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have repeatedly denied that it was written by her. The author of 'The Rectory of Moreland' is correctly given as Clara M. Thompson, but 'The Chapel of St. Mary,' "by the author of 'The Rectory of Moreland,'" is put down to Mary Evans. 'Mary Evans' is elsewhere entered as a book by C. M. Thompson, though 'Evans, Mary,' is an author. Isabella Harwood, who died in 1883, after writing two novels which had a great run, is not mentioned, though her books are entered by title. The catalogue is further defective in omitting cross-references to works like 'Gil Blas,' 'David Grieve,' 'Huckleberry Finn,' 'Joseph Andrews,' 'Verdant Green,' etc., which are universally known by these abbreviated titles. In this respect it might profitably have imitated the practice of the excellent fiction catalogue of the San Francisco Free Public Library, published in 1891.

—'Field-Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke as a Correspondent' (Harpers) is a second instalment of the letters of the Prussian general, and is a translation of the first 225 pages of the fifth volume of his collected works, the remainder of that volume consisting of personal recollections contributed by various friends. The letters to his mother and to two of his brothers, which make up the fourth volume of the German edition, were published in English last year and noticed in these columns. The present collection has a more varied interest, in so far as it covers a greater number of topics, and will serve to deepen the impression that Moltke, quite apart from his greatness as a warrior, was a man worthy of admiration for the sterling qualities of head and heart which are unconsciously betrayed in letters never intended for print. If the letters which he wrote to his wife before and after their marriage, and which fill the sixth and largest volume of his works, are ever translated, English readers will have such a picture of the man as will show that his rise in the world was but the natural product of the faithful employment of unusual intellectual and moral gifts. The translation of the present volume is by a new hand. It reads smoothly enough, and, while it renders the sense of the original fairly well, is not always as close as it might have been. The translator appears to have lightened her task a little by skipping the hard words or going around them. The outward dress of the book is very attractive in the matter of print, paper, and binding.

—'Dante's Comedy in English Prose—Hell,' by Sir Edward Sullivan, Bart. (London: Elliot Stock), requires no detailed criticism. It reads fluently, and is nearly always intelligible, but when we compare any passage with the original, we find that Sir E. Sullivan is never very exact. The inaccurate temperament which led him to call his translation Dante's "Comedy" instead of "Divine Comedy" shows itself throughout. No one who understood the deep significance of Dante's epic would omit the epithet "Divine" from the title; such an omission is as unjustifiable as would be that of the qualifying adjective "Lost" from Milton's 'Paradise Lost.' So far as we have observed, the translator throws no new light on and gives no felicitous renderings of the many test words and phrases of the text. Often he misses the meaning, as in the lines

"Quando leggemmo, il disiato riso  
Esser baciato da cotanto amante," (v. 133-4);

which he translates, "When that we came to read of how the smiling lips he loved were kissed by lover such as he." "The smiling lips

he loved" is certainly a poor paraphrase of "il disiato riso," and "cotanto amante" does not represent "by lover such as he." We have noted many instances similar to this, but it is not necessary to discuss these. In no sense can Sullivan's version compete with that of John Carlyle or of Prof. Norton. Only readers who wish to get a blurred reproduction of Dante's vivid pictures will be satisfied with this translation; others will object not only to the inaccuracy, but to affectations wholly contrary to Dante's genius. At times, Sir E. Sullivan seems to choose a poor word because he fears that by choosing a good one he might be charged with borrowing from previous translators who have already used it. His translation has no explanatory notes.

