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Studies," to the last, "Historical and Biographical." The midway set is "Religious and Philosophical." Of the literary studies the most important is "Did Shakspeare Write Bacon's Works?" It turns the tables in an effective manner, showing that the greater was likelier to include the less than the less to include the greater. The religious and philosophical articles are polemical, and already "Why I am not a Free-Religionist" would sound strangely in a Unitarian conference, though Dr. Clarke was accounted a radical among Unitarians forty years ago.

The historical and biographical papers are particularly interesting as touching things in which Dr. Clarke had a personal acquaintance and a deep and vital interest. Thus, he writes of Carlyle as one of the first of those who felt the stress of his early inspiration, and as one of those who were most grieved by his decline and fall. He does not, however, sufficiently indicate the extent to which the germs of Carlyle's later brutalities existed in his earlier and earliest work. He is singularly inappreciative of that humanity in Voltaire which was so lacking in Carlyle. To Harriet Martineau is measured praise and blame in about equal parts. A fearful catalogue is made of her assaults on various people in her 'Autobiography.' He thinks she was needlessly afraid of being mobbed, especially in Louisville, Ky., where "it was easier at that time to speak against slavery than in Boston." This testimony of Dr. Clarke is that of a resident of Louisville, where he had his first parish. He also brings his personal knowledge to bear upon some of Mrs. Chapman's additions to Miss Martineau's book, and he "points with pride" to the "Protest against American Slavery," no mealy-mouthed affair, which he wrote and 173 Unitarian ministers signed when there were not more than 250 all told. But far the most interesting and valuable paper is his review of Wilson's 'Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,' which is less a review than a short history from his own point of view, and we could hardly have a better. The account of the early abolition meetings is at once critical and sympathetic. It is "important if true" that "Mr. Garrison always maintained that his converts were most likely to be made among those whose consciences had been educated by the Church and the Bible." Dr. Clarke's psychology of Southern bitterness is not that of Dr. Leonard W. Bacon, ascribing it to Nat. Turner's insurrection, nor that of Dr. Lyman Abbott, who fathers it on the abolitionists, but this, that the pro-slavery Southerner was subconsciously in the wrong; for nothing ever makes a man more bitter than to go counter to the deepest motions of his private heart.

*The Conception of God.* By Josiah Royce, Joseph Le Conte, G. H. Howison, and Sidney Edward Mezes. The Macmillan Co. 1897. 8vo, pp. xxxviii, 354.

On some day in 1895 Professor Royce delivered an address before the Philosophical Union at the University of California, which occupies fifty pages of this volume. This address was devoted to a restatement and simplification of the argument for the existence of a God given in Professor Royce's earlier book 'The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.' The argument substantially is, that the mere existence of experience shows that something exists, no matter how inco-

herent that experience may be. That experience, with whatever its existence involves, has a whole, and therefore there is an all-embracing being, which is all-knowing. Then, following out this line of reflection, the other attributes of Deity are regarded as deducible from omniscience. Of course, the other disputants, Professors Le Conte, Howison, and Mezes, were familiar with this argument in the earlier form in which its author had broached it. Following Professor Royce, Professor Mezes presented certain objections, which as printed here, occupy a dozen pages. He substantially admits Prof. Royce's metaphysics, but is unable to see that the existence of a good God is thereby proved. Prof. Le Conte followed, and, in remarks of about the same length, urged, in very simple eloquence, the existence of a soul of the world, as harmonizing with our knowledge of nature and with the theory of evolution. The debate was closed by an attack upon the argument by Professor Howison, of equal length with the address that set it forth, from the standpoint of a Berkeleyan idealism. Prof. Howison, however, does not explicitly state his own theory. It appears that there were subsequent private discussions among the disputants, which had the excellent result of inducing Prof. Royce to write a supplementary essay that fills considerably more than half the volume, which is thus two-thirds of his writing. An introduction of thirty-eight pages, by Professor Howison, resumes the course of the disputation, and informs us that it resulted, in accordance with the time-honored custom of debate, whether philosophical or political, in all parties retaining their original opinions. The Supplementary Essay treats chiefly of the principle of individuation, and this, even more than the other parts of the book, is of decided value as a line of reasoning concerning logical and logico-metaphysical matters.

For few men will the book have any practical religious importance. In the eyes of the majority of modern logicians, religious metaphysics for the most part falls into two logical sins, which are far worse than fallacies. In the first place, it violates that logical rule which may be said to supersede all others with an imperial sway; namely, owing to the power of genuine scientific reasoning to correct itself—that is, to correct its own previous conclusions by the admission of additional evidence, to correct its very premises, as it constantly does in the most exact sciences, and even to correct its own fallacies, of which there are many historical examples—and owing to the fact that this scientific procedure is nothing but the self-development of man's original impulse of curiosity or interest, it may be said that the only one thing absolutely indispensable to the discovery of truth is the perfect sincerity and earnestness of the endeavor to get one's errors corrected and be set right. But the religious philosophers are not striving to get set right, but to defend a foregone conclusion, and, as history shows, by their mutual conflicts they attain only the imposing persuasions for which they strive, and not the truth for which they do not strive. It has been as often remarked that the religious metaphysicians usually commit another logical fault, that of totally misunderstanding the nature of necessary reasoning. Metaphysics has always been an ape of ge-

ometry. But nowadays geometers no longer regard the postulates of geometry as axioms, but merely as hypotheses. All that necessary reasoning can do is to keep an initial hypothesis consistent with itself; it cannot prove any matter of fact. But the religious metaphysicians seek thus either absolutely to hoist themselves by their boot-straps, or at least to very much increase the height of their jump. Starting with no premises except such as every man knows, they seek to make this take the place of the special religious experience upon which Christianity professes to be founded. Since Hegelianism was exploded, the world will not believe that philosophy (that is, so much of science as can be inferred from the common experience of all men) can do the work of the special sciences, each of which is founded on some department of experience, to be undergone only upon the fulfilment of laborious conditions.

The question to which Royce's Supplementary Essay is mainly devoted has an intimate connection with this frequently urged objection to metaphysics. The world of possibilities, in which necessary reasoning holds a solitary sway, is a world of generals. You can no more suppose an individual horse than you can wish for an individual horse. You can suppose a pseudo-individual—for example, a vague individual—just as you can wish for one horse and no more. Yet even this you can do only by the aid of a real experience. The world of existences to which truth relates, and in which necessary reasoning is out of place, is a world of individuals. The question for metaphysics is, therefore, how deep into the nature of things does the distinction between the general and the individual go. Prof. Royce comments upon what Aquinas and Duns Scotus have to say upon this subject, which was the leading topic of logico-metaphysical discussion from the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fourteenth century, say during the period of the decorated Gothic architecture. Duns Scotus, one of the ablest logicians that ever lived, was the principal doctor of that period to hold virtually the proposition that metaphysics has nothing decisive to say concerning religious questions, which must be left to religious experience or special information, or concerning special science, which must be left to the appropriate department of experience. "Non potest probari Deum esse vivum." See this and some dozens of similar propositions in his 'Tractatus de Creditis.' But if pure reasoning is thus impotent as to existence, the concrete world cannot be a mere solidification of the world of ideas. In harmony, therefore, with that view of demonstrative reasoning, he held that the principle of individuation was a certain "positing mode of being" (*positiva entitas*). This was not very explicit, but it was important as showing that the individuality was something utterly different from anything else. Throughout the writings of Scotus, not merely in the famous discussion concerning the third distinction of the second book of the 'Sentences,' but wherever the question of individuality is approached (as in the 'Questiones Subtilissimas') we see its peculiarity insisted upon; yet Prof. Royce has read Scotus through such spectacles that he adduces him as an authority in favor of his own views. But Royce's speculations burningly approach the truth, and become most interesting when he connects individuation

with will. This is an important step for one who has always been an absolute idealist in the Hegelian sense; for the moment that the phenomenon of will, in its strictly individual character, is given its due place in philosophy, though a sort of absolute psychism may survive, a seed of death would seem to be implanted in the Hegelian system. Here is the keynote to this highly important contribution to logico-metaphysical thought:

"We have seen that the completion of the unity of Absolute Consciousness demands the presence of a factor not separate from thought and experience, yet not definable in terms either of bare thought or of the data of immediate experience, in so far as they are merely felt or are present as the merely sensuous fulfillment of thought. This new factor we have defined as will. We have seen that it does not form merely one of the contents of experience to which thought refers, but determines the world which fulfills thought to be this world rather than any of the other of the abstractly possible, but not genuinely possible worlds."

