

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

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I. PRAGMATISM.¹

BY W. CALDWELL.

THERE has recently appeared as one of the publications of the University of California (a society whose activity has

¹ Read (in part) before the American Psychological Association at their last annual meeting, at Yale University, 28th-30th December, 1899. Several of the papers of this Association, of the last two or three years, have reflected an interest in the question of the relation of *non-rational* (emotional and volitional) to *rational* (intellectual, conceptual) factors in the formation of opinion and belief, and of the relation of *theory* to *practical procedure* in both logic and metaphysic—an interest to be associated, of course, with (among other things) the reception accorded (in philosophical as well as in general literature) to recent writings of Mr. G. H. Romanes (*Thoughts on Religion*), Mr. Huxley (*the Romanes Lecture*, with its sharp opposition between the moral will and natural law), Mr. Arthur Balfour, Prof. Andrew Seth, Prof. William James, not to mention their intellectual associates in other countries such as Fouillée and Brunetière and some of the French writers on moral and social psychology, and in Germany Sigwart and Simmel and Deussen, and Encken, etc. At the 1897 meeting (at Cornell University), Prof. J. G. Hibben of Princeton read a paper upon Mill and Romanes (regarding the formation of opinion), and the interest excited was such that, at the suggestion of Prof. James Seth (then of Cornell) the general question of the relation of *Will* to *Belief* was made the leading topic for discussion at the New York meeting of 1898. The *International Journal of Ethics* for January and April, 1899 (in an article by Prof. Dickinson Miller, and a discussion by H. Rutgers Marshall and the present writer) and the *Proceedings of the Association* reflect and publish some of the opinions brought forward on that occasion. Meantime the manifesto of Prof. James appeared, of which (for it has an interest and importance out of all proportion to its size and scope), a consideration is

already resulted in publications¹ of value to philosophy) a pamphlet by Prof. James, entitled *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*, that has "the uncommon merit of being its author's chief or only express treatment of the question of philosophical method".² In what follows I intend to keep in view the justifications as well as the limitations of the point of view therein termed *Pragmatism*. I welcome the very expression not only as giving a name to a point of view revealed in this pamphlet and in that important volume of essays called *The Will to Believe*, but as characterising to some extent a few of the various tendencies of what is being called by critics³ as well as by apologists⁴ the "New Ethical Philosophy". I have elsewhere written upon this so-called new "ethical" philosophy under the title of "Philosophy and the Activity Experience"⁵ indicating thus by my very title as well as (I hope) by my conclusions that I prefer on the whole to think of the use that philosophy may make of certain facts that have been emphasised and re-emphasised by recent psychology and epistemology than of a new philosophy. It is at once true that every age or generation may be said to have its characteristic philosophy, and yet at the same time that there is throughout the ages only one philosophy or metaphysic—the science of the categories or of the points of view from which the world may be regarded. Philosophy is continually enriching itself in a material regard by including within its synthesis the accredited discoveries of science and of scientific method, and is a formal regard by the elaboration of a greater internal coherence between its different parts or doctrines, and between these doctrines and the logical whole of which they form part. For example, a whole realm of fact and a whole realm of theory have been opened up in the present

attempted in this article. Some of its ideas are mentioned by Prof. Watson in the *International Journal of Ethics* (July 1899, "The New 'Ethical' Philosophy"—an article professing to be occasioned by my article in the same Journal for July, 1898, on "Philosophy and the Activity Experience"), but are not treated with the same fullness as are the ideas of Mr. Balfour and Prof. A. Seth.

¹ To wit *The Conception of God*—a discussion by Prof. Royce and others, and Prof. Watson's *Christianity and Idealism*.

² *Philosophical Review*, March, 1899.

³ E.g., by Prof. Watson, in the article mentioned in the first footnote.

⁴ See e.g., Discussion in the *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1900, by Rev. Jas. Lindsay.

⁵ I do not wish to be understood as drawing any such absolute distinctions between an older and a newer idealism as Prof. Watson and Rev. Jas. Lindsay would seem to suggest.

century, that enable philosophy to overcome at least partially that Dualism between Reason and Will with which Kant left us in his two great *Critiques*, although that Dualism still survives in the case of those who seem to think that they can save the reality of some important facts (e.g., religious experience, or social progress) by attempting to put them on a supra-rational or anti-rational basis, or in the case of some others who seem to think that they render philosophy service by insisting upon the difference between philosophy proper (or metaphysic) as an explanation of the world for the intellect¹ and a common-sense (?) account of the world as we apprehend it in our practical experience—overlooking altogether the fact that has recently been so completely re-demonstrated by Mr. Bradley that: "*The mere intellect has shown itself*

¹ There is a trace of this sharp distinction in Prof. Watson's article, although he is careful to guard against misinterpretation. He is quite right in insisting that philosophy is not experience but the theory of experience, and quite right in insisting upon the difference between philosophy and art and life and religion, etc. But even this line of reflexion may be pursued too far, for I am afraid that Prof. Watson's excessive care to insist that "truth" is never "reality," and "reality" is never "truth," and that there "can be no philosophy which does not presuppose the reality of which it is the theory" might leave upon the minds of some readers an impression that "reality" is somehow "outside" thought (an idea which he of course would rightly regard as pernicious and fatal, if it is not absurd). I mean that philosophy should profess to be more than a mere study of truth, that it should profess to study reality and should claim to give the only genuinely objective and universally true statement about reality. The world always will (and its instinct in this cannot be called unsound or impertinent) insist upon its right to take the results of metaphysicians *en bloc* and to test them in the light of the version of reality that they seem to countenance. It still judges, e.g., of the English neo-Hegelian metaphysic as giving men a shadowy rather than a substantial account of the real (as giving a "stone" when they ask for "bread")—a criticism that cannot be turned by the assertion that philosophy can never give anything but a conceptual analysis of reality. If it cannot, men will reject philosophy, and where then can they go? for nowhere else can they get anything but particularised and limited accounts of reality—statements rather about particular sets of relations in the world than about the world as a whole. It does not (to take an example of Prof. Watson's, p. 431) seem to me "an abandonment of philosophy altogether" to tell people that, "if we are to lay hold upon reality and lift ourselves out of the flux of phenomena, we must do so by a species of assurance different from knowledge" (he here quotes some "ethical" idealist). This last statement might be a perfectly natural corollary of a doctrine of the real (a doctrine that seems to be increasingly obtaining credence), i.e., the doctrine that the real ultimately consists of the activities of personal beings (or beings destined to become personal). Philosophy is a reflexion upon the world as a whole and upon all kinds of experience, volitional as well as cognitive—even if volitional experience represents something that is done rather than thought.

incompetent to explain all phenomena,"¹ i.e., that (in the language of Kant as rightly explained by Schopenhauer and Deussen and others) the mere intellect always leaves us with the shadow of the thing-in-itself. It is my opinion that in this so-called Pragmatism or Practicalism of Prof. James, despite the contempt that has been poured upon it by rationalistic metaphysic, we may find elements of fact and truth that with the help of a few assumptions may be generalised into important philosophical truth—truth not only about the relation of reason to will but about the relation of thought to reality.