—Though privately printed (by A. S. McClurg & Co., Chicago), and not, therefore, seeking criticism or public scrutiny, we cannot let pass without notice an attractive and informing pamphlet, of one hundred and fifty-nine pages, entitled "Japanese Women." It has been compiled by the Japanese Woman's Commission for the World's Columbian Exposition. The aim has been "to present to the World's [World's Fair?] public, however briefly, the true condition of the Japanese woman, ancient and modern." The eight chapters are the work of native authoresses, "each chapter being undertaken by a different lady who is especially interested in and perfectly informed of the subject assigned her." While bearing unmistakable marks both of the presence of the native censor and of the absence of purists in English, the discussion and presentation of the Japanese woman in politics, literature, religion, domestic life, industrial occupations, accomplishments, and in the charities and education of the present, or Meiji era, are highly creditable to the editor and contributors. The illustrations are simple but accurate. Biographical outlines and details of famous women are numerous. One sees clearly how much higher, in ancient Japan of the pre-Confucian ages, was the position of woman than after the dominance of Chinese ethics and philosophy. Yet it must not be forgotten that, while ten empresses have sat on the throne, while the early national literature is almost wholly the creation of Japanese women, and while female exemplars of courage, ability, and devotion, as pictured in tradition, art, literature, and sober history, are numerous, yet these were almost wholly within the court circle. The ultra-patriotic devotee of "Japan for the Japanese," or the radical Shintoist, would have hard work, we imagine, to prove that the introduction of Chinese ethics did not greatly improve the status of Japanese women in general. Most frankly, the authoresses acknowledge the good influence in every walk of life of Buddhism. Christianity, though still the religion of only a small minority, is treated as one of the settled faiths of the people. The chapters on domestic life and industrial occupations are of especial value for their contemporaneous interest. Since by the Constitution of 1889 the imperial succession is in the male line only, the words by which it is signified that Japanese women will not henceforth, as so frequently in centuries past, be publicly active in matters of state, are of interest. They show, what other parts of the work abundantly prove, that female energies are to have all the greater outlet in the new life of the nation. Resisting the temptation to quote or hint further, we can only add that the pamphlet, despite its interest, does but reflect credit indirectly upon the foreign

scholars who, years ago, set forth so much of the substance of these chapters. On the final page, it is shown in the tabulated statistics, that in 1891 there were, besides the great number of private technical, professional, language, and ordinary schools, the kindergartens, and the higher normal and female schools, 917,270 female students and 4,149 female teachers in the public or common schools.

—Apropos of our note, in No. 1480, that, according to the last report of the Japanese Department for Education, the city library of Tokyo contains 2,332 foreign works in a total of 31,629 volumes, a traveller writes:

"Visiting the Tokyo public library on September 23, 1890, although the entire stranger and ignorant of the Japanese tongue, I was readily allowed by officials almost as ignorant of mine to wander among the stacks. What I understood to be the American quarter consisted of seven rather long shelves. On these I observed the works of Irving, Webster, Bancroft, Prescott, Motley, some of the Abbott histories, etc. What I especially noted was two copies of Milton and six editions of Shakespeare. Probably there were other shelves which escaped my eye. One of the first books I opened was an English Bible published by the American Bible Society, on the first fly-leaf of which I read, written in a fair hand, these words, 'Presented to St. Nicholas Hotel, New York City.' Was it an American or a Japanese guest who held it for a pious fraud to steal the Holy Book? or did the proprietor of the hotel think that he placed it where it would do the most good by sending it to the heathen? The library building, said to have once been a temple of Confucius, is spacious and well-lighted, with trees and an open space around it. Some readers were seated at the tables, but the books, as I understood, were mostly taken out for perusal at home."

#### RITCHIE'S DARWIN AND HEGEL.

*Darwin and Hegel*, with Other Philosophical Studies. By David G. Ritchie, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

AN undeniable knack for clear analysis of questions has Mr. Ritchie. He shows symptoms, too, of a power of grasping and handling very broad philosophical arguments, without which power it would be useless to attack such a problem as he has set himself. His greatest fault is no doubt plain to himself, and should correct itself with time: it is that he has not thought enough. His own suggestions are not thoroughly worked out; and there are very pertinent questions that do not seem to have occurred to him.

The object of Mr. Ritchie's studies has been to determine how far the conceptions of Hegel can advantageously be applied in Darwin. A speculation. But he does not pretend to offer any definite answer to the question, speaking, indeed, of his "philosophic creed" as "but partially formulated." Everybody qualified to form even a rudimentary judgment upon Hegel has long ago recognized in his 'Phenomenology' and 'Logic' rich mines of philosophic thought, whose ore, however, is intimately combined with the gangue of error—some say with more, some with less—from which we hardly know how to separate it. Germany, after following with docility the Hegelian method, was certainly in the best possible situation to judge it by its fruits. The outcome, as all the world knows, was an overpowering disgust; so much so that not the slightest attention is any longer paid in Germany to any of the Hegelian ideas. But by this revolution the Germans unconsciously confess their own weakness in logic—a weakness that has always

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been evident enough to foreigners. Even without that awful warning, American and English thought could never have been caught in Hegel's too easily detected traps. Not going in so blindly as did German thought, it will be able to derive more good from Hegel's endeavors. However, the world still awaits a satisfactory criticism of Hegel; and towards that Mr. Ritchie helps us little.

