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time continue to redeem in gold that same money.

EDWARD F. SWEET.

CHICAGO, February 23, 1892.

[If the Government revenues were doubled, the silver crisis would be staved off indefinitely, because in that case the purchase of silver would not be an appreciable embarrassment. The silver notes put out would come back for redemption whenever they were in excess, but there would always be means to redeem them, and they would pile up in the Treasury. The law says that they "may be reissued," but there is no way to reissue them except in payment of Government debts; and under the hypothesis, the Government has sufficient money coming in to pay all its debts. The situation, therefore, would be simply a redundant revenue and the application of a portion of it to the purchase of silver bullion. It might be pig-iron, or pig-lead; the effects would be the same.]

Now, the sale of bonds is, for all the purposes we are considering, the same thing as an addition to the revenues. It has the same effect upon the maintenance of gold payments. The fact that the bonds must be redeemed at maturity is a separate fact, interesting in itself, and having its own consequences, the most important of which is a probable increase of taxation to meet them. But for the present the effect of bond sales is simply an increase of Treasury receipts. If anybody can see how an increase derived from ordinary sources would stave off the silver crisis, he should be able to see how an increase derived from extraordinary sources would produce the same result.—ED. NATION.]

#### THE EDUCATION OF SOUTHERN YOUTH.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In your paper of the 25th inst., now before me, I read, under the caption of "An Interesting Question," your comment upon the editorial of the St. Louis Republic, and on what the Buffalo Courier also had to say upon what, for us of the South at least, might be called a painfully interesting question. The comments of the three papers are correct; but as far as the causes that have led to this condition of things in the South are concerned, all has not been stated, and the most painful effects not even been hinted at.

As to the causes in the Southern States: after the war, bread was the first cry, followed by the insatiable appetite for money-getting, to enjoy once again after four years the mere comforts of life. This led fathers of families to take their half-educated sons into their stores and offices, that the salaries they must pay if employers, or earn if they were employees, might aid in the family support; and the girls, after the household duties were performed, were put to their books under the mother's charge as schoolmistresses. Consequently, the proportion of girls and young women who were being educated largely exceeded the number of boys and young men. Then, too, be it remembered, there were comparatively few schools and colleges open in the South for a year or two after the close of the war. And still another cause must be mentioned—one that should not have existed, though easy for us of

the Southern States to understand. So many half-grown boys, and war-grown young men, had either been in the active army, or in the reserves, or at posts and depots, or in charge of the planting or other business of the fathers and elder brothers in the field, that when the war was over, these youngsters, having proved themselves to be in deeds, felt that in fact they were men; a few—very few—were willing to return to their books, and full parental control was hard to establish. Had these war-worn and almost despairing parents (for the mothers were perhaps more worn than the fathers) had the means and the moral strength to insist upon their sons' returning to their studies, the young women of to-day would not so frequently have to complain of the want of intellectuality of their male friends.

Then as to the effects: in ante-bellum times parental control in the South "went without saying," and children looked up in deference to their elders—though not in fear of them. Now this is largely changed; young men, still in their teens, do not expect to ask permission to leave their homes after tea for the theatre or billiard-room, nor to account for either the hour or the condition in which they return. A general want of deference is observable on the part of the young to the old: the lifting of the hat is almost obsolete, and the man of middle age is fortunate if his friend's pert son does not call him by his Christian or nickname. This state of things, in the providence of God and the influence of his handmaidens, the future mothers, will cure itself; but to hasten it, fathers who can afford it (even when, as is largely the case, those who can afford it nowadays in the South are so-called "self-made men") should force their sons to take an education, even if they keep them at grammar and high schools until they reach their majority; and, failing in this, should enforce the law parental, at least in the home-stead, and, like the wise German fathers, consider the son's wages as due to the head of the family until the fatted calf is killed and the christening bottle of wine broached on the twenty-first birthday.—Respectfully,

JAMES G. HOLMES.

CHARLESTON, S. C., February 27, 1892.