I am aware of the various epithets by which Prof. James's "new ethical philosophy" and that of his intellectual associates have been stigmatised, such as Irrationalism, Romanticism, Disguised Scepticism, the Philosophy of Reaction or of Dogmatic Theology, the Philosophy of Authority or of Caprice, Dynamism, Voluntarism, or what not. The justification for some of these terms of reproach is perhaps more apparent in the case of Prof. James than of Prof. Andrew Seth or of Mr. Arthur Balfour, or of A. Fouillée or of Deussen and Eucken and Simmel² and others, and it is particularly fortunate for the purposes of our discussion that he should have employed such a blankly utilitarian and flatly commonplace word as Pragmatism to describe his philosophy. Philosophy, it would certainly seem, must be more than Practicalism or Pragmatism—the selection of theories of the universe that enable us to act hopefully and to be better men, although there have always been philosophers like Socrates and Fichte who could not altogether dissociate, in their thinking, philosophy and good citizenship. To be sure, students of philosophy know that all definitions of philosophy and its purposes have their justification: they all may be true under certain presuppositions. And Prof. James is one of the men who know so much about philosophy and its effects upon the human mind that anything he may choose to say about its purpose will be true if we only remember what he means by it. Our discussion however will not be solely devoted to the threading of our way through various more or less tentative descriptions of the purpose of phi-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 484.

² For Simmel see below. Deussen (like Münsterberg of Harvard) is a follower of Schopenhauer in the true sense, in believing that *reality* in "things" and in "persons" is to be found in the *will*. Eucken's well-known ethicalism or humanism warrants us in associating him with James and Pringle-Pattison and Balfour.

losophy. The business of philosophy is to explain reality or to discover the truth about the world, and of course the discovery of truth or of the highest reality includes a *methodology*, a theory of the nature of fruitful and unfruitful hypotheses. But Prof. James's Pragmatism is, when we look into it, very much more than the mere practical methodology that it seems to be. It reposes in the last resort on a theory of reality to which, judging from many appearances in contemporary scientific thought, philosophy must more and more have recourse as a basis for construction and system. Let us however outline somewhat definitely and precisely our author's standpoint.

1. This, he declares, is an adoption and development of principles laid down, some twenty years ago, by a Mr. Charles S. Peirce, "one of the most original of contemporary thinkers," in an article in the *Popular Science Monthly*, entitled "Illustrations of the Logic of Science." "To develop a thought's meaning," we are told, "we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole (!) significance." Or, "to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all." And again: "The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires". Or, more pointedly: "The *effective meaning* [what a characteristically American idea this is!] of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down [*sic*!] to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active".

After these statements about the nature and essence of Pragmatism, Prof. James proceeds to illustrate its utility as a principle of philosophy by reference to some of its consequences and applications. (1) One of these is that "to be mindful of it in philosophical discussions tends wonderfully to smooth out misunderstandings and to bring in peace". *Cela va sans dire*, although the truth of a philosophy is not proved by showing its value as an *eirenikon*. (2) Another is that two philosophical definitions or propositions or maxims whose practical consequences to all people at all time, are *identical*. This too is but a formal truth or

corollary—a novel and useful rendering of Leibnitz's principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. And (3) another is that the "whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true," it being Prof. James's opinion that all philosophy is but "words, words, words" unless the metaphysical alternatives under investigation can be shown to have alternative practical outcomes, however delicate and distant these may be. I shall deal with this third point immediately in connexion with the sixth. (4) There is, again, the position that the meaning of such philosophical abstractions as the "one" and the "many," and "substance" and the rest of the "categories" becomes clearer when we think of what may be called their practical significance, their working value. "Substance," for example, means, as Kant says, *Das Beharrliche*, that which will be as it has been, because its being is essential and eternal."¹ This is something that the philosophy of to-day must learn anew, although it is substantially one of the things that Hegel teaches in his *Logic*, wherein he may be said to prove by his whole procedure the truth of his emphatic declaration that: "The only way to make good any growth and progress in knowledge is to hold results fast in their truth."² (5) Prof. James, despite the modesty of his pretensions about his pamphlet and its tentative nature, makes little attempt to conceal the fact that with his torch of Pragmatism, with his principle of examining only hypotheses with "vital differences" and "effective meanings," he has found his way to the vision splendid—to the God and Freedom and Immortality, the *Ideas*, that lay in the depths of the forest of human experience and human knowledge all but totally concealed by the growths and overgrowths of Naturalism and Materialism. These things make life more worth living, consequently they are true and real. All the world now counts Prof. James on the side of Belief, just as it does M. Brunetière or Mr. Balfour or M. Huysmanns or Mr. Kidd, and for very much the same reasons—that both he and they

¹ This illustration I take from the *Will to Believe*, p. 80.

² I use Wallace's translation, p. 145. Readers of the *Logic* will remember another place in which Hegel characteristically insists that even the highest things must be regarded as also the most useful. In Hartmann's *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* we can see how metaphysical method may very naturally become a study of theories in the light of their practical consequences. See two articles on Hartmann by the present writer (*Philosophical Review*, September and November, 1899).

attempt to prove by some philosophy or other the legitimacy of affirming as real the objects of certain practical needs after having shown the unsatisfactoriness of the ignorance or the negations of mere science. As to all this, I have but a single remark. It is no proof of the reality of God and Immortality to say that we *will* these things to be real, unless we can prove¹ by an appeal to fact and to reason that *what we will is real*, or that by *reality* we do mean and can only mean *volitional experience* and whatever is organically related to this.

