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FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE

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'breadth' (for 'breath') p. 72, 'educational' (for 'educational') p. 118, and 'oculist' is spelled with a double 'c' on p. 112 and again on p. 114.

J. W. BAIRD.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

What Pragmatism Is. C. S. PEIRCE. *The Monist*, April, 1905.

This article is the first of a series of three, and consists in an exposition of 'Pragmaticism.' It is to be followed by a second, presenting examples, and by a third, which is to furnish proof and establish the truth of Synecchism. As a designation for his own views the author coins the term Pragmaticism, in place of Pragmatism, since the latter has become too broad.

The meaning of a concept is reduced to that which shall have a bearing on human conduct, and, since only experimental phenomena can have such a bearing, is confined to experimental phenomena. The significance of such phenomena is that they are general and lie in the future. Since they are general, they are not determined by this or that special purpose or accidental circumstance. They are, however, significant for rational purposes and conduct just because of this generality. Reality is defined as that which is independent of what you or I may think about it, and truth as that which represents reality. The laws of nature, for instance, are true and represent a real. Not all generals, of course, are real, nor, apparently, are all reals generals. But generals of the experimental type are real and constitute the only meanings of Pragmaticism. Pragmaticism aims at a rational conduct whereby these generals may become more and more embodied in reality, for generals are effective in the determination of human conduct.

Truth, again, is defined in terms of fixed belief, the fixation being the result of the continuation of an experimental process. It is similar to that ethical process whereby, from the anticipation of results and reflection upon them, action, by this process of self-control, becomes more and more free from the necessity of self-reproach upon reflection. It thus becomes fixed in character, or destined, and the process of self-control is no longer necessary.

As belief becomes fixed by this process of prevision and reflection, it becomes more and more independent of the accidental and merely individual, and when it has reached the point of absolute fixation, it is true and represents a real. Beliefs are thus of the habit type and mostly unconscious. Mr. Peirce emphasizes the necessity of accepting the most, at least, of our instinctive beliefs, and says that what one can not doubt must be for him the absolute truth. As I understand him, however, the mere fixation of belief by lack of stimulation or effort is not sufficient. The process is of such a type that no amount of individual aberration can prevent the final form of fixation. In this way the ultimate course of belief is destined.

The test of a concept, then, is not merely that it terminate actually or conceivably in a percept, nor that it be followed by action, but that

it represent a uniform process, that it have been built up into a fixed belief as a result of the experimental method, and that it be significant for the direction of rational conduct.

The system is thus opposed to a pure sensationism or voluntarism, but it would restrict the field of metaphysics to problems capable of solution by experimental methods.

What is the significance in this system of immediate experience and purpose? The test of a concept, at least, is that it be absolutely general, that it be indifferent to special purposes or circumstances, and the test of belief and so of truth is that it be fixed as a result of a process which is destined and is uninfluenced by individual aberration. If the reviewer correctly interprets certain forms of Pragmatism as making the criterion of truth significance for present purpose and not purpose in general, we would apparently have here a point of difference. If this process of fixation is to be absolute, must not all problems be settled before we can have a fixed belief, and so truth, and so reality of this type? Since belief tends to become unconscious as it becomes fixed, would not our test not only be in the future instead of the present, but also point to a condition of things in which experience itself had ceased to have significance and even to exist?

Reality is defined in terms of independence of what you or I may think about it, and fixed belief and so truth is said to represent reality. Probably Mr. Peirce does not intend to imply a correspondence test of truth, but if not, we still seem to have the difficulty cited above in regard to the test requiring a transcendence of individual and possibly of all experience.

HENRY A. RUGER.

COLORADO COLLEGE.

The Herbert Spencer Lecture, Delivered at Oxford, March 9, 1905, by
FREDERIC HARRISON. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Though Mr. Harrison is not a Spencerian, but a Positivist, this lecture was not intended to be controversial. By universal agreement Spencer must be considered a great philosopher; and, further, as a man with a purpose in life, from which he could not be distracted, and in which he persevered through an unremitting pressure of physical ailments, a character of a very noble type. He is the only English synthetic philosopher. How much of his system, then, can be taken as permanent?

Spencer's definition of philosophy is correct. Philosophy is the generalization of all the sciences into their ultimate coordination. And synthesis means coordination. So far Spencer and Comte agree. Evolution (not in a sense commensurate with Darwinism) is Spencer's synthetic principle. But is philosophy the science of the sciences; is such a correlation of human knowledge either possible or needful? The vogue of Spencer, the craving of the mind for some coherent system, would indicate that an ultimate generalization of human science is possible.

But, again, is Spencer's generalization the correct one, and destined