#### IS INDUCTION AN INFERENCE?

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In the communication of Maxime Bôcher in the Nation of February 18, referring to the unsatisfactory condition of geometrical studies in our schools, he says:

"If we could lead the student first to see the truth of a proposition, and then, perhaps much later, to prove it, we might hope in time to have mathematicians in America. For every mathematical discovery is made in this way, let the mathematician conceal his footprints as he will; it must come as an intuition, and the man to whom it has thus come is its discoverer, even though he never succeed in finding a proof."

Is not this statement of general application? Is ever the boundary of knowledge advanced in any other way, whether in mathematical or physical science? Reasoning serves merely to verify and confirm the intuitions of genius by applying general principles to concrete cases; but inference, in any proper sense of the word, cannot advance knowledge—it cannot grasp more than is contained in the premise.

I know the common doctrine represents this as the province of induction. But induction is not reasoning; it is intuition, or happy guessing, if you like. Take any so-called inductive syllogism, and substitute for the major premise

what is tacitly assumed, and it is converted at once into a strictly deductive argument. By no possible reasoning, or inference proper, could Newton have attained to the law of gravity. It was a happy guess, an inspiration of genius. It was based on wide knowledge, it is true; but it was not a necessary consequence of that knowledge. Assuming the law to be true, reasoning applied it, and the conclusions were found to agree with experience and observation. But the conception of the law was an intuition; it was not a conclusion involved in any known premises.

Take Whately's old school-book illustration of an inductive syllogism: "The ox, sheep, goat, deer, bison, etc., are a sample of the class 'horned animal,' or represent the class; the ox, sheep, etc., are ruminants, therefore all horned animals are ruminants." But what do you mean by "the ox, sheep, etc., are a sample, or represent the class 'horned animal'?" Evidently you mean that whatever is true of them is true of all horned animals. Unless this is true, your conclusion is worthless. But if you substitute this, which is tacitly assumed, the argument is deductive, not inductive. The same is true in every case of so-called inductive argument. The real induction—the advance in our bounds—is contained in the assumption that what is true in the cases we know will be found true in all cases having a certain other similarity to these. But this is not an inference, it is not reasoning, it is intuition.

DATTON O.

J. McL. S.

[It is plain that in no case of genuine induction is *everything* that is true of the sample true of the whole class; so, according to our correspondent, all inductions must be worthless. But he supports this position by nothing, nor does he notice a single one of the objections to it which have been urged from the days of Philodemus to our own, and are found in common American books, such as the 'Studies in Logic, by Members of Johns Hopkins University.' The main distinction between induction and statistical deduction (the latter and of deduction which bears most resemblance to induction) is that the premises made by the deductive form of inference is applicable in many cases, and while it may be false in any one, it will probably and approximately be true in the long run; but the inductive conclusion on the other hand, may be false—only, if so, the further pursuit of the same method will in the long run probably and approximately correct it. The distinction is between getting confirmed in the long run, and being corrected in the long run.]

Our correspondent's proposition that induction is not inference will meet with less favor than it might do, owing to his use of the unfortunate word *inference*, which most people particularly appropriate to the designation of uncertain presumption, amounting to little more than conjecture. But in its philosophical sense inference is defined in the 'Century Dictionary' as "the formation of a belief or opinion, not as directly observed, but as constrained by observations made of other matters or by beliefs already adopted." For instance, we wish, let us suppose, to know whether

among negroes male births are more numerous than female births or not. This general proposition cannot be directly observed. We turn, then, to the compendium of the tenth census, and find a considerable excess of female over male births there recorded among negroes in this country for one year. This brings us to the belief that the same phenomenon would generally occur among large populations of negroes, and our proceeding is *inference* according to the received definition, as certainly as it is induction.