(6) There is Prof. James's claim that, if Pragmatism be true, it is after all "English" philosophy and not German philosophy that represents the true critical method, inasmuch as it is the English speaking philosophers who first introduced the idea of interpreting the meaning of conceptions by asking what difference they make for life. This however is a thing that has long been maintained by such penetrating students of English philosophy as Prof. Campbell Fraser,² and that was substantiated anew with much ingenuity and discernment by his successor Prof. Andrew Seth³ in regard to the Scottish criticism of David Hume, but it is none the less valuable to have it so incorporated into our conception of philosophy as to seem a natural admission of a true philosophical attitude. It ought to need no supremely profound insight into British philosophy to see that there, as well as everywhere else in the history of philosophical thought, men have been essentially engaged upon nothing but the one problem of investigating the real meaning for our human experience of alleged ideas and facts and principles and beliefs. It is to me but another version of this truth to maintain, as does point number three,⁴ that the proper function of philosophy is the study of the differences to us of the truth or untruth of different world-formulae. I should prefer to say (as I have indicated) that the business of philosophy is to study reality and to reduce it to its fundamental terms, but then it is nothing against the *pragmatic* view of philosophy and of reality (for I shall below insist upon this addition to James's thought) to say that it gives the average man, or the practical man, a view of the function of philosophy that commends itself to his judgment in the same terms that (in

¹ I shall try below to indicate how this may be and has in a manner been proved.

² See his *Britannica* article upon Locke, and also his edition of the *Essay*, and the life of Locke in Blackwood's "Classics".

³ See *Scottish Philosophy*.

⁴ Cf. *supra*.

accordance with the tendency of the hour) he uses in speaking of the reality of any other alleged thing. Philosophy will be real to him if it can do something! Well! it can. (7) To the enumeration of the consequences of his principle that are more or less clearly seen by Prof. James himself we may add still another consideration. It is easy to see how the principle of studying the nature of a thing through the conception of its consequences is a way of summing up that transition of human thought with which we are all now familiar—the transition from the scholastic doctrine of Essence to the Dynamism of modern science with its notion of a few different modes of one fundamental energy. It used to be said a few years ago that evolutionists, instead of telling us what things *are*, had a way of invariably trying to show us how they had *become* what they are. We have now, it seems to me, so thoroughly assimilated this tendency into our thinking that we have taken the further step of maintaining that the practical utility of things (of “substances,” “organisms,” “species,” “institutions,” “ideas”), their subserviency to the process of universal evolution is their only *raison d'être*—the only reason for their continuing to be what they are. My point now is that this principle of Pragmatism by its very name, if by nothing else, brings home to the minds of students as a *tendency of thought and method of looking at reality* this very process of substituting what may be called Teleology and the doctrine of Functional Utility for what has been called Ontology and the doctrine of Essence and Quiddities. It may not be the only thing that is doing so, but it is at least doing so.

II. The philosophical bases and affinities of these ideas may be more apparent if we think of some facts and tendencies revealed by the science and the criticism of this century with which they may naturally be associated. (1) There is, first of all, the fact so strongly emphasised and so completely exploited by recent psychology,¹ that all cognitive activity is at the same time volitional activity, and that consequently our “intellectual systems,” our “sets of ideas”—just like religious beliefs and cults and social customs—must

¹ E.g., by Baldwin and Stout and others—referred to by me in more detail in the July number of the *International Journal of Ethics* for 1898. The fact that intellectual development is a continual growth in motor accommodation and in practical inventiveness is, to my mind, brought out more fully by Baldwin (the two volumes on *Mental Development*) than by any one else. See an article on his *Social and Ethical Interpretations* by Prof. Dewey, in the *New World*, September, 1898, and one by me in the *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1899.

be regarded as competitive action-tendencies whose validity and truth may be demonstrated by their power to survive in the life of the race. “The fittest conceptions survive, and with them the names of their champions,” says James.¹ If all this be true, as it undoubtedly is, it is certainly natural to conclude that an important clue to the meaning of a thought may be found—the influence it wields over the life of man, in its relative efficiency or inefficiency. “It is far too little recognised how entirely the intellect is made up of practical interests.” Mr. Peirce (to Prof. James the champion of Pragmatism) even maintains that the “sole motive and function of thought” is to “produce action and volition” through the intermediary help of “belief”—belief being, in his eyes, only a “stadium” of mental action, and not the goal of thought. This is apt to strike the student of philosophy as going somewhat too far, although a moment’s reflexion upon the history of civilisation will perhaps convince us that the persistence (merely as an instinct) of the metaphysical impulse is intelligible only on the ground of its organic connexion with the highest interests of the human race as a whole. I have no intention of confounding the metaphysic of knowledge with the psychology of thinking,² but it is simply a most pertinent question whether the reality of that section of metaphysic³ called *teleology* has not in our day been vitally strengthened by the discovery of the fact that *all thinking is necessarily teleological*—the search for the intermediary steps in a process, the discovery of means to an end or of the relations between certain events and certain other events, the discovery of the relation of “external” events (or of external nature itself) to the world of our activity, etc. The Pure Reason of the early Kantian writers in Germany and in England has been reduced to being simply

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 93.

² I.e., the question of the necessary categories of knowledge as knowledge with the fact pointed out, e.g., by Dr. Stout in the words “simple attentiveness tends to pass into equation,” or by Sigwart (*Logic*, vol. ii., pp. 548-549), “the ultimate basis of all the mental activities, for the right conduct of which we seek a clue in methodology, is a will which sets below itself definite ends; and to this is due the motive force which impels us to investigation, while the most general principles of the investigation are derived from the ends pursued by it.” I have such faith in the reality of metaphysic that I believe its positions to be good irrespective of the psychology of the discovery of truth by the individual. On the other hand the wise metaphysician will never care to philosophise in ignorance of certain accredited facts, say those of biology and psychology about the utility and tendencies of knowledge.

³ See my *Schopenhauer's System in Its Philosophical Significance*, chapts. iii., iv. and ix.

our power of reflecting upon and analysing the conditions of experience as a whole, *i.e.*, of the nature of the world-process as related to our experience and our action; and we have thus retained the main principles of the doctrine of Criticism while at the same time letting go our hold of the crude psychology of Kant. (2) Biology has gone even farther than psychology in proclaiming that the end and purpose of all thinking, of all brain development and mental contrivance, of all morality, indeed, is action and evolution. In its eyes, as in the eyes of sociology, the supremacy of philosophy and the arts and science, consists in the fact of their having raised man to his present position from the condition of the animal or the subconscious man. We shall, however, again face this fact in thinking of Prof. James's conception of the function of philosophy as the selection of "vital hypotheses" and of his implicit claim that truth itself is not absolute but relative.¹ (3) It has been discovered by social psychology that the adoption of the social standpoint, the imitation (even before we can understand them) of the habits and customs and "reactions" of other people, is demonstrably necessary to the mental development of the individual.² It is thus no new thing for us to adopt intellectual points of view and mental attitudes that have come to us, first of all by way of practical exigency or unconscious natural "suggestion". We have from childhood been compelled to use our intellectual powers to imitate, and devise means to the execution of "reactions" that are suggested to us by our associates. There is already in vogue a way of writing out the history of philosophy, the history of leading ideas about man and the universe, from the standpoint of the moral and social needs of men at different times and places.³ (4) The logic of

¹ See the reference to Simmel, below.

² Cf. Mr. Balfour's perception of the importance of social relations and social "reactions" to the development of the religious consciousness. . . . "Religion works, and to produce its full results, must needs work through the agency of organised societies. It has therefore a social side, and from this its speculative side cannot, I believe, be kept wholly distinct," *Foundations of Belief*, p. 259 (italics mine).

³ The names and works of Profs. Eucken and Ziegler and Hoffding and of Mr. A. W. Benn and others, suggest themselves at once as proof of this tendency, not to mention the recent important prize essay (published in the current numbers of *MIND*) by Dr. F. Tönnies, which insists so thoroughly on the influence of the social will on the formation and differentiation of metaphysical conceptions. Dr. A. Kenyon Rogers of the University of Chicago has recently written a *Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, that openly professes to connect the "presuppositions of philosophy" with our "ordinary beliefs and practical needs". Doubtless a thorough knowledge of the life of the Middle Ages would reveal the

science may be said to afford a certain confirmation of the basis of Pragmatism. "The truth at which scientific thought arrives," says Clifford,¹ "is not that which we can ideally contemplate without error, but that which we may act upon without fear; and you cannot fail to see that scientific thought is not an accompaniment or condition of human progress, but human progress itself." Or Dr. Carstanjen of Zurich, in an article² upon the philosophy of Avenarius, "The presupposition of every science . . . must not only be theoretically correct in itself, it must also agree both in itself and in the consequences to be deduced from it, with practical life"—words that only too truly express the principle upon which Avenarius works out his conception of the nature of philosophy by determining its relation to human effort. Or, as Mr. Peirce³ puts it: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate it is what we mean by the truth." This sentence if conceived in its broadest possible significance, if writ "in large letters" as a Platonist would say, would be true of even philosophy itself, for philosophy must certainly be able to make a synthesis of the truth of science with the realities and tendencies of human action.⁴ Metaphysic, we might say, is nothing if not practical; it is the one science that goes to work without any presuppositions, the one science that endeavours to find out what things really are as distinct from what they appear to be from particular or prescribed points of view. It would somehow always seem to be part of the duty of the metaphysician to insist, as does Simmel⁵ in a recent article, that the separation

connexion between the "vermiedlate discussions" of the Schoolmen and practical needs.

¹ *Lectures and Essays* ("Aims of Scientific Thought"), p. 109 (italics mine).

² *MIND*, October, 1897, p. 453.

³ *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, 1878, vol. xii., p. 300.

⁴ This is obviously Prof. Sidgwick's idea of the work of philosophy, as expressed in a recent article ("The Relation of Ethics to Sociology" in the *International Journal of Ethics* (October, 1899). Philosophy he therein describes as a contemplation of the "whole of human thought—whether concerned with ideals ['of what ought to be'] or empirical facts" ["about the actual relations of men regarded as members of societies"]. And Prof. Ladd's when he says (*Theory of Reality*, p. 21), "What is true of the sciences which deal with things is equally true of the sciences which deal with minds, or with both minds and things. They all both assume and demonstrate the truthfulness of certain conceptions, in their application to the concrete realities with which they have to deal."

⁵ "Über eine Beziehung der Selektionslehre zur Erkenntnistheorie," *Archiv f. Phil.*, Bd. i., Heft. 1, p. 34.

of conceptual truth from practical results rests upon prejudice, and that true ideas are really successful ideas—ideas that prove themselves fruitful.

(5) Of course it is now only too well known that so far as the "legitimacy of the argument from consequences" is concerned, Prof. James's Pragmatism may be associated with the positions of Prof. A. Seth and Mr. Arthur Balfour, both men in whom this agreement is connected with a general metaphysic of reality and a general theory of knowledge. "The *ultima ratio*," says Prof. A. Seth,¹ "of every creed, the *ultima ratio* of truth itself, is that it *works*; and no greater condemnation can be passed upon a doctrine or system than that if it were true *human life as it has been lived by the best of the race* would cease to be reasonable." And again, "The ethical life has also its certainties and postulates; and a man is not necessarily erasing truth, when he rejects a creed, because it has no place within it for these postulates of the ethical or spiritual life which are to him the most fundamental certainties of all." Nor is he convicted of prejudice, because he avows that the defence of these postulates is the motive of his speculative inquiry. And as for Mr. Balfour, the whole of his *Foundations of Belief* may be regarded as an illustration of what in the spirit and in the letter of Prof. James's pamphlet we may call the "definite differences" that result from the truth or the untruth of different systems of thought. (6) Lastly it might doubtless be said that Pragmatism is manifestly in harmony with the sound instinct of mankind to judge of any tree or growth by its fruits or absence of fruits. This instinct is so deeply rooted in human nature, that there never is a time when some form of Criticism, be that literary or artistic or philosophical, does not proceed upon the idea of its essential soundness and rationality.

Enough has perhaps been said to show us that we may (I think) accept Pragmatism as a real enough thing, i.e., a real enough thing in the light of what it purports to be and evidently is (to a large extent) and in the light of the philosophical and scientific and common-sense tendencies with which it can most naturally be associated, and in the light of the many important conclusions to which it leads. Taken at its face value, taken as a working principle, it is good as far as it goes. Nearly everything that it represents is good

¹ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 307 (italics partly mine).

