

better than its predecessors as to be likely to stem the flood of composition and competition. One had a right to expect much from Mr. Fiske's well-known faculty for luminous exposition, though his powers of condensation had perhaps hardly been tested. As an apostle of evolution, too, he might have been counted on to exhibit in a masterly manner the organic growth of American institutions. He assures us, in fact, in his preface, that he has "aimed, above all things, at telling the story in such a way as to make it clear how one event led to another."

Now what is the greatest single event in the one hundred and five years of the republic's existence? Undeniably the civil war. When did it end? Some will answer literally, in 1865, with the surrender of Lee; others, in 1877, when President Hayes withdrew the Federal troops from the support of the carpet-bag governments; others, in 1894, when the war-tariff policy was reversed as far as was possible in view of the pension burden. When did it begin? Some will say in 1861, with the firing upon Sumter; others, in 1860, with the secession of South Carolina; others, in 1859, with John Brown at Harper's Ferry; others, in 1854, with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill; others, in 1850, with the passage of the Fugitive Slave bill. For forty-four years, then, at the very least, the conflict of the two sections and the consequences thereof have occupied public attention without intermission. But what is the genesis of the Fugitive Slave law? Every one knows that its foundations, as of all the events enumerated, were laid in the compromises of the Federal Constitution—Lincoln's "house divided against itself," Seward's "irrepressible conflict." The historian, therefore, has one thread running down the wool from the beginning, of vital interest at the present moment, by which the child's mind can naturally and easily be led back in a causal connection. No other thread of equal antiquity is so distinct, none possesses anything like its importance. Not one of the group of American historians above enumerated has firmly grasped this thread, and Mr. Fiske is even conspicuously inferior to several of them in his attempt "to make it clear how one event led to another." Slavery is to him actually a "new question" in 1820. In the nine lines which summarize the Constitution of '89 there is not a word respecting slavery or compromises, and in fact Prof. Thomas alone, of our six authors, takes notice of the clause tolerating the slave trade, or of that which provided for slave representation—the national political premium on the perpetuity of a system which economically was always committing suicide.

Suppose a bright lad reads, in the daily press, of Miss Wells's recent mission to England to enlist foreign public sentiment against the horrible lynchings to which her race is subjected in the Southern States, and by contagion even in the Northern. What is there in Mr. Fiske's narrative to show him the connection between these atrocities and the defunct system of slavery? Nothing, for there is nowhere any description of American slavery—not an anecdote from which the child's imagination might glimpse the truth: the burning alive of slave men and women in Massachusetts, burnings in New York, in New Jersey, in all the Southern slave States, still continued upon the freedmen and justified by current Southern public opinion, ecclesiastical as well as vulgar. Prof. Johnston does mention the New York colonial holocaust, and has a phrase about "the cruelty of the system." He also touches fairly upon the race question. He records, too, the abolition of the foreign slave

trade, but without remarking the sanction given to it by the Constitution, or picturing the infernal traffic, about which our bright lad might have read in a recent magazine.

It must be a false motive in an historian to cover up what is barbarous in the nation's history; and what, above all, should our Evolutionist be doing in that gallery? The offence becomes grave when we recall the complaint of the lack of moral instruction in our schools, and consider that history is one of the most potent vehicles of such instruction. Prof. Fiske errs with Prof. Johnston in narrating the Mexican war without an allusion to its pro-slavery inspiration. This is virtually, of course, to put that war on a level of glory with the Revolution and the war of 1812, and the child reads of its victories with the same pride as of Trenton or Lake Erie. He sees "the flag" and nothing else, and imbibes unconsciously the immoral precepts of that day: "Our country however bounded," "Our country, right or wrong." Under such circumstances the national conscience must perforce be neglected by our school historians. Few mention the abolition movement, as none truly defines its principles; few give it its chronological place, with its philanthropic pedigree. Mr. Fiske picks it up in 1837, and implies that then "the little band of abolitionists began an agitation which they were determined should not stop so long as slavery endured." Not a word of Lundy and his *Genius of Universal Emancipation*, but the trumpety Lundy's Lane is itemized in this, and in nearly all our six histories. Not a word, except in Johnston and Thomas, about the mobs directed against the abolitionists, and Thomas alone commemorates Lovejoy. Not a word about the service rendered the cause of free speech in this country by the Alton martyr and the abolitionists. Must the child go for this to the Life of Channing? Can one infer the wave of feeling caused by Brooks's assault on Sumner in the Senate chamber from Johnston's "cruelly beaten [where?] by a South Carolina Representative," or Fiske's "atrocious and cowardly act" occasioned by "a speech of an exasperating character, containing some personal allusions . . . which were not in good taste"? Not a syllable in any of the six about the significance of the outrage in having been perpetrated where it was, by a fellow-Congressman, for words spoken in debate; the Senate as a body consenting, and Brooks's constituency reflecting him! Thomas gives in an appendix Lincoln's immortal second inaugural address; Mrs. Barnes, who quotes from the Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society, also gives a portion of John Brown's immortal address to the court. What would happen to the child's moral sense if the whole of the latter were printed by Fiske, in silent comment on his text: "He [John Brown] was, of course, captured and hanged. His attempt was an insane piece of folly, and found but little sympathy or approval in the North"? True, but is the "of course" the chronicler's or the moralist's? And if there was little sympathy at the North for the attempt, was there no sympathy for the man? Did the Northern conscience not recognize its own?

