerical or quantitative— Attempts verification of the assumption that various measures of patterned behavior and its consequences do not stand in random relation to each other—indeed words, that they are parts of some sort of system. Though the theoretical innocence of some research practitioners is pristine and profound, they are unwitting functionalists. Durkheim's judgment that the canon of inductive logic most apt for sociology is that of correlation appears amply fulfilled in the research literature, though the perpetrators may not have read Durkheim.

The agenda for the subsequent proceedings here are principally these: an examination of the origins of functionalism; functionalism viewed as a systems perspective; structural functionalism; functionalism as a neoevolutionary perspective, including the theory of modernization; and concluding comments concerning limitations and controversies with respect to functionalism, though some of these will necessarily intrude in the earlier exposition as it proceeds.

The Problem of Origins

In the moderately long history of social theory, genuine theoretical "breakthroughs" are rare. It is not mere modesty that has led the more conscientious innovators to recognize that they "have stood on the shoulders of giants." Any allegiance of primacy in a fundamental idea is likely to provoke scholars into becoming detractors by assembling evidence of earlier anticipations and even articulations of the same ideas. Integration and formalization of prior insights are easier to document for claims of constructive novelty than are the component ideas. Conceptual innovations are of course easy. If they merely enrich the vocabulary of synonyms, their novelty is spurious. If they add defensible precision or identify distinctions that make a difference, the claim of clarification is enhanced. New observational instruments (the telescope, the microscope, the sample survey) are seemingly easier to document as to origin and consequence than are systems of ideas.

These stipulations and cautions are meant to be disarming. For I intend to view functionalism as a more or less systematic framework for social analysis and, with that qualification, to begin its history as recently as the latter part of the last century. My intent thus is not to deny that some of the fundamental ideas are of impressive antiquity in recorded "philosophies," and thus of probably even greater antiquity in unrecorded folk wisdom. Rather, by reliance on integration and formalization as comprising significant novelty, I hope to evade the requirement of tracing the origin of component ideas.

The central ideas of the functionalist perspective can be stated rather simply. Human social aggregates involve differentiated units which are interdependent. These units may be individuals, families and kinship structures, villages, or such analytical structures as age-sex categories or broader
status groups. It has been customary for sociologists to view "societies," and
anthropologists to view "cultures," as the most encompassing social aggre-
gates or social systems, of which other concrete or analytical units thus
become parts of subsets. (The circumstance that the contemporary world may
offer few if any actual examples of genuinely self-subsistent social units is
worth passing notice, but need not detain us here as long as most social
aggregates are mainly contained within what we may cautiously want to call
differential—that is, society—then becomes an analytical construct or "model.""

The combination of differentiation and interdependence permits asking
two related questions: how is the interdependence of parts effected? what
contribution do the parts make to the whole?

The central importance of differentiation in the functionalist perspective
warrants close scrutiny. There is no better place to start than with the classic
work of Emile Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social* (translated as
*The Division of Labor in Society*). Durkheim, often credited with "founding"
functionalism, devoted the greater part of his prolific scholarly writing to
aspects of differentiation and integration. Yet in *Division of Labor* he
began that enduring concern in a curious way: by positing a fictitious
primitive state of social cohesion based on likeness rather than on interdepen-
dent differences. His concept of "mechanical solidarity" makes semantic
sense only when placed in contrast to "organic solidarity," with its readily
grounded connotations of differentiated parts that perform various interdepen-
dent functions in maintaining the viability of the complex organism as a
whole. Durkheim did not succeed in making his state of mechanical solidarity
quite credible, for actual examples of societies lacking internal differentiation
were not available, and indeed it is highly improbable that such a primitive
state among wandering prehistoric groups or bands ever could have existed.
(As a minimum, age and sex are always relevant and necessary bases for
differentiation, and others such as aptitudes and skills are highly probable.)
The factual point is relatively unimportant, for Durkheim was using his
fictitiously homogeneous society as an expository device for examining
the sources of differentiation and the problem of maintaining cohesion of
increasingly differentiated societies.

The theme of increasing differentiation was of course not original with
Durkheim, as it was solidly based on evolutionary theories, particularly in
their post-Darwinian versions and extensions. Durkheim had the exceptional
merit of not taking the process as a given, a datum; rather, he noted the
importance of population growth and density as well as a rather unsatis-
factory concept of "moral density," that came close to meaning "increasing
normative complexity," which was what was to be explained. (To take
increasing differentiation as a given seems still to mar the contemporary work
of Parsons and Smelser.) The reality of fundamental social transformations
accompanying the expansion of industrial capitalism was of prime concern to
Saint-Simon and Comte, with their quest for a rationally constructed new
social order; to Marx, with his concern for the radical alienation of the
worker from the product of his labors; to Tönnies, with his nostalgic regret
for the loss of multibonded ties in the stable community as contrasted with
the fragile structure of specialized associations; and to Weber, with his
tensive admiration for the bureaucratic state and bureaucratized work
organizations generally. Though these well-remembered scholars, whose work
spanned nearly a century, differed in many significant respects, they all
reflected an underlying concern for the twin themes of differentiation and
interdependence, of specialization and integration.

A secondary and somewhat muted theme underlies the preoccupation
of these scholars with the new forms of social interdependence established by a
highly rationalized economy and polity. That theme is order and change. It
was the passing of old and putatively stable social orders that provoked
scholarly concern. With the most notable exception of Marx, the scholars
muted the theme of change by the expedient of constructing dichotomous
types of social systems. Durkheim contrasted contemporary (and admittedly
precocious) organic solidarity with "primitive" mechanical solidarity. Tönnies
clearly regretted the passing of the ordered community with the establish-
ment of rationalized forms of social organization. Weber compared rational-
legal political systems with those deriving their legitimacy from unchallenged
tradition. We shall later note that the before-and-after comparison still haunts
the analysis of "traditional" and "modern" societies in contemporary scholarly
work on the universal process of modernization.

It was, in effect, the emphasis on interdependence in social systems that
partially diverted attention from the processes of their creation. The neglect
of dynamics was of course not total. Comte adopted an essentially evolu-
tional view with his theological, metaphysical, and positivist (scientific) stages
of sociocultural systems. Marx developed a special variant of social evolution
with his emphasis on technology, property systems, and class struggle. Weber
was insistently historical in his perspective and notably emphasized the
importance of changes in values and ideas as sources of structural transforma-
tion. Even Durkheim, as noted, made modest efforts to account for the
phenomenon of increasing differentiation.

What these social theorists—and of course a number of others—had in
common was the preception of the emergent reality of social systems. They
were antireductionists. The position is again most articulately formulated by
Durkheim in his famous assertion that social facts have a reality sui generis
and his admonition that social facts are to be explained by other social facts
and thus, not to be reduced to psychological states of the actors). This
is closely akin to Marx's equally famous assertion, "It is not the consciousness
of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social
existence that determines their consciousness." Neither Marx nor Durkheim
had any enthusiasm for the vulgar hedonism or utilitarianism of classical
economics. Durkheim's discussion of the "noncontractual elements in con-
tract" called attention to the normative order, the body of rules that
comprised the "collective conscience." Marx and Durkheim differed as to whether the rules are to be regarded as manipulative or consensual, but not as to their superindividua quality.

It was Durkheim's correct perception that interdependence does not assure solidarity of the system as a whole that led him to explore the function of ultimate values, of beliefs held not subject to question. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life he made the assumption that a primitive or tribal society with the most rudimentary forms of survival technology would also have a religious system of the most elementary sort. Reflecting the evolutionary principle of progression from simple to complex structures, the argument also assumed a principle of social integration that would become a basic tenet of functionalism: that analytically distinguishable parts of any society or culture must be appropriate for the rest of the system. Ironically, Durkheim's assumption of "uniformity of simplicity" turned out to be simplistic. The aboriginal Australians, ethnographic reports on whom led Durkheim to their selection as a case, were later shown to have an exceptionally complex kinship system. That complicating consideration had more devastating implications for oversimplified notions of social evolution—and, more than incidentally, for notions of technological determinism—that it did for notions of interdependence and integration. And Durkheim's conclusion that the object of religious worship is, at base, society itself remains an arguable interpretation of at least part of religious beliefs and practices.

Durkheim's concern with problems of social integration was early and enduring. Not only in the Division of Labor but also in subsequent books and essays a great part of his work focused on the maintenance of the moral order, the avoidance of anomic—that is, rulelessness. Yet, curiously, his immediate associates and students did not deal with whole societies or cultures, but rather with aspects of cultures and their significance in a comparative perspective. Some, like Durkheim's own work on religion, reflected an evolutionary perspective. Thus, Durkheim joined Marcel Mauss in an essay on "primitive forms of classification." Mauss also wrote a small book on the gift as a "primitive" form of exchange. On the other hand, Arnold van Gennep's book on rites de passage explored a structural universal in human societies without strong overtones of searching for origins.

The persistently comparative focus of Durkheim and his associates bespoke an effort to build a science of society, or at least of social phenomena, with ample attention to non-Western societies. It was almost certainly the evolutionary perspective that prompted attention to the growing volume of ethnographic reports on "primitive" societies, though one should not forget the influential work of Marcel Granet on China. One enduring consequence of the comparative emphasis was the avoidance in the French academic establishment of a sharp distinction between anthropology, primarily concerned with nonliterate cultures, and sociology, primarily concerned with complex literate societies. The distinction has little intellectual merit—no more, say, than societies with or without money as a generalized medium of exchange, or those with or without a formalized system of government. (Unfortunately for either a rigid evolutionary doctrine or a rigid functionalist view of systemic determinism, these—and other—discontinuities in the structural features of societies exhibit scant coincidence. The inventions of writing, of money, of government, of settled agriculture do have important systemic consequences. Those consequences are not total and definitive.)

There is a further irony. Functionalism mainly reached contemporary sociology by virtue of the work of British social anthropologists. In a university setting more hospitable to the analysis of exotic tribes than to the analysis of strictly Western cultures, some anthropologists abandoned the attempt to arrange cultures in a stringent evolutionary order. Rather, particularly following the work of A. R. Radcliff-Brown, a new model of analysis appeared. A culture was to be viewed as an integrated whole. ("Culture" was taken in the inclusive sense of knowledge, beliefs, and rules of conduct, but also patterns of behavior and forms of social organization.) Conventions for "mapping" a culture were developed, with attention not only to forms but also to functions—that is, consequences of forms for other aspects of the culture.

