

sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.

It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the consistency of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decis-

ion of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.

The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,

* * * "proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

[Translated from the French of Charles Bédard by JAS. A. MARTLING.]

IV. Music.—Art represents, under different forms, the development of spirit. It is, accordingly, the degree of spirituality in the mode of expression which assigns to each of the arts its rank, its pre-eminence, and which serves to fix its relations.

Architecture is the most imperfect art, expressing thought in a vague manner only, through forms borrowed from inorganic matter. Next, *Sculpture* represents spirit, but still as identified with the body, and only so far as corporeal form allows. *Painting* expresses the innermost and profoundest side of the soul, passion, and moral sentiment. Hence it rejects matter, in order that it may confine itself to surface. It employs visible appearance and color as a richer, more varied and more spiritual mode of expression. Nevertheless this appearance is always borrowed from the visible, extended, and permanent form.

There is in the soul a necessity for signs, for materials, more in conformity with its nature, presenting nothing fixed and extended, and where the material side wholly disappears.

This need is supplied in *Music*. Its end is to express the soul in itself, the inner sentiment, by a sign which no longer offers anything extended or material, by a sign invisible, rapid and fleeting as the movements of

soul itself. This sign, which is, however, still produced by means of matter, no more recalls extension and its forms, but is sound, the result of the undulatory vibration of bodies.

As music abandons visible forms, it addresses itself to a new organ, to the hearing, a sense more spiritual, though less contemplative, than vision. The ear perceives this unextended sign, the resultant of that vibration which leaves no trace after it, and vanishes in its expression.

By thus divesting itself of external and material form, sound is eminently fitted to be the echo of the soul and of sentiment. Accordingly, the problem of music will be to awake the innermost chords of the soul, and to reproduce all its movements and emotions.

Thereby, also, its effects are explained. Its aim is to reach the utmost limit of sentiment; it is the art of *sentiment*. Between art and sentiment there exists so intimate a union that they seemingly fuse together. Sound, that immaterial phenomenon, without proper duration, instantaneous, borrowing all its value from the sentiment which it veils, penetrates into the soul and echoes through its depths.

If we compare music with the other arts, we find, in the first place, that it exhibits certain real analogies with *Architecture*. If

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WHAT IS MEANT BY "DETERMINED."

[The following discussion, which is a continuation of the one in a former issue called "Nominalism and Realism," may serve a good purpose to clear up any confusion that may exist regarding some of the important technical expressions employed.—EDITOR.]

To the Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

SIR:—Your remarks upon my inquiries concerning Being and Nothing are very kind and courteous. Considered as replies, they are less satisfactory than they might have been had I succeeded better in making my difficulties understood.

I suspect that there must be some misunderstanding between us of the meaning of the various terms cognate with "determined." Perhaps, therefore, I shall do well to state more fully than I did before, the manner in which I understand Hegel (in common with all other logicians) to use them. Possibly, the original signification of *bestimmt* was "settled by vote"; or it may have been "pitched to a key." Thus its origin was quite different from that of "determined"; yet I believe that as philosophical terms their equivalence is exact. In general, they mean "fixed to be this (or thus), in contradistinction to being this, that, or the other (or in some way or other)."—When it is a concept or term, such as is expressed by a concrete noun or adjective which is said to be more determinate than another, the sense sometimes is that the logical extension of the former concept or term is a part and only a part of that of the latter; but more usually the sense is, that the logical comprehension of the latter is a part and only a part of that of the former.

In my former letter (page 60, column 1) I sufficiently expressed my own understanding of "determined" as applied to a concept or term such as is expressed by an abstract noun. *Determinate* is also used either in express application or with implicit reference to a second intention or term of second denomination. In such an acceptation, we may speak either of a singular as indeterminate, or of a conception of Being, in gene-

* Where in is the force of this "in contradistinction to" which our correspondent employs here? *Determination*—as we understand the Hegelian use of the term—implies all difference, property, mark, quality, attribute, or, in short, any distinction whatever that is thought as being owing to a subject. This would include its "being this, that, or the other." Thus "highness of pitch" and "loudness of sound, in general," are through their determinateness distinct.—EDITOR.