We might, from the evolutionary point of view, criticize Mr. Fiske's History in sundry other particulars; but our space is overrun. Prof. Thomas's work seems to us, on the whole, the best of those here considered in its treatment of the main question (in one form or another) of American politics from 1789 to 1894. He has an excellent observation on the effect of the civil war in lowering "in many

ways the moral tone of the whole country"; and might have shown how the survival of the Republican organization as a war party has put it in the very shoes of slavery as an obstruction to independent thought and effort touching all reforms. Only now (if there is to be no step backward toward protection) have Stuart Mill's words of congratulation at the close of hostilities come true:

"The chains of prescription have been broken; it is not only the slave who has been freed—the mind of America has been emancipated. The whole intellect of the country has been set thinking about the fundamental questions of society and government; and the new problems which have to be solved, and the new difficulties which have to be encountered, are calling forth new activity of thought, and that great nation is saved, probably for a long time to come, from the most formidable danger of a completely settled state of society and opinion—intellectual and moral stagnation."

#### FOUR HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY.—I.

*A History of Philosophy.* With especial reference to the Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions. By Dr. W. Windelband. Authorized translation by James H. Tufts, Assistant Professor in Chicago University. Macmillan & Co.

*History of Modern Philosophy.* By Richard Falkenberg. Translated with the author's sanction by A. C. Armstrong, jr., Professor in Wesleyan University. Henry Holt & Co.

*An Historical Interpretation of Philosophy.* By John Bascom. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

*A History of Modern Philosophy.* By B. C. Burt. 2 vols. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

If history is to be conceived neither as mere narration nor as the study of obsolete politics, but as an account of man's development, then the history of the mind is surely the main thing, and that of thought must stand at its head. It is odd how different to different sciences is the importance of their own chronicles. Mathematics can boast of a long and interesting past; but it is neither needful nor usual for mathematicians to know much about it, except only in certain special branches—the theory of elasticity, for example—which are regularly studied in the discussions that gave them birth. An examination of the beginnings of mechanics throws, as is well known, no feeble light upon the science itself; while physicists hardly concern themselves about early optics or early meteorology. Certainly of no natural science can it be said, as might very well be maintained of metaphysical philosophy, that its history is of more consequence than its doctrine. The University of Paris, and every mediæval university, required a student to be fairly well trained in the history of philosophy before they would allow him to teach it. The metaphysics of those days was theology, and theology was metaphysics. Now Charles Thurrot and many good authorities understand that in Paris, after a man had taken his hood of master of arts, he had to study fourteen years more before he could be admitted to the degree in theology. That study was, of course, almost entirely historical. Denifle understands that only fourteen years in all were required; but what a contrast even that to modern practice.

