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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

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sidered in order to discover its real nature. Professor Taylor quite fails to refute the pragmatist's appeal to practical results because he does not see that the real pragmatist contention is that the intellect itself is practical throughout. Accordingly, he is unable to overcome the intellectualism of his school. The Absolute is an essential part of Professor Taylor's philosophy. He derives it from the assumption that the world is ultimately a rigid system, a perfect and complete individual in the form of an infinite experience. The Absolute is out of space and time and hence cannot develop. The doctrine of degrees of reality is a pure assumption and is quite delusive, for it is impossible in any case for the finite to attain the Absolute and impossibility has no degrees. Nevertheless, we are bidden to believe that the Absolute realizes our aspirations and satisfies our emotions. The whole doctrine of the Absolute depends on the validity of the ontological proof; viz., the transmutation of a conceptual ideal into absolute fact. Professor Taylor's proof of this is a *petitio principii*. The question is whether a subjective claim of ours has a *priori* objective validity, for clearly the ontological proof cannot be empirical. The Absolute is a postulate of the extremest and most audacious kind, made in answer to our demand for the elimination of contingency from experience. It was put forward as an existing reality which no sane intelligence can deny, and it turns out to be an emotional postulate. It fails in this respect, however, because its use depends on its *a priori* certainty, which cannot be made out. Moreover, it does not satisfy our moral needs, for it regards evil only as the necessary incompleteness of the parts of a whole. The inability of man to identify himself with the universe is not the source of human misery, nor is it a common human longing. The Absolute, therefore, is a bad postulate because it does not work, and it can continue to exist only as a personal idiosyncrasy in a few philosophic minds.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

*Issues of Pragmatism.* CHARLES S. PEIRCE. *The Monist*, XV, 4, pp. 481-499.

The author restates his former maxim of pragmatism as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. 'Critical Common-sensism,' which the author defended about nine years before his pronouncement of pragmatism, may be regarded as a consequence of the latter position. It is a variety of the philosophy of Common Sense but has six distinctive characters: (1) Critical Common-sensism admits that there are both indubitable propositions and indubitable inferences. These propositions and inferences are acritical. In reasoning we are always more or less aware of the logical grounds of our conclusions, but there are also cases where a belief is determined by another belief without the consciousness of a general principle. This is an acritical in-

ference. (2) The Scottish philosophy regarded original beliefs as unchanging, and investigation shows that the change is so gradual that one may substantially agree with Reid. (3) Original beliefs were always regarded as being closely connected with instincts, but the Scottish philosophers failed to see that they remain indubitable only in their application to affairs of primitive life. (4) The most distinctive mark of Critical Common-sensism as distinguished from the Scottish philosophy is its insistence that the acritically indubitable is invariably vague. A sign which is objectively indeterminate is objectively vague in so far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign. Anything is vague in so far as the principle of contradiction does not apply to it. (5) Critical Common-sensism attaches more value to doubt than did the Scottish philosophers. (6) It is critical because it criticises four opinions: its own, that of the Scottish School, that of thinkers who base logic or metaphysics on psychology or any other special science, and that of Kant. The scholastic doctrine of realism, another position which the author defended before he formulated pragmatism, is a necessary part of it. This means the acknowledgment that there are real general objects, real vagues, and especially real possibilities. The ultimate intellectual purport of anything consists in conceived conditional resolutions or their substance; and accordingly these conditional propositions must be capable of being true, *i. e.*, independent of being thought to be so. Pragmatism may be illustrated by its answer to the question, What is time? It is assumed that time is real and that it is a variety of objective modality. The past is the sum of *faits accomplis*, and acts on us precisely as an existent object does. The future is not actual since it acts only through the idea of it; everything is regarded as destined or undecided. The present is the nascent state between the determinate and the indeterminate. The past works upon conduct by furnishing us the data from which we start. Future facts are the only ones which we can control, and those things which are not amenable to control are those which we shall be able to control. The present can only be conative, which proves it to be, as was said before, the nascent state of the actual.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*Wundt's Doctrine of Psychical Analysis and the Psychical Elements, and Some Recent Criticism. II. Feeling and Feeling-Analysis.* EDMUND H. HOLLANDS. *Am. J. Ps.*, XVII, 2, pp. 206-226.

Two objections to Wundt's theory of feeling have recently been made. It has been held that his distinction between feelings as subjective and sensations as objective is epistemological, and not psychological. And it is also said that his reference of the unity of feeling to that of apperception, and his consequent definition of the simple feeling, make it impossible to



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