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time series,— or in a non-temporal sense, referring to the qualitative difference between the original experience, in which reality must coöperate, and the later revival of that same experience, to which the coöperation of the object is, on the theoretical side, not essential. This difference between the original experience and the retained or remembered experience is in the main irrelevant for logic, but not for psychology. An object once experienced as real retains this character of reality even though known thereafter only through memory. (*o*) The identification of reality with sense-perception, as contrasted with the ideal element in thought, shows that the distinction depends on the subject's mode of experiencing the object, not on the content of the object which coöperates in the original experience. Disputes about the relation of sense-perception to thought are largely due to a confusion of these two meanings of 'idea.' In conclusion, the author indicates briefly the application of his theory to the realization of ideas in volition. F. D. MITCHELL.

Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism. C. S. S. PEIRCE. The Monist, XVI, 4, pp. 492-546.

This article, as its title indicates, is meant to be propædeutic to a further discussion of the pragmatic theory of knowledge. It is an attempt on the part of the author to present in diagrammatic form the general course of thought. Such diagrams, he argues, will enable one to investigate the essential relations involved in a process of thought, just as the chemist, for example, investigates the molecular structure of a particular substance. Since the logician is concerned not so much with results as with the nature of the process by which they are arrived at, the diagram, to be of service to the logician, should picture distinctly the smallest step of the process so that its significance in relation to the whole may be adequately represented. Such a scheme of diagrammatization the author believes he has discovered in his system of existential graphs. He goes into a somewhat detailed discussion of this system of existential graphs, but, on account of its very technical nature, it hardly lends itself to a summary. In general, he attempts to show by analysis how this scheme of diagrammatization is suited to an adequate and thorough representation of any proposition or course of argument. By means of this scheme, also, he hopes to bring to light important truths of logic, hitherto little understood, and closely connected with the truth of Pragmaticism. Then follow certain rules by which the method of the formation and interpretation of the existential graph is to be determined. There are five such rules, or 'conventions' as the author chooses to term them. A few examples are then given to illustrate this diagrammatic reasoning, which to the author is the only really fertile reasoning. The reader is first carried through the evolution of the graph, is shown how it pictures to the eye the essential nature of the reasoning process, and finally is assisted through various steps

of interpretation. In a later paper the author purposes to show in what relation the conception of the proposition and argument, reached as a result of this system, stands to the truth of Pragmaticism.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Thought and Language. J. MARK BALDWIN. Psych. Rev., XIV, 3, pp. 181-204.

This article, which is taken from the material of Chap. vi of the author's work, *Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic*, Vol. II, "Experimental Logic," is an attempt to study the normal development of logical meanings. Viewing the problem from the standpoint of language, one notes two distinct and opposing tendencies in the various theories. (1) The personal or dynamic tendency, which considers language genetically as the vehicle of expression for thought, and looks at the problem from the personal or individual point of view. But how does language get its common meaning? This question leads naturally to (2) the social or static theory, which views the problem from the social side, and maintains that language is first common and conventional. Its problem is how such a stereotyped system of forms can become the vehicle of personal experience. The truth lies between these two extremes. Personal meanings and social meanings overlap, but do not coincide. The symbolism of common intercourse must therefore be both flexible, so that it can accommodate itself to personal experience, and static, so that it may embody the habitual and symbolized meanings of common experience. So the demand of developing thought is for a social form of expression, embodying the dual reference ('synnomic' character) of logical meanings. Language grows to meet this demand, and is thus at once personal and social from start to finish; it is the material evidence of the concurrence of social and personal judgment. Written language embodies the static, speech the dynamic aspect of thought. Thought thus having a dual reference in its development, there must be two tests of truth. On the one hand, the individual must have a means of testing the validity of proposed meanings; on the other hand, there must be a means, social in its nature, by which the hypotheses of individuals may be tried. The unit for such comparison of meanings is the unit of linguistic expression or a predicative meaning. Now analysis shows four possible cases of predicative meaning : a statement of belief (elucidation) by the speaker may be met with acceptance (elucidation) or a question (proposal) on the part of the hearer ; and a statement of question (proposal) by the speaker may be met with belief (elucidation) or a joint question (proposal) on the part of the hearer. From the social point of view, we see that thought, and so truth, is instrumental in a very important sense. The development of truth is dialectic ; the two tests in its development from proposal to elucidation are commonness and reasonableness. That is, this dialectic consists in the twofold movement from personal proposal through social judgment to personal judgment, and