Dr. Windelband is a German professor of high reputation. His manual history of philosophy, now presented to English readers in such English diction as can emanate from the most modern, if not (after the flesh) the most

wealthy, of earth's seats of learning, is well known everywhere; his larger work is celebrated. Throughout Germany, this scholar is extolled for his accuracy, for the energy of thought with which he compresses a whole philosophy into a paragraph, and for his crystal clearness. The most faithful student must tremble at the idea of criticising such a work. We will suppose that the college "senior" for whom the book is intended, reads upon p. 342 about the *Parva logicalia*, which are a series of mediæval treatises explaining how the forms of everyday thought are to be made amenable to strict logical rules—explanations highly useful in times when formal accuracy of logic was exacted in all those scholar's disputations which filled most of the scholar's waking hours. Windelband, speaking of that one of these *Parva logicalia* which relates to "supposition," i. e., the logical denotation of nouns, remarks that the importance attributed to this subject was "not without its precedent in antiquity"; to which he somewhat cruelly adds that "the reader need only be reminded of the investigations of Philodemus on signs and designations." Our student, not being blessed with Teutonic phlegm, blushes at this as a snub; for the investigations of Philodemus with which he is expected to be so familiar are contained only in a somewhat recently transcribed and fragmentary papyrus from Herculaneum, of which Dr. Windelband in this history has only recorded the bare title, *περί σημειῶν καὶ ἀντικειμένων*, which he now translates, "On Signs and Designations." Stung to the quick by the imputation of unusual ignorance, our ingenuous youth rushes to the college library, gets the transcription of the papyrus by Gompertz, and proceeds to dig out the Greek until he has mastered the substance of it. Having done this, he finds to his amazement that the title cannot, agreeably to the contents, be understood to mean, "On signs [i. e., words and the like] and designations," but, on the contrary, must be rendered "On signs [i. e., facts symptomatic of other facts] and their significance [i. e., their inferential value]"; and further that the substance of the treatise bears not the remotest affinity with the "supposition" of nouns, but is a discussion of the philosophy and value of inductive reasoning! In short, he discovers that the superlatively learned Windelband can certainly never have opened the volume of which he talks so glibly. After that, the poor fellow will begin to doubt whether Dr. Windelband has so much as read Henry of Ghent (whose works are downright rare); though he talks of him as an intimate; and he will almost be tempted to extend that doubt to Richardus de Mediavilla, whose name is printed in this volume Mediavia.

The above is, perhaps, not the worst of swarms of amusing blunders of detail with which the book abounds, and which the translator had better have obtained leave silently to rectify. Roger Bacon is spoken of as a product of the Franciscan order, which is as if Marie Antoinette were called a product of the French Revolution. Albertus Magnus stands shoulder to shoulder with Roger Bacon—a worse error yet, exposing defective perception of the calibres of men, and at the same time naïve want of acquaintance with the spirit of natural science. Besides, in truth, Bacon never tires of satirizing Albert. True, he does not name him—that were unnecessary and coarse. But there is no mistaking the characterization, which, so aptly fitting the most prominent man in the learned world of that day, cannot be meant for some indiscoverable

nobody, when Bacon plainly says he means a person of universal celebrity. Errors of a more important description are equally rife. Windelband speaks of the heccecacy of Scotus as a *form*, instead of a *formality*, or *formal principle*, a widely different thing. This error has been committed by others, but it none the less argues a terrible misapprehension of the central idea of Scotus, as well as a total obliviousness of the literature of the dispute between Thomists and Scotists. We notice, too, that Prantl's unfounded theory of a "Byzantine logic" is spoken of as if it were beyond all doubt. This hypothetical "Byzantine logic" is represented by a single book, the Greek of which is fishy to the last extreme. It is full of phrases which can only be explained by the Latin, and its ideas are even more Latin than its language. In short, it is a manifest translation from the Latin.

Dr. Falkenberg's history is eminently modern in its methods and preferences. It furnishes what may be called the conceptions best received in Germany to-day of the different systems of modern philosophy. It is little colored by personal views, is luminous, sensible, and accurate. Not its least recommendation is that it has been translated by a man able to write an agreeable English style. It is to be feared that unfortunate presswork, quite painful to the eyes, may detract from its usefulness.

