

experiences in Corea. Though this journey was over a beaten track, Mr. Curzon spied out the poverty of the land. Then follow descriptions of the capital and court, a keen diagnosis of the political and commercial symptoms in the Land of Morning Radiance, and a forecast of the little kingdom's political future. It is doubtful whether in any European language so clear a picture of peninsular and Lilliputian politics exists, though it lacks a certain depth and tone which the student of Corea's language and history would crave. We quote, for its pith and point, and as a specimen of the author's style, this characterization:

"Yet in the Korean polity, viewed as a form of government, [are] features inseparably associated with the Asiatic system and recognizable in every unreformed Oriental State from Teheran to Seoul. A royal figurehead, enveloped in the mystery of the palace and the harem, surrounded by concentric rings of eunuchs, Ministers of State, officials, and retainers, and rendered almost intangible by the predominant atmosphere of intrigue; a hierarchy of office-holders and office-seekers, who are leeches in the thinnest disguise; a feeble and insignificant army, an impecunious exchequer, a debased currency, and an impoverished people—these are the invariable symptoms of the fast vanishing régime of the older and unredeemed Oriental type. Add to these the first swarming of the flock of foreign practitioners, who scent the enfeebled constitution from afar, and from the four winds of heaven come pressing their pharmacopœia of loans, concessions, banks, mints, factories, and all the recognized machinery for filling Western purses at the expense of Eastern pockets, and you have a fair picture of Corea, as she stands after ten years of emergence from her long seclusion and enjoyment of the intercourse of the nations. She is going to purchase her own experience, and to learn that, while civilization is a mistress of rare and irresistible attractions, she requires to be paid for in coin of no small denomination."

As a (British) matter of course, Mr. Curzon, who sees "another market for Manchester," utters his convictions in no uncertain tones as to the necessity of Corea's shaking herself free of Japan, and saving herself from Russia by remaining a Chinese vassal, and thereby assisting the scheme of British trade. In fact, it is this undisguised passion for pounds, shillings, and pence that must vitiate in non-British eyes so many of the author's judgments. His reasons given on page 232 for peninsular policy seem to be founded less on fact and history than on insular sentiment. When, as on page 209, he adduces a "common language" between China and Corea as an argument for Chinese ascendancy, it is evident that he is less a student of Dallet, Aston, Underwood, and the vernacular of Ta Chô-sen, than of superficialities discovered in a short journey and residence in this "Naboth's Vineyard of the Far East."

China naturally occupies the largest share of the author's attention, and in the four chapters devoted to the country "governed by professors," where the standard military works are 3,000 years old, he contrives to make even Chinese subjects interesting. He doubts the so-called awakening of the sleeping giant, believing that the yellow race will always exist, but feeling less sure that the integrity of the Chinese Empire is a certainty. He would have Japan and China keep a good understanding, in order to resist Russia, their common enemy. The painted picture from "the Chinese standpoint" is that of progress; the reality is that of standstill. Very salutary and very impartial is the author's discussion of the missionary problem. Surely, it is worth the while of Christians to inquire why the bearers of the Gospel are so unpopular with their own fellow-

countrymen resident abroad, while considered intolerable nuisances by the natives.

Two chapters of fascinating interest conclude this suggestive book, which bristles with topics that tempt the reviewer to discussion, as they will the thoughtful reader to reflection. In forecasting the destinies of the Far East, Mr. Curzon combats at length the views of the late Mr. Pearson, who foretold a Mongolian deluge. The Japanese victories in Corea do but add commentary to Mr. Curzon's sober estimate of the "monstrous but mighty anachronism." Concerning the Japanese and their danger from conceit, he conceives that "no worse service could have been rendered to Japan than the publication of the last work in English, which has been dedicated to her charms by a well-known English writer and poet." He closes with a delightful and in the main truthful picture of those who from the land of homes maintain character, vigor, and health in climates wherein "the German grows fat and the Frenchman withers." English "is destined with absolute certainty to be the language of the Far East." "Moral failure alone can shatter the prospect that awaits" Great Britain in her impending task of regenerating Asia.

#### FOUR HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY.—II.

*A History of Philosophy.* With especial reference to the Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions. By Dr. W. Windelband. Authorized translation by James H. Tufts, Assistant Professor in Chicago University. Macmillan & Co.

*History of Modern Philosophy.* By Richard Falkenberg. Translated with the author's sanction by A. C. Armstrong, jr., Professor in Wesleyan University. Henry Holt & Co.