ral, as determinate. Every singular is in one sense perfectly determinate, since there is no pair of contradictory characters of which it does not possess one. Yet if the extension of the term be limited, not by additions to its comprehension, but by a reflection upon the term itself—namely, that it shall denote but one—it is called an indeterminate singular. In this sense, "some one horse" is an indeterminate individual, while "Dexter" is a determinate individual. In a somewhat similar way, every universal conception of Being is quite indeterminate in the sense of not signifying any particular character. Yet, if the reflection is explicitly made (*gesetzt*) that every thing to which it applies has its particular characters, it is called by Hegel, *determinate being*. Hegel teaches that the whole series of categories or universal conceptions can be evolved from one—that is, from *Sein*—by a certain process, the effect of which is to make actually thought that which was virtually latent in the thought. So that this reflection which constitutes *Dasein* lies implicitly even in *Sein*, and it is by explicitly evolving it from *Sein* that *Dasein* is evolved from *Sein*. (Hegel's Werke, Bd. 3, S. 107.) The term "What is" has reference to pure *Sein* only; the term "What is somehow" has reference to *Dasein*.

This is my understanding of the term "determinate." It must differ from yours, or you would not say that animality, in general, is determined in respect to humanity: so when you say that were animality and humanity, in general, undetermined with respect to each other they would be identical, I take the example of "highness of pitch in general" and "loudness of sound in general," and I conclude again that we are taking the word "determining" in different senses. May I ask you to reperuse my 4th question? (p. 60)

You have apparently understood me as applying the term "abstract" to any concept the result of abstraction. But, as I intimated (p. 57), I adopt that acceptation in which "whiteness" is said to be abstract and "white" concrete. For this use of the terms, I refer to the following authorities: Andrews and Stoddard's Latin Gram-

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SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the NEWEST PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

(Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.)

FIFTH CONVERSATION.

A. That which the Science of Knowledge deduces is to be a faithful and complete picture of fundamental consciousness. Can its deductions then contain more or less or anything else than what occurs in actual consciousness?

R. By no means. Every deviation from actual consciousness would be a sure proof of the incorrectness of the deduction of that science.

A. Hence, according to all our previous results, the total consciousness of a finite rational being can involve only the following:

FIRSTLY—The primary and fundamental determinations of consciousness, or common consciousness, or immediate experience, or whatever else you choose to call it.

These determinations form in themselves a complete system, which is altogether the same—apart from its exclusively individual determinations—for all rational beings. We have called this system common consciousness, or the first degree of consciousness.

SECONDLY—The reflection and representation of this common consciousness, the free separating, composing, and infinite judging of it; which, being dependent upon freedom, varies according to the different use made of that freedom. This we have called the higher degrees of consciousness—the middle region of our mind, as it were. It is to be remembered that nothing can occur in these

higher degrees which has not occurred previously in common consciousness, at least in its elements. The freedom of the mind has the power infinitely to separate and compose that which is given in fundamental consciousness, but it cannot create anything anew.

THIRDLY AND FINALLY—A complete deduction of all that which occurs in common consciousness—without any relation to actual experience—from the mere necessary manner of acting of the Intelligence in general; precisely as if that common consciousness were the result of this manner of acting. This is the Science of Knowledge, as the absolute highest degree, which no consciousness can transcend. In this science, also, nothing can occur which has not occurred in actual consciousness, or in experience, in the highest significance of that word.

According to our principles, therefore, nothing can enter the consciousness of a rational being, in any manner, which does not in its elements occur in experience, and in the experience of all rational beings, without exception. All have received the same gifts, and the same freedom further to develop these gifts; and no one can create something of his own. Our philosophy is, therefore, most decidedly favorably disposed towards common sense, and secures its rights, as we asserted at the beginning; and

mar, § 28, 5; Scotus, *Super Prædicamenta*, qu. 8; Durandus à Sancto Porciano, *In Sentent.*, lib. 1, dist. 34, qu. 1; Ockham, *Summa Logices*, pars 1, cap. 5; Chauvin, *Lexicon Rationale*, sub. V. *Abstractum*; Mill, *Logic*, Bk. 1, cap. 2, § 4; Trendelenburg, *Elementa Logices Arist.*, 6th ed., p. 117, note; Überweg, *Logik*, § 51 (where Wolff, also, is cited); Hoppe, *Logik*, §§ 236, 237. This misapprehension affects the relevancy of most of your remarks.