Dr. Bascom, who has hit upon an expressive title for such a sketch of history as his, is well known as a dualistic intuitionist. The business of his life has been to fit out young men destined to practical pursuits with a kit of ready-made opinions and to train them in not criticising the same. Everywhere throughout this book he is occupied with the good or bad practical results of the different philosophies. What has been taught is the question that interests Dr. Bascom, and on that head he makes many shrewd observations, forcibly expressed; but as to what train of thought it was that led to any doctrine he does not care, and teaches his scholars not to care. The most important knowledge, he holds, "admits of no further explanation than is involved in the very act of knowing" (Bascom's 'Psychology,' p. 13). Or, as he says in another place, "sound philosophy gives no entrance to the feeling that, knowing a thing once, we need to know it again, in some other way, in order to know it" ('Historical Interpretation,' p. 390). This is declaring war on criticism in general. Provide yourself, young man (is his general tone), with a full set of sound beliefs, and then take good care of them, and don't indulge in idle longings to know things in two different ways: so you will have a successful and happy life, and go to heaven when you die.

That a history of philosophy ought to be written in the country where it is to be used, is a maxim that gains in weight the more one reflects upon it. Mr. Burt's pretty volumes, besides being written by an American to meet the wants of American students, present several excellent and original features. In the Kantian volume, one-third of the space is devoted to English philosophy. The corresponding ratio in Falkenberg, though the translator of that work has entirely rewritten and greatly enlarged the English section, is only 1-10. Among German authors, such intense concentration of thought, such subtlety, such fine edge upon ideas as Scotus, Ockham, Hobbes, Hartley, Berkeley, James Mill, Clifford exhibit, will be sought in vain. Everybody knows that there is a German history of philosophy, admirably translated, that has been

of very great usefulness in this country; we mean Morris's *Überweg*. But now that work, more than twenty years old, is growing out of date. Besides, it states only the conclusions of philosophers, not their reasonings, and then, it is written from a foreign point of view. We need an American history of philosophy, upon an encyclopædic scale. It does not matter much whether we have good summaries of Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, nor even of the second grade of philosophers, but it is for information about writers whom few can find time to read, Samuel Parker, Toland, Arthur Collier, Jean Senebier, Tetens, Rosmini, and hundreds of other third-rate philosophers, that such a work is greatly needed. Mr. Burt devotes a section (sometimes several) to each writer, who is taken up, his life briefly narrated, his doctrine stated, and his influence estimated. If Mr. Burt does not display an exceptional power of comprehensive statement, the clear, sensible, and logically excellent arrangement of his work lights it up very much in more senses than one. We could wish he would take more pains to satisfy our curiosity as to just how each metaphysician came to think as he did.

*Teutonic Switzerland. — Romance Switzerland.* By W. D. McCrackan. Boston: Joseph Knight Co. 2 vols., pp. 315 and 270.

WE are in the habit of looking upon Europe as practically immutable, compared with growing, ever-changing America. But as a matter of fact it has been shown lately that the cities of Germany grow and alter more rapidly than our own; and to realize how many changes are constantly taking place in mountainous Switzerland, it is only necessary to compare two or three successive editions of Baedeker's guide-books with one another. Every year new mountain railways are built, new points of view made accessible, and so many other changes are made that thirty or forty extra pages are required to describe them. Indeed, the mere facts and dry directions multiply so rapidly that all historical details and touches of local color in description have to be gradually eliminated. Thus a Baedeker ten years old would to-day utterly fail of its purpose as a guide; but if you should happen to come across one in a hotel book-case, you would find in it much interesting reading-matter which has been gradually crowded out by the accumulating facts and directions.

Under these circumstances it was a happy thought on the part of Mr. McCrackan to write these two volumes, which are intended to be a sort of literary supplement to a guide-book, themselves avoiding all practical directions regarding routes and hotels, but supplying the "atmosphere" which has gradually been banished from the guide-books. Doubtless, also, the author valued the opportunity thus provided to make use of chips that accumulated in his workshop while he was writing his 'Rise of the Swiss Republic.' His present volumes might be briefly described as a pleasant mélange of descriptions of cities and mountains, together with historic glimpses and short biographies of famous men and women who were born in Switzerland or made it their home—Rousseau, Voltaire, Mme. de Staël, Calvin; Saussure, the subduer of Mont Blanc; Sismondi, Amiel, Agassiz, and others.

Globe-trotters think it necessary to go to Japan in order to find the modern side by side with the mediæval, but Switzerland presents many sights almost equally incongruous. "In Bern you can see on the streets a car-line, run

THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY