

account of Locke's writings is, however, unusually good; and the insufferable sophistry of T. H. Green is well disposed of in a paragraph. Prof. Fraser pleads for a new edition of Locke's works, and it is very true that this great man, whose utterances still have their lessons for the world, with wholesome influences for all plastic minds, should be studied in a complete, correct, and critical edition.

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#### NOTES

Attributed to Peirce by Fisch in his *Third Supplement* (internal evidence). This note is unassigned in Haskell's *Index to The Nation*, vol. 1.

—Many minds nowadays are turning towards high philosophy with expectations such as wide-awake men have not indulged during fifty years of Hamiltonianism, Millism, and Spencerianism; so that the establishment of a new philosophical quarterly which may prove a focus for all the agitation of thought that struggles to-day to illuminate the deepest problems with light from modern science, is an event worthy of particular notice. The first number of the *Monist* (*Open Court* Publishing Company) opens with good promise, in articles by two Americans, one Englishman, three Germans, two Frenchmen. Mr. A. Binet, student of infusorial psychology, treats of the alleged physical immortality of some of these organisms. In the opening paper, Dr. Romanes defends against Wallace his segregation supplement to the Darwinian theory, *i.e.*, that the divergence of forms is aided by varieties becoming incapable of crossing, as, for instance, by blossoming at different seasons. Prof. Cope, who, if he sometimes abandons the English language for the jargon of biology, is always distinguished by a clear style; ever at his command in impersonal matters, gives an analysis of marriage, not particularly original, and introduces a slight apology for his former recommendation of temporary unions. Prof. Ernst Mach has an "anti-metaphysical" article characteristic of the class of ingenious psychologists, if not perhaps quite accurate thinkers, to which he belongs. Mr. Max Dessoir recounts exceedingly interesting things about magic mirrors considered as hypnotizing apparatus. Mr. W. M. Salter and M. Lucien Arreat tell us something of the psychology of Höffding and of Fouillée. Among the book-notices, a certain salad of Hegel and mathematics excites our curiosity and provokes an appetite for more of this sort. The writer makes much ado to state Dr. F. E. Abbot's metaphysics, certainly as easily intelligible a theory as ever was.

—It remains to explain the name *Monist*. Dr. Carus, the putative editor, says: "The philosophy of the future will be a philosophy of facts, it will be *positivism*; and in so far as a unitary systematization of facts is the aim and ideal of all science, it will be *Monism*." But this is no definition of monism at all; in fact, the last clause conveys no idea. The search for a unitary conception of the world, or for a unitary systematization of science, would be a good definition of *philosophy*; and, with this good old word at hand, we want no other. To use the word *monism* in this sense would be in flagrant violation at once of usage and of the accepted

principles of philosophical terminology. But this is not what is meant. Monism, as Dr. Carus himself explains it in his 'Fundamental Problems,' p. 256, is a metaphysical theory opposed to dualism or the theory of two kinds of substance—mind and matter—and also conceiving itself to be different both from idealism and materialism. But idealism and materialism are almost identical: the only difference is that idealism regards the psychical mode of activity as the fundamental and universal one, of which the physical mode is a specialization; while materialism regards the laws of physics as at the bottom of everything, and feeling as limited to special organizations. The metaphysicians who call themselves *Monists* are usually materialists *sans le savoir*. The true meaning attaching to the title of the magazine may be read in these words of the editor:

"We are driven to the conclusion that the world of feelings forms an inseparable whole together with a special combination of certain facts of the objective world, namely, our body. It originates with this combination, and disappears as soon as that combination breaks to pieces. . . . Subjectivity must be conceived as the product of a coöperation of certain elements which are present in the objective world. . . . Motions are not transformed into feelings, but certain motions, . . . when coöperating in a special form, are accompanied with feelings."

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#### Our Dictionaries, and Other English-Language Topics.

By R. O. Williams. Henry Holt & Co. 1890.

CSP, identification: MS 1365. See also: Burks, *Bibliography*. This notice is unassigned in Haskell's *Index to The Nation*, vol. 1.

This little book is mainly taken up with notes upon the use of a few words. The hasty dictum of Dr. E. A. Freeman, that the non-ecclesiastical use of *metropolis* is "slang," is easily and amply refuted. Mr. Williams well says that, "for more than two hundred years the secular meaning has been the prominent one," and the only reason for not extending the statement is that Elizabethan secular writers were not fond of the Greek forms. They often alluded to London as the "mother towne" of England.

The account of "our dictionaries" could not well be flimsier; but a discriminating guide to books of reference, useful as it would be, can hardly be looked for from American publishers. "The examples collected by Johnson," says Mr. Williams, "have formed the main stock of the citations used by subsequent dictionary-makers." This, of course, does not apply to Richardson, to say nothing of Murray. The 'Century Dictionary' has as many quotations as Johnson and Richardson together. It is no wonder that the fraction of the population which has not been engaged in the production of this world of words, has included every person capable of supervising the quotations in a really masterly way; for there was no possibility of competing with Murray and his 1,300 readers. Still, most of the 'Century' citations are judicious and unexceptionable; and if the treatment of them is less severely scientific, it is more agreeable than that of the Philological Society's vast collection.