² *Ibid.*, p. 308.

and valuable and ought certainly to be part of a true philosophy of life and reality. Again and again, however, we have found that it seems to repose upon a certain view of the "real" that cannot be even described without examining many of the assumptions of Pragmatism.

III. That Pragmatism is impossible as a working philosophy without certain important assumptions may be apparent from some of the following reflexions. (1) To argue from our actions or "reactions" to the existence of what we think to be their necessary conditions or "objects" presupposes at least, as Mr. Balfour¹ puts it, "a harmony of some kind between our inner selves and the universe of which we form a part". It involves what Scottish metaphysicians of the common-sense school would term an argument "from thought to being," or Cartesians an inference from the *ordo idearum* to the *ordo rerum*. (2) It also involves a thorough-going criticism of our needs and desires and imagined satisfactions. The ideas of God and Immortality may be on a certain and by no means uncommon interpretation of things merely some of the many fictions that have no validity on their own account, but merely a utility or service in view of "the life that now is"—the tendency, e.g., to foster prudence or altruism. Of these and similar considerations Mr. James makes no explicit recognition. (3) The Argument from Consequences presupposes that we know all, or nearly all, the effects that the truth of a given theory about the universe might conceivably have upon ourselves, and also a criterion of desirable and undesirable, good and evil, consequences. Of what kind of consequences would Prof. James have us think in estimating the value of theories? Immortality as the mere continuation, in an infinite straight line, of our individuality or personal identity, means very little to many good and wise people. Nietzsche and others of his ilk write of the utility of wickedness by way of trampling under foot certain anæmic forms of goodness, and Zola has recently praised to the skies the infinite value of mere *fecundité*. A Renaissance pope used to speak of the good ("definite" and "particular," doubtless) that "this Jewish legend" has done to "us popes". On the other hand it was probably owing to the apparent absence of "definite" and "particular" results, that the scientific friends of J. S. Mill deplored his being drawn for a time to Wordsworth. Is there with Prof. James no criterion of consequences other than their *particularity* and *definiteness*

¹ *Foundations of Belief*, p. 247.

and tangibility? A criterion of consequences is provided, e.g., by the conception of *Justice* in Plato's *Republic* or by the idea of a *Kingdom of Ends* in Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*; and these philosophers moreover offer us a metaphysic of being that tends to show how the existence of a moral kingdom of beauty and justice is implied not only in the simplest forms of human association but even in the constitution of External Nature.

(4) The highest form of the Argument from Consequences is, if we think accurately, the argument known in logic and metaphysic as the dilemma. Prof. James might perhaps do well to think of strengthening his philosophy by connecting it with its true theoretical basis. But the strength of the dilemma or of Hypothetical Reasoning or of Indirect Proof lies in the claim to have an exhaustive knowledge of possibilities or alternatives.¹ To know with absolute exactitude and exhaustiveness about the possibilities for conduct afforded by different philosophical hypotheses would imply at least an exhaustive knowledge of the points of view from which conduct and the universe may be regarded. This however implies the Transcendentalism or the Metaphysic of the Categories of which Prof. James has so sorry an opinion. It also implies the existence of ethical norms and conceptions and perhaps the teaching of history and the guiding force of heredity and the principle of continuity. But of all this Prof. James in his practical contempt for *Apriorism* in all its forms takes very slight recognition.

(5) It looks like a philosophical error for him to distinguish, as he does, between the future consequences and the past necessities of action, holding that the former alone are of vital and spiritual importance to us while the latter may or may not have had spiritual significance. "As far as the past facts go, indeed, there is no difference. These facts are bagged [is not the phraseology too recklessly sportive?], are captured; and the good that's in them is gained, be the atoms, be the God their cause." And again, "Theism and materialism, so indifferent when taken retrospectively, point when we take them prospectively to wholly different, practical consequences, to opposite outlooks of experience". And again, "... But I say that such an alternation of feelings, reasonable enough in a consciousness that is pro-

¹The whole development of the dilemma as a logical argument seems to me to depend upon the fact that the *alternatives* in a disjunctive proposition (the minor premiss in a dilemma) should always be regarded as exhaustive. They are always such in a true "universe (or sphere) of thought," whatever they may be in a "universe of discourse".

spective, as ours now is, and whose world is partly yet to come, *would be absolutely senseless* [!] and irrational in a purely retrospective consciousness summing up a world already past. Now on what theory of things is it that the future of the world and our future may be affected by ideal elements and factors (God, Freedom, Recompense, Justice) without having been so affected or determined in the past. One of the supreme difficulties of Pragmatism as presented in this pamphlet is that Prof. James often writes as if the world that is round about us were sufficiently explained by the entities and laws of physical science, and as if our moral life were sufficiently explained as a part of the "scientific" order of the world.¹ Then, strange to say, he asks us to turn around and think out the consequences of introducing into this palpably godless and purely mechanical world certain entities and points of view whose bare existence is unnecessary to the world as we know it to be and to have been. Does he not see that from the very nature of the case *nous n'avons pas besoin de ces hypotheses là*—to adapt the words of Laplace to Napoleon. It is true that Prof. James mentions the fact of certain great men like Dante and Wordsworth having throughout their lives lived in the actual consciousness of the reality of a spiritual order, and it is also true that he elsewhere² hints at the necessity of including our spiritual and moral reactions in the sum total of real things, i.e., in our very conception of reality. It is also true that he is sometimes simply stating the case for Materialism and consequently describing the world in terms of mechanical and biological categories and at another time stating the case for Idealism and consequently throwing out vivid pictures of the world in terms of the glories of God's providence and of our dearest affections. But (6) this vacillation apart, it is never altogether clear what his own conception of the real nature of the world would be were he called upon to state it frankly and freely. His writings, taken as a whole, may have the incidental effect of making us think of our theories of the *nature* of the world in terms of our theories about the *purpose* or outcome of the world, but he never himself gives a statement of what the world *now is* in the light of what it is *becoming to be*. To do so would obviously imply a philosophy enabling him to establish the "ideal order" as a part of the "real order".

¹I am aware, of course, that this is an error into which even such a profound philosopher as Kant sometimes fell.