But the 'Century Dictionary' adds this remark: "The act of inference consists psychologically in constructing in the imagination a sort of diagram or skeleton image of the essentials of the state of things represented in the premises, in which, by mental manipulation and contemplation, relations which had not been noticed in constructing it are discovered." This recognizes an intuitive or perceptive element as an important part of reasoning itself—a doctrine which results from the study of the logic of relatives, where the perceptive element comes into great prominence. Proof believed to be conclusive has been offered of the truth of this view, which has been accepted by many philosophers. "J. McL. S." seems to offer no rational objection to it. He says, indeed, that Newton's discovery was "a happy guess, an inspiration of genius"—that is, it came directly from on high, or from the action of chance, and was not based upon any knowledge already in Newton's mind, or dependent from any luminous conception which he had carefully worked out. But the truth is, our correspondent seems to have taken his notion of reasoning from the 'Elements of Euclid,' which was written before logic was much understood, and from texts-books of logic inspired by theological doctors. If, as he says, "reasoning serves merely to verify [something] by applying general principles to particular cases," there is next to no reasoning in mathematics; for the *modus* of a mathematical demonstration does not consist in the application of a general principle.

The original passage quoted has some truth in it. The mathematician usually sees a thing dimly before he sees it clearly. But between the processes of coming to see a mathematical truth, as probable, and coming to see it as evident, there is no radical difference. It is all reasoning, and, as such, it is an act of perception—or, rather, of experiment, followed by observation.—ED. NATION.]

#### "YOU WAS."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: Mr. T. L. Kingston Oliphant, in *The New English* (1886), vol. ii., p. 188, referring to Dr. Bentley's *Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris* (1699), writes: "The new use of *was*, just coming in, is seen in p. 299: 'when you was a boy.' The fact, however, is, that the expression instanced was current at least ten years before Dr. Bentley was born, and all

along in the latter half of the seventeenth century:

"But thus you will not have the same Individual Soul you was Christianized with." Rev. Dr. Henry More, *The Second Lash of Alazonomastia* (1631), in *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus* (1656), p. 263. More has you was in his *Antidote against Idolatry* (1664), O 4 v., *Divine Dialogues* (1668), vol. ii., p. 354, *Letters*, etc., also.

"Having known that you was there." "After you was departed from Valencia." "You was about to marry the widow." Anon., *Translation of The History of Don Felix* (1651), pp. 120, 240, 242.

"I have heard that you, Polymachus, was much offended when Aganacton was sick of this disease." Rev. Dr. Nathanael Ingelo, *Bentivoglio and Urania* (1660), Part i., p. 108 (ed. 1682).

"What was you saying?" John Wilson (1664), *Works* (1874), p. 204.

"You, your self, was pleased particularly to shew me the place." Dr. Henry Stubbe (1670), *A Reply to a Letter of Dr. Henry More* (1671), p. 68.

"You was." Dryden and Lee, *Duke of Guise* (1682), Act IV.

"My sister told me you was pleased . . . to wonder I did so seldom write to you." Dean Swift (1692), *Letter to William Swift*, Nov. 29.

Other quotations could be given, as from Sir Aston Cockain (1658 and 1662), *Works* (ed. 1874), pp. 96, 297; and from Charles Cotton (1664), *Poetical Works* (ed. 1765), p. 62.

Mr. Barrett Wendell, in his *English Composition* (1891), p. 79, observes: "A slight examination of some of the best writers of the last century will show that, certainly as late as the time of Fielding, there was a great deal of good authority for *you was*, when the second person singular was intended." Fielding published from 1730 till 1754, the year of his death; and nearly all that he wrote was of the lighter cast of literature. But, as is shown below, in such literature, and more especially in familiar epistolary correspondence, *you was* continued to enjoy good repute long after his days:

"I find you was no more born for servitude than myself." Bp. William Warburton (1758), in *Letters from a Late Eminent Prelate* (ed. 1809), p. 268. In sixteen other passages in this volume, dated between 1749 and 1775, Warburton has *you was*.

"You, I was told, had been married, and was a widow." Mrs. Frances Sheridan, *Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidolph* (1761), vol. iii., p. 119.

"You was the most lovely person in the world." "I learned, from Don Carlos, that you was resolved to go away with him." Oliver Goldsmith (ca. 1774), *Translation of Scarron's Comic Romance* (1776), vol. i., p. 125; vol. ii., p. 85.