The last words indicate that Prof. Royce is still unwilling to admit an element of blind force in the universe. Nor does he make much of the intrinsically dualistic character of will.

*Memorials of William C. Bond,* Director of the Harvard College Observatory, and of his son, George P. Bond. By Edward S. Holden. San Francisco: Murdoch; New York: Lemeke & Buechner. 12mo, pp. 291.

Prof. Holden, with the aid of members of the Bond family, by whom most of the material was supplied, has here brought out a little book which will prove interesting to the general reader and important in the history of American science. American astronomy may be said to have come into an independent existence sixty years ago, and Bond was one of its pioneers. Like most born astronomers, he began trying what he could do in astronomical work at an early age. His first instruments were fashioned by himself, and were, of course, of the rudest description. Later, when he owned a small house, a huge granite block to support his transit instrument rose through the centre of the parlor, the ceiling of which was intersected by a meridian opening. In 1838 his well-established reputation led to his being engaged by the Navy Department to make observations for use in connection with the Wilkes exploring expedition to the Southern hemisphere. In the year following he accepted an invitation from President Quincy to connect himself with Harvard College, the only inducement offered being a residence and improved opportunities for his scientific work. The erection of the Harvard Observatory three years later afforded him for the first time facilities of the best class, of which he availed himself to initiate the long series of observations and researches which have raised the establishment to its present rank.

A curious historic circumstance connected with the early history of the Washington Observatory is obscurely alluded to in a footnote by G. P. Bond on page 23. That some project for placing a civilian astronomer in charge of this institution had been urged when it was founded, first came out through a remark in a letter of Maury to a friend, which was not published till after his death:

"You know I did not want the place, and only decided to keep it when I heard it had

been promised to a civilian, under the plea that no one in the navy was fit for it. I then went to Mason . . . and told him he must stand by me. He did so, and though I had never seen an instrument of the kind before, and had no one with me who had, I was determined to ask no advice or instruction from the savants, but to let it be out and out a navy work."

It would seem from the note in question that the civilian here alluded to was Bond.

George P. Bond, the son and successor of William, had many of the characteristics of his father, and was more fortunate in having an early mathematical training. He was an industrious though not brilliant observer, and his two or three papers on mathematical astronomy are of high merit—one of them, indeed, may be called classic, as it contained the first development of one of the methods of "special perturbations" still in extensive use. This method was shortly afterwards independently worked out by Encke of Berlin, who, however, publicly acknowledged Bond's priority as soon as his attention was called to Bond's paper. A letter of Encke to Bond apologizing for his ignorance of the latter's work is found on p. 153.

The two men, father and son, were intimately associated with two capital improvements in practical astronomy. One of these is the system of registering the moment of an observation by electricity on a revolving cylinder; the other the application of photography to astronomy. But, although Bond seems to have been almost a pioneer in astronomical photography, the credit of first applying it to the practical purposes of celestial measurement on a large scale must still rest with Rutherford. The modest and retiring disposition of the two men was not conducive to public notoriety during their lives; and their work was characterized by patience, persistence, and good judgment rather than by brilliancy.

*The Italic Dialects.* By R. S. Conway. In two volumes. Cambridge, England: University Press; New York: Macmillan. 1897.

The study of the Italic dialects—meaning by Italic the ancient dialects of Italy, sisters of the Latin—has made remarkable progress within the last five years, and this is due in large degree to the teaching and inspiration of Prof. Brugmann of Leipzig, to whom Prof. Conway has dedicated his stately volumes. For many years Brugmann has made the interpretation of the Umbrian remains a feature of his *Sprachwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft*, and in 1891, when it fell to him to assign the subject for the first prize of the philosophical faculty, a statistical and comparative treatment of the Oscan vowel system was requested. This brought out two treatises, both of which were published in 1892 