²In "Reflex Action and Theism" in the *Will to Believe*.

of things. Before we can be sure about the consequences to our experience of certain theories or of the truth of certain theories it is absolutely necessary to have in our minds a uniformly working conception of what our experience is. At one place he emphasises the fact that the experience by which we test theories and propositions must be *particular*.¹ and at another he seems to assign no limit to the experience that may be ours if we but have the conviction of the reality in the world of certain ideal things. "The notion of God, on the other hand, *however inferior it may be in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical philosophy*,² has at least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees an ideal order (how much better this is than definite and particular consequences! that shall be permanently preserved." (7) These very words *inferior in clearness* and *withal practical superiority* are only too suggestive of the difficulties that arise in the minds of metaphysicians in consequence of Prof. James's comparative neglect to give a uniform statement or theory of the real nature of experience and of his neglect to offer us a valid reason for sacrificing *theoretical inferiority to practical superiority*. The real question is not, as he puts it: "And how, *experience being what it is once for all* [i.e., godless and 'brutish' and 'short'—how fatal!], would God's presence in it make it any more 'living,' any 'richer' in our sight?" but: "Is there anything Divine about experience as it now is?" for surely if the world is fixed and determined as it is without God, it is supremely idle to bring in anybody or anything to make it different. To do so would also be illogical,³ for as logicians know men never invent absolutely groundless hypotheses. We must have at least *some* ground in experience for believing in a divinity that "shapes our ends" ere we can logically talk of the theistic philosophy as what Prof. James calls a "vital hypothesis".

It would be perfectly in order for Prof. James to attempt by some philosophy or other to show that the Good Life and Goodness may be demonstrated to be the supreme

¹ Cf. *supra*, sec. i. One of the worst phases of the Materialism of to-day is its impossible faith in the actuality of certain isolated *particular* things. The more resolutely we search for the indubitably *particular* and the merely individual, the more surely do we find that nothing exists unto or for itself. As Mr. Bradley said long ago (*Logic*, p. 63): "It is an illusion to suppose that by speaking of 'events' we get down to real and solid particulars, and leave the region of universal adjectives".

² Italics mine.

³ As Mr. Bosanquet puts it (*Logic*, i., 287), "Every hypothetical judgment is affirmed only within an actual system".

reality and the supreme force of the world, or—to avoid the pitfalls that beset the attempt to insist upon any one thing as more real than any other thing—to be simply the most intelligible,¹ the most fairly and squarely perceived aspect or phase or tendency of reality; and, consequently, that any philosophy which cannot rise to the perception of the absolute and eternal character (even in this world, *Denn alle Schuld rächt sich auf Erden*) of goodness and of that which makes goodness possible is demonstrably no philosophy. No one, he might say, surely thinks that he *perceives* or that he *could perceive* such things as atoms or primal unicellular organisms or pure undifferentiated energy. Consequently it would be absurd to explain the world by these fictions, not to mention the immeasurable difficulty of the step from gravitation and cohesion and the war of organisms to moral and social evolution and to the effort to transform the physical basis of life into something intrinsically higher. But contrary to all this, as we read Prof. James's Pragmatism we are never free from the uncanny suspicion that Nature may conceivably, nay, very conceivably overturn all our ideal dreams and ideal politics and systems—for the plain reason that so far as the present is concerned she is at least as real as these things, and so far as the past is concerned, *we hypothesise* a good deal more real, and that, so far as the future is concerned, we have as yet no rational theory of the possibility of its being essentially different from present or past. In other words what we have in Prof. James is a psychological philosophy of action, a statement of some of the ideas that constitute the most potent *stimuli* to action—with, however, the underlying presumption that human volition is so far from being different from physical action and reaction that it is by the progress of science being every day more and more closely

¹ I mean that the reality of the active intelligent self is after all much more intelligible than the reality of any so-called external thing, for "things" somehow "go to pieces" in our hands as we study them either from the common-sense or the scientific standpoint. Or, as we say, so many "contradictions" (Herbart is quite right in making philosophy start at this point) arise in regard to their reality and function (utility) and "independence" that we are soon driven into interpreting (and this "interpreting" is not the mere analogical argument it is sometimes taken to be) them in terms of the reality of the active self that we know in ourselves. And as to the most real thing about this "self" of ours, we soon come to the conclusion or philosophical commonplace expressed by a recent writer on metaphysic thus: "The highest and worthiest selfhood with which man has acquaintance is the Self that is self-active in pursuit of the ideals of knowledge, of conduct, of art, and of religion"—Prof. Ladd, *Theory of Reality*, p. 399.

assimilated¹ to the type of reflex action. "We seem," in fact, "driven to infer a . . . rigid determination of the psychical concomitants [of our actions], to admit with Huxley, 'the banishment from all regions of human thought and activity of what we call spirit and spontaneity.'" Thus our "last state," our response to ideas and theories that bid fair to emancipate us from the "bondage" to which we have "all time been subject" as creatures of a purely naturalistic evolution in a purely physical universe, turns out to be "worse than the first" state of an at least possible choice between "hypotheses with different practical consequences". The moral life is seen to be but a fugitive dream in the brain of unconscious nature and our spiritual house is left unto us absolutely "desolate"—an edifice all but too light to be dragged to earth by the force of universal gravitation.

εἶπατε τῷ βασιλεῖ, χαμαὶ πέσε δαίδαλος αὐλά.

IV. It might seem at first sight impossible to supply the theory of reality with which the method of Pragmatism must be associated in order to become part of a true philosophy, without laying down, at least in outline, a whole scheme of constructive philosophy. It is however unnecessary to think of anything so vast and so difficult. No one who studied modern psychology to any purpose has much difficulty in perceiving and grasping the truth of the proposition that from the psychological standpoint reality means simply *that which is in verifiable relation to our active and sensitive life*.² Similarly, any one who has persistently studied and reflected upon the "Mechanical Theory" as a doctrine of reality has become convinced that (in the language of Prof. Jas. Ward): "It is far truer to say that the universe is a *life* than to say that it is a *mechanism*". And, as for biology and the evolution theory, an examination of their logic and philosophy, an examination even of their elementary conceptions (*cell*, *egg*, and *organism* and *reflex action* and the *formation of nuclei*, and *differentiation*, etc.), will convince any fair-minded person of the impossibility of proceeding far in their domain without the help of teleological assumptions, *i.e.*, without the help of theories about the relation of facts and processes to their consequences, or the relation of elements

¹ Prof. James represents this assimilation in the essay (in the *Will to Believe*) on "Reflex Action and Theism".

² Prof. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii., p. 6.

³ One of the most convincing expositions of this truth has always seemed to me to be the chapter on the "Perception of Reality" in the second volume of Prof. James's *Principles of Psychology*.

to their wholes. Then, again, the very logic of science, as has been suggested above, shows us that all scientific laws and hypotheses are teleological in the sense that they have to do with *purposes*, (α) because they are *hypotheses* and because "every¹ hypothesis is a means to an end, a theoretical organon that *may or may not work*," and (β) because all hypotheses rest upon the supreme hypothesis that Nature will conform to the conditions of our intelligence. All of these considerations are becoming increasingly evident to men of science who are at all aware of the presuppositions and functions of science, and who know enough about the history of science to see that the idea of *substance*, the idea of different substances in different individual things and the idea of a substance is general for the whole universe, flies before us as we contemplate it or as we investigate its alleged reality, and is actually *disappearing* into the idea of *causality* or the conception (or fact) of measurable energy or modifiable life-process. In particular they are all perfectly well known to Prof. James and receive from him the most explicit kind of recognition in his writings.² Why is it however that he cannot, as it were, generalise these results of observation and reflexion into a philosophy of the real on the strength of which as a basis he might maintain, *re* Pragmatism, that it is the most natural thing in the world to consider the consequences of theories as part of their very nature, part of their very *data*, seeing that the only possible aim of all theories is to explain the activity and the evolution that is in process all around us—that is in fact the essential nature of all reality?

Doubtless, he might urge, for the reason that it is all well enough to say what reality is for purposes of science or psychology or logic, but that it is quite another thing to say what reality is in itself, *i.e.*, we must be able to prove on independent principles that reality is that which sustains a more or less verifiable and determinable relation to our activity, ere we can reach the highest possible use of the Method of Pragmatism with its ideas of the selection of fruitful hypotheses. But this is exactly what German Metaphysic³ (let Prof. James) of its "conse-

¹ Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, (p. 10, *op. cit.*).

² I am thinking especially of his *Principles of Psychology*.

³ I am perfectly aware that Prof. James, if his eye should ever happen to fall upon these pages, would in all probability (*i.e.*, judging from his claim that "English" philosophy has rendered German philosophy superfluous) withdraw his attention at this very stage. My only claim upon him would be to think of the Kantian Idealism in the light of its

quences" ere he speak disparagingly of its "nature"!) from the time of Leibnitz to that of Schopenhauer has enabled us to do; it is this that constitutes its permanent contribution to the thought of humanity. "Before Kant¹ we were in Time; now Time is in us," and so on with Space and Cause and Substance and the rest of the categories. Before the time of Kant our lives were construed as subjected to the limitations represented by these categories; now we see that the whole *idea* of these points of view about *things* is drawn from our consciousness of our mental and physical activity. It is in the writings of Kant and Hegel, in particular, that we find that complete logical justification for considering the necessities and conditions of our active experience as part of the actual texture and nature of what men regard as *reality*, for it is they alone who have shown conclusively that the activity of the subject and self or agent is implied in the bare existence of "external" reality. I am further of the opinion that it is only Schopenhauer² who has put in our hands that real statement (*viz.*, that *reality*, *Wirklichkeit* is through and through *will*—not merely *life* but *will*) about the nature of reality which enables us to meet the objections of those who rightly refuse to stop at a definition of reality beginning (as do the usual epistemological or Kantian definitions of reality as "that which is constituted into an intelligible system by the activity of a synthetic consciousness") with a "that which". Reality is not merely *that which* is related in definite and verifiable ways to my thought and my activity, to my experience; reality is *will*, not blind will (as Schopenhauer seems at first to say) but *will* in any and all of its grades from inertia and gravity upwards through cohesion and chemical affinity and reflex and vital action (nutrition, reproduction) to intended or *motived* and moral action: reality is known to me *directly* in the activity of my own body and "will" (the "body" is simply objectified will, and the "mind" simply internalised will—the 'first realisa-

effects—particularly that of opening the eyes of so many men all over the western world to a *perception* of the theoretic absurdity of mere materialism.

¹ This is literally true so far as modern philosophy in Europe is concerned, though Indian philosophy had been free from the trammels of Time and Space for generations.

² For two reasons if for no other. In him, above all other post-Kantian philosophers, do we find the ultimate origin and the *complete proof* of the ideas (1) that *substantiality* is through and through *causality*, and (2) that we *cannot* think of an "activity" in the outer world save in terms of the "activity" that constitutes our own lives.

tion of a body, etc.," as Spinoza and Aristotle, respectively, saw), for I observe in my body the operation of all physical and chemical and vital processes, and I experience *in my conscious action* that reintegration and redistribution of physical force by moral force which in its higher and its collective forms ("civilisation," "religion," "art,") is literally the spiritualisation of the entire universe. It is thus indeed the most natural thing in the world to study theories in the light of their consequences for the simple reason that *from the very nature of reality* no theory about the real can be anything else than a statement about certain *tendencies*, certain *successions*, *antecedents* and *consequents*, certain *actions* and *reactions*, certain modes of the manifestation of the force or life or will that is in nature and in history. There can *ceteris paribus*¹ be nothing illogical in the tendency to estimate hypotheses by their practical consequences, for the world of reality consists of nothing but happenings and sequences and the manifestations of the struggle for life and the motived or purposeful actions that constitute the moral order.²

¹ *I.e.*, The other *desiderata* about a criterion of consequences or the Idea of the Good, referred to above, being granted.

² Of course, as I have indicated, this ontology, this view of reality rests upon (1) the metaphysic of Transcendental Idealism (Kantism) which has as matter of fact reduced the world of "external" reality to (a) *phenomenon*, *idea* (sensible idea), representation: *Vorstellung*—that which is presented (in consequence of the activity of the understanding) to the mind as sensible, intelligible, related, etc., etc., and (2) *manifesting activity*, *will* (force, energy in the broad and in the *real* sense). (To say that the world consists of Will and Idea expresses the ultimate truth and reality of the position of physical science—that the world consists of energy and matter—and at the same time the truth and reality of the position of philosophy—that the world consists of Reality and Appearance. Reality means—in the last resort *will*; just as appearance means *idea* (in Locke's sense, or phenomenon). But I here put forward this result of Critical Idealism as only the last step in the *cumulative argument* about reality) that is (in my opinion) afforded us by the positions of Prof. James when taken along with the logical and psychological and scientific considerations to which I have referred. Only if we take this last step can Pragmatism become not only a true theory of reality, but also a true support to that revival of the *anthropocentric* point of view about the world to which the metaphysic of the present seems (in many quarters and in many ways) to be returning. "As it [philosophy] *defends the truth of teleology in spite of former abuses of the principle*, so it has now to *champion the truth underlying the old view which made man the centre of the universe*. . . . Much current thought is *naturalistic* at heart—that is to say, it makes human nature only a part of nature in general, and seeks therefore to explain away the most fundamental characteristics of intelligence and moral life. As against this naturalistic tendency philosophy must be unflinchingly *humanistic*, anthropocentric."—Prof. A. Seth, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 60-61.

V. It is to be sincerely hoped that the coming generation of metaphysical philosophers will have lost altogether that feeling of resentment which many thinkers of to-day still cherish against what they believe to be the dishonesty or the thoroughly unphilosophical character of *any* attempt to judge of theories by their consequences or by their influence over the "will". A moment's reflexion will perhaps convince us that David Hume (confessedly one of the purest and freest intelligences not only of the Enlightenment Period but of all time) never doubted that *action, human action*, was, after all, *the thing, the entity* of which all metaphysic might be regarded as attempting an explanation. It was because knowledge and theory could not justify action that he professed a sceptical theory of knowledge. And there are signs in many other modern metaphysicians that they too *simply cannot* keep purely theoretical inquiries about the nature of things apart from questions of practical necessity. All the world knows that Kant (whose mind is almost an ultimate fact for the philosophy) *could not and did not*, however the fact is ridiculed (as by Heine and Schopenhauer and others) or explained away or justified (by Edward Caird, *e.g.*, and Prof. Adamson). As for Hegel, Prof. Ritchie (like many other expositors has recently¹ been very anxious to prove that he Hegel approached *logic* through the study of history. If we turn to Mr. F. H. Bradley whom many of us delight to honour as our modern Parmenides, we find him (partly like Hume) openly confessing that his only reason for treating of such things or topics as "God and Religion" is his *practical inability* to refrain from doing so. "If I have touched on them here it was *because I could not help it*." Why does not Mr. Bradley demand of himself a philosophy of this very fact. Surely there is no fact, no tendency, beneath the level of metaphysical inquiry. Why is it that neither he nor Hume can avoid treating of such perilous matters, or that they both concede that to treat of them at all is defensible only as the expression of an instinct? Evolution teaches us that there would be no such instinct were not "morality and religion" matters of "practical consequences," matter of *real* as opposed to *imaginary* relations between our actions and the behaviour (?) of the universe as a whole. "That a man should treat," says Mr. Bradley, "of God and religion in order merely to understand them *and apart from the influence of some other consideration and inducement* is to many of us *i.e.*, we

¹ See *Mix*, Jan. and Oct., 1899.

² *Appearance and Reality* 1st ed., p. 451.

'English' with our 'Church and State' traditions and customs and society; in part *unintelligible* and, in part also shocking." And why not? we ask of Mr. Bradley. It is unintelligible because it is *impossible*, and it is certainly shocking in so far as it is highly sensational. It may be doubted if any man has ever been able to keep theoretical questions about God and religion utterly divorced from suppositions about the dynamic efficiency of these "entities" to him or to the human race. Indeed, with the anthropology and sociology of to-day matters of God and religion have become so much matters of statement or theory regarding the necessities and actualities of moral and social development that it is almost time to revive some questions about their "structural" or "morphological" in addition to their merely functional significance.

Mr. Bradley confesses that the idea that a man cannot treat of God and religion for theoretical purposes alone has a "personally deterrent" effect on his mind. That is, he will not treat of these things because he will not "set up as a teacher or preacher". There are some of us upon whose minds the idea that God and religion could be understood theoretically (*i.e.*, solely in a theoretical way) has had and still has a "personally deterrent" effect, and we can never hear of any one trying to "theorise" (*i.e.*, in the merely abstract and conceptual sense) God and religion without a feeling of fatuity and aversion. Questions about the reality of God and religion like those about the existence of matter and force and substance and cause and atoms and cells and heredity and continuity and the social "tissue" and the social "organism" and the "one" and the "many" and heaven and hell and purgatory, for that part of it, and Realism and Idealism and Classicism and Romanticism and Impressionism and Divine Justice and Divine Love and a great many other things, never do become clear and tangible and comprehensible until we see that they are largely questions about the reality or the unreality of certain practical tendencies in human experience or in nature or in thought or in human history, etc., as the case may be, or in all of these together.

Pragmatism, then, looked at broadly, is simply the expression, in a phrase, of many important tendencies of the science and the criticism and the practice of our day. It requires however both the Criticism of the Categories and the Theory

¹ This seems to be attempted in the recent important lectures by Prof. Tiele, "Elements of the Science of Religion," *Gifford Lectures*.

of the Ideas (as reinterpreted by Aristotle and the Metaphysic of Evolution¹) to give it form and reality. It is not the one method of philosophy any more than the testing of hypotheses is the one work of science or of philosophy. In other words it is susceptible of a strong defence ~~not~~ as a method of philosophy but as a would-be theory of reality, as an attempt at an ontology through the door of a teleology — as an attempt at a theory of the real through a theory of end and purpose and "consequences". Prof. James is trying to show us how reasonable it is to regard things as we are compelled to assume them to be: he ought rather to take the ground that the manner in which we are compelled (by genuine practical and moral necessity) to assume things to be disposed is the only possible theory of their reality. This perhaps would be the true Pragmatism.

¹ With Plato the *Ideas* represent so many eternal and unchanging types or forms of being. That is, with Plato, *e.g.*, the Idea of a species is absolutely fixed and determined to all eternity. This is not so, to be sure, in evolutionary philosophy when species are regarded as *variable*. The notion of the Ideas may be therefore retained in philosophy as denoting not so much an infinite number of distinct groups or types of things as rather the different *grades* of being (see *supra*) that seem to be constituted by the different manifestations of the cosmic energy or *will* in which we believe reality to consist. Cf. my *Schopenhauer's System*, etc., pp. 108, 115.

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