*An Historical Interpretation of Philosophy.* By John Bascom. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

*A History of Modern Philosophy.* By B. C. Burt. 2 vols. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

In order that the reader may be able to compare the style of the four books, we will quote a part of what each says about Berkeley, selecting this subject as familiar and as capable of brief treatment. Of course, there is not room for two opinions regarding Berkeley's place in history. What Windelband says is distributed in five different places, although Berkeley's system is as clearly "all of a piece" as can be. In one of these places we find this characteristic specimen of English:

"As the ambiguous, indeterminate nature of Locke's psychology unfolded itself in the antithesis in the following developments, so, too, this epistemological metaphysics offered points of departure for the most varied transformations. The very first of these shows an audacious energy of one-sidedness in contrast with the indecisiveness of Locke. Berkeley brought the ascendancy of inner experience to complete dominance [why not say he brought the dominance of inner experience to complete ascendancy? One phrase seems to mean as much as the other] by putting an end to the wavering position which Locke had taken [not that he influenced Locke, who was dead and gone; but he put an end to the position which had wavered while Locke was in it] upon the question as to the knowledge of bodies. This he did with the aid of his extreme Nominalism and with a return to the doctrines of Hobbes. He demolished the conception of corporeal substance. According to the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, it was held that a part of that complex of ideas which perception presents us as a body should be separated out [the means eliminated] and another part retained as alone real; but this distinction, as Hobbes had already taught, is in the nature of the case erroneous. The 'mathema-

tical' qualities of bodies are as truly ideas within us as the sense qualities, and Berkeley had demonstrated exactly this point with analogous arguments in his 'Theory of Vision.' He attacks the warrant of the distinction of Descartes (and of Democritus). [This reference to Descartes and Democritus has nothing to do with Berkeley.] But while, according to this view, all qualities of bodies without exception are ideas in us, Locke has retained as their real supporter a superfluous unknowable 'substance'; in a similar way others speak of matter as the substrate of sensible qualities" (p. 469).

Now let us see how Falkenberg expresses precisely the same ideas:

"Berkeley is related to Locke as Spinoza to Descartes. He notices blemishes and contradictions allowed by his predecessor to remain, and, recognizing that the difficulty is not to be remedied by minor corrections, goes back to fundamental principles, takes these more earnestly than their author, and, by carrying them out more strictly, arrives at [attains] a new view of the world. The points in Locke's doctrines which invited further advance were the following: Locke proclaims that our knowledge extends no further than our ideas, and that truth consists in the agreement of ideas among themselves, not in the agreement of ideas with things. But this principle had scarcely been announced before it was violated. In spite of his limitation of knowledge to ideas, Locke maintains that we know (if not the inner constitution, yet) the qualities and powers of things without us, and have a sensitive certainty of their existence. Against this, it is to be said that there are no primary qualities, that is, qualities which exist without as well as within us. Extension, motion, solidity, which are cited as such, are just as purely subjective states in us as color, heat, and sweetness. Impenetrability is nothing more than the feeling of resistance—an idea, therefore, which self-evidently can be nowhere else than in the mind experiencing it. Extension, size, distance, and motion are not even sensations, but relations which we in thinking add to the sense-qualities (secondary qualities), and which we are not able to represent apart from them; their relativity alone would forbid us to consider them objective. And material substances, the 'support' of qualities invented by the philosophers, are not only unknown but entirely non-existent. Abstract matter [this is not very good English. "Material substance" is Berkeley's expression] is a phrase without meaning, and individual things are collections of ideas in us, nothing more. If we take away all sense qualities from a thing, absolutely nothing remains. Our ideas are not merely the only objects of knowledge, but also the only existing things—nothing exists except minds and their ideas. Spirits alone are active beings, they only are indivisible substances and have real existence, while the being of bodies (as dependent, inert, variable beings, which are in a constant process of becoming ["forever changing," "in a perpetual flux," are Berkeley's expressions. "Spirits," §§ 344 et seqq.]) consists alone in their appearance to spirits and their being perceived by them. In-cogitative, hence passive, beings are neither substances nor capable of producing ideas in us. Those ideas which we do not ourselves produce are the effects of a spirit that is mightier than we.

With this a second inconsistency was removed which had been overlooked by Locke, who had ascribed active power to spirits alone and denied it to matter, but at the same time had made the former affected by the latter. If external sense is to mean the capacity for having ideas occasioned by the action of external material things, then there is no external sense.

A third point wherein Locke had not gone far enough for his successor concerned the favorite English doctrine of nominalism. Locke, with his predecessors, had maintained that all reality is individual, and that universals exist only in the abstracting understanding. From this point Berkeley advances a step further—the last, indeed, which was possible in this direction—by bringing into question the possibility even of abstract ideas. As all beings are particular things, so all ideas are particular ideas."

The above two presentations of Berkeley are as alike as two peas or as two synoptical gos-

pels, and illustrate what advantages and disadvantages the Germans derive from thinking gregariously.

The following is about one-fifth of what Bascom has to say about Berkeley, and we select the passage in which he has the most to say about methods of reasoning:

"Bishop Berkeley stands quite by himself. Idealism has played a very secondary part in English philosophy. The idealism of Berkeley did not arise from magnifying mental processes, and displacing with them the physical phenomena disclosed in the senses, but sprang from the dualism of Descartes and from the weakness involved in empiricism itself. Empiricism becomes uncertain in its affirmation of any exterior reference of sensations. The mind is so robbed of its native powers as to be able to make no primitive assertion with certainty. Sensations, as simple phenomena, overmaster the mind and hold it in subjection to themselves. Mill gave this tendency full expression in regarding matter as only the possibility of sensations. The correct and firm reference of our ideas became impossible. Berkeley, much impressed by the empiricism of Locke, and escaping the fracture in the universe involved in the system of Descartes, affirmed the true origin of sensations is the divine mind."

The following is about a third of Mr. Burt's account:

"To the query 'whether a man born blind and then made to see would at first give the name distance to any idea (object of consciousness) intromitted by sight,' Berkeley's answer is that he would 'take distance that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind, but would certainly think nothing seen was without his mind.' He would come to perceive distance by sight, only as he learned to interpret visual impressions by impressions of touch and bodily movement. By experience he would become able to 'perceive' distance at once by sight; every visual impression would instantaneously receive an interpretation in the language of touch and movement. But, this being the case, all vision would, in a very important sense, be prevision; visual perceptions are, unconsciously to ourselves, created for us beforehand by experience; and every idea or object of (visual) consciousness would presuppose a subject of consciousness or mind. What is true of vision is true of all forms of sensible experience. Why the sensations of one sense thus receive interpretation in the language of another, and why certain impressions of different senses are uniformly conjoined to constitute the idea of a fixed object, we do not know, any more than we know why words in English, Greek, or any other language have the significations they have for us. Certain it is that we find in experience ideas or objects existing in regular coexistence and succession, or in an order—which order we know, from the manner in which we get these ideas, and from the fact that they form an order, to be inseparable from mind. Such being the case, the traditional notions of matter, substance, and the like which suppose a real existence apart from mind, are 'empty metaphysical abstractions,' a 'dust raised by metaphysicians that prevents their seeing clearly.' The notion of matter is self-contradictory; 'matter is something that is not, and yet at the same time is for consciousness,' since we cannot attach any meaning to the term 'matter' without giving matter an existence for the mind, or 'bringing it within the mind.' The very being of all objects for us consists in the 'being perceived and known.' What does not exist in my mind or that of some other mind or spirit, finite or infinite, cannot have existence. The self-contradiction inherent in the notion of matter [misprinted, water] does not appertain to that of spiritual substance. The words *I* and *you* have certain intelligible meanings which warrant our speaking of spiritual beings, though they be not exactly phenomenal."

This is perhaps not quite so forcible a presentation of Berkeley as the Germans give; but it is thought out by the author for himself, and presents the subject in the fresh light of a new morning.

#### WALKER'S CONGREGATIONALISM IN AMERICA.

*A History of the Congregational Churches in the United States.* By Williston Walker, Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary. [The American Church History Series.] New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1894.

PROF. WALKER has done his work in a manner that deserves the warmest praise. With a large subject and a small canvas, he has managed his composition and distributed his light and shade in a way that shows something artistic in his quality. The result is a most happy one, whether attained by lively intuition, or, as is more likely, by the carefullest deliberation. He has best economized his space by abstaining from all personal controversy. Here and there we are sure that he has in mind Mr. Douglas Campbell or some other author with whom he cannot quite agree, but he calls no names and very seldom falls into the controversial tone. Even where he is dealing with others' controversies—and from the nature of the case he is doing this for the best part of the way—he holds the balances so evenly that we are not always able to make out to which side his own sympathies incline. He seems to write of "the New England theology" of Jonathan Edwards and the later Edwardsians with admiration and approval, but he notes the various stages of its decline without painful emotion, and its decease without any beating of the breast. In such later controversies as those of the Andover heresy and the missionary theology of the Board of Foreign Missions, the treatment is extremely brief—a mere outline of the facts. But the inference is unmistakable that Prof. Walker's sympathies are with the party of progress. If they are not, he is a man of singular self-restraint. Of course a method so impartial has its peculiar disadvantages. It does not convey the spirit of this, that, and the other stage of the long history, at which amenities were interchanged by the contending parties as hot as bullets from the rifle's bore. One going to these pages for a just impression of the "Taylor and Tyler Controversy," for example, would get little notion from their colorless phrases of "the deep damnation" that was dealt out on either side.

Prof. Walker introduces the American part of his history with two valuable chapters, "The Beginnings of Congregationalism" and "Early English Congregationalism." In the former there is much emphasis, as there should be, on the Swiss and German Anabaptists. The bad name which they have had in Protestant histories, and especially in apologies for Luther's treatment of "the fanatics of Münster," does not prevent the critical historian from seeing how many seeds of social and religious good which have since come to light were buried in their chaff. The connection between English Congregationalism and the Continental Anabaptists cannot clearly be made out. They had much in common and much in difference, but that which was most central to either was the idea that a Christian church was made up exclusively of persons who had "experienced religion." That the magistrate has no right to interfere with the church (Roger Williams's doctrine of "soul liberty"), was an Anabaptist doctrine long before his time—a fact to which Mr. Oscar Straus's anxiety for Williams's originality has made him strangely indifferent. Not less so were the English Congregationalists of the Barrowe sort, but the Brownist separatists held distinctly to the Anabaptist opinion.

Hence, in part, the better treatment which Williams received at Plymouth, though Prof. Walker contends that Robinson and his Pilgrim band were less rigidly separatist than the Brownists, and made concessions to the civil power which they would not. The English Congregationalists also rejected the doctrine of adult baptism which gave a name to the Anabaptists, and their forswearing of oaths, civil office, and the use of arms. Prof. Walker finds it easier than Tolstoi and many sounder scholars to set aside the Anabaptist Scripturalism here as "uncritical literalism." If with so much difference there was a genetic relation between the Continental Anabaptists and the English Congregationalists, how did it come about? Evidently through the Dutch that swarmed into the eastern ports of England and the adjacent towns.

As between the English Congregationalists Browne and Barrowe, Prof. Walker's sympathy evidently inclines to the former, though not because of a career which ended in the Established Church, while Barrowe's ended at the stake. Prof. Walker is happy to distinguish the free association of American Congregationalist churches from English independency, and he finds in Browne the germ of the American system. He also finds in him the prophecy of that democratic church government to which American Congregationalism finally attained, after wandering through all its early history in the semi-Presbyterian ways of Barrowe, who made church government wholly a matter of church officers.

The history of the Pilgrims is written, perhaps, more expansively than our needs required, but it can never fail to interest the common heart. Much is made of the influence of the Plymouth Colony on the settlements at Salem and Boston in shaping their church polity. It was evidently very great. History has few transformation scenes more sudden than that which converted thousands of Church of England Puritans into New England Congregationalists, as if their affection for the "dear Church of England" had been washed overboard on their way across the sea. Prof. Walker may not overrate the Plymouth influence, but, as Becky Sharp "must be her own mamma," so was it with the young colonies. They had to shift for themselves. They had to fashion a polity suitable to their novel circumstances in a new world. From these sober pages one learns how much rhetoric there has been in the talk and writing about the New England theocracy. The relation of Church and State was simply a survival of the English system, to which the Presbyterians of the Long Parliament held in as good faith as Laud and his bishops. The identification of Church and State in New England was, however, never so complete as has been commonly supposed. State and Church had their separate organizations, and there were bounds which the State might not pass. That the early State was officered and manned entirely by churchmembers made the approximation to a practical identity much nearer than it would otherwise have been.

Prof. Walker's fifth chapter, "The Development of Fellowship," handles the affairs of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, and characterizes "The First Synod" and the "Cambridge Platform" which followed in the wake of the religious troubles brought upon the community by Williams and Mrs. Hutchinson. The handling is apologetic, but without violence to the offenders. Williams's proportions are far less heroic than in Mr. Straus's memoir, and the illiberality of his excommu-

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