The author adopts provisionally the hypothesis of materialism. He speaks of "that materialistic monism which is nowadays the working hypothesis of every scientific explorer in every department." This attitude is certainly very much more moderate than that of the ardent Buchnerites and Haeckelites with whom Germany and the German parts of this country swarm, who inscribe Materialistic Monism upon their banners. Yet Mr. Ritchie unquestionably goes too far in saying that materialism is the working hypothesis of all explorers. For what is a working hypothesis? It is a problematic proposition that touches a question of fact, and from which can be deduced definite consequences which the inquirer is engaged in testing by comparing them with observations. Now it would be absurd to say that an astronomer, a physicist, or a chemist is engaged in testing the consequences of materialism; for even if materialism be false, nobody doubts that the phenomena with which those men deal are the same as if it were true. Equally ridiculous would it be to say that a geometrician, or an historian, or an economist, or a student of jurisprudence is engaged in testing the consequences of materialism. Indeed, the only inquirers whom the question of materialism at all concerns are a certain class of biologists and a certain class of psychologists. Now there cannot be the slightest question that the initial working hypothesis of these inquirers must be the hypothesis of materialism. *Entia non sunt multiplicanda*, etc.; and their first business must be to see whether they can get along without supposing a second kind of substance and a second order of laws, or not. Therefore, to say that materialism remains the working hypothesis of those whom the question concerns is, after all, merely to say that nothing decisively fatal to that hypothesis has yet been brought to light. Even now, there are eminent biologists who hold that the hypothesis is refuted, and at least half the psychologists are of the same opinion—and this, although the question is whether the facts can be made to fit that hypothesis. Were the question simply whether the facts seem on the whole to be favorable or unfavorable to materialism, the vote against it would, of course, be larger.

Wherein do materialistic monism and idealistic monism differ? Only in this, that the former makes the laws of mind a special result of the laws of matter, while the latter makes the laws of matter a special result of the laws of mind. Now, one of the Hegelian ideas that Mr. Ritchie wishes to introduce (though it would be needless to raise the ghost of Hegel merely for this suggestion) is that of teleology—that states of things are to be explained, not by instantaneous conditions, nor by what went before, but by what is to result later. Indeed, Hegel or no Hegel, the materialist is plainly confronted with the following problem: The laws of matter are entirely blind, or non-teleological, only prescribing that in given relative positions the motions of particles shall have given accelerations; now, mind does not act blindly, but pursues purposes; therefore the problem is how teleological or purposed action can be a secondary effect of non-teleological action.

This problem, says Mr. Ritchie, Darwinism solves. The tendency to an end, according to generalized Darwinism, or the tendency towards the production of definite forms of phenomena, is due to the combination of two agencies, the first being fortuitous insensible variation, or the gradual diversification of forms, and the second the destruction of forms whose modification shall have carried them over certain limits. This second agency may undoubtedly be supposed to be of the nature of mechanical law; but whether the phenomenon of diversification can be explained by the action of unyielding law is a question which Mr. Ritchie has yet to consider.

That which conferred upon the Darwinian hypothesis its sovereignty over subsequent thought was its power of explaining what seemed so mysterious by conceptions mathematically definite. The conception of fortuitous variation is so exact that it can be expressed by a mathematical equation. In fact, it is expressed by the formula which expresses the conduction of heat, the action of viscosity, and the diffusion of gases. All these phenomena are explained by physicists as results of Bernoulli's law of high numbers, where the same idea of multitude reappears which is directly involved in the Darwinian hypothesis. The same formula shows itself in the doctrine of chances, in the theory of errors of observation, and in the logic of inductive reasoning. As well as we can make it out, the law of mental association, which is at least strongly analogous to induction, is probably of the same form. All these things seem to be connected. These considerations serve to illustrate, what can be shown in many ways, how the perfect definiteness of the conceptions which enter into a theory contribute to its fruitfulness. One of the worst faults of the Hegelian philosophy is that its conceptions are wanting in this definiteness, and that its consequences are not unmistakable. When Mr. Ritchie undertakes to "Hegelianize natural selection" by the remark that "Heredity and Variation are just particular forms of the categories of Identity and Difference, whose union and interaction produce the actually existing kinds of living beings," he makes us think that Hegelianism needs to be Darwinized much more than Darwinism needs to be Hegelianized.

