One distinctive feature of contemporary ethics is its interest in the connection between moral judgment and emotion. At the heart of this contemporary discussion is a view known as “sentimentalism,” which claims that moral judgments just are, in some sense, expressions of emotion or sentiment. The view itself, however, is not new. Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, and David Hume, in particular, articulated something like it in the eighteenth century. However, existing scholarly effort to understand Hume’s account of “moral sentiment” is critically underdeveloped. The problem stems from a failure to address seriously the fact that Hume lays at the heart of his ethical argument in A Treatise of Human Nature not just any sentiment, but a peculiar sentiment. Although most commentators notice the peculiar sentiment argument, no one has yet tried to determine exhaustively what this argument amounts to for Hume. There is no dedicated and systematic study of the nature of this “peculiarity”; the import of the argument for Hume’s general ethical theory; the consistency of that argument with his greater philosophical system; and the supposed source of the peculiar sentiment in the human psyche. This paper attempts to correct this oversight.
Saturday, 28 April, English/Philosophy 106

10:00am
Zack Robinson (South Plains College), “William James was HOT!: James’ Account of Consciousness as a Higher-Order Thought Theory”
Commentator: Matt Keeler (Texas Tech)

11:00am
Andrew Smith (Texas Tech), “Kant on Despising Oneself in the 2nd Critique”
Commentator: Chris Corbin (Texas Tech)

1:00pm
Karl Aho (Baylor), “Two Rival Versions?: Towards a MacIntyrean Reading of Kant’s Ethical Project”
Commentator: Rob Reed (Texas Tech)

2:00pm
Commentator: Dan Osusky (Texas Tech)

3:00pm
Matthew McCall (Ohio State), “How to Cause Lockean Perfections”
Commentator: Amanda Silbernagel (Texas Tech)