sciences" should be *verstehen* (understanding). One could not explain social processes by abstract laws, but must get inside the subjective viewpoint of the actor, and see the world as he or she sees it, in order to capture their motivation.

These are two pieces of evidence that Weber was really an idealist, or at least tried to give ideas as much influence as possible even in the material world. For Weber never let go of the hard material realities surrounding people. There is another type of "idealistic" theme that can be found in Weber, however. He was often concerned with the rationalization of various institutions: the development of an abstract, means-end calculation. He described modern capitalism as the rationalized economy, bureaucracy as the rationalized organization, the modern state as based on the formal procedures and rules of rational-legal authority. He even argued that what is distinctive about European music since about the time of Bach is that it rationalized the musical scale, turning music into a kind of abstract mathematics. Thus, some commentators, especially recent German ones such as Friedrich Tenbruck, Jurgen Habermas, and Wolfgang Schluchter have claimed that the trend towards rationalization is Weber's master theme of world history. If Weber's *verstehen* method and his emphasis on religious ideas is a version of the idealism of Kant or the "human science" of Wilhelm Dilthey, this world history of rationalization makes Weber sound like a modern heir to Hegel.

The central reality of Weber, though, was that above all he saw the world as *multidimensional*. He gave all factors their due, striving hard to be neither a one-sided idealist nor a materialist. Rationalization, which he certainly saw as a major trend in recent centuries in the West, he nevertheless did not worship in the manner of Parsons and some of Weber's recent German interpreters. Rationalization for Weber was a two-sided sword, simultaneously an increase in formal procedures *and* an undermining of substantive human capability for consciously achieving one's goals.

Weber above all was detached, aware of the distorting possibility of value judgments and biased interests coming from many different directions. His multidimensional perspective made him *fundamentally* a conflict theorist. For conflict is not merely just one more factor among others, it is an expression of the very multidimensionality of things, the plurality of different groups, interests, and perspectives that make up the world. Ultimately the world does *not* hold together as one great social or metaphysical unity. Though there is consensus and solidarity inside some components of society, the whole thing is a mixture of contending parts. This is one important reason, besides the specific things that Weber learned from the Marxians/Engelsians, why Weber had such a fundamental effect in shaping the entire subsequent conflict tradition in sociology. Weber not only saw that there are multiple spheres, but also that there is a struggle for domination going on inside each one. Economics for Weber is a class struggle, though of a more complicated sort than Marx and Engels had seen. Politics is yet another realm of struggle, both among contending political interests and between the politicians and the economic classes. Even the world of ideas is divided among its own interest groups. Religions, for example, have their own internal struggles—based on the social organization of the church itself—that divide professional theologians from the "church politicians" and these in turn from the pious followers. Even where Weber seems to be defending the autonomous influence of ideas, he contributes what may be seen as a sophisticated development of the theory of ideology.

Weber consequently saw history as a messy, multiple-sided process of conflict on many fronts. He was an enemy of simplified notions of evolutionary stages or other neat patterns that theorists tried to impose on the complexities of historical reality. For this reason alone, one has to doubt whether he really thought rationalization was the "master trend" of history. Was Weber, then, an historicist, a believer in the doctrine that there are no general laws, only the endless unfolding of historical particulars, with the principles of each era differing from the next? Often Weber sounded like this, especially early in his career when he was writing methodological pronouncements. This would seem to make sociology impossible, at least as generalizing science. But Weber actually left a way out. He subordinated sociology to the task of showing the elements out of which history is made. For this purpose he created *ideal*

types, abstract models of bureaucracy, class, markets, and so forth, that could capture an aspect of the complex historical reality, always keeping in mind that several different ideal types would have to be applied at once to capture the various sides of things.

These ideal types have become the germs of post-Weberian sociology. Each one is a kind of encapsulated theory, much in the same way that the chemical table of elements is a theory of how molecules are put together. Weber denied that there were laws for the overall pattern of history. How that went depended on just which combinations of "molecules" were put together in each case. But these social "molecules" have turned out to be quite structured and lawful on their own level, and they have given rise to theories of classes, organizations, and the like, to give a real content to Weberian conflict theory.

Weber's famous three-dimensional model of stratification is as close as one can find to a key for his complicated system. His American translators, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, introduced this under the terms: class, status, and party. All of these are kinds of interest groups that can fight both among themselves and against each other. They are also connected to each other, and each describes a particular realm about which Weber had a theory.

Class, for Weber, was the same realm Marx and Engels were talking about. One might say then that Weber incorporated Marx and Engels's sociology as one element in his system. In doing so he changed their model. Class conflict for Weber is more complicated than it was in Marx and Engels. They dealt mainly (in their theoretical writings at any rate) with the conflict of capitalist and worker, the owner of the means of production versus the producer of labor. Weber elaborated this to add conflict of finance capitalists (whom Marx described in the 1848 revolution in France) against borrowers of capital, and also the battle of sellers versus consumers. This scheme was pointed up more recently by Norbert Wiley to show that American politics has indeed been full of class conflict; although the capitalist/worker battle has been less apparent, the debtor/creditor battle dominated the farm-based politics of the

1800s, and the racial uprising of the 1960s involved consumers attacking ghetto merchants. For Weber class conflict is a three-ring circus.

Weber's class conflict differs from Marx's in a further and more crucial way. Marx's classes are defined by ownership or nonownership of the means of production. Weber's classes are defined by their position on a market. Recent Marxian theorists, reacting against Weber, have criticized his scheme as putting stratification on the superficial level of economic circulation rather than the basic level of economic production. Nevertheless I would say that this is a strength of Weber rather than a weakness. For Marx's scheme attaches classes to his theory of economics—which is the part of the Marx/Engels system that has proven least realistic as a guide to historical change. Changes in the means of production or in the ownership of them do not follow the path that Marx had set forth, neither since his day nor even in the history that went before. Moreover I think that Marx and Engels tacitly acknowledged this whenever they wrote the actual history of some political event such as the French Revolution of 1848. In those cases they always dealt with many more classes than the owners of production versus the workers. In fact the action always centered on the intermediate classes and on various complicated splits in the upper classes: the financiers and landowners (whom Weber would point out were likely to be a class of debtors) as well as the large and small industrialists.

Weber built his class theory on economic conflicts where they are most real: a struggle to control a place on some market. For Weber, monopoly is not simply something that emerges at a late stage of capitalism. It is a fundamental process found throughout its history. Social classes are based on different ways of trying to gain control over particular markets: money and credit, land, various manufacturing industries, various labor skills. This both gives a more realistic picture of class conflict as it actually happens, and also provides a general theoretical conception of the process of stratification. The dominant classes are those who manage to achieve a tight monopoly on some lucrative market; less dominant classes get only partial monopolies or monopolies in less desirable kinds

of markets. Classes who achieve no monopoly at all and are forced to compete on the open market are subject to its leveling forces.

We come now to Weber's second stratification category, *status groups*. These are usually understood as the opposite of economic class stratification. Whereas classes are based on cold economic considerations—the grouping of similar interests by virtue of similar market positions—status groups are supposed to be in the realm of culture. They are not mere statistical categories but real communities, people with a common lifestyle and viewpoint of the world, people who identify with one another as belonging to a group. This makes us think of ethnic groups, races, religious groups, small-town communities, urban neighborhoods: groups that tend to deny social class or to cut across class boundaries. But in fact there is a deeper connection between class and status group. Remember: classes are groups that share a particular degree of monopolization on some market. They do this by becoming organized, by forming a community, acquiring a consciousness through some legal or cultural barriers around themselves—in short by becoming status groups.

Any successful, dominant class must become organized as a status group. In fact historically this has always been the case. Marx and Engels' historical ruling classes were organized legally and culturally to keep control of property within their own ranks. The Medieval landowners did not just hold land and exploit serfs; they did this by becoming the noble Estate, with their requirements of hereditary pedigrees, their chivalrous manners, their knightly style of life, which prevented them from getting their hands dirty with anything other than blood. In India, occupational groups went even further and turned into castes, avoiding each other as ritually polluting—justifying their avoidance by a religious doctrine of past karma and future reincarnation. From the Marxian viewpoint, these classes were simply cloaking themselves in ideologies. Weber's theory agrees with this but with the added proviso: the ideological or cultural side is absolutely necessary for a group to become more than merely a set of persons with the same economic position, a real social community. Moreover the status group reacts back upon the economic situation: it is the way the group becomes powerful enough to monopolize the desirable part of a market, instead of merely competing on equal terms within it. Status-group organization is an economic weapon.

For this reason, status groups are not noneconomic. Their very lifestyle and outlook depend on their economic resources and their position in society. The nobles' castles, along with their horses and costumes, were only possible because of their wealth. In the modern equivalent, the upper class puts on debutante balls and contributes to symphony concerts and art museums as a process of turning economic capital into cultural capital, as Bourdieu calls it. Even their religious propensities are affected by their class position. Weber pointed out in a comparative analysis that the higher social classes always prefer a dignified religion, full of stately ceremonial but not calling for too much personal commitment; the striving middle classes prefer an ascetic, moralistic religion that bolsters their respectability and motivates them to work hard; and the lower classes treat religion as a form of magic, supernatural interventions to bring good fortune and strike down one's enemies. These different cultural outlooks can make higher and lower status groups seem like alien beings to each other. They also help to cloak the economic basis underneath. This is especially true because a dominant group that has become organized as a status group always idealizes itself and claims that it is different not because of its wealth or power, but because of its greater nobility, its honor, its politeness and artistic taste, its technical skills, or whatever the prevailing status ideology happens to be.

Possessing this kind of status ideology in turn makes it easier for the group members to monopolize economic positions. Outsiders can be excluded and competition limited automatically because only persons who seem like "the right kind" are allowed into the preferred positions. The type of status ideology can shift from time to time, but there is always some process of this sort operating. Although the proliferation of educational credentials was not yet very great in Weber's day, he saw that they were creating modern status groups that

served to monopolize the more lucrative occupational positions. The growth of the modern "professions" shows how much our work force has become permeated by these kinds of monopolies. Doctors, after all, are really just engaged in a form of specialized labor, but they have cut themselves off from the rest of the working class by building an elaborate occupational culture buttressed by educational degrees and state-licensing requirements to monopolize medical knowledge. In effect they have built a lucrative monopoly on the dispensing of drugs by maneuvering politically to be sure that medical drugs are not sold on the open market. The same type of analysis may be made in many other modern occupational spheres.

One key development Weber evolved from the Marxian theory of classes, then, is that economic struggle is much more multisided than Marx had shown. Classes become subdivided into status groups and gain control of particular sectors of economic markets. A secondary market for status attributes arises, and this tends to blur over the primary economic lines. But the economic struggles go on underneath nevertheless. They are less easy to see, but they remain the skeleton inside the system.

Finally *parties* or power groups: here Weber points to yet another realm of struggle, among political factions. He asserts that politicians and their maneuvers are not simply reducible to the struggles of economic classes or even of status groups because they have interests of their own. This sounds anti-Marxian, a claim that class struggle isn't everything. But in fact Marx and Engels were not so far away in their actual sociology. Recall that in addition to the various classes fighting it out in their revolutionary scenarios, they also pointed to political groups per se: the army and the bureaucrats in 1848 France, the Emperor versus the princes versus the knights in Reformation Germany. These were real interest-group struggles, and although these groups allied with different class factions, they were not reducible to them.

But political factions are not an inexplicable epiphenomenon, a "superstructure" spun free into the realm of indeterminacy. They are organized groups, in a different sphere than classes but nevertheless on the same footing with them. As Weber put it, parties live "in the house of power": in other

words they inhabit the state. Now the state is an organization; indeed Weber's analysis of the state gave rise to his theory of bureaucracy and, hence, to the modern sociology of organizations. But an organization is a real material thing—at least if it is to have any permanence, it must acquire property, land, buildings, weapons, claims of sources of income to feed its own members, and so on. Every state has its economy. (Incidentally, Weber said the same thing about every church: as soon as it stops being merely a charismatic sect and starts taking on some permanent leaders, it acquires property and becomes transformed into an economic entity.) Hence, political factions have their own economic interests: the power and wealth of their own organization, the state itself. The same thing can also apply within smaller political organizations such as a political party: its official staff acquires an interest in the prosperity of the organization itself because it is where they make their careers.

It follows that political factions, living in "the house of power," are living in a real house, alongside other organizations of business, finance, and the rest of the class realm. What is distinctive about the state is not the ultimate interests of its members, but its unique weapons. The state is armed and, hence, can dominate all other organizations. Marx and Engels already saw this, in the implication that the force of the state upholds the system of economic property. The state needs to invest in arms and in troops and in police to wield them; the extensive state apparatus of bureaucrats, tax collectors, law courts, and the like, arose to maintain and supply these forces. But this creates a distinctive economic problem for the state: its own fiscal problems. States also have their distinctive enemies: namely, each other. States and their leaders vie over power in the international arena and in its offshoot, national prestige. It is these conflicts above all that increase the power of some states while threatening the power of others. But even militarily successful states risk economic troubles owing to the costs of their armies. The modern conflict analysis of revolutions, as we will see, places considerable emphasis on this kind of economic-and-military strain in the state.

The state also has another crucial weapon: legitimacy. This

is an aspect of the cultural and emotional realm. In Marx and Engels's terms, the state is the great engine for generating ideology; in Weber's terminology, the successful state makes most people within its borders feel they are members of a single status group, the nation. There are various ways in which legitimacy can be generated: Weber enumerated the charisma of forceful leaders, the tradition of hereditary arrangements, and the rational-legal authority of constitutional law. Each of these rests upon a certain material and organizational base. Legitimacy does not just come out of nowhere; it is produced, and the various kinds of organization that produce it might well be called another aspect of means of mental production (or what I have more recently called the "means of emotional production.") Recent neo-Marxian analysis has picked this up. For example, the German theorist Jurgen Habermas has claimed that the revolutionary struggle of the modern state occurs not because of economic crisis, but because of a "legitimacy crisis." A more economic analysis was given by the American James O'Connor, who argues that the modern "fiscal crisis of the state"—the galloping situation of government debt, escalating taxes, inflation—is due to the way the state tries to buy legitimacy by providing welfare services at the same time that it is being milked by the monopoly sector of the economy. Both Habermas and O'Connor illustrate the way modern Marxian theories of the state have drifted in a Weberian direction.

The Twentieth Century Intermingles Marxian and Weberian Ideas

Weber deserves to be named as the individual who set off modern conflict sociology. Not that Engels and Marx were not more fundamental, but for them sociology was buried in politics and (especially for Marx) in economics and philosophy. Weber, although an economist and a lawyer by academic training, nevertheless helped found the German Sociological Association and identified his own work as sociological. Furthermore Weber's comprehensive efforts to lay out all the factors that would go into understanding the development of capitalism set the contours of the field. In the generations after

Weber, sociology became much more directly empirical, relying not only on historical comparisons, but also on systematic research efforts to gather new data. The historical and comparative data—which are of course empirical, too, though collected in a different way—have come to be treated in a more explicitly theory-building and theory-testing way than Weber himself treated them. His pioneering efforts and his ideal types provided the nucleus of concepts and theories that were fleshed out by subsequent research and of course transformed as our theoretical viewpoints continued to develop.

Politically, of course, Marxism has maintained a distinctive identity throughout the twentieth century. This has obscured the fact that *intellectually* the conflict tradition, common to both Marx and Weber, has gone on from both of them and that there has been a great deal of crisscrossing between the lines. We even see this in the young generation that followed right after Weber. One of the intellectuals that frequented Weber's salon at Heidelberg was a young Hungarian Marxist, Georg Lukács, whom Weber greatly respected despite their disagreements. Lukács, like his Italian counterpart Antonio Gramsci, bucked the tide of Marxian economism and materialism and developed a Hegelian account of class conflict that emphasized the "false consciousness" of the higher social classes. In Lukács's view, the higher social classes were more alienated from reality and from true human essence than the oppressed lower classes because they purveyed the reified ideology of the permanence of the capitalist order. How much Weber influenced Lukács's ideas is not clear, but it does illustrate the way in which Marxians and Weberians were already part of the same intellectual circle.

Another instance of this intermingling is the development of sociology at Frankfurt. There the so-called "Frankfurt School" of Marxists, led by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, had a research institute endowed by a wealthy supporter (again the material means of mental production). Adorno's ideas went in the direction of Lukács' philosophy of alienation and reification, whereas Horkheimer brought in Freudian theories to synthesize with Marx. Another member of the school was Herbert Marcuse, who took both of these

themes and fashioned a critique of capitalist culture that later served as a rallying cry for the radical wing of the student movement in the 1960s. A more materialist form of Marxism was produced by Karl Wittfogel, who tried to show that China and other forms of "Oriental Despotism" were distinctive because of their own economic base. In Wittfogel's view, they were "hydraulic civilizations," based not on the private landed property of an aristocracy or slave owners, but on irrigation works built by the state. Hence, the state itself was the key economic entity in the Orient and private classes did not strongly develop. Here again we see that the Marx/Engels scheme was not simply a finished set of stages, but an incentive to understand the variety of societies in world history by the variety of economic factors. And it fits with the point just made above that the state itself must be seen as an economic entity in its own right.

ORGANIZATIONS AS POWER STRUGGLES

One of the most influential lines of analysis that came out of Frankfurt was more directly a confrontation and synthesis of the Weberian and Marxian approaches. At the University of Frankfurt—not the Marxian institute for social research—the chair of sociology was held by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim became famous in 1929 with his book *Ideology and Utopia*, a work that turned the Marxist theory of ideology against the Marxists themselves. If conservative ideologies represent the interests of the dominant class, the political claims of the working class are equally ideological and take the form of utopias. Even more important for the development of conflict sociology was a Weberian theme that Mannheim developed in his next book, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, written in exile from the Nazis in 1935. Following Weber, Mannheim pointed out that organizations can operate by two different types of rationality. There is *substantial rationality*: the human insight into how certain means lead to certain ends. This is the kind of rationality that we usually exalt, that is supposed to be the hallmark of our unsuperstitious, scientific, professionalized era. But there is a second type of rationality that has become even more

prominent: the *functional* (or *formal*) *rationality* of bureaucratic organizations. Here rationality becomes the following of rules and regulations, going by the book, which is supposed to cover comprehensively the most efficient way to function.

The formal type of rationality tends to undercut the substantial type. As we have become more enlightened and scientifically expert, we have embodied our expertise in massive organizations that no longer think in a human way, but merely follow general procedures. The organization develops an inertia of its own and slips out of human control. Mannheim had in mind the military arms races carried on by government bureaucracies from the beginning of the twentieth century—a pattern we still see today, but with the added awesome threat of total annihilation in nuclear war. This was a pattern that Mannheim had already discerned in the buildups that had led to World War I. It was a war no one wanted, but once a minor crisis in the Balkans in 1914 set the machines in motion, there was no way to hold back mobilization and countermobilization until the entire world had escalated into an extremely destructive war. Mannheim asserted that the same process held in the civilian sphere as well. The formal rationality of capitalism in the search of profits nevertheless led to no one looking out for the substantial rationality of the whole economic system. Rationality on one level coincided with irrationality on another level, precipitating an economic depression that could not be controlled. Mannheim argued that Fascism—an antimodernist and antirational ideology—was, thus, not merely a bizarre aberration, but a reaction to the deeper lack of rationality in the world of impersonal modern organizations. Fascism asserted the power of the human leader—exalting a Hitler or a Mussolini—as an antidote to the faceless efficiencies and larger irrationalities of the bureaucrats.

Hans Gerth, a student at Frankfurt, brought Mannheim's message to America. As a professor at the University of Wisconsin, he collaborated with the young C. Wright Mills in a series of books. They attempted to synthesize Freud (an approach the Frankfurt Marxists were using) as well as George Herbert Mead with Weber in their *Character and Social Structure*. In 1946, they brought out the most influential collection of

Weber's writings, the famous Gerth and Mills edition, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. This brought attention to Weber's stratification theory under the title of "Class, Status, and Party" as well as to his theory of bureaucracy. In general Gerth and Mills stressed Weber as a conflict theorist, counteracting the image given by the earlier translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* brought out by Talcott Parsons. Over the next 20 years, a struggle went on over which side would appropriate and define the meaning of Weber for American sociology. Parsons and his collaborators brought out Weber's abstract definitions of capitalism (which stressed its rationality) and then his writings on law and on religion, whereas Gerth and his colleagues countered this idealist image of Weber by bringing out his more fully rounded historical studies.

During the 1950s, the conservative mood dominated American sociology. Talcott Parsons and other functionalists produced abstract categorizations of social institutions, everywhere finding a benign function contributing to maintaining the social order. Conflict sociology was not dead, but it was scarcely noticed. It was, however, making progress on the empirical front, racking up studies of power politics in organizations and charting the realities of stratification. Virtually the only loud voice upholding the insights of the conflict tradition was C. Wright Mills. These were the days of rabid anticommunism in American politics, led by right-wing witch-hunters such as Senator Joe McCarthy, but the mood in a less extreme form was shared by virtually everyone. Liberal academics were afraid to use the word "Marx" in public, and they denounced anyone who had a critical stance lest they themselves arouse the ire of the right-wingers, whom most people felt could easily turn into Nazis. Thus, Mills acquired a reputation for being an extreme leftist. It was not quite accurate. C. Wright Mills was simply an individual of considerable personal courage who wrote clearly and did not mind being a minority because of his sharp criticism of the prevailing trends of his discipline.

Mills's theory was actually an application of that of Mannheim and, hence, of Weber. His most famous book, *The Power Elite* (1956), argued that America was not under the control of

individual decision makers—that is, elected officials—but was actually controlled by three massive, bureaucratic organizations. These were the corporate business establishment, the military bureaucracy of the Pentagon, and the bureaucrats of the federal government. One can see the Weberian theme: Marx's capitalists are there, but they are only one part of a larger concatenation of power groups, in which the state (Weber's realm of "party," "the dwellers in the house of power") is importantly represented. Mills also discusses the elite status groups, "high society" and the Hollywood-style celebrities, though he claims that these are more of an offshoot or camouflage for the real power centers. The key point is a variant on Mannheim's: the policy of the United States at the highest level is not really set by any substantively rational, thinking human being and the voters do not exercise control through the mechanisms of democracy. The real forces in control are the huge bureaucracies, following their own logic of self-aggrandizement. Mills argued that the short-run self-interest of the capitalist establishment had become meshed with the interest of the Pentagon bureaucrats in expanding the military arms race. The flow of elite personnel back and forth between top positions in corporate business, the military, and the top federal bureaucracy cemented this structural convergence. All three sectors were drifting out of control and in the same direction. Mills feared it was leading directly towards World War III.

Today a good deal of what Mills pointed out remains equally true and equally frightening. The personnel of presidents, generals, and cabinet officials changes, but most administrations, both Republican and Democrat, seem equally unable to disengage themselves from the drift of the war machine. Nevertheless we have learned about some countervailing forces. The machine drifts out of control but that is only one tendency among several. Wars and nuclear confrontations have happened, but we have not yet entirely gone over the brink. One of these countervailing forces was pointed out by a theorist we have noticed earlier. James O'Connor pointed out that the modern state has undergone a fiscal crisis, which is due in part to the economic strains of the same military-industrial complex that Mills talked about. It is

true that to some extent the military arms buildup spurs the capitalist economy, but this is more important at some times than at others. It also contributes to burgeoning government costs; hence, periodically we become involved in efforts to adjust to the economic strain by cutting back.

Another shortcoming of Mills's viewpoint is that it considered the United States in isolation, as one capitalist/bureaucratic complex in itself. We have subsequently begun to pay more attention to the larger world system and to discover some of the laws by which it operates. There is a larger geopolitics of military expansion and contraction, involving all states and not fueled merely by one of them. One version of this larger viewpoint, enunciated by Immanuel Wallerstein, argues that large-scale "turning-point" wars (i.e., those that shift the balance of power in the world system) happen only at a certain point in the long-term world-economy cycle. The realignments of the entire period of 1914–1945—including both World War I and World War II as parts of the same larger world convulsion—are matched by the similar 30 years of war between the French Revolution of 1789 and the downfall on Napoleon in 1815, or the earlier decline of the Spanish power in Europe in the Counter Reformation wars of 1618–1648. By this logic, Wallerstein predicts that our smaller wars are not structurally due to escalate into a truly global war until some time in the twenty-first century.

Let us return for a moment to the development of the conflict sociology of organizations. Mannheim and Mills helped develop this by applying an aspect of Weber's theory of bureaucracy. For another important aspect, we need to go back to Weber's own day. One of Weber's protégés was a young Marxist socialist named Robert Michels. Because of his political beliefs, Michels was denied a position in the German academic world, although Weber crusaded on his behalf. But Michels was already turning cynical. He was thoroughly familiar with the Marxist party of his day, the Social Democrats with their elaborate bureaucracy based on trade unions and their officials. On this organization, Michels trained an eye opened by Weber's notion of political conflicts in their own right. He noted that leaders of an organization are locked in an implicit

struggle for power with their own followers: inside every organization there is a kind of miniclass struggle. Just as the small upper class in the economic system is able to dominate the much larger but unmobilized lower classes, the organizational elite is able to get its way, though outnumbered, by its followers because it, too, is much better mobilized. The organization should be seen as a political environment in which internal power struggles are won by those who control the material means of administration. This is a development of the Marx/Engels theory of political mobilization and of the means of mental production. The elite controls the organizational machinery for intercommunicating among themselves and also for defining reality to its members. The members of the elite, too, tend to identify the interests of the organization with their own career interests. Whatever makes the organization safe, secure, and wealthy, benefits its leaders, who thereby derive prominent and cushy jobs. This is another reason for the "organizational drift" that Mannheim discerned. Leaders become attached to the status quo; they compromise with their environment and do whatever they feel is necessary just to keep the organization surviving, no matter how far it takes the organization from the official ideals for which it was set up.

Michels' theory laid the basis for a series of empirical studies of organizations in the 1940s and 1950s. Philip Selznick showed how the same process of organizational "goal displacement" Michels had found in the German workers' party also existed in the liberal bureaucracy of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, undermining its reform-minded goals in the interest of softening the opposition of local elites. Selznick also showed some further tactics in organizational power struggles: for example, the way dissenters can be co-opted by putting them in positions of formal power where they have no room to maneuver for their own ideals. In effect this is a mechanism whereby the organizational position itself brainwashes the opposition leaders. Other researchers like Alvin Gouldner dealt with the power conflicts of the "change of administration" among top executives; Melville Dalton revealed the techniques of power struggle at the level of middle managers and their efforts to control workers; and Michel Crozier, a French soci-

ologist, pointed out the crucial weapon of control over areas of uncertainty as a key to victory in these power struggles. A host of other studies—some coming not only from sociologists, but also from business schools or public administration—filled in many facets of organizations.

By the 1960s, it was possible to synthesize a full-scale theory of how organizations operate. Amitai Etzioni, for example, used Weber's three dimensions of class, status, and power, to show three alternative techniques of control. Each of these works best in a particular kind of technical environment; each also gives rise to particular kinds of strategies of struggle between bosses and workers. *Economic controls,* essentially through the power of the paycheck, are most usable in organizations that have clearly measurable outputs by each worker, but such controls lead to the displacement of the workers' attention—from the quality of the work itself to a struggle over just how the output is measured. Sheer *coercion* as a form of control—brute force and threat—works best when it is easy to maintain surveillance over the workers; its drawback is that it is extremely alienating and results in workers who are brutalized and dull if they are not able to escape. Finally for tasks that require a great deal of initiative and judgment, Etzioni coined the term *"normative control."* Here the management needs to manipulate status groups and their ideologies in order to get the tasks done: thus, the huge sector of professionalized and credentialized organizations that exist wherever work becomes highly esoteric and technical.

Further developments in the theory of organizations reveal many of the principles by which they operate in different circumstances. We have fitted in the varieties of technology that make organizations different from one another, and recently we have begun to map out the principles of interorganizational relations as they form an environment, or competitive ecology, for each other. Organizations survive, grow, or are picked off, not merely because of their internal processes, but as part of a kind of local "world system" of the organizations around them. This is particularly apparent in the case of capitalist business organizations, but it applies to government, religious, and other kinds of organizations as well. This type of theory is still

being developed. Harrison White theorizes that "markets" do not consist of competitors but of cliques of organizations that try to separate themselves into noncompetitive niches. This type of theory has the potential for overturning the whole conventional economic way of looking at the capitalist system. Through all this work, a guiding thread is an extension of the conflict sociology that grew up around the time of Weber. The struggle for domination does not go on merely among aggregate social classes, but takes place in organizations. This makes the world of conflict more complex, as there are struggles among organizations, and within them as well. But the complexity is not a chaos. Organizational theory has shown, with considerable insight, how organizations create particular interest groups at the same time that the organizations themselves give these interest groups the weapons that bring about varying degrees of domination. Organization theory, when understood in its broadest context, is a key for understanding the whole workings of society.

CLASSES, CLASS CULTURES, AND INEQUALITY: THE CONFLICT THEORISTS

Empirical research also got going in the 1940s and 1950s on the stratification of social classes in general. A lot of this research might be called an effort to soften the class model: to show, for example, that there is a continuum among occupations ranked by prestige. This eliminates class boundaries and thereby presumably does away with class conflict, at the same time that it shifts attention away from economic interests and towards the subjective or cultural differences among individuals. Another popular form of stratification research has concentrated on social mobility, which focuses on the extent to which social class membership is not permanent, especially between generations.

Nevertheless social class positions exist, however long people may happen to be in any one of them. During the time they are there, class positions exert a powerful influence on the way people think and behave. Economic inequalities still exist, even if we avert our faces from them to look at prestige or

mobility. And as organizational analysis has already shown us, there is a continual struggle for advantage among occupants of different sorts of positions. The key question is: What is the nature of the dividing lines? Given that there are all sorts of organizational factions and that gradations of prestige can become fairly minute, is there nevertheless a basic line of cleavage that strongly affects what people will do?

In the late 1950s and the 1960s, a position emerged that arrived at some consensus on just such a powerful factor. It did not turn out to be economic property per se. Inside the complex bureaucracies of modern society, the main social dividing line has been between workers and managers. These groups belong to different networks, have different cultures and outlooks, and engage in struggles with each other. But the managers, especially at the middle levels, are not actually property owners at all, but only administrative labor. Conversely, small independent businesses (like plumbers, electricians, and so on) are in many respects more similar to workers than they are to big business owners. The German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf proposed a revision of Marx to deal with these anomalies. The major class dividing line is between *power groups*, between those who give orders and those who take orders. Sometimes property may be the basis of power: in those cases power classes coincide with economic classes. This was the situation observed by Marx and Engels in the early 1800s that had mislead them into thinking that property was the basis of class conflict. Instead of property, Dahrendorf proposed that power divisions are more fundamental.

Dahrendorf's position generated a self-conscious tradition of conflict theory that is more general than Marxism, although it includes Marxism as one of its intellectual predecessors. Dahrendorf took the Marx/Engels conception of class and generalized it in a Weberian direction, making Weber's conception of power conflict more basic. In my opinion, this is a strategically important move for several reasons. As we have seen, Weber's theory of power conflict connects directly with the theory of organizations because it is in organizations that power is mobilized. Furthermore it enables us to bring what has been learned in organizational analysis into the service of a

theory of social classes. Organizations and classes are just different ways of slicing up the same social reality; classes always have their basis as parts of some organizations, and organizations create classes and class conflicts.

There is also a payoff on the level of understanding the subjective and individual side of class, the way in which individuals think and act differently because of their class positions. If the fundamental reality of classes is the division between giving and taking orders, that points us to the social psychology of just how those experiences take place: What is it like to be an order-giver? How does that affect one's consciousness? What kinds of maneuvers must one go through in the course of an ordinary day in such a position? The same questions of course must also be asked about the experience of taking orders. Now it happens that Erving Goffman, starting from an entirely different point of view, showed us a model of social life as a series of frontstages and backstages, a kind of theatre of everyday life. The persons who control the frontstage (i.e., official parts of the society) turn out to be the order-givers, the higher social classes, whereas those who are merely compliant audiences for these official performances are the order-takers, the working classes of society. I will leave the details of this theory for Chapter 2 because Goffman came out of the Durkheimian theory of social rituals, not from conflict theory at all. But as my *Conflict Sociology* (1975) attempts to show in detail, putting together Dahrendorf and Goffman's models enables us to explain fairly rigorously why different classes have the kinds of outlooks that so much empirical evidence tells us they do.

One other sign that the power-conflict model is fundamental was provided by a successful theory of the distribution of wealth. Gerhard Lenski's *Power and Privilege* (1966) was the first major comparative analysis to ask the question: What conditions determine whether a society will have a large or small degree of economic inequality? Lenski examined all types of societies, ranging from hunting-and-gathering tribes on through the great agrarian (medieval-style) empires and the modern industrial societies. He showed that as the amount of economic surplus increases, the total wealth is in-

creasingly distributed not by economic need or by productive contribution, but by the organization of power. The most severe inequalities occur where there is a sizable surplus *and* where power is most concentrated. Historically, the most unequal societies fit this description: they are the agrarian empires, where the economy produces a considerable surplus but where the military aristocracy, the only politically mobilized group, appropriates virtually all of it. In industrial societies, the distribution of wealth becomes somewhat more equal, precisely to the degree that there has been a *political* revolution that has given more power to the masses of the population. In capitalist countries, it has been mostly the middle and upper-middle classes that have been the beneficiaries of this power shift. In countries where there has been a *political* shift towards socialism, as further research has shown, the degree of inequality is reduced still further. To the extent that inequalities remain in the socialist states, it is not because of economic property but because of concentration of power in the hierarchy of party officials. The Lenski and Dahrendorf models together, thus, throw considerable light not only on inequality in modern capitalist states, but also on the quite apparent class divisions and conflicts that have been going on in Poland, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

CLASS MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

We have already seen in the discussion of Marx and Engels how fruitful their model has been for a sociology of political conflict. As sociology began doing survey research in the 1940s and thereafter, it inevitably had a rediscovery of many of these insights. Seymour Martin Lipset (in his youth a Marxist, though he later moved sharply to the right) summarized the evidence of the class influence on politics by calling elections "the democratic class struggle." Social classes have been among the most essential dividing lines in explaining how people vote, although the other dimensions that also predict political attitudes are often versions of Weber's status groups. Social class has been shown, moreover, to strongly affect the mobilization of people in modern politics. The conservative

parties have not disappeared in modern democracies, even though they represent only a minority of the people, because their higher-class supporters are much more likely to vote, to contribute financially, and to be active in party affairs than are the working-class supporters of the more liberal parties. The material means of mobilization continue to be crucial in the modern struggle for political power. Although the more spectacular conflict theories have dealt with revolutionary uprisings and other social movements, "resource mobilization" is equally applicable to the mundane class conflicts that go on through the medium of voting.

Though the model is generally correct—in the sense that the higher social classes tend to favor the status quo and the maintenance of property, whereas the lower social classes tend to favor reforms and economic redistribution—there have nevertheless been some major refinements in it. Marx and Engels were not just interested in liberal/reforming politics, but in a revolutionary working class. The question that has been addressed is: Within the general left/right continuum of politics, how far will the left go? Under what conditions does it produce reformism, and when radicalism? For that matter, when does one find reactionary movements emerging from the lower classes? Comparative sociologists have made considerable headway on this question.

The first part of this analysis dealt with the early phase of capitalism: the penetration of the capitalist economy into the agricultural societies of Europe as early as the 1700s, as well as subsequently around the world. Both Arthur Stinchcombe and Barrington Moore, Jr., proposed models of agricultural class politics. They both pointed out that the capitalist market itself tends to mobilize social classes. Hence, it made a great deal of difference whether peasants marketed their own crops or whether this was done by some feudal landowner. The French Revolution of 1789 gave peasants their own land. But as a result it made them not a radical force, but a conservative one: as small farmers, unprotected by any monopoly position, they were always kept on the brink of ruin by the ups and downs of the market for farm products. Thus, like small farmers everywhere, they became a typically reactionary force in modern

politics, hostile to urban society and to the socialistic or trade-union policies of the workers, which the farmers regarded as just so much featherbedding at the expense of honest citizens. Paradoxically, Moore pointed out, the establishment of modern democracy proceeded most smoothly in countries such as England where the landlords drove the peasants off the land and into the cities, where they were then transformed from a reactionary force into a liberal one. The worst possible outcome, Moore argued in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), is when feudal lords keep the peasants on the lands and force them to produce goods for the market by an intensification of traditional discipline. This is the formula for fascism, which developed in Germany and Japan. Finally, there is also the possibility of agricultural workers going radical. This happened, for instance, in China, where the peasants did not own the land, but had to pay rent to absentee landlords. The result was that the peasants were left to absorb the pressures of the market while being squeezed by landlords who demanded rent in good times and bad. Peasants in this case reacted by supporting a movement to overthrown the entire property system.

In Craig Calhoun's recent book *The Question of Class Struggle* (1982), this type of analysis is extended to urban workers as well. Marx and Engels expected that the coming together of workers in factories would make them "capitalism's gravediggers," revolutionaries mobilized to bring down the system. But their sociology of political conflict was not quite right on this point. For factory owners themselves are the *most* directly exposed to the market; and it is this market experience that mobilizes them and makes them politically active and aware of their national interests, whereas the workers are somewhat shielded by the organization itself. The workers, thus, fight their class battles within the factory itself, striving for better employment security and for better wages—but not on the national level. They do not direct their attack on the institution of property itself; their basic stance becomes not radical and socialist, but local, trade unionist, and reformist.

The real radicals, Calhoun points out, were those workers who were most directly exposed to the market. These were the small craft workers, self-employed artisans or those in

domestic enterprises who were involved in the "putting-out" system of working up raw materials sent to them by merchant-entrepreneurs. For them, there was no cushion against economic downturns, which could immediately drive them out of business. Moreover the crafts workers had no local enemies they could fight—enemies in the form of factory owners and bosses. They could not fight for organizational reforms because they did not work in someone else's organization. Instead, they had to direct their protest against the whole system. It was these workers who made up the radical movements Marx and Engels observed in the early 1800s, the decades of their own youth, and who convinced them that a still larger radical socialist movement was in the offing.

This is not to say radical socialist movements cannot reappear at later times. But Calhoun's type of analysis is in keeping with the general growth of modern sophisticated conflict theory. Organizations are capable of containing and localizing class conflict, just as they create and shape new conflicts of their own. For a full-scale revolutionary transformation of the system to occur, we need to look beyond the localized conflicts to structural forces that focus conflict on the level of the overall property system itself. And this brings us again to that dominant superorganization, that upholder of property through its means of exerting force: the state.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

The last 20 years, right up to the time in which we are now living, has seen many of the finest and most ambitious projects in historical sociology ever attempted. I have already mentioned some of its high points: the studies of class conflict and the rise of the modern state by Barrington Moore, Jr., and by Craig Calhoun, Charles Tilly's studies of revolutionary social movements that produced his resource mobilization theory, Gerhard Lenski's comparative model of inequality across all of world history. Inevitably the realistic treatment of history has led into the paths of conflict sociology. In these works, the themes of Marx and of Weber have come together.

Some comparative/historical work has stayed closer to a

Marxian identity. This includes the British sociologist Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), which traces the distinctiveness of the West not only to capitalism but also to its foundation upon the downfall of the ancient Roman empire. The most ambitious of these projects is Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World System*, the first volume of which was published in 1974. Wallerstein's work is perhaps the closest to a classic Marxian interpretation in that he regards economic processes and contraditions as the driving engine of history. But he differs from the classic Marxist model in that the economy is located not within any particular state but is organized as a world economic system, with its long-term cycles of expansion and contraction. These long waves of global economic boom and depression, taking over 100 years each, are connected with imperialism towards the periphery in their upswings and with wars among the core powers in their downswings, bringing about the hegemony of a new state. Wallerstein's project is as yet only half finished. Already it promises to be the grandest and most comprehensive view of the mechanisms that drive human societies since Weber's comparative studies of the world religions—and Weber's project was only a fragment, never finished.

Even though Wallerstein is the most "orthodox Marxian" of the major historical/comparative sociologists of today, I would still maintain that the logic of his world system leans in a Weberian direction. The military hegemony of the core states is a key device by which they are able to dominate the world system economically, and the question remains unsettled as to just which of the core states wins hegemony at each showdown period. I would suggest that there is a further process of the geopolitical relations among states themselves that determines these things. These involve such factors as the sheer geographical positions of states vis-à-vis each other: states on the outer ring of a settled area have a military advantage over states in the middle, as the latter tend to get chewed up in the long run through multisided wars. There are processes of cumulative advantage and disadvantage as conquering states build up their momentum and add further to their size and resources, whereas their rivals fight from successively weaker

positions. But there also seems to be an outer limit to a state's ability to conquer territory; a principle of military overextension applies that can be a prime source of the kind of fiscal crisis of the state that we have already discussed above. When such overextension happens, states can collapse much faster than they grew originally, and they are carved up to the benefit of their neighbours.

The principles of geopolitics, I would contend, are more general even than the principles of capitalism. Geopolitics determined the military cycles of ancient and medieval empires, and the same principles operate today, even though a capitalist world economy has been superimposed on them. A state's geopolitical position, furthermore, has a crucial effect on its internal politics, including its experience of revolution. Theda Skocpol, in her now-famous book *States and Social Revolutions* (1979), showed by a comparative analysis of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions that revolution needs more than merely the mobilization of social classes making economically radical demands. Revolution always begins with a crisis of the state, a breakdown due to war or fiscal crisis that paralyzes the ruling clases in a battle between the administrators of the state sector and the dominant propertied classes outside that sector. The theory is compelling as far as it goes. What can be added is the point that the strain on the state that starts this off is not accidental. It flows systematically from the position of the state in the larger geopolitical situation. Pre-1789 France, pre-1917 Russia, and pre-1949 China were all in the peculiar position of having great geopolitical strengths in one aspect, but crippling geopolitical weaknesses in another. All were states with great cumulative resource advantages that nevertheless had overexpanded and taken on neighboring powers in too many different directions. In this view, the revolutionary upheaval is a convulsion nested within the larger state system in which the classes that directed the disastrous geopolitical policies had to pay the price. Once these inefficiencies were eliminated, postrevolutionary states, as Skocpol aptly demonstrated, reestablish a militant—and militaristic—national identity and become once again aggressive powers on the world geopolitical scene.

The tradition of conflict sociology is very much alive today

and continues to make intellectual progress on many fronts. To some extent it is divided within itself. There are ideological debates between Weberians and Marxists and between different viewpoints within each camp. To some extent this is due to the fact that the conflict tradition is the most politically activist of all the brands of sociology. We tend to choose our intellectual stances because of the ammunition they provide for the political programs we would like to advance. But besides these inevitable debates over policy questions, there is a genuine core of insight into the principles of how the world works. Conflict sociology is necessarily conflictual, like everything else. For all that, it adds up to a tradition of sociological realism that has become truly sophisticated. If we ever felt like rising above our own social conflicts and merely contemplating the science of how society operates, the conflict tradition would have to be a central part of that vision.

Appendix: Simmel, Coser, and Functionalist Conflict Theory

The term "conflict theory" is sometimes used for a rather different tradition of analysis begun in Germany by one of Weber's contemporaries, Georg Simmel. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was revived and formally expounded by the German-American Lewis Coser. Nevertheless its tone and its analytical apparatus cuts in quite a different direction than the Marx-Weber lineage of ideas. Coser was at pains to show that conflict could be incorporated within the perspective of functionalism as another support of social order. If one looks at Simmel's original arguments, the conservative themes are even more marked.

Simmel's one major sociological work, his *Soziologie* (1908), shows a programmatic structure that could have been most fruitful. He pushes for a structural perspective, the social forms that are to be analyzed beyond their specific empirical contents and beyond a merely psychological outlook. And if the emphasis on forms comes from a Kantian philosophical tradition, Simmel is equally German in the emphasis he gives to stratification and conflict. Hierarchy ("superordination and subordination") is a fundamental topic for Simmel. He treats it early in the book and follows it with an analysis of conflict, so often the concomitant of hierarchy. No utopian idealist he.

Nevertheless it is apparent that Simmel's interest in these hard-nosed aspects of society is largely negative and polemical. The very first chapter [translated as "The Problem of Sociology" in Kurt Wolff (ed.), *Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics* (1965)] starts off by criticizing the existing approach to sociology, which Simmel saw as stemming from the rise of the socialist movement in the nineteenth century. It is this movement (perhaps Simmel had Comte in mind as well as the Marxists) that exalts the class over the individual and, hence, substitutes a new level of analysis. Fair enough, Simmel will enter into that level; but he will do it by proclaiming that sociology must detach itself from the usual contents of social issues and give a formal analysis of the structural forms underlying all sociation. The justification for doing so, he declares (in a passage entitled "How Is Society Possible?"), is by allusion to a neo-Kantian concern for forms.

Simmel's approach to sociology is ambiguous. He does catch a vision of a structural science of sociology, but this works out largely as a cover for his polemical intent: to attack the socialistic world view and defend individualism. For instance, his first substantive chapter begins with a section "On the Significance of Numbers for Social Life." A promising beginning. But where we would expect an abstract analysis, his opening example is labeled "Socialism," and its point is to declare that socialism is impossible as a modern political ideal because equality is possible only in a small group. It is not even a good theoretical point; empirically small groups may be quite authoritarian and hierarchical (think of the patriarchal family) and large-scale societies certainly can approach social equality to some degree. Even if absolute equality is ruled out, economic differences between today's socialist and capitalist societies are substantial.

The example, unfortunately, is all too representative of what Simmel does with his formal approach. Over and over again he makes points of an allegedly universal and theoretical nature, but they represent (more than anything) his own preju-

dices. Large groups, he declares, are mindless and authoritarian—hardly an original point but a common charge among the conservatives of his day. (And of earlier days as well—elements of this are found in Aristotle's attacks on democracy.) When Simmel discusses the poor, he throws in a section on "The Negative Character of Collective Behavior." He speaks of "The Sociological Error of Socialism and Anarchism" as searching for freedom in directions that always bring about domination because large groups must always be hierarchical. (Must they always become steadily more hierarchical the larger they are? Simmel assumes so, but he never proves it, nor even seems to think any variation is possible.) When he speaks of coercion, it is in a rather unrealistic fashion; coercion is not the basis of domination, merely something that is sometimes added onto it. Simmel discusses force only in the philosophical context of the doctrine that people ought to be coerced for the good of the social order. Simmel does not entirely agree (he is after all a nineteenth-century Liberal), but he still believes that the majority of people may well need to be coerced into behaving (Simmel is an elitist Liberal, no John Stuart Mill).

And so it goes. Time and again Simmel's headings get up one's hopes, but his content is usually disappointing. The reason is that Simmel is carrying on an underlying polemic almost from beginning to end. The contrast with Weber, who shared many of Simmel's political views, is instructive. Weber really did take his value neutrality seriously; Simmel by comparison seems shallow. The same holds on the empirical side. Simmel is not without empirical reference; in fact he fills his pages with examples of different types of groups. But they are mainly casual observations, good stories of just the sort that would entertain a dinner party but that are never checked for their truthfulness (e.g., Simmel illustrates the place of numbers in social life by an anecdote of a group of friends who broke a plate into a dozen pieces and each kept one to represent their unity). Or else there are historical examples: the customs and political constitutions of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the New England township, the structure and practices of the medieval Papacy (the last quite a favorite source of examples for Simmel). But they remain merely examples. Unlike Weber, Simmel never goes into a comparison of cases nor makes even the most rudimetary effort to see if the preponderance of the evidence is on his side. Instead, he is content to provide a colorful illustration for each of his categories.

One point that Simmel is at pains to make is that bourgeois society is the precondition for individualism. He does not put it quite like that: it would be too overtly polemical and not "formal" enough, but the message comes through nevertheless. The great danger is the mass society touted by socialists: it destroys individualism. (This sounds like Friedrich Nietzsche, whose vogue in the 1890s and early 1900s coincided with Simmel's activity.) What makes possible individualism is a large-scale society with considerable internal differentiation. Where individuals are simultaneously members of various groups ("the intersection of social circles"), that is where individualism flourishes.

That this is part of a specifically bourgeois, capitalist order is made plain in Simmel's other major book, *The Philosophy of Money* (1900). Incidentally, this work is genuinely philosophy, in much the same way that Marx's early economics was simultaneously philosophy. Simmel reads like almost a direct refutation of Marx (as well as of other economists). Economic value is an objectification produced by separating the individual from the object. Whereas for Marx this is a definition of alienation, for Simmel this is a positive result, analogous to aesthetic values, which he declares are produced by the same objectifying process. Simmel goes on to argue that this objectification and transcendence of subjectivity is due to the exchange process; contrary to Marx, exchange value is absolutely central and use value is not economic value at all. Money is a symbol of objectivity that emerges in a relationship among subjective elements; as such, Simmel pointedly remarks, money is analogous to truth itself. He goes on to attack the Marxian labor theory of value. Not only does Marx's theory ignore mental labor in favor of physical; but, even more, physical labor derives its value from the psychical effort involved in it!

Simmel's evaluation of money is, thus, very much of the positive side. Money allows for anonymity and emotional detachment among persons; thus, it breaks down the omnipres-

ent group controls of traditional society. Money is the basis of individual freedom. This is not to say that Simmel sees nothing negative about modern capitalist society. He expresses his opinions (of the sort that have become clichés among modern intellectuals) that modern life has become calculating, emotionless, and, hence, characterized by greed, wastefulness, miserliness, cynicism, and boredom. Money generates the "decadent personality type." Simmel is explicit that these are two sides of the same coin: the price of modern individualism and freedom is the deracination of personality. On the whole Simmel is willing to pay the price. He speaks of how personal culture lags behind material culture. The latter, we may surmise from his sociological writings, means the exalted conversation and aesthetic appreciation of *fin de siècle* salon society, that is, Simmel's own upper-bourgeois milieu. Simmel was known as a fascinating conversationalist, and the best aspects of his sociology come through in the Goffmanesque portraits of the "playful" world of talk, of secrets (Goffman's backstages), of intimacy, and of sexual affairs. It is here that individualism is in its element, especially if one is a cosmopolitan insider/outsider with entrée to many groups but permanently enclosed by none.

Despite his insights, I would judge that Simmel does not qualify as an intellectual giant of the discipline of sociology. Probably there is no other classic figure who makes more palpably false assertions. He declares that money because of its externality and relativism is most congruent with personality types of outsiders—Jews, Parsees, Huguenots, Lombards, Armenians. He might be surprised to learn that bankers are the very center of the modern social establishment. Simmel vents his prejudices as if they were formal insights: the money society produces boredom (as if no one was ever bored in sleepy rural towns), greed, avarice, and miserliness (stock figures from ancient comedies come to mind) as well as (somewhat contradictorily) wastefulness. One could go on, almost endlessly.

Simmel is not a great sociologist; one reason is that he was not really all that serious about it. A number of the themes of *Soziologie* (1908) are already introduced in *Philosophie des Geldes* (1900). But Simmel does not seem to notice the continuity, and

he even sometimes contradicts himself. In the earlier book, he is already onto the numerical theme that the largeness or smallness of the group and the diffuseness or concentration of the economic circle have major effects on the character of money. But *Soziologie* is devoid of economic discussions; it is as if he had deliberately decided that sociology had nothing to do with economics, even though his own earlier analysis gave economic causes for social phenomena. The impersonality and so forth which characterize modern large-scale urban society Simmel (1900) declares are the consequences of the money economy, whether found in urban or rural locales. Later, he ignores this assertion, giving primacy to the sheer quantitative aspects of social structure. It appears that Simmel did not care very much about consistency or about building a substantially valid theory of society.

This makes sense if one realizes what kind of career Simmel was pursuing. As a private lecturer (*Privatdozent*) in philosophy, he made his reputation by publishing a large number of popular articles in newspapers and magazines as well as both long and short books. He wrote a great deal on art, culture, women, coquetry, and other subjects of the drawing-room culture of his day. His *Soziologie* (1908) was his eleventh book, sandwiched in between *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (1907) and *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* (1910) (*Major Problems of Philosophy*). The truth of the matter is that Simmel was not particularly serious about sociology, and his writings show it. Even his bourgeois background did not set him in a serious direction. It apparently gave him his political prejudices, but no insight into the economic side of the world. And this too makes sense when one realizes that his family connections were all in the luxury side of business. His father owned a famous chocolate factory; the father died when Simmel was a boy, and Simmel acquired as a guardian the head of a music-publishing house. Georg Simmel inherited a considerable fortune and never had to enter the grubby world of work, except at his own pleasure. The background to be sure is not too dissimilar from that of Weber. But Weber's family was in basic industry, not luxury trades, and Weber grew up in the inner milieu of Reichstag politics. Both men were privy to secrets;

but for Weber these were the backstage secrets of political manuever, whereas Simmel's backstage was merely that of sexual gossip at elegant salon parties.

When Simmel writes about conflict, then, it is in order to disprove the contentions of the Marxian conflict theorists (and perhaps also the military *Realpolitik* theorists). For Simmel, conflict does not produce social change; it is merely another structural relationship endemic to any social form. He sees that it has something to do with domination, but it does nothing to change the system of domination. It is merely another drama of social life to be appreciated, scarcely more than another salon entertainment.

NOTES

1. Some commentators have noticed a difference between Engels and Marx. For the most part they have made the distinction to the disparagement of Engels, who is regarded as more dogmatically materialist and doctrinaire. Engels's late essay (1873–1874) applying the dialectic to physical science was criticized by philosophical Marxists of the 1920s such as Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch. Recent Marxists (e.g., Norman Levine, *The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels*, Oxford: Clio Press, 1975) have attacked Engels for lacking Marx's humanistic vision, which was derived from the Young Hegelians. As a result Engels was allegedly the forbear of Stalinist oppression that the more humanistic Marx would have disavowed. The attack is completely wrongheaded. It is true that increasingly "soft" Hegelian reinterpretations of Marx have become popular in the last few decades (and the revival of interest in Lukács and Korsch, both of them Hegelian philosophers, is part of this mood), but this is largely because a declining faith in the economic inevitability of capitalist crisis, and a general mood of antagonism to science: a mood that neither Marx nor Engels shared. The Hegelianism is largely an element of mystification, which keeps us from seeing the actual sociological processes that Engel opened up. The real difficulty of Marx's economic system, in fact, is the way that he continually tried to fit it into the frame of Hegelian categories.

Engels opposed paying so much attention to the Young Hegelians (he did not want to add a long section on Feuerbach to *The German Ideology*, regarding him as unrealistic; among all the manuscripts of

Marx that Engels did publish posthumously, he did not include the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844"). This has been taken as a weakness on Engels' part, and so has his lack of interest in the more abstract convolutions of Marx's economics. But one could say more justly that Engels had a better sense of what was worthwhile as a realistic analysis of the social world. Moreover it is hardly the case that Engels was the more dogmatic of the two. His essays on the "dialectics of nature" are not notably successful and only point out a kind of metaphorical resemblance between the dialectic and various physical and biological processes. But the effort showed Engels' intellectual breadth and his interest in the laws of nature, which was part of his general push towards making a science of society as well. He used the dialectic on his own turf merely to sensitize one to processes of conflict and change, as one can see in his historical writings. In fact Engels gave considerable weight to the priority of empirical complexities over preconceived theory, and he used the dialectic as a way of *overcoming* any crude materialism. He was willing to give the "superstructure" of politics and ideology the dignity of an independent pole in the dialectic with the economic "base" (Leonard Krieger, "Introduction" to Friedrich Engels, *The German Revolution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967: xx).

2. Characteristically, Engels gave credit to Marx, whose ideas he claimed he was merely elaborating. This seems dubious. Engels's theory became the rallying point for radical feminism; under its influence, the German socialist party took a strongly pro-feminist stance, claiming that the only way to achieve sexual equality was to replace capitalism by socialism. Marx, on the other hand, was rather strongly antifeminist. In 1872, he ordered the International Workingman's Association to expel an American chapter, led by Victoria Woodhull, that had feminism (along with Negro rights) among its top priorities. Marx declared that the association must rid itself of those who gave "precedence to the women's question over the question of labor" and who advocated "women's franchise, and . . . all sorts of nonsense" (in Hans Gerth, ed., *The First International: Minutes of the Hague Conference of 1872*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958: 177–78, 194–95, 248, 264–67). Privately, as well, Marx was very much a traditional sexist. He ran an authoritarian, Victorian home, regarded his wife as little more than housekeeper and mother of his children, and referred to her in his letters to Engels as merely a harried, "silly" creature (Levine, 1975: 232, 238–39). Marx's daughter, who worshipped him, lists his answers to the questions: "Your favorite virtue in man: Strength. Your favorite virtue in women: Weakness" [quoted in Erich Fromm, ed., *Marx's Con-*

cept of Man (N.Y.: Frederick Ungar, 1961: 257)]. Marx seemed to think that the relation of man to woman was simply a natural relationship [in his "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," *Ibid.*, p. 126]. Engels was on the contrary somewhat of a romantic and a supporter of the new underground ideals of sexual liberation. He supported and lived with a working-class Irish woman, Mary Burns. But Marx and his wife pointedly snubbed Mary Burns when Engels tried to introduce her to them because she and Engels were not married; their moral disapproval fell totally on Mary Burns, not on her male partner. The one time in their relationship that Engels was genuinely hurt by Marx was when Mary Burns died and Marx refused to extend any condolences. Given these sharp differences in their attitudes, it is not surprising that Engels did not publish *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* until the year after Marx died.

3. Weber's theory is not well known and has remained buried in his lengthy works, especially his encyclopedic *Economy and Society* as well as in his lectures on *General Economic History*. For an exposition and development of this theory, see Randall Collins, "Weber's Theory of the Family," in my *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).