The first essay in the book is entitled "Origin and Validity." Its purpose is to show that it is one thing to ask how a belief has arisen and another to ask how it is justified. Surely, we are not justified in believing a proposition not yet sufficiently proved. But no doubt that which suggests a proposition is one thing and that which proves it is another; and the formula of generalized Darwinianism would make this to be so. A theory arises by some slight original modification of an idea already in our possession. It is not yet justified, but it is provisionally allowed a place among the possibilities as a "working hypothesis." After that it has to fight its way, and it is by its results that it is destined sooner or later to be condemned or modified. But whether this is a complete and accurate formulation of the universal history of science is a question that it were best to be in no haste to answer.

But no sooner have we made the innocent admission that the question of origin is one thing and the question of validity another, than we find Mr. Ritchie purposes to use our concession as a gate at which Kant's transcendental proof and Hegel's idealism may gain entrance. If we wish to avoid the terrible loss of time from which Germany suffered during the Hegelian period, we shall do well to be very cau-

tious here. A metaphysical philosophy, in the sense of that which is to be definitively accepted in advance of scientific inquiry, is, or should be, a system of pigeon-holes in which facts are to be filed away. Its first merit is to give a place to every possible fact. Whatever could conceivably be settled by experiment, metaphysics should abstain from settling in advance. Mr. Ritchie professes a readiness to admit all that Auguste Comte said in condemnation of what he called "metaphysics." What Comte called "metaphysics" was unverifiable hypothesis—unverifiable, not in the sense of supposing a fact not capable of being directly observed, for many indispensable hypotheses do that, but unverifiable in the sense of leading to no unmistakable consequences capable of being put to the test of comparison with observation. An a-priori philosophy ought not to pronounce in advance upon the truth of anything which is capable of verification or refutation by subsequent experience. But beyond the realm of verification truth and falsity lose their meanings. Hence the moment a philosopher, upon a-priori or epistemological grounds, enunciates any proposition whatever as true, we are warned to be upon our guard against some jugglery. Where we have no scientifically observed facts to go upon, the prudent thing is to confess our downright ignorance. Even where we have such facts, we are subject to a probable error. From this pregnant fact, if one only takes it to heart, can be developed a whole Darwinianized Hegelism, having fruitful suggestions and indications for the prosecution of science and for the conduct of life.

#### MORE FICTION.

*The Coast of Bohemia.* By William Dean Howells. Harpers.

*Duffels.* By Edward Eggleston. D. Appleton & Co.

*The One I Knew the Best of All.* By Frances Hodgson Burnett. Charles Scribner's Sons.

*A Liberal Education.* By Mrs. George Martyn. Frederick Warne & Co.

*Seraph: A Tale of Hungary.* By Sacher-Masoch. Translated by Emma M. Phelps. Geo. M. Allen Co.

"If people only kept to what they knew," says one of the characters in Mr. Howells's latest novel, "and didn't do what they divined, there would be very little art or literature left, it seems to me." And the hero answers, with the true realistic doctrine, "Perhaps the less the better. What was left would certainly be the best." This is the condemnation of the book. It is only the coast of Bohemia that our author pretends to visit, but one feels that even the coast has been seen only from the decks of an excursion steamer, and that the observer never really landed on the shores of that, for him, still undiscovered country. In a word, Mr. Howells blunders constantly as to the facts of the life of an art-student in New York. His mistakes are both general and particular, and we shall take the pains to point out a few of each.

In the first place, he shares with the romantic novelist the peculiarity of making his hero and heroine preposterously young. There are exceptions to all rules, but the artist who should return to this country, after years of study abroad, and take a position as a man of some importance and an exhibitor at the Academy and the Society of American Artists at the ripe age of twenty-two, would be little less than an infant prodigy. After that, the fact

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