Most of the cultures so studied were relatively small and only moderately contaminated by contemporary Western influences—of which, of course, the anthropologists themselves were a part. Mainly the resulting reports documented diversity among cultures as they traced systemic integration within them. The primacy of kinship within the patterns of organization, however, emerged with such clarity and uniformity that its centrality became a kind of conventional wisdom. The "explanation" of any belief, rule, structure, or practice was to be found either through linkages with other parts of the system—a view completely consistent with that of Durkheim—or in its contribution to the survival of the system and its members.

The attempt at deliberate exclusion of extraneous influences in order to reconstruct the culture in its "pure" form had as a cost of its benefits the neglect of adaptation to change. Yet there was a further, perhaps more significant, cost: the acceptance of the system as given and not as the product of some evolutionary process or of adaptation to prior external influences. Thus appeared one of the clearly identifiable weaknesses or ambiguities in functionalism. Does adherence to Durkheim's prescription that social facts are to be explained by other social facts imply that the qualifier "coexisting" be inserted before the explanatory facts, or may one properly attend to a system's history?

The Systems Perspective

Durkheim called the combination of differentiation and integration "organic" solidarity. After brief discussion of his choice of the term he did not avidly pursue the metaphor of society as an organism. Others did. Particular-
ly in the work of Herbert Spencer, 46 elaborate analogies between specialized units of society and parts of the human body were developed. Evolutionary doctrine provided a ready rationale for differentiation through genetic variability and for the use or function of organic parts by their contribution to the survival of the organism. With this comforting answer to the question "Why?" attention could be given to examination of interdependence and thus the question "How?" Around this organic metaphor the functionalist could develop a set of operating assumptions about social systems.

The two most fundamental assumptions, we have noted, are differentiation and integration. Two others were essentially derived from these. One is the "canonical" view that any observed cultural form or pattern of behavior must fit the system—that is, must have a function. 44 Thus survivals without current utility are discredited. It may be admitted, implicitly or explicitly, that the current function is not the same as the original or other prior use, but the "strict constructionist" in functional theory would not admit that an extant form or practice is simply accidental or a currently meaningless survival and thus unrelated to the system and essentially irrelevant. The system, in other words, is to be regarded as highly integrated, with no loose parts lying about. This is what Merton calls "the postulate of universal functionalism." 45

The other derivative assumption is that forms fit functions. As Timasheff observes, 49 this comes close to being tautologous, as either the forms develop "to fulfill the function"—a teleological view much evident in the writings of biologists—or the function is simply the consequence of any form. If the vague term "form" is rendered as "structure"—a pattern of social behavior—then the relations among such structures and their consequences for integration or survival of a society or some lesser system do constitute significant questions. To those we shall return a little later.

Organic analogies were of course particularly appealing to the post-Darwin social evolutionists. Herbert Spencer, as a voluminous expositor of that perspective, was not consistently cautious in remembering that an analogy is not an equivalency. 44 But the analogy has retained its appeal, while the evolutionary argument has been muted. Animal anatomy and physiology provide analogies or metaphors for the relation of parts to the whole in any "living" system, the biological whole comprising the skin-bound organism. Parsons, in a recent recapitulation of aspects of his theoretical position, unblinkingly uses a biological system analogy for the social system. 46 Since such analogies rarely if ever figured in his theoretical writing in earlier decades, it is not unlikely that they came to his attention by a familiar route. In relatively recent work he made a fairly extensive foray into a refurbishing of social evolution both as a taxonomic device for classifying societies and as a dynamic principle in accounting for their transformations. 44

The use of organic analogies in sociological theory is not limited to explicitly functionalist perspectives. Ecology, as the study of the relationship of the organism to its environment or of the interdependence of living species, has been extended not only to the spatial distribution of human populations but also to interdependence (symbiosis) among differentiated activities. 47 True, human ecologists tend to adopt the view that they are dealing with a "natural" order that exists independently of mere socially invented norms and values. Their approach has even been characterized as devoting attention to the subsocial. Yet the exclusion of political and institutional variables is difficult and misleading. What is at issue is not the use of a systems perspective, but the properties of the systems. The ecologists do attend to problems of form conforming to use and the adapting of forms to changing circumstances of the system as an entity.

Central to the systems perspective is the problem of integration. How is order possible? Parsons started his early work, The Structure of Social Action, 44 with an analysis of Thomas Hobbes on the presocial "state of nature." Hobbes correctly perceived that in an aggregate of solely self-seeking human beings where other human beings become potential means to any individual's goals, force and fraud would turn out to be the most effective means of goal attainment. Parsons of course did not accept Hobbes's royalist solution of an absolute sovereign as viable, but derived from Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto the central importance of a value system and a normative order. Among that company, it was especially Durkheim who was attentive both to the problems of maintaining the moral integration of such specialized social units as religious or occupational groups and to the problems of integrating these into a more general fabric. And it was Durkheim, too, who was most sensitive to the fragility of that integration, though here his most lasting contribution was his discussion of anomie, the objective state of rulelessness (in a sense, Hobbes's state of nature).

Now, genuine states of anomie are likely to be rare and transitory, for a social situation without rules is likely to prove intolerable. Yet universal conformity to normative expectations is unlikely, on the evidence. This is what led Durkheim to comment on the "normality of crime." 48 From this Durkheim developed a special variant of a retributory theory of punishment. Punishment, Durkheim argued, was of crucial significance, not primarily for deterrence of future criminality by the malefactor, but as a reassertion of the moral sentiments of the community. Punishment is not meant for the criminal but for honest men. 48 And note, punishment serves not primarily as a deterrent by example but as an opportunity to reaffirm the moral code. By only a slight extension, one could argue from this the social utility of misbehavior. That is, by adding only the assumption of a probable atrophy of moral sentiments if they remain unchallenged, with seemingly slight deviations increasingly tolerated, gradual demoralization might ensue if conspicuous deviance did not occur and provoke the emotional reaction of the community.

Nonconformity or deviance has remained a theoretical problem with respect to integration. The social sources as well as social consequences of deviance were placed solidly within the functionalists' social-systems perspective by Merton's famous essay on "Social Structure and Anomie." 44 Accepting the fundamental tenet that both values and norms are essential for integration, Merton developed a classificatory scheme as follows:
Two points are noteworthy about this scheme. The first is a semantic one, but of some importance. None of these forms of deviance has anything to do with anomie, for both social goals and codes of conduct are stipulated. Merton's discussion focuses on the lack of close integration between goals and means as a source of deviance. Deviance then is not only a manifestation of disorganization by lack of consensual conformity, but derives from the failure of the system to provide uniformly appropriate connections between approved procedures and avowed purposes. It is a profound disavowal of a social integration model, for it goes beyond a mere recognition of the propensity to sin and identifies society as an instigator of sin. Social disorganization yes, but anomie it is not. (Merton offhandedly recognizes this conceptual problem in a later essay.)

The other point raises a different problem with respect to the character of social systems. I said that in Merton's analysis both social goals and prescribed means are "stipulated." This assumes that wise and prescient formulators of values and rules of conduct have foreseen all contingencies and have a rule to cover any occasion (or that unconscious evolution has somehow produced the same comprehensive result, with no further adaptations in prospect). I have argued in Social Change for the probability of "evasive innovation," of actors or groups finding ways to achieve accepted goals by neither following conventional procedure nor violating established prohibitions. If the types of deviance identified by Merton doubly impair an integration model (not every one conforms, and at least part of the nonconformity derives from inconsistencies in the structure itself), evasive innovation imparts notions of inherent fixity in social systems. Since innovation must be accepted, modified, or rejected, new rules are required: thus the principle of normative accumulation.

We have arrived at a position some distance removed from a stable integration model of society maintaining an equilibrium among parts by various homeostatic mechanisms, such as the classical economists' model of a self-regulated market economy. But before we leave the troublesome problems posed by deviance and internal inconsistencies, we should attend to more orthodox functionalist interpretations of them.

Under the dictum that "if it exists and persists, it must have a system-maintenance function," attention turns to practices and structures that are condemned or at best viewed ambivalently. For example, Bronislaw Malinowski, solidly in the tradition both of Durkheim and his associates and of the British social anthropologists, examined the uses of magic. Defining magic the use of nonrational means for the achievement of practical, observal goals, he found that the Trobriand islanders did not substitute magic for best experiential knowledge and rational techniques available. (More incidentally, he thus argued against the idea that the "primitive mind" qualitatively different from the modern.) Malinowski made analytic distinctions between religion (concerned with superempirical values a beliefs) and magic, as well as between magic and science (a more appropriate term would have been technology). And he did not limit magic to primitives, but generalized that it could be expected in situations of uncertain and need for control.

Kingsley Davis argued that prostitution is consistent with, rather than threat to, the conventional structure of the family. (This was an argument made by Bernard de Mandeville in The Fable of the Bees, published 1714.) Merton wrote kindly words about urban "machine politics" in terms the access to a modicum of "justice" for the poor through the vote-assurition of urban politicians. Lewis A. Coser, building on the work of Ges Simmel, has documented some of the positive functions of social conflict.

Certainly the most enduring controversy in contemporary functionalism has revolved around the Davis and Moore "functional theory of stratification." The theory, properly called an "immodest" one by authors of a recent article, argued that universally there is a differentiation of tasks or postic that are of unequal functional importance for the systems in which they are found, that there is an unequal availability of talented and trained persons fill these positions, and consequently that unequal rewards are used "... to ensure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons.

Critics have properly objected to the term stratification, which seems be reserved for systems of differentiation that permit fairly distinct boundaries between strata and that are likely to be more or less hereditary. Davis and Moore were concerned with institutionalized social inequality, with or without hereditary strata. Critics have also properly noted that the authors paid attention to tensions and to inequities within systems of social inequality. Much of the criticism has derived from an ideological position that espous the ideal of equality and rejects a "functional" view of inequality as giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

In none of the controversy has the universality of inequality been challenged. Its inevitability is in dispute, along with the particular explanatory advanced by Davis and Moore. Attempts at empirical tests of the theory have yielded "mixed notices." In fact, a test at the level of generalization assumed the theory would require establishing an ordered array of essential functional clear data on availability of persons with differential talent and training, and measure of rewards, financial and otherwise. And, since those in positions power probably can exercise that power to "rig the system" in terms of rewards, the definition of talent, and access to training, one would need to wary of spurious confirmation of the theory as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.
These examples confirm the merits of looking beyond an aspect or segment of social systems to find system-supporting consequences that may not conform to conventional values and preferences—a demonstration that common sense may be wrong. It remains true, however, that complex societies offer ample evidence of lack of consistency and of system failures. Patterns of behavior may have truly negative consequences for system maintenance and effective operation. Merton suggested that such consequences be identified as “dysfunctions.” To keep the terminology symmetrical, Levitt suggested that “functional” be made a neutral designation, meaning only that patterns have consequences beyond themselves for other parts of the system or the system as a whole. If positive or supportive, the consequences are identified as “eufunctional”; if negative, “dysfunctional.”

Complexity, however, does confound: mixed cases abound. If differential rewards serve as the motivational incentive to assure that important positions are conscientiously filled by appropriately competent performers, it remains true that known systems of social inequality exhibit counterproductive characteristics: for example, in Western societies, excessive inequalities give rise to differential hereditary opportunities to acquire skills and display competence, with negative motivational consequences for the least privileged segments of the population. If magic is the universal expedient for eking out the gap between rational control and certainty of outcome, magic imbedded in a predominantly religious context may impede a rational calculus of institutional acts: for example, reliance on a Saint Christopher’s medal for a safe journey to the neglect of the mechanical safety of an automobile and careful driving.

Determining the consequences—the functions—of an aspect of social reality thus often requires an appraisal or calculation of net balances. Such calculation will of course not be attempted if one starts with the unexamined assumption that systems are perfectly integrated—or nearly so, with the exception of random deviance.

System integration is put in further doubt if circumstances permit “subsystems” with sufficient degrees of independence or autonomy so that what is eufunctional or dysfunctional for the part does not have the same consequences for the broader society. Though Charles E. Wilson, a former chief executive of General Motors Corporation before he served a term as United States secretary of defense, expressed the opinion that what was good for General Motors was good for the United States, this view appropriately aroused considerable dissent. Corporate profit maximization at the expense of environmental pollution or bribing legislators or selling unsafe vehicles imperils other legitimate interests, public and private. Or let us take a somewhat more complex example. We know, by time-honored sociological principle, that up to some (poorly established) point, increased external threat or conflict increases the cohesion of social groups. Ideologically oriented dissident political groups are not only in conflict with the existing political regime, but often also with other dissident groups with differing ideological orientations. These latter conflicts have their expected favorable conse-
quences for group solidarity, at the expense of a more broadly base opposition that might unseat the government. Knowledgeable officials perceive this reality, encourage the conflicts among dissidents, and thus follow another time-honored precept, “Divide and rule.”

The almost surreptitious introduction of a conflict perspective into the discussion provides an opportunity to face that challenge to functional theory. Conflicts of course exist in complex societies. (They almost certainly exist in nonliterate societies also. Such conflicts tend not to be reported in anthropological monographs, and we are permitted to suspect that they go unnoticed because of the observers’ acceptance of an “integrated-system model or are discounted as mere examples of relatively unimportant deviance.) The conflicts have multitudinous sources and manifestations. These include almost purely “ideological” disagreements, such as those of varying persuasions in their religious orientations and theologies and those that reflect differing views of an ideal society, ranging from nostalgic distortion of a simpler past to possible equally distorted visions of, say, a more equalitarian future. Conflicts of a more immediate and pragmatic character are also evident: between management and labor, between producers and merchants on the one hand and consumers on the other, between those who would extend the influence of government and those who would reduce it. To argue that some form of conflict—say between classes in the Marxist sense—is more fundamental than others either rests upon a doctrinal faith that unbelievers are not bound to accept or requires factual and logical demonstration that will meet the canons of empirical science.

Yet conflict clearly impairs any “consensual-integration” model of society. Even Parsons, commonly identified as the staunchest defender of “consensualism,” writes into his social-system model the management of tensions. Feldman and Moore have gone somewhat further, suggesting a tension-management model of society, noting the advantage of making order as well as disorder problematical. Since no society, including allegedly “classless” ones, actually eliminates sources of conflict, tension management becomes a requisite part of any viable social system.

Parsons, in The Social System, constructs a complex model of societies in which the social system provides a linkage with two other analytically distinct systems: personality and culture. To make these aspects of social phenomena analytically distinguishable implies that they may display independent variability. Parsons explores that variability primarily with reference to personality. Socialization, the combination of cognitive learning with the internalization of established norms and values, comprises, along with biological reproduction, the master process of social continuity. Adopting a modified Freudian perspective, Parsons explores the psychodynamic complexities of personality formation and differentiation. To these we may add the certainty of genetic variability and structural differentiation (both among families and within them, as in birth order), which in combination assure that a “cookie-cutter” pattern of uniformity in socialized product will not occur. Personality differences thus become not only sources of variability and deviance,
but also possible instigators of changes in patterns, norms, and values.

If culture is defined approximately as comprising various symbolic subsystems, such as language, normative codes, and articulated values, it obviously comprises an intrinsic part of any rounded description of a social order. Yet parts of cultural systems appear less closely linked than others to principal components of social structure. I have argued that the supernatural components of religious beliefs as well as aesthetic canons and forms are such loosely linked cultural features. This is not to say that no connections can be established with, say, political and economic structures (a sociologist should, after all, be able to link anything with anything), but they may be tenuous and not highly determined or predictive in either direction. To take an extreme example, there appears to be no clear structural source of a five-note, seven-note, or twelve-note musical scale, and little structural consequence except in a strictly musical context. Similarly, except through explicit administrative rulings requiring that painting, sculpture, or the ballet must display "socialist realism," there appears little way to account, in terms of integrated systems, for the appearance of representational, geometric and formal, or purely abstract "art." The precise system-maintenance function of these products of human activity prove difficult to demonstrate, though the universality of aesthetic expression invites speculation regarding its sources and consequences.

Sorokin, it is true, attempted to demonstrate what we might call thematic consistency of cultural forms within each of his three major cultural types, the ideational, idealistic (later called "integral"), and sensate. Though Sorokin criticized my assertion of looseness to fit between cultural forms and patterns of social organization, his own work did not establish the kind of linkages that a strictly functionalist view of social systems would require.

One further difficulty with the functionalist view of social systems needs comment. The integration model, we have noted, neglected or minimized conflict. From a Marxist perspective the neglect was double: blindness to the reality of conflict and thus failure to perceive conflict as the source of systemic change. The problem is in fact more extensive. For example, though fertility and mortality patterns are not autonomous variables external to social systems, the consequences of those patterns clearly do not establish stationary states. Further, no society can be fairly described as existing in an untroubled adjustment to its environment. Environmental challenges provoke innovative "coping" strategies, including attempted control or mastery, but these do not result in final solutions. And lest that essentially technological interpretation of social change stand as uniquely significant, we must note strictly systemic sources of innovation. Perfectly integrated systems do not exist "in nature." To deviance and conflicts we must add the gap between ideal values, goals, and normative standards and actual practices and achievements. This gap, too, invites innovation, including attempts at tension management, but also including changes in political structure, economic systems, and modes of distribution of social position and benefits.

The functionalists, we have seen, have not totally neglected the individual motivational elements in social behavior, while generally avoiding reductionist "psychologizing" that would negate the emergent social reality intrinsic to the concept of systems. There has been, however, an apparently studied neglect of collective purpose, of public and private decision making on behalf of collectivities such as corporations, universities, or national states. Deliberate change—social planning—may not figure prominently in relatively uncontaminated tribal societies beloved of anthropologists, but it now comprises a major feature of the social landscape in virtually all contemporary political systems. How this reality affects the analysis of modernization will engage our attention later in this essay.

Structural Functionalism

Functionalism in sociological theory could, in most instances, also be called structuralism, though not in the special sense of the latter term as used, for example, by Claude Lévi-Strauss. The primary key here has been the focus on a whole relatively autonomous social unit, whether called a culture by the anthropologists or a society by the sociologists. This "macro" focus has distinguished functionalism not only from various social-psychological concerns with the transactions between individuals and various social units, but also from various "process" orientations as represented by the German formalists such as Leopold von Wiese or their American counterparts represented by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess.

The "holistic" approach advocated and practiced by the social anthropologists attended to structural interdependencies but as a consequence did not encourage attention to structural commonalities across cultures. Meanwhile American sociology, which was expanding rapidly in colleges and universities beginning with the 1920s, became for a time almost exclusively concerned with the United States. This was not in the tradition of such earlier notable figures as William Graham Sumner, Lester F. Ward, Albion W. Small, or Franklin H. Giddings. By the mid to late 1930s, however, the enduring influence of these earlier scholars, increasing interaction with anthropologists, the concern of Talcott Parsons and his students with social analysis at a very high level of generalization, and no doubt other influences began to be reflected in the main textbooks on sociological principles. For a time after its publication in 1937 the single most popular introductory text was that by Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward. The authors organized the bulk of their material around major "social institutions" (an unfortunately ambiguous term), meaning the family, economy, polity, religion, education, and so on. The outstanding feature of this text was the introduction of each of these "core" topics with descriptive material from exotic (mainly tribal) societies.

That kind of reintroduction of a comparative perspective of course had the effect of emphasizing differences, differences that came to be known as
but also possible instigators of changes in patterns, norms, and values. If culture is defined approximately as comprising various symbolic subsystems, such as language, normative codes, and articulated values, it obviously comprises an intrinsic part of any rounded description of a social order. Yet parts of cultural systems appear less closely linked than others to principal components of social structure. I have argued that the supernormal components of religious beliefs as well as aesthetic canons and forms are such loosely linked cultural features. This is not to say that no connections can be established with, say, political and economic structures (a sociologist should, after all, be able to link anything with anything), but they may be tenuous and not highly determined or predictive in either direction. To take an extreme example, there appears to be no clear structural source of a five-note, seven-note, or twelve-note musical scale, and little structural consequence except in a strictly musical context. Similarly, except through explicit administrative rules requiring that painting, sculpture, or the ballet must display "socialist realism," there appears little way to account, in terms of integrated systems, for the appearance of representational, geometric and formal, or purely abstract "art." The precise system-maintenance function of these products of human activity prove difficult to demonstrate, though the universality of aesthetic expression invites speculation regarding its sources and consequences.

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That kind of reinsertion of a comparative perspective of course had the effect of emphasizing differences, differences that came to be known as
"cultural relativism," which can be crudely rephrased as "We do it this way, they do it that way." For a considerable time the topics in textbooks became fairly standardized, but from the perspective of a generalist the complaint could be fairly made that any general theory of social structure was represented only by chapter titles, not by their contents. That is, the titles represented universal structural aspects of any society, but the contents emphasized the differences in the actual structures without attention to why these structures could be so conveniently grouped under standard rubrics.

Human Society by Kingsley Davis, published in 1949, though not a best-selling introductory text, turned out to be an influential one. Davis adopted an explicitly functionalist perspective, relating the common structural aspects of society to the common problems of systemic integration and survival. Later text writers, with or without credit to Davis's work, tended to be not only comparative but also to make at least modest justifications for their topics and organization.

Davis's own exposition paid appropriate attention to systemic linkages, including such subtleties as the distinction between the part and the whole and the positive consequences of nominally disapproved patterns. Yet part of the language implies a virtually anthropomorphic view of society, which somehow chooses appropriate structures from among limited options. (The previously discussed essay on social inequality by Davis and me, published several years before his general work, cryptically refers to systems of social inequality as having "unconsciously evolved." In Human Society, functions (eufunctional consequences of patterns of action) appear essentially to determine structures, though by mechanisms not fully articulated.

Even if the functions are stipulated as consequences necessary for the system to survive—a stipulation that we shall discuss in the next principal subdivision of this essay as implicitly reflecting an evolutionary perspective—the structural determinism can scarcely be regarded as complete and definitive. The documentation of historical and contemporary structural differences provides ample warning, even if those variable structures can be grouped around a limited number of categories that represent commonalities at a high level of abstraction. Here the focus on interdependent systems provides an escape from the position that one may expect merely eclectic combinations from the rather wide range of options available for any essential performance outcome. The situation, in other words, is not one in which the major requirements for any society to exist and persist would form column headings, under each of which a list of observed (and possibly even hypothetical) options would be listed, with the only requirement for constructing a society being that one option must appear from each list. It follows that actually observed societies should not display a kind of random or eclectic combination of structural elements, so long as each essential "function" is represented. Indeed, if we were to take seriously a model of society with "perfect" interdependence and integration, observation or stipulation of one major structural feature should permit reliable prediction of the appropriate item in every other list. This is the kind of assumption that underlies the

explication of the social consequences of industrialization. A stipulation of the structure of economic production would make all other social structures highly determined dependent variables. This approximates the Marxist position but also that of many other analysts of modernization. From a strict functionalist perspective the selection of an independent variable is essentially arbitrary. Thus, it should be possible to derive all other essential structural features equally well from stipulation of the form of the political or the educational structure or the system of social inequality.

Three types of comparative structural analyses in a sense have put this form of the functionalist position to test. One type represents the extension of the Marxist interpretation to situations different from the dynamics of industrial capitalism, which was Marx's own concern. Here adherents to the Marxist tradition attempt to demonstrate the fundamental character of economic structure and the dependency of the noneconomic "superstructure."批评s of that interpretation argue for the equivalence in importance of other structural features of society and/or the partial indeterminacy (and thus independent variability) of other structural characteristics.

A second type of comparative test of systemic determinacy is prominently illustrated by the use of the Human Relations Area Files, which represent a compilation of recorded observations, primarily of nonliterate cultures or societies studied by anthropologists, arranged topically (unfortunately, by a not very highly rationalized classification of categories). For example, George Peter Murdock has selected types of kinship organization and made correlational analyses of other structural features found with a given kinship type. Stanley H. Udy, Jr., has used the same information source to determine the structural determinants of forms of work organization.

The third type of test of structural interdependence is represented by the analyses of the structural consequences of industrialization or economic development. In anticipation of fuller discussion later, I have concluded in my own moderately extensive work in this field that industrialization—often used in an encompassing sense to represent extensive rationalization of the modes of economic production and distribution—has both structural preconditions and consequences. In the relationships between economy and society, and indeed in the precise forms within a rationalized economy, the viable structural characteristics are radically more limited than would be represented by a full list of options representing the range of human experience, but they are not fully determinate. For example, there is no case of even moderately successful economic development in the absence of both a stable political order and a widely shared ideology favorable to economic rationalization. However, evidence makes clear that neither parliamentary democracy nor the "Protestant ethic" is a uniquely requisite structural component for such an economic order.

The same "limited determinacy" emerges from the other types of comparative analysis just discussed. We thus once more find the utility of the systems perspective but the factual reality of looser, less fully cohesive systems than assumed by orthodox functionalism.
We have been exploring the extent to which parts of a social system determine the remainder—whether the selection of the part is merely convenient or arbitrary or is genuinely more fundamental than others, as in forms of economic determinism (or what might be called Weber's theological or ideological determinism in The Protestant Ethic). Other complications arise if one starts from the assumption of a kind of general functional determinism—that is, that various functions must be fulfilled if the society is to survive. The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inevitable about the survival of societies, as recorded history amply testifies and, by justifiable if speculative inference, unrecorded history would further confirm. The introduction of a value position—say, a just, humane, or even a totally compliant society—would argue that some societies should not survive or at least should not survive as presently constituted. Both positions reject the kind of "functional teleology" represented by the simplistic view that "if it exists it must be essential." That view is further undermined by the recognition of some structural indeterminacy, even when parts of the system are stipulated.

It was earlier noted that the idea that the "form must fit the function" verges on a tautology. There is of course a necessary consistency, which we may call "structural suitability." The evidence for some systemic looseness and indeterminacy leads to a parallel and cautionary idea, that of "structural substitutability." Parts of systems may be subject to evolutionary, accidental, or deliberate change, perhaps resulting in an improved "goodness of fit" among structures or closer approximation to articulated ideals. Of course evolution and accident, being mindless, may have dysfunctional consequences, and errors in knowledge and strategies in planned change may also produce unanticipated and regretted results. This view argues for the possibility—and probability—of piecemeal alterations in societies. The value-based view that the evils of a system are so pervasive and interconnected that only a radical and total transformation will suffice thus represents a more fundamental commitment to determinant integration than the modified structuralism that we have been discussing would warrant.

There is a further complication that must be noted. The stipulation of functions requisite for societal survival does not imply the necessity of a similar list of discrete and specialized structures. Here we encounter once more the degree of structural differentiation. The modest (though variable) degree of such differentiation, linked with the pervasive, multifunctional importance of kinship structures, especially distinguishes the nonliterate societies studied by social anthropologists, as compared with the highly differentiated structures of complex societies of the ancient and modern world. Yet even in complex societies the matching of structure and function is not precise. Levy distinguishes between "concrete" and "analytic" structures. Concrete structures constitute membership groups (such as families or lineages) or aggregates (such as unorganized "classes"). Such memberships are in principle preclusive within their type. That is, one belongs to one kinship group and not others, one community and not others, one occupational group and not others. Analytic structures are essentially identified by their functions (consequences for the system). Thus the economic structure comprises all patterns relevant to the production and distribution of goods and services. Though there are predominantly economic organizations that are concrete structures—manufacturing corporations, collective farms, trade associations, retail stores—they neither comprehend the totality of the economy nor are they exclusively economic in either form or function. The economy is pervasive. No individual member of the society can avoid membership in the economy and stay alive. Virtually every group or association has its economic aspects. On the other hand, corporations or professional associations are also political bodies, being concerned with normative compliance and maintenance of order, as well as having a variety of other social consequences, such as their effects on members' families. Similar points are appropriate to the polity or to the structuring of social inequality.

This complication, though awkward for any attempt at tidy structural mapping in terms of a standard list of systemic consequences, constitutes one of the more impressive claims for the utility of the functionalist approach to comparative structural analysis. It permits posing the significant questions: how are goods and services produced and distributed? how are power and responsibility allocated? The answers to those questions permit the observation of the interdependence among differentiated structures, not only through transactions between them or their regulation by some overarching supervisory body such as the state, but also through their concrete interpenetration.

It is of course not necessary to start a "functional analysis" with fundamental functions. That starting point is especially appropriate for comparative structural or "cross-cultural" analyses, for the universal functions requisite to societal survival provide at minimum the standard categories for structural comparisons, though other uniformities such as magic and passage rituals or structurally distinctive recreational patterns may supplement the more "fundamental" (and partially self-evident) necessities for systemic persistence. That approach also has the more than incidental benefit of providing generality in sociological theory in the textbooks that dutifully document diversity. The historic roots of functionalism are more partial: addressing the question of the "meaning" of cultural forms or behavior patterns in terms of consequences beyond the particular form or structure. Leaving aside the somewhat ambiguous meaning of cultural forms, for reasons already discussed, analysis may start with structures rather than functions. What do structures actually do? Schools are established to educate pupils, and they perform that mission with varying degrees of proficiency. They also serve, for younger children, as baby-sitters and day-care centers, as the context for possibly deviant peer-group socialization, as preliminary sorting mechanisms for adult social placement, and possibly as a devious or at least indirect and not very effective device for palliating racial and ethnic discrimination in housing and employment. For younger teenagers, schools keep their pupils off the streets during school hours and serve as "day reformatories" for juvenile delinquents not committed to official reformatories. For later teenagers and young adults the adult place-
ment function becomes more precise: meanwhile staying in school delays entrance into the competitive and possibly overcrowded labor force, and in that sense at least represents a prolongation of infancy.

Hospitals provide another convenient example of multifunctionality. While at least nominally providing medical therapy for the sick or wounded, they must necessarily also provide custodial and hotel-and-restaurant services. They get the sick or dying persons out of the household and, especially for the moribund, provide a kind of emotionally sterile setting for death. Concentration of medical services in a separate establishment eases the problems of coordinating specialized services and has the more than incidental consequence of requiring the patient to get to the services rather than the physician or visiting nurse delivering the services to the patient's home.

The possible illustrations abound. "Service clubs" avail their aim of improving their communities, but their weekly luncheons provide opportunities for business and professional contacts and developing clientele. Professional associations profess that they are designed to maintain and improve standards of professional competence and performance. They also serve to limit access to certification of proficiency and, by monopolizing the skill, can collectively enjoy monopolistic price fixing for their members' services to the laity.

Tracing the true consequences—the "outputs"—of organizations and other patterns of action or the ramifications of seemingly minor innovation constitutes major claims for the functionalist version of a systems perspective. Like the various examples of the utility of derogated practices such as magic or corrupt urban government, the unadvertised and often unintended consequences of organized behavior go well beyond common sense or the unreflective experience of participants and lay observers. The sociological exposer, as teacher or writer, is permitted a feeling of mastery over mysteries that transcend concepts and classifications or mere surface descriptions rendered in an exotic tongue.

To accommodate and formalize this application of functional analysis to the relations among structures within societies, Merton suggested a conceptual distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions. Manifest functions comprise the overt purposes or missions of organizations, and latent functions the additional (or possibly substituted) consequences of the activities of the organizations. The substitution of latent functions for avowed goals may be unintended and harmless or benign in their consequences. Parent-teacher organizations, established to mediate and improve relations between families and schools, may have no detectable influence on those relationships but may survive because of the recreational and status-enhancing satisfactions that members derive from activities and offices. The possibility of latent functions may also invite intentional deception, however. Charity frauds, "front organizations" for espionage, nominally legitimate businesses as covers for organized crime, legislatures that serve the interests of wealthy campaign supporters or bribers instead of their ordinary constituents—these essentially constitute a disparity between the concealed real intentions of the active participants and the appearance of pursuing other goals viewed as proper by significant elements of "the public."

To call the concealed illicit outcomes latent functions may stretch the ordinary sense of the term, but since intentions and motives are implicit in the concept of manifest functions, there seems no bar to symmetry. Just as Levy added symmetry to Merton's discussion of dysfunction with the concept of efunction, he has noted that Merton's dichotomy of manifest and latent functions is oversimplified. In order to take into account both the perception and the motivation of actors in any social system, he introduces the further categories of unintended but recognized functions (eu- or dys-) (UIR) and intended but unrecognized functions (UIR). Useful examples of UIR consequences come readily to mind: schoolteachers may be all too aware that although they are supposed to train their pupils they spend a considerable amount of time and energy in being their custodians; hospital nurses are notorious for exhibiting greater interest in the maintenance of normal routines than in the specific relevance of procedures to individual patients. Useful examples of IUR consequences seem more difficult to identify. (Levy suggests the "compulsive striver" who does not recognize success when achieved.) Here the quest for classificatory symmetry may have exceeded utility. (A good rule-of-thumb caution to dedicated developers of conceptual taxonomies is that if one cannot think of a significant—perhaps hypothetical—example where the distinction makes a difference, the exercise is excessive.)

We must now revert to a recurrent query: just what is the relationship between structures and their consequences? One of the theoretical difficulties in strict functionalism, as several critics have noted, is the expressed or implied argument that the functions determine the structures. Merton has been complimented on having made structuralism independent of functionalism by starting with structures and tracing their consequences for other structures and more encompassing systems, rather than starting from functions as a way of accounting for structures. Certainly the notion of dysfunctions would scarcely arise if one started only with an integration model of consequences necessary for systemic operation and preservation, unless the ensuing empirical quest for the appropriate structures turned up disquieting surprises. And Merton's latent (including Levy's UIR) functions would be far more likely to be noted if one started from structures than if one started with a tidy list of expected or "necessary" consequences. The avoidance of functional determinism evades the teleological assumption that reality has a purpose—the kind of assumption that pervades biologists' writing on "Nature's purposes." Homans, for example, asserts the fallacy of explanation by "final causes."

Yet the concept of manifest functions warns against outright rejection of purpose in human action. Of course the consequences determine (or at least radically delimit) the behavior patterns for their production if the consequences are intended and planned. (I am reminded of a comment by the late philosopher Ralph Barton Perry on the question of whether the ends justify
the means. Asked Perry, "What else could?"") If we were to start with a "completely planned" model of society, as some contemporary postrevolutionary national states have attempted to approximate, we should note the specification of collective and distributive objectives and the establishment of structures for their accomplishment. Ignorance and error would of course lead to partial failures (let us, precisely, call those latent dysfunctions) in implementation, leading to deliberate attempts to improve performance, including reduction of unanticipated negative side effects. Homans, as his work in general testifies, manifests a regrettable failure to understand the reality of collective human purpose, the existence of which makes his strictures on "final causes" irrelevant.

Orthodox functionalism is not cleared of suspicion by hypothetical reference to a planned society, for the functionalists have operated from a generally implicit evolutionary model of systems that have persisted and maintained their structural integrity through a more or less prolonged process of natural selection. Integration models fail to fit reality for a variety of reasons already discussed. Yet interdependence and the problem of order are intrinsic to the human condition, so that some form and degree of integration are requisite not only to preserve "the system" but for bare biological survival.

The survival test, which has been the functionalists' alternative to the planned society as a way of making consequences the determinants of procedures, fits most of human societies for most of human history. Yet that test is shaky, partly for reasons of definition and identification. The patterns of behavior in a society, faithfully observed and measured in some particularity at a moment in time, will differ in significant ways from previous states of the system, even if those are recorded more crudely. Thus, a certain amount of abstraction, of attention to continuities rather than alterations, is necessary in order to claim that one is dealing with the "same" system. Further change is to be expected in future observations, because of intrinsic, though unplanned, sources of change, unforeseen disturbances, and deliberate problem solving and goal seeking. How rapid, extensive, "fundamental," and discontinuous would such change need to be for the analyst to admit that the system had not survived?

Failure of a society to survive as a more or less autonomous entity for reasons intrinsic to the system (failure of one or more necessary functions to be fulfilled) may be difficult to demonstrate. Within the range of our reliable knowledge, societies that have ceased to exist or have persisted only as subsets of more encompassing systems, falling on their evil fate as a consequence of conquest, novel diseases, or natural disasters. Since adequate protection against human and nonhuman enemies is bound to be a requisite for survival of any social system, the survival test does call attention to structural deficiencies: inadequate military preparedness; insufficient public health and medical technology; lack of anticipatory precautions against uncontrolled plagues of locusts, droughts or floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Existing societies have either had the good fortune not to have faced potentially devastating adversity or have had means for coping. Those means are not without theoretical interest in terms of the operation of social systems.

A major part of the problem in both the exposition and the criticism of what Turner calls "functional imperativism" has been the failure to take into account the level of generality or particularity involved in the functional analysis attempted. Survival requirements, viewed across the spectrum of human societies, must be stated fairly abstractly; thus they are not highly predictive of exact structural forms. Were the integration model of society more tenable, observation or stipulation of one or at most very few "fundamental" structures should be highly predictive of the remainder. Known societies are looser and more disordered, so that various system properties determine only ranges of variability in behavior patterns and formal organizations, not their exact form. The loss of information in the process of abstract generalization may unnerve those who prefer to study more concrete patterns and relationships, but that is a matter of taste and not of scientific virtue.

The Neoevolutionary Perspective

Despite the disclaimers of defenders of the faith, functionalism has mainly eschewed dynamics. The course of functionalist analysis, among both anthropologists and sociologists, veered from Durkheim's muted evolutionary orientation to "synchronic," cross-sectional analysis. Not only was the older evolutionism rejected, but also virtually all sequential patterns. (Short-term, repetitive cycles of activity marked by days, weeks, months, seasons, years, and even life cycles were of course noted when relevant, but these essentially comprise elements of order, having few if any enduring consequences for the shape of social systems.) The assumptions concerning interdependence and integration were principally responsible for paying scant attention to demographic variability, the propensity to adopt innovations promising to narrow the gap between the ideal and the actual—whether in dealing with nonhuman environments or in approximating ideal goals—and various essentially dialectical disharmonies intrinsic to organized societies.

The explicit introduction of system survival as a test of necessary consequences of human action and the structural mechanisms for producing those results perforce appealed to an evolutionary perspective. The argument must essentially be that various behaviors appear in human aggregates, some of which support or improve the viability of those aggregates and others that do not. Through "natural selection" those that contribute to system operation survive, and others are rejected. The same argument can be made for whole societies, whether in competition with other societies or simply in coping with the challenges of the nonhuman environment.

In the early explicit formulations of what came to be called "functional requisite analysis" this evolutionary assumption was not articulated. Rather, as
exemplified in Levy’s analysis, a society is essentially defined as a persistent and self-subsistent social system—that is, a system comprising a plurality of interacting individuals oriented primarily to the system, the individuals being at least in part sexually recruited, and the system being in principle self-sufficient for those individuals and capable of surviving beyond the life span of current individuals. Levy then proceeds to indicate the “requisite functions” for such a unit to exist and persist. The explanation of why societies exist at all requires certain stipulations regarding human nature and the relations between the organism and the nonhuman environment, which Levy incorporates as part of the explanation of the functional requisites.

Levy incorporates all of what I should call the bioeconomic requisites for system maintenance under the single rubric of “ provision for an adequate physiological relationship to the setting and for sexual recruitment.” He justifies this on grounds that the nonhuman environment, man’s biological nature, and the existence of other societies constitute aspects of the “setting” of human action. In a sense, therefore, they are given—data in the strict sense—though Levy does note that purely passive modes of adaptation are not to be expected and indeed are not possible if a society is to persist.

Because these relationships to the societal setting are not only analytically separable but also require concretely distinguishable patterns of action, their disaggregation as requisites seems sensible. Adequately motivated heterosexual copulation leading to reproduction is an evident requirement for persistence of the relevant population. And since the human infant at birth and for a considerable proportion of its life span thereafter is unable to sustain life unaided, reproductive behavior would simply result in total infant mortality without provision for care and nurturance. No society leaves either mating or infant care unregulated, and the cross-cultural variety of the relevant patterns precludes any reductionist assumption that the behavior is merely instinctual, “doing what comes naturally.”

Food supplies are obviously necessary for biological survival, and in some physical settings clothing and shelter are also. High mortality rates from starvation or exposure can of course be sustained if fertility rates (and survival rates at least until the age of reproductive capacity) are high enough to maintain the population in approximate balance. Negative population growth obviously must lead to extinction if not reversed. Positive population growth requires changing environmental parameters by territorial expansion, changing the diet and/or the technology of food acquisition, or sooner or later reaching limits requiring higher mortality. (Human populations, given the biological capacity for calculated, purposive action, are never limited to merely “natural” restraints on growth through starvation. Rules on who may mate and under what circumstances, contraception, induced abortion, and infanticide provide possible remedies for excessive increase. Many orthodox functionalists, if they attend to the “demographic equation” at all, favor such structures as intertribal warfare or rules on eligibility for mating that seem not to be explicitly intended or recognized as limiting growth. Truly latent functions—consequences of patterned action—of course exist, but it seems unwise to underestimate calculated conduct, even in nonmodern societies.

A further comment is necessary with respect to sustenance. In all societies there are consumers who are not producers: infants and young children certainly, and also those temporarily or permanently incapacitated, including the infirm aged, unless the disabled potential dependents are simply permitted to die from “natural causes”—that is, lack of food and protection from the elements. On the historical and ethnographic evidence, further task differentiation is virtually certain—at least on the basis of sex—and highly probable on the basis of genetic or trained differences in talents and skills. Thus effective sustenance must include patterns of distribution as well as production, and probably patterns of exchange.

The nonhuman environment also offers a number of uncertainties and threats. The inorganic ambience may produce droughts, winds, boat-engulfing waves, floods, earthquakes and tidal waves, or volcanic eruptions. If one of these natural disasters simply obliterates a population, no great insight is required to conclude that the system has not adequately coped with its setting. Lesser and recurrent dangers are likely to provoke preventive and palliative measures, representing a mixture of rational and magical behaviors according to the technological and organizational sophistication available. The nonhuman organic environment may offer threats from wild animals requiring evasion, mastery, or simply accepting the risk if the incidence of death is manageable. The ingestion of poisonous plants and animals is likely to lead to trial-and-error learning. Protection against unseen enemies such as microbes and viruses is likely to be magical in the absence of requisite knowledge, though again latent structures such as eating only cooked food and attaching negative magical properties to human wastes and the corpses of the dead give support to notions of mindless adaptation.

A threat from other societies may or may not exist in particular circumstances. Where it does, negotiation, actual or ritual exchange, or essentially military patterns are probable. Failure of these accommodative structures results either in the elimination of society by death of its members or their incorporation into another society, possibly as slaves or otherwise subordinated units.

The remainder of Levy’s functional requisites may be characterized as emergent social properties, less closely linked to mere biological survival than those just discussed. “Role differentiation and role assignment” rests upon at least the minimum task differentiation by age and sex, and the further importance of genetic variability in physical capacities and possibly in learning ability. Varieties of productive tasks must be performed, even at the simplest of technological levels, and supportive tasks in care for the unproductive. Randomness in task performance, even among those competent, yields only chaos. Any degree of specialization requires coordination in some form, with authority patterns being highly likely, particularly for any “emergency” task. Whether unequal rewards to induce crucially important and skilled or responsible performance are necessary remains theoretically in dispute, as we have discussed. They are factually universal.
Communication in the human species is mainly by way of symbolic language. The instruction of infants in the information requisite for participation in social interaction and the orderly and predictable conduct of interpersonal transactions depend in large measure upon language. In systems too large for each-to-every, face-to-face transactions, language provides the means for indirect communication throughout the system. (Other symbol systems, such as talking drums, essentially represent supplemental languages.) Simple signals, such as danger or food availability, may be "passed along" in other animal species, but symbolic language permits rather complex information, ideas, affective states, and value articulations to be shared. Learning a language permits not only a common understanding of what the symbols mean, but therefore "shared cognitive orientations" as to the perception of reality. This Levy adds as a further functional requisite, noting that not only common "definitions of the situation" are required to avoid endless, conflictual misunderstandings, but also common "explanations" for failures and uncertainties.

Next on Levy's list of functional requisites is "a shared articulated set of goals," but for reasons that will be discussed shortly, I believe that this system requisite is incorrectly placed in his sequence. Levy is essentially and correctly arguing that for any relatively (in principle, absolutely) self-sustaining aggregate within the human species, and beyond biological reproduction and "coping" with biological heredity, the nonhuman environment, and possibly other human aggregates, differentiation and consequent interdependence are intrinsic to the human condition. Yet nothing in human heredity would assure mutuality or care for infants and other physiological dependents. Purely self-serving action would assure Hobbes's war of all against all. Thus the first emergent property of human aggregates, requisite for their physical survival, comprises the elementary mechanisms of interdependence—communication and shared cognitive understandings. Mere cognitive commonalities, however, do not alleviate the probability of conflicting interests. Interdependence requires also, and crucially, rules governing interpersonal transactions; the approved, permitted, and prohibited forms of interpersonal and more complex transactions; the powers and duties, rights and responsibilities of interacting units. Thus the next emergent system property is that or order: rules, carrying effective negative sanctions if necessary, rendering social encounters in any and every differentiated context predictable.

Thus the fundamental social-system property of order (which of course has its counterpart in personality at the psychological level) comprises, in addition to role differentiation and role assignment, another five of Levy's requisites, which he chooses to distinguish: regulation of the choice of means, regulation of affective expression, adequate socialization, effective control of disruptive forms of behavior, and adequate institutionalization. Only two of these merit additional comment. The regulation of affective expression is a recognition of human emotionality, which is as firmly based in human genetics as is the capacity for cognition and rational calculation. This is a reality commonly neglected in rationalistic theories of social action and social systems. Similarly with respect to socialization, the process of incorporating infants (or other neophytes) into socially patterned behavior involves more than cognitive learning, including mere knowledge of the regulatory codes. Ideally, both norms and values are internalized and become the individual's conscience. (Freud's term superego adds nothing to our understanding.) Factually, any known society is marked by some overt deviance and some difficult to determine proportion of "external conformity"—that is, adherence to rules because of fear of negative sanctions. No social system could survive the discovery that no one accepted the rules as personally binding, as a matter of moral rightness. Systems may persist, of course, without a high degree of normative consensus, if one segment of the population controls the rest through force and fraud, terror and deceit. But the costs of extracting reluctant compliance, the representatives of any system of authority will seek to secure "legitimacy" and thus conscientious compliance.

We come then to the troubled question of goals and values. Here it is useful to make an initial distinction between distributive or "like" goals and those attaching to the collectivity as such, or "common" goals. Distributive goals, even if nearly consensually shared, do not assure order if one actor's goals are achieved at the expense of others or if the means for their achievement are not readily and uniformly available. This, once more, is the fatal defect in speculative systems comprised only of self-seeking participants. Shared distributive goals simply raise once more the problem of order. Ultimate goals, particularly those attaching to collectivities such as whole societies, present other questions. Here the argument for the necessity of ultimate values, of beliefs and ideals held not subject to question, is essentially one of logical inference. Ultimate values and collective goals provide the rationale, the final answer to a succession of querulous "whys," for the normative order. Granted that some rules of more administrative convenience may rely for their acceptance solely on that instrumental basis, and others that command moral allegiance rest, sooner or later in a possibly complex means-end chain, on ultimate virtues or collective welfare. The universality of nonrational bases for the legitimacy of any system for maintaining order, including the exercise of political authority, lends support to this argument. The argument as presented, however, rests on logical inference rather than inductive generalization.

The exact number of identifiable functional requisites distinguished is somewhat discretionary, since some may be subsumed under others—as I have just done with several of Levy's analytical distinctions, which he chose to make in order to highlight various nuances in a complex analysis; I have subdivided another one for the same reasons. Indeed, at that level I should add still another—namely, the maintenance of motivation. Early socialization cannot be assumed to endure indefinitely, particularly under changing circumstances, including the possible lack of reinforcement by the expectations of significant others. Maintenance of orderly compliance solely by resort to penalties for deviance is not essential to the inferential argument and certainly does not conform with observed reality. Positive rewards commonly ensue from normative compliance, and these constitute components of "social control" of generally greater efficacy than are repressive measures. The
universality of recreational patterns and other releases from routine suggest a motivation-maintaining outcome.

It is also important to note the tactical costs and benefits of the number of system properties analytically distinguishable as essential to continued operation, after one has started from some general axiom such as: "If human beings are to survive and reproduce their successors, they can do so only as participants in social systems." (Various human-nature stipulations, including individual mortality, infant incapacity, lack of complex instincts, capacity for learning, and calculated problem solving of course lie behind this axiom.) A fairly extensive elaboration of requisite system properties has the advantage of reminding the analyst to look for the patterns of action, the structures, that serve each need. There are two difficulties, two types of costs, involved in this tactic of disaggregation. The first is that the same kind of analytical distinctions made among functions are unlikely to be reflected precisely in differentiated structures, as observed. All concrete structures such as organized membership units are in some degree multifunctional, partly because they too have system properties that must be fulfilled. From a functional-requisite perspective, all structures thus become analytic structures. A somewhat cautious scientist, intending observational tests of a deductively derived set of predictive propositions, would surely suggest or perform observations on concrete structures to determine their actual consequences for the encompassing systems in which they are encountered.

The second difficulty with extensive enumeration of analytically distinguishable requisites is that their interdependence may obscure their more general properties. Thus, in Levy's list of requisites, it is impossible to discuss meaningfully "adequate institutionalization" without reference to "socialization," and conversely. The analysis being strictly at what we might roughly call the social interdependence-and-order level of system properties, as distinct from the bioeconomic requirements for survival, the order in which requisites are identified becomes arbitrary, and indeed the attempt to map the territory in detail may lead to distinctions without fundamental differences. For example, "adequate institutionalization" includes and encompasses "regulation of the choice of means," "regulation of affective expression," and "effective control of disruptive forms of behavior." To repeat, the only advantage in the more extended list is to alert the theorist or observer to aspects of structured behavior that might be otherwise neglected.

Parsons, expectably, consolidates various analytically distinguishable system requisites into fewer categories than does Levy. In a first attempt at stipulating what he called "the functional requisites of social systems,"104 Parsons acknowledged familiarity with the formulation of his former students105 but also acknowledged a radical departure from it. He starts with his tripartite division of individuals as organisms and personalities, the "interactive system" (that is, the social system narrowly identified), and the system of cultural patterning. For the individuals he specifies nutrition and physical safety and personality stability. From the individuals the system needs positive motivation for required performance and the avoidance of disruptive behavior, effected through socialization, but this is supplemented by institutionalized social control. For the cultural system Parsons specifies language, relevant empirical knowledge, and "sufficiently integrated patterns of expressive symbolism and of value orientation."106 He later adds "nonempirical existential ideas."109 Partial closure of his tripartite system is achieved by noting that culture becomes part of personality through internalization.

A substantially more orderly, and even diagrammatic, presentation of system requisites soon appeared in Parsons's work jointly with Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils110 and a little later in Economy and Society, written with Neil J. Smelser.111 The functional requisites are now grouped under four headings: Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration, and Latency. The concepts are moderately self-explanatory except for the bizarre term "latency," which turns out to comprise pattern maintenance and tension management. By the time of the relatively brief essay, "An Outline of the Social System,"112 latency has become simply pattern maintenance, with tension management being one set of mechanisms for that function. In his quest for abstraction through grouping, Parsons could go one step further, for at the level of generality at which he presents his argument, there is little merit in his distinction between pattern maintenance and integration.

Throughout his discussion of these functional requisites Parsons is punctilious in noting that exact correspondence between personality and the normative order and values attributed to the social system is unlikely; that deviance will occur; that conflicts (of both interests and ideologies) are an observed reality; thus, that norms and values themselves may not be fully integrated; and (less frequently) that change, for example in information levels, may be intrinsic to the system.

Certain advantages inher in the comparative analysis of societies in terms of functional requisites. One such advantage clearly is the provision of observational categories or standardized questions: how does the system under observation provide for socialization? for role assignment? for maintaining motivation? Aside from the awkward circumstance that a neat correspondence between a requisite outcome and a specifically differentiated pattern of action is unlikely, the answers to the questions provide the opportunity to record the interdependent structures of social systems in a comparable way across the wide spectrum of organizational forms and degrees of differentiations. If the answer to a standard question, after careful probing, is that there is no provision for a stipulated requirement, the rules of the game permit only one of two conclusions: either that requisite has been falsely alleged to be essential, or the patterns under observation do not constitute a society as defined—that is, do not qualify as a self-subsistent social system.

The specification of the requisites for any society might be regarded as merely an enumerative definition of society, but the stipulation that the system is self-subsistent makes of properties of any such system genuine theories of society: for example, any society will have the structural means for producing rules that govern standardized interpersonal or intergroup transactions.
It may be noted that the explication of the functional requisites, starting from human-nature assumptions or axioms and proceeding logically and expeditiously to the properties of social systems, constitutes a deductive theory, so much admired by Homans, and one attending to complex social reality that could not be derived from his psychological reductionism.

Derivation of the requisite system properties of any society has evolutionary implications only if one attempts to account for the survival of existing systems that closely approximate the model. The line of reasoning then becomes, if not the survival of the fittest, at least the survival of the relatively fit. In the vernacular expression, "They must be doing something right." More circumspectly, they must be doing things not fatally wrong. The term "natural selection" is an inviting one for a kind of process presuming wide variability in practices, some of which must have been lethal to systems in which they were adopted, leaving existing ones adequately adaptive.

Given the purposive, problem-solving orientation possible among human actors, no current social structure can be automatically assumed to have been created by purely random innovation, its successful persistence solely the consequence of chance avoidance of mindless forces of rigorous restraints on tolerable variation. The possibility of deliberate, even collective, problem solving and choice cannot be ruled out for any socially organized aggregate of the human species with approximately the same genetic capacity for "intelligence" that characterizes current representatives of the species. Written records attest to such deliberate actions in ancient civilizations. Not all of those policies now appear wise. The same can be said for executive, legislative, and judicial decisions in contemporary states. Societies dependent on oral traditions commonly attribute the origin of current practices to supernatural or at least superhuman figures in a vague and mythic past. (It has been suggested that it is the universal function of myths to account for meaningful uncertainties.) These qualms about the application of doctrines of biological evolution to human social systems are fundamental, but they have not dissuaded the perpetrators.

Durkheim, we have noted, inferentially accepted evolutionism in his quest for the most "elementary" forms of religion in the one society, among those on which information was available to him, with the most elementary techniques of acquiring food. More significantly, he contrasted a contemporary, differentiated society with a mythical (or rather, heuristic) primal aggregate bonded by the likeness of its members, and he attempted to account for increasing differentiation especially to pursue its systemic implications. His diachronic, or process, view of societies was not pursued by Durkheim, who became almost exclusively concerned with problems of interdependence and integration. The evolutionary perspective was essentially renounced by the anthropologists, who emphasized explanation of cultural or social traits and complexes in terms of current utilities, not in terms of origins.

Yet increasing differentiation became the basis for a persistent concern with "developmentalism," emphasizing orderly change in mainly orderly systems. Actually, as Szymon Chodak has shown, directional change by incremental units is consistent with two explanatory stances in the social sciences. One is evolutionary, with systemic change the consequence of unsuccessful adaptation to the exigencies of a harsh and competitive ambience. The other is more or less explicitly goal directed, concerned with such problem solving as the quest for individual and collective security and with such "progressive" changes as improvements in material well-being and other aspects of "modernization."

What might be called "evolutionary functionalism" was first made explicit by Parsons in an essay published in 1964. Here Parsons is less abstract with reference to requisite system properties, since he is attempting to stipulate the prerequisites for "sociocultural development" rather than systemic survival as such. These prerequisites he identifies as: (1) communication based on symbolic language, (2) kinship organization based on the incest taboo, (3) at least a rudimentary technology, and (4) religion. These constitute "evolutionary universals" in the human species that substantially increase generalized adaptive capacity, as compared with other species, in cushioning the impact of natural selection. Parsons notes, however, that the relative advantage of these systemic emergents is less in terms of survival than in terms of the potentiality for further major developments. These universals, the argument proceeds, constitute necessary (but apparently not sufficient) conditions for other system properties. In an intermediate "stage" of development Parsons identifies stratification beyond the ascriptive statuses inherent in primitive kinship systems and cultural legitimation through institutionalized agencies that are independent of a diffuse religious tradition. He then adds four further structural complexes that are fundamental to the distinctive features of modern societies, constituting thus his third "stage" of development: bureaucratic organization of collective goal attainment, money and market systems, generalized universalistic legal systems, and democratic associations with elective leadership to establish policy orientations.

Parsons appears to be curiously oblivious to, or unimpressed by, conventional historical interpretation and social evolutionary doctrine. Ancient historians underscore the discontinuity in those societies that accomplished the invention of settled agriculture and the consequent availability of food surpluses to support not only other forms of physical production but also occupationally distinct "professionals" (especially priests and healers), governors, and perhaps other service producers. There is no reason to question the accuracy of that interpretation. It is perhaps significant that Parsons does not pursue the significance of technology beyond the minimum stipulated as a survival requisite for any society.

The other major neglected discontinuity in developmental stages, deriving from earlier social evolutionist theories, is that marked by the invention of written language. In the conventional American academic division of labor that difference has been made the primary basis for the distinction between anthropology and sociology. Though we have earlier noted that the absence of written language does not necessarily mean total "simplicity" of social organization, there is no doubting the significance of writing in allowing
indirect communication without distortion by intermediaries, communication at a distance in time and space, reliable codification of rules despite possible turnover in those affected, and the assembly of reliable records as a supplement to human memory and as a protection against willful or merely nostalgic distortion of past events and circumstances. The neglect of these significant "developmental emergents" is made all the more puzzling by Parsons's final achievement of democracy. If intended as some sort of end point or climax in social development, it cannot fail to remind us of the ethnocentric interpretation of stages in social evolution among complacent late-Victorian scholars.

What Parsons does, in essentially his first attempt to deal with structural differences among societies, is to make a number of structural specifications much more precisely identified than those to be derived from his fourfold set of functional requisites. The way whereby those system-survival requisites are fulfilled distinguishes a limited number of classes of societies, with those in successive stages of development being marked by more highly differentiated, and thus somewhat more functionally specific, subsystems, displaying increasing autonomy within their specialized jurisdictions or spheres of competence.

Because of the central, and therefore controversial, position that Parsons has occupied in contemporary sociological theory for something over four decades, particularly as the expositor of the general properties of social systems, it is appropriate to note the changes evident in his recent work. Especially in the two relatively brief books elaborating his evolutionary classification of societies and the distinctive features of modern societies, Parsons has made some notable departures from the main emphases in his previous theoretical work. He has been frequently criticized for equating theory with a conceptual scheme, so that much of his work has been definitional and taxonomic rather than propositional. True, he occasionally dealt with less abstract and less general topics, such as the professions, American kinship, or political situations of current interest. Yet he gave little attention to the variability in the structural characteristics of whole societies until these more recent works, which thus feature more allegations of testable relations among variables as distinct from definitional distinctions among concepts.

A further notable departure is the explicit recognition—but only as a distinctive feature of modern societies—of organized goal setting, problem solving, and decision making. Parsons was always concerned with the motivated actor, and later with the intersections between the personality system and the sociocultural system. The (consensually held) ultimate values, the individual and societal goals requiring structures appropriate for their attainment, were more postulated than viewed as problematic and subject to contention and deliberate resolution. The structural mechanisms for collective goal setting now get explicit recognition and are interpreted as a kind of evolutionary emergent that permits further "development."

The evolutionary argument used by Parsons can be stated rather simply.

Increasing structural differentiation requires new principles and forms of integration. The consequence is an increased survival capacity of the differentiated system in relation to its environment. Now this conclusion is far from self-evident truth. That organic evolution is directional, from simple to complex, is also part of biological doctrine, but that too will not withstand inspection. Simple organisms do survive as a species, and some have a greater antiquity, with little or no change by the fossil record, than later and complex structures have yet had a chance to demonstrate. Meanwhile, many species of complex animal organisms have become extinct without the evil depredations of human beings.

What is true is that technological superiority (which includes highly rationalized organizations) possessed by modern complex societies imperils less developed ones and has in fact mainly put the latter in one form or another of dependency—thus increasing their distance from true self-subsistence. The cumulative, and avidly fostered, useful knowledge with respect to the nonhuman environment has led to increasing environmental "mastery" rather than passive adaptation. Even environmental influences not yet subject to control, such as physiographic disturbances in the earth's surface, climate, and weather, are the focus of calculated coping procedures. Rational control of fertility and mortality results in less wasteful reproductive patterns and less erratic mortality conditions from infectious and contagious diseases.

Yet the superiority of highly differentiated societies is not without costs and hazards. Differentiation obviously requires integration if system properties are to be maintained. No trouble-free mode of integration exists. Between the poles of consensual adherence to norms and values and the coercive regimentation of the many by the powerful few, both of which are ideal typical and not actual alternatives, there are various somewhat disorderly mixtures. Moreover, a high degree of interdependence with structural integration through centralization of essential controls (including power, money, and information) has a higher vulnerability to attack through destruction of its center than does a less fully integrated system.

Let us revert to the question of increasing differentiation, on which brief comments were made early in this essay. In his fullest discussion of his version of social evolution, Parsons seems to leave unexplained the initial emergence of differentiation beyond that biologically mandated by age and sex and that socially mandated by the universal incest taboo (which requires some differentiation between or within kinship systems). Once differentiation beyond kinship structures occurs (for whatever reason), it tends to be self-confirming, and may become self-expanding through the organization and institutionalization of change. Thus, after the emergence of what we may call "intermediate" differentiation, the process becomes the efficient cause of further development. In a later (1975) restatement of his evolutionary perspective, Parsons uses the analogy of genetic variability to assert that "some cultural values or norms arising in processes of social change do in fact become constitutive of concrete social structures, whereas others fail to do so."

The consequence for which he adduces this argument is with respect
to "institutionalization," and thus he misses differentiation as the process crucial to his explanatory system.

Although Parsons extended his evolutionary view of variability among societies to the common structural features of modern societies, he has not been primarily concerned with "modernization" as that term has come to stand for the contemporary transformation of "traditional" or "underdeveloped" countries in the direction of the economic and other structural features of high-technology national units. That focus of interest among the social sciences, mainly since the Second World War, began for the most part with economists and was phrased in terms of "economic growth" or "economic development." Within the framework of a neoclassical orientation to markets and profits, backward economies were seen as possible candidates for incremental growth through capital expansion. Past failures to achieve such growth could then be seen in terms of one or more relevant inadequacies: of savings or their mobilization, of rationalized impersonal markets, of technology, of entrepreneurship. Economic growth then became the agency, indeed the cause, of other structural transformations characteristic of "advanced" societies.

Other social scientists became involved in the conversation, partly through the agency of the Committee on Economic Growth, chaired by the eminent economist Simon Kuznets, under the auspices of the (American) Social Science Research Council. That committee, established in 1950, sponsored a wide-ranging series of interdisciplinary conferences, with the contributed papers subsequently edited for publication in a number of influential symposia. Later, UNESCO sponsored a series of regional conferences with a similar format.

Anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists explored the cultural and structural sources of "underdevelopment" or "backwardness," often in terms of the functional integration of traditional societies, which included the lack of improvement-oriented values. Attention was also turned to the sociocultural conditions, immediate concomitants, and less closely linked structural consequences of economic rationalization or industrialization (commonly used in a fairly broad sense). This focus on the prospects for developmental change seemed appropriate in view of the unmistakable facts that the political spokesmen for virtually every one of what the United Nations came to call the Less Developed Countries articulated goals of economic growth and other forms of modernization, and that, given the opportunity, people everywhere clearly did not let their traditional cultural values inhibit their desire for improved conditions of material well-being. (The economists appeared to be right all along in their assumptions concerning hedonic motivations, at least at the level of creature comforts, including health and longevity. Anthropologists and sociologists found their emphasis on cultural differences slightly tainted.)

The use of the term "modernization" symbolized the participation of social scientists besides economists in analyzing the general characteristics of modernity. Although economic development, including industrialization in the narrow sense of manufacturing, was taken to be a prime ingredient of modernity, wide-ranging structural features that set modernized societies apart from traditional or less developed ones were explored. Thus, modernized societies are characterized by such structural features as formal systems of graded education; mobile nuclear families, with extended kinship relatively weak and discretionary; political systems capable of mobilizing diverse and often divisive populations toward programmed change; modes of social participation in specialized associations, furthering shared economic or political interests or simply shared recreational and expressive activities; social placement and mobility closely linked to occupation; extensive reliance on formal modes of social control such as law enforcement and bureaucratic regulations rather than the customs of kinship organizations and communities.

These and other structural characteristics may be taken as an enumerative definition of modernity, with societies sharing those characteristics considered modernized. The contrast between that class of societies and others has led to a curious scholarly convention. That convention is to use, more often than not implicitly, a three-stage model of modernization. Stage one is the functionally integrated and therefore relatively static traditional society; stage two comprises the transitional processes of structural alteration in the direction of modernity; stage three is the functionally integrated fully, or at least "highly," modernized society. What I have called the "model modernized society" thus becomes the destination toward which the "newly modernizing societies" are moving or seeking to do so through deliberate programs of change.

The neglect of the documented differences among so-called traditional societies is perhaps not a fatal defect if their commonalities are such as to make the recipe for modernization a standard one. In view of differing histories and current states, that could scarcely be the situation. The actual course of transition has received remarkably little attention, as the mode of analysis has been that of comparative statics—before-and-after comparisons—rather than factually based sequential models of structural change. And the common destination presents grave problems of both factual and theoretical import. Those problems must now be clarified.

The "model modernized society" rests upon two assumptions: that all industrial or highly modernized societies have sufficient structural commonalities to be treated as a class or type, and that such conspicuous (or subtle) differences as remain are either relatively unimportant or anachronistic. What has come to be called "convergence theory" argues that members of the modernized class are on courses of change that will eventually eliminate their remaining significant differences. Since convergence theory is the actual source of what passes for modernization theory, this sophisticated form of functional teleology warrants close examination.

Several years ago I argued that crucial differences were likely to remain, noting particularly the political (as distinct from the merely administrative) structure of the national state. I noted genuine differences in political ideologies and the bases for the claimed legitimacy whereby the governors govern. These differences are compounded by different historic paths to the present, leaving unresolved residual tensions requiring management, and the
functional utility of nationalism—buttressed by the doctrine of national sovereignty—as a collective value for differentiated and often conflictual populations. Of course under imaginable but not highly probable conditions of common crisis or an imposed singular world state through conquest, the exigencies of the world political system might lead to convergence of a rather different sort than any of the less drastic courses of change now evident. (Of course the world does constitute a singular, if disorderly, system from some points of view. The growing factual interdependence and abrasive interaction among national states puts increasing strains on the model of societies as self-subsistent systems.)

More recently it has seemed to me that the processes called modernization are best viewed as forms of rationalization of social structures. These processes include monetization and commercialization of exchange, together with ledgered accounting, credits and debts; technification in the restricted sense of applying useful knowledge from physics, chemistry, and biology in physical production, transportation, communication, health services, and a myriad of other contexts; bureaucratization as a highly rationalized form of integration of specialized tasks; formalization of legal codes and procedures; and even a considerable, but still limited, degree of secularization with respect to conventional values and beliefs.

The limits to secularization are symptomatic of the limits to rationalization generally. In addition to the inescapable significance of human emotion and of affective patterns of interaction, there are collective or system-oriented limits to rationality. Rationality describes a calculated choice of effective means for given ends but is not the basis for the ends pursued. Except where the goal is intermediate and thus an appropriate means for some higher or at least subsequent goal, rational action or rationalized systems of action cannot determine the goals sought. Bureaucratic organization lends itself at least as well to warfare or internal repression as it does to producing cars or distributing welfare benefits. Max Weber's rational-legal basis for political legitimacy cannot stand on the same footing of ultimacy as his traditional and charismatic types. This correct perception has been developed by Heinz Hartmann.

We come then by this indirect route to a rediscovery of the importance of collective values and goal orientations in viable social systems. Those systems, however, are no longer self-equilibrating entities but rather systems in constant disequilibrium because of deliberate change, unintended consequences of change, and the very unequal susceptibility of segments of conventionalized behavior to the master process of rationalization.

Of course much of functionalism survives. This is especially noteworthy in the systems perspective, whereby structurally differentiated parts provide a substantial degree of determination of other (but not all) parts. It is also true of functional requisite analysis, which leads to some structural universals (such as the nuclear family—not discussed in this essay—or magic, myths, and rites de passage) and otherwise leads only to a tolerable range of expected consequences out of some combination of patterned behavior. The neoevolutionary perspective either yields a kind of mindless adaptation with trial-and-error acceptance of innovations that have useful emergent properties, or the emergence of institutionalized change, which makes the continued use of the evolutionary model of change highly dubious. Modernization is the first truly global process of structural change, and it is producing a world quasi-system of a complexity so far beyond the small, self-subsistent tribal group as to require theoretical models of a different, and not yet visible, order.

Much remains to be done by way of what might be called conventional comparative structural analysis, though at increasing risk of making erroneous assumptions about the stability of structures observed at a particular time that may in fact be in rapid transition. Comparative dynamics offers somewhat greater challenges for both conceptualizing and measuring sequential systems. (The refinements of measurement used in sociology are almost entirely sophisticated forms of atemporal correlations and might be said to be what static functionalism deserved.) Of course, through the discretionary division of labor within disciplines, many if not most sociologists may choose to work on small fields of observation with tidy techniques of testing hypotheses. Meanwhile, as the gross structural features of social life on this planet are likely to continue in rapid transition verging on turmoil, the challenge to those scholars who will not abandon a macrosociological focus will require innovative intelligence of a high order.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Jonathan H. Turner, The Structure of Sociological Theory (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1974).


49. Durkheim, *Division of Labor*, book one, chap. 3.
51. See Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions."
52. Ibid., pp. 30-32
54. On Spencer, see ibid., pp. 50-42.
60. In addition to ibid., see the discussion by Parsons in *The Structure of Social Action*, pp. 309, 318-19, 402-3.
64. Ibid., p. 27.
70. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, pp. 71-82.
72. Davis and Moore, *Some Principles of Stratification.*


104. Ibid., pp. 151-57.


107. Aberle and others, "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society."

108. Parsons, The Social System, p. 34.

109. Ibid., p. 35.


111. Parsons and Smelser, Economy and Society.


113. Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology."


115. Durkheim, Division of Labor.


118. Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives; and Parsons, The System of Modern Societies.


126. Moore, "Modernization as Rationalization."

127. Moore, "The Singular and the Plural."

128. Ibid.


130. Moore, "Modernization as Rationalization."