I think that I have not, as you suppose, greatly mistaken the sense in which Hegelians use the term Pure Being. At least, my definition seems to be in accord with the explanations of almost all, if not all, the commentators and expositors of Hegel. I would submit respectfully, that your own remarks upon p. 117 of Vol. I. of this Journal contradict, almost in terms, what you say (Vol. II., p. 57) in reply to me.*

Once or twice you use such expressions as "We do not profess to speak for Hegelians," "Hegelians may understand this as they please," &c. Have I been wrong, then, in supposing that the passage to which my

* The passage here referred to is in Chapter III. of the "Introduction to Philosophy," where in there is no reference whatever to the Hegelian use of the term. It is a psychological investigation of the significance of the first predicate which is a determinate somewhat, and "Being" is used in the popular sense of "something" (i. e. a being, and its origin traced to the substantive-making activity of the Ego, which in its first exercise seizes itself as the fundamental basis of all. Just as, according to Kant, Time and Space, the forms of the mind, are made the basis of what the mind sees; so, too, Being as a universal predicate is the pure activity objectified. But the making it substantive, at the same time, determines it.—EDITOR.

queries related was a professed defence of Hegelian doctrine?*

I am sorry to learn that I have done you injustice in saying that you profess to be self-contradictory. Yet I do not see in what sense you object to the remark. To say that a man is self-contradictory is, of course, but a way of saying that what he believes is self-contradictory. You believe that "finite things contradict themselves"; that is, as I understand it, that contradictions exist. Therefore, what you believe in appears to be self-contradictory. Nor can I see how a person "escapes self-contradiction by not attempting to set up non-contradiction as the first principle of things"; that is, by not professing to be otherwise than self-contradictory.†

I do not see that you notice query 3.‡

* Of course, our correspondent would not consider "a defence of Hegel" as identical with a championship of the Hegelians. It is the latter, only, that we object to, for the reason mentioned in the article on Janet, viz., that the term is used so vaguely as to include those who differ essentially from Hegel.—EDITOR.

† We hasten to assure our correspondent that we do not "believe in the self-contradictory." We are sorry we were so unhappy in our expressions as to convey such a meaning. The *Alidino* or the Total Process is not self-contradictory, neither is it an abstract identity, but is (as we described it on p. 54, 2d col. of this volume) "self-identical through self-distinction." The self-determining is what we believe in, and it alone exists, while the fleeting show whose reality rests on contradiction is (and this is not Hegelian merely, but older than Plato) mingling of Being and non-Being. One who sets up the principle of contradiction ignores one side of the process, and thus involves himself in that which he tries to avoid.—ED.

‡ If any point is involved in question 3d that is not answered in the discussion of the other queries, we fail to seize it.—EDITOR.

INTUITION vs. CONTEMPLATION.

Through a singular chance, the present number of the Journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word *Anschauung*. Mr. Kroeger holds that the word *Anschauung*, as used by Fichte and also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word *Intuition* does not at all express, but for which the English word "contemplation" is an exact equivalent. Mr. Pierce suggests that no person whose native tongue is Eng-

lish will translate *Anschauung* by another word than *Intuition*. Whether there is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word under consideration both by English and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb *intuite* (at least in the

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SECOND PART OF GOETHE'S FAUST.

Translated from ROSENKRANZ'S "Deutsche Literatur," by D. J. SNIDER.

Goethe began nothing if the whole of the work did not hover before his mind. By this determinateness of plan he preserved a most persevering attachment to the materials of which he had once laid hold; they were elements of his existence, which for him were immortal, because they constituted his inmost being. He could put off their execution for years, and still be certain that his love for them would return, that his interest in them would animate him anew. Through this depth of conception he preserved fresh to the end his original purpose; he needed not to fear that the fire of the first enthusiasm would go out; at the most different times he could take up his work again with youthful zeal and strength. Thus in the circle of his poetical labors, two conceptions that are in internal opposition to one another, accompanied him through his whole life. The one portrays a talented but fickle man, who, in want of culture, attaches himself to this person, then to that one, in order to become spiritually independent. This struggle carries him into the breadth of life, into manifold relations whose spirit he longs to seize and appropriate; such is Wilhelm Meister. The other is the picture of an absolutely independent personality that has culti-

vated its lordly power in solitary loftiness, and aspires boldly to subject the world to itself; such is Faust. In the development of both subjects there is a decisive turning-point which is marked in the first by the "Travels"; in the second, by the Second Part of the Tragedy. Up to this point, both in Wilhelm Meister and in Faust, subjective conditions prevail, which gradually purify themselves to higher views and aims. For the one, the betrothal with Natalia closes the world of wild, youthful desire; for the other, the death of Margaret has the same effect. The one steps into civil society and its manifold activity with the earnest endeavor to comprehend all its elements, to acquire, preserve and beautify property, and to assist in illuminating and ennobling social relations; the other takes likewise a practical turn, but from the summit of Society, from the standpoint of the State itself. If, therefore, in the "Apprenticeship" and First Part of the Tragedy, on account of the excess of subjective conditions, a closer connection of the character and a passionate pathos are necessary, there appears, on the contrary, in the Travels and Second Part of the Tragedy a thoughtfulness which moderates everything—a cool designingness;

secondary place. After having finished its independent career, it becomes an obscure satellite of science and philosophy, in which are absorbed both religion and art. This thought is not thus definitely formulated, but it is clearly enough indicated. Art, in revealing thought, has itself contributed to the destruction of other forms, and to its own downfall. The new art ought to be elevated above all the particular forms which it has already expressed. "Art ceases to be attached to a determinate circle of ideas and forms; it consecrates itself to a new worship, that of humanity. All that the heart of man includes within its own immensity—its joys and its sufferings, its interests, its actions, its destinies—become the domain of art." Thus the content is human nature; the form, a free combination of all the forms of the past. We shall hereafter consider this new eclecticism in art.

Hegel points out, in concluding, a final form of literature and poetry, which is the unequivocal index of the absence of

peculiar, elevated and profound ideas, and of original forms—that sentimental poetry, light or descriptive, which to-day floods the literary world and the drawing-rooms with its verses; compositions without life and without content, without originality or true inspiration; a commonplace and vague expression of all sentiment, full of aspirations and empty of ideas, where, through all, there makes itself recognized an imitation of some illustrious geniuses—themselves misled in false and perilous ways; a sort of current money, analogous to the epistolary style. Everybody is poet; and there is scarcely one true poet. "Wherever the faculties of the soul and the forms of language have received a certain degree of culture, there is no person who cannot, if he take the fancy, express in verse some situation of the soul, as any one is in condition to write a letter."

Such a style, thus universally diffused, and reproduced under a thousand forms, although with different shadings, easily becomes fastidious.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II.

We hope to see those necessities of thought which underlie all Philosophical systems. We set out to account for all the diversities of opinion, and to see identity in the world of thought. But necessity in the realm of thought may be phenomenal. If there be anything which is given out as fixed, we must try its validity.

Many of the "impossibilities" of thought are easily shown to rest upon ignorance of psychological appliances. The person is not able because he does not know *how*—just as in other things. We must take care that we do not confound the incapacity of ignorance with the necessity of thought. (The reader will find an example of this in Sir William Hamilton's "Metaphysics," p. 527.) One of those "incapacities" arises from neglecting the following:

Among the first distinctions to be learned by the student in philosophy is that between the imaginative form of thinking and pure thinking. The former is a sensuous grade

of thinking which uses *images*, while the latter is a more developed stage, and is able to think objects in and for themselves. Spinoza's statement of this distinction applied to the thinking of the Infinite—his "Infinitem imaginatio" and "Infinitem actu vel rationis"—has been frequently alluded to by those who treat of this subject.

At first one might suppose that when finite things are the subject of thought, it would make little difference whether the first or second form of thinking is employed. This is, however, a great error. The Philosopher must always "think things under the form of eternity" if he would think the truth.

Imagination pictures objects. It represents to itself only the bounded. If it tries to realize the conception of infinitude, it represents a limited somewhat, and then *Reflection* or the *Understanding* (a form of thought lying between *Imagination* and *Reason*) passes beyond the limits and annuls them. This process may be continued indefinitely, or until *Reason* (or pure thinking) comes in

and solves the dilemma. Thus we have a dialogue resulting somewhat as follows:

Imagination. Come and see the Infinite just as I have pictured it.

Understanding [peeping cautiously about it]. Where is your frame? Ah! I see it now clearly. How is this! Your frame does not include all. There is a "beyond" to your picture. I cannot tell whether you intend the inside or outside for your picture of the Infinite; I see it on both.

Imag. [tries to extend the frame, but with the same result as before]. I believe you are right! I am well nigh exhausted by my efforts to include the unlimited.

Un. Ah! you see the Infinite is merely the negative of the finite or positive. It is the negative of those conditions which you place there in order to have any representation at all!

[While the Understanding proceeds to deliver a course of wise saws and moral reflections on the "inability of the Finite to grasp the Infinite," sitting apart upon its bipod—for tripod it has none, one of the legs being broken—it self-complacently and oracularly admonishes the human mind to cultivate humility; *Imagination* drops her brush and pencil in confusion at these words. Very opportunely *Reason* steps in and takes an impartial survey of the scene.]

Reason. Did you say that the Infinite is unknowable?

Un. Yes. "To think is to limit, and hence to think the Infinite is to limit it, and thus to destroy it."

Reason. Apply your remarks to Space. Is not Space infinite?

Un. If I attempt to realize Space I conceive a bounded, but I at once perceive that I have placed my limits *within* Space, and hence my realization is inadequate. The Infinite, therefore, seems to be a beyond to my clear conception.

Reason. Indeed! When you reflect on Space, do you not perceive that it is of such a nature that it can be limited only by itself? Do not all its limits imply Space to exist in?

Un. Yes, that is the difficulty.

Reason. I do not see the difficulty. If Space can be limited only by itself, its limit continues it instead of bounding it. Hence it is universally continuous or infinite.

Un. But a mere negative.

Reason. No, not a mere negative, but the negative of all negation, and hence truly affirmative. It is the exhibition of the utter

impossibility of any negative to it. All attempts to limit it, continue it. It is its own other. Its negative is itself. Here, then, we have a truly affirmative infinite in contradistinction to the negative infinite—the "infinite progress" that you and *Imagination* were engaged upon when I came in.

Un. What you say seems to me a distinction in words merely.

Reason. Doubtless. All distinctions are merely in words until one has learned to see them independent of words. But you must go and mend that tripod on which you are sitting; for how can one think at ease and exhaustively, when he is all the time propping up his basis from without?

Un. I cannot understand you. [Exit.]

NOTE.—It will be well to consider what application is to be made of these distinctions to the mind itself, whose form is consciousness. In self-knowing, or consciousness, the subject knows itself—it is its own object. Thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative Infinite. The subject is its own object—is continued by its other or object. This is merely suggested here—it will be developed hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

In the first chapter we attained—or at least made the attempt to attain—some insight into the relation which Mind bears to Time and Space. It appeared that Mind is a *Transcendent*, i.e. something which Time and Space inhere in, rather than a somewhat, conditioned by them. Although this result agrees entirely with the religious instincts of man, which assert the immortality of the soul, and the unsubstantiality of the existences within Time and Space, yet, as a logical result of thinking, it seems at first very unreliable. The disciplined thinker will indeed find the distinctions "a priori" and "a posteriori" inadequately treated; but his emendations will only make the results there established more wide-sweeping and conclusive.

In the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of attempting to realize in our minds the results of thought. If we have always been in the habit of regarding Mind as a property or attribute of the individual, we have conceived it not according to its true nature, but have allowed *Imagination* to mingle its activity in the thinking of that which is of a universal nature. Thus we are prone to say to ourselves,

"How can a mere attribute like Mind be the logical condition of the solid realities of Space and Time." In this we have quietly assumed the whole point at issue. No system of thinking which went to work logically ever proved the Mind to be an attribute; only very elementary grades of thinking, which have a way of assuming in their premises what they draw out analytically in their conclusions, ever set up this dogma. This will become clearer at every step as we proceed.

We will now pursue a path similar to that followed in the first chapter, and see what more we can learn of the nature of Mind. We will endeavor to learn more definitely what constitutes its *a priori* activity, in order, as there indicated, to achieve our object. Thus our present search is after the "Categories" and their significance. Taking the word "category" here in the sense of "a priori determination of thought," the first question is: "Do any categories exist? Are there any thoughts which belong to the nature of mind itself?" It is the same question that Locke discusses under the head of "Innate Ideas."

I.—"Every act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown somewhat into a known, as a scholar translates a new language into his own." If he did not already understand one language, he could never translate the new one. In the act of knowing, the object becomes known in so far as I am able to recognize predicates as belonging to it. "This is red"; unless I know already what "red" means, I do not cognize the object by predicating red of it. "Red is a color"; unless I know what color means, I have not said anything intelligible—I have not expressed an act of cognition. The object becomes known to us in so far as we recognize its predicates—and hence we could never know anything unless we had at least one predicate or conception with which to commence. If we have one predicate through which we cognize some object, that act of cognition gives us a new predicate, for it has dissolved or "translated" a somewhat, that before was unknown, into a known; the "not-me" has, to that extent, become the "me." Without any predicates to begin with, all objects would remain forever outside of our consciousness. Even consciousness itself would be impossible for the very act of self-cognition implies that the predicate "myself" is well known.

It is an act of identification: "I am myself"; the subject is, as predicate, completely known, or dissolved back into the subject. I cognize myself as myself; there is no alien element left standing over against me. Thus we are able to say that there must be an *a priori* category in order to render possible any act of knowing whatever. Moreover, we see that this category must be identical with the *Ego* itself, for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time a recognition; it predicates only what it recognizes. Thus, fundamentally, in knowing, Reason knows itself. Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge. This will throw light on the first chapter; but let us first confirm this position by a psychological analysis.

II.—What is the permanent element in thought? It can easily be found in language—its external manifestation. Logic tells us that the expression of thought involves always a subject and predicate. Think what you please, say what you please, and your thought or assertion consists of a subject and predicate—positive or negative—joined by the copula, *is*. "Man lives" is equivalent to "man is living." "Man" and "living" are joined by the word "*is*." If we abstract all content from thought, and take its pure form in order to see the permanent, we shall have "*is*" the copula, or, putting a letter for subject and attribute, we shall have "*a is a*" (or "*a is b*") for the universal form of thought. The mental act is expressed by "*is*." In this empty "*is*" we have the category of pure Being, which is the "summun genus" of categories. Any predicate other than *being* will be found to contain being plus determinations, and hence can be subsumed under being. We shall get new light on this subject if we examine the ordinary doctrine of *explanation*.

III.—In order to explain something, we subsume it under a more general. Thus we say, "Horse is an animal"; and, "An animal is an organic being," etc. A definition contains not only this subsumption, but also a statement of the specific difference. We define *quadruped* by subsuming it ("It is an animal"), and giving the specific difference ("which has four feet").

As we approach the "summun genus," the predicates become more and more empty; they become more *extensive* in their application, and less *comprehensive* in their content." Thus they approach pure sim-

plicity, which is attained in the "summun genus." This pure simple, which is the limit of subsumption and abstraction, is pure Being—Being devoid of all determinateness. When we have arrived at Being, subsuming becomes simple identifying—Being is Being, or *a is a*—and this is precisely the same activity that we found self-consciousness to consist of in our first analysis (I.), and the same activity that we found all mental acts to consist of in our second analysis (II.)

IV.—Therefore, we may affirm on these grounds, that the "summun genus," or primitive category, is the *Ego* itself in its simplest activity as the "*is*" (or pure *Being*, if taken substantively).

Thus it happens that when the Mind comes to cognize an object, it must first of all recognize itself in it in its simplest activity—it must know that the object *is*. We cannot know anything else of an object without presupposing the knowledge of its *existence*.

At this point it is evident that this category is not derived from experience in the sense of *an impression from without*. It is the activity of the *Ego* itself, and is its (the *Ego's*) first self-externalization (or its first becoming object to itself—its first act of self-consciousness). The essential activity of the *Ego* itself consists in recognizing itself, and this involves self-separation, and then the annulling of this separation in the same act. For in knowing myself as an object I separate the *Ego* from itself, but in the very act of *knowing* it I make it identical again. Here are two negative processes involved in knowing, and these are indivisibly one: first, the negative act of separation; secondly, the negative act of annulling the separation by the act of recognition. That the application of categories to the external world is a process of self-recognition, is now clear: we know, in so far as we recognize predicates in the object: we say, "The Rose is, it is red, it is round, it is fragrant," &c. In this we separate what belongs to the rose from it, and place it outside of it, and then, through the act of predication, unite it again. "The Rose is" contains merely the recognition of being; but being is separated from it, and joined to it in the act of predication. Thus we see that the fundamental act of self-consciousness, which is a self-separation and self-identification united in one act of recognition,—we see that this fundamental act is repeated in all acts of

knowing. We do not know even the rose without separating it from itself, and identifying the two sides thus formed. (This contains a deeper thought, which we may suggest here. That the act of knowing puts all objects into this crucible, is an intimation on its part that no object can possess true, abiding being without this ability to separate itself from itself in the process of self-identification. Whatever cannot do this is no essence, but may be only an element of a process in which it ceaselessly loses its identity. But we shall recur to this again.)

Doubtless we could follow out this activity through various steps, and deduce all the categories of pure thought. This is what Plato has done in part, what Fichte has done in his Science of Knowledge ("Wissenschaftslehre.") and Hegel in his Logic. A science of these pure intelligibles unlocks the secret of the Universe; it furnishes that "Royal Road" to all knowledge; it is the far-famed Philosopher's Stone that alone can transmute the base dross of mere talent into genius.

V.—Let us be content if at the close of this chapter we can affirm still more positively the conclusions of our first. Through a consideration of the *a priori* knowledge of Time and Space, and their logical priority, as conditions, to the world of experience, we inferred the transcendency of Mind. Upon further investigation, we have now discovered that there are other forms of the Mind more primordial than Space and Time, and more essentially related to its activity; for all the categories of pure thought—Being, Negation, &c.—are applicable to Space and to Time, and hence more universal than either of them alone; these categories of pure thought, moreover, as before remarked, could never have been derived from experience. Experience is not possible without presupposing these predicates. "They are the tools of intelligence through which it cognizes." If we hold by this standpoint exclusively, we may say, with Kant, that we furnish the subjective forms in knowing, and for this reason cannot know the "thing in itself." If these categories are merely subjective—i.e. given in the constitution of the Mind itself—and we do not know what the "thing in itself" may be, yet we can come safely out of all skepticism here by considering the universal nature of these categories or "forms of the mind." For if Being, Negation, and Existence are forms of

mind and purely subjective, so that they do not belong to the "thing in itself," it is evident that such an object cannot *be* or *exist*, or in any way have validity, either positively or negatively. Thus it is seen from the nature of mind here exhibited, that Mind is the *noumenon* or "thing in itself" which Philosophy seeks, and thus our third chapter confirms our first.

NOTE.—The MATERIALISM of the present day holds that thought is a modification of force, correlated with heat, light, electricity, &c.; in short, that organization produces ideas. If so, we are placed within a narrow idealism, and can only say of what is held for *truth*: "I am so correlated as to hold this view; I shall be differently correlated to-morrow, perhaps, and hold another view." Yet in this very statement the Ego takes the stand-point of universality—it speaks of possibilities—which it could never do were it merely a correlate. For to hold a possibility is to be able to annul in thought the limits of the *real*, and hence to elevate itself to the point of universality. But this is *self-correlation*; we have a movement in a circle, and hence self-origination, and hence, a spontaneous fountain of force. The Mind, in conceiving of the possible, annuls the *real*, and thus creates its own motives; its acting according to motives, is thus acting according to its own acts—an obvious circle again.

In fine, it is evident that the idealism which the correlationist logically falls into is as strict as that of any school of professed idealism which he is in the habit of condemning. The *persistent force* is the general *idea* of force, not found as any *real* force, for each *real* force is individualized in some particular way. But it is evident that a particular force cannot be correlated with *force in general*, but only with a special form like itself. But the general force is the only abiding one; each particular one is in a state of transition into another—a perpetual losing of individuality. Hence the true abiding force is not a *real* one existing objectively, but only an *ideal* one existing subjectively in thought. But through the fact that thought can seize the true and abiding which can exist for itself nowhere else, the correlationist is bound to infer the transcendency of Mind just like the idealist. Nay, more; when he comes to speak considerably, he will say that Mind, for the very reason that it thinks the true, abiding force, cannot be correlated with any determined force.

CHAPTER IV.

Philosophers usually begin to construct their systems in full view of their final principle. It would be absurd for one to commence a demonstration if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove. From the final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in the philosopher's mind before he can commence his demonstration. Usually, the order of demonstration which he follows is not the order of discovery; in such case, his system proceeds by external reflections. All mathematical proof is of this order. One constructs his demonstration to lead from the known to the unknown, and uses many intermediate propositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result. With another theorem in view, they might be used for steps to that, just as well. But there is a certain inherent development in all subjects, when examined according to the highest method, that will lead one on to the exhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein. This is called the *dialectic*. This dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic instrument, unless one has seen the deepest *aperçu* of Science; if this is not the case, the dialectic will prove merely destructive, and not constructive. It is therefore a mistake, as has been before remarked, to attempt to introduce the beginner of the study of Philosophy at once into the dialectic. The content of Philosophy must be first presented under its sensuous and reflective forms, and a gradual progress established. In this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again the ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general manner as *Mind*. We will use the method of external reflection, and demonstrate three propositions: 1. There is an independent being; 2. That being is self-determined; 3. Self-determined being is in the form of personality, i.e. is an *Ego*.

I.—1. Dependent being, implying its complement upon which it depends, cannot be explained through itself, but through that upon which it depends.

2. This being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being; for the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another; all that it has is borrowed. "A chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent being. Dependence is not converted into independence by mere multiplication."

3. The dependent, therefore, depends upon the

independent and has its explanation in it. Since all being is of one kind or the other, it follows that all being is independent, or a complementary element of it. Reciprocal dependence makes an independent including whole, which is the *negative unity*.

Definition.—One of the most important imple-
ments of the thinker is the comprehension of "negative unity." It is a unity resulting from the reciprocal cancelling of elements; e.g. *Salt* is the negative unity of *acid* and *alkali*. It is called *negative* because it negates the independence of the elements within it. In the negative unity *Water*, the elements oxygen and hydrogen have their independence negated.

II.—1. The independent being cannot exist without determinations. Without these, it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nought.

2. Nor can the independent being be determined (i.e. limited or modified in any way) from without, or through another. For all that is determined through another is a dependent somewhat.

3. Hence the independent being can be only a self-determined. If self-determined, it can exist through itself.

NOTE.—Spinoza does not arrive at the third position, but, after considering the second, arrives at the first one, and concludes, since determination through another makes a somewhat *finite*, that the independent being must be undetermined. He does not happen to discover that there is another kind of determination, to-wit, self-determination, which can consist with independence. The method that he uses makes it entirely an accidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he does—the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination, as we shall see later. It is Hegel's *aperçu* that we have in the third position; with Spinoza the independent being remained an undetermined *substance*, but with Hegel it became a self-determining *subject*. All that Spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary manner; it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes and attributes, but the contrary. This *aperçu*—that the independent being, i.e. every really existing, separate entity is self-determined—is the central point of speculative philosophy. What self-determination involves, we shall see next.

III.—1. Self-determination implies that the *constitution* or *nature* be self-originated. There is nothing about a self-determined that is created by anything without.

2. Thus self-determined being exists dually—it is (a) as *determining*, and (b) as *determined*. (a) As determining, it is the active, which contains merely the possibility of determinations; (b) as determined, it is the passive result—the matter upon which the subject acts.

3. But since both are the same being, each side returns into itself: (a) as determining or active, it acts only upon its own determining, and (b) as passive or determined, it is, as a result of the former, the self-same active itself. Hence its movement is a movement of self-recognition—a positing of distinction which is cancelled in the same act. (In self-recognition something is made an object, and identified with the subject in the same act.) Moreover, the determiner, on account of its pure generality, (i.e. its having no concrete determinations as yet,) can only be *ideal*—can only exist as the *Ego* exists, in thought; not as a thing, but as a *generic* entity. The passive side can exist only as the self exists in consciousness—as that which is in opposition and yet in identity at the same time. No finite existence could endure this contradiction, for all such must possess a *nature* or *constitution* which is self-determined; if not, each finite could negate all its properties and qualities, and yet remain itself—just as the person does when he makes abstraction of all, in thinking of the *Ego* or pure self.

Thus we find again our former conclusion:—All finite or dependent things must originate in and depend upon independent or absolute being, which must be an *Ego*. The *Ego* has the form of Infinity (see Chap. II.—*The Infinite is its own Other*).

Resumé.—The first chapter states the premises which Kant lays down in his Transcendental Aesthetic (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*), and draws the true logical conclusions, which are positive, and not negative, as he makes them. The second chapter gives the Spinozan distinction of the Infinite of the Imagination and Infinite of Reason. The third chapter gives the logical results which Kant should have drawn from his Transcendental Logic. The fourth chapter gives Spinoza's fundamental position logically completed, and is the great fundamental position of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel, with reference to the Absolute.