"As I told you, when you was here." "You, I think, was never a dabbler in rhyme." William Cowper (1780 and 1786), *Works* (1885-1887) vol. iv., p. 16; vol. vi., p. 17. Other instance if you was occur in vol. xv., pp. 33, 34, 45, 68.

"You was prevented, by Sir Joshua Reynolds, in your kind intentions of giving me the earliest notice of the honour you have done me." Bp. Jonathan Shipley (1780), in *Lord Teignmouth's Memoirs of Sir William Jones* (ed. 1806), p. 194.

"I am sorry you was disappointed of going to Vallombrosa." Horace Walpole (1791), in *The Journals and Correspondence of Miss Berry* (1865), vol. i., p. 367.

For you was could also be quoted: Dr. Hawkesworth (1773), in *The Private Correspondence of David Garrick* (1831, 1832), vol. i., p. 536; Miss Elizabeth Carter (1785), *Letters to Mrs. Montagu* (1817), vol. iii., p. 258, and often before; Richard Cumberland, *The Natural Son* (1788), *passim*; with many other writers between 1760 and 1800.

The quotations which follow are not without interest:

"Was you ever in Dovedale?" Lord Byron (1817), *Works* (1837-1840), vol. iii., p. 360.

"I understand that Pillans is to be succeeded by Carson, whom, if I am not mistaken, you saw while you was at Edinburgh." Professor Dugald Stewart (after 1819), in *Dr. Parr's Works* (1823), vol. vii., p. 552.

Byron, it may be surmised, picked up *was* you in Scotland, where, as I know from my own observation, it is still used by persons fairly well educated.

Writing of *was*, I am reminded of the barbarisms I were and *he were*, indicative; often heard, here in Suffolk, from rustics when, in addressing their superiors, instead of speaking naturally, they aim to speak elegantly. A neighbor of mine, a cottage-woman, giving her opinion of a clergyman, an Oxford graduate, who had lately visited her parochially, remarked that he could have had but little schooling. By way of a reason for this conclusion, she added that he had said, "I was there the other day." I asked whether she preferred "I were." "Of course," was her reply. The very elementary lesson in grammar which I thereupon ventured had, however, the effect, I perceived, of only convincing her that I was as great an ignoramus as the Oxonian cleric. This result was not wholly unexpected.

Your obedient servant,

F. H.

MARLBOROUGH, ENGLAND, Feb. 10, 1892.

#### AUGHT AND NAUGHT.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: Surely there can be no disputing Mr. Hampel's account of the misuse of *aught* for *naught*; but his conclusion, that it may be "about time to recognize usage" as justifiable, may be questioned. *Naught* means *nothing*: will even the use of *aught* one hundred times instead of ninety-nine make *aught* mean *nothing*? In *adder*, *apron*, *auger*, *umpire*, the dropping of the first letter has led to no confusion. Shall we use *aught* for *nothing*, and say of an empty argument, or an empty bottle, that there is *aught* in it? You supply "one classical use of *aught*." Why only one, if the spelling of Hosea Biglow is to be considered classical? There are four such classicalities in the two lines you quote: *wy* instead of *why*, *aught* for *naught*, *fredum* for *freedom*, and *twuz* for *twas*.

W. J. LINTON.

NEW HAVEN, CONN., February 26, 1892.

[Though but lookers-on in this discussion, we may observe that *aught* and *naught* present no greater contradiction than *either* and *neither*. Yet when Defoe writes, "However, I do not tell you that this was all at once neither," and we rewrite "—all at once either," precisely the same sense is conveyed. So "I can but believe," "I cannot but believe," etc. Mr. Linton's other "classicalities" belong in the phonetic category, and do not call for notice in a dictionary of orthography and etymology.—ED. NATION.]

#### TOLSTOI AUTOGRAPHS FOR STARVING RUSSIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: I have two autograph letters from Count L. N. Tolstol, the famous author. Autographs of Count Tolstol are rare, and I should like to sell these for the benefit of the starving Russian peasants.

Letter No. 1, is in English, with a few words of Russian. It refers to 'Robert Elsmere,' and to the Count's own 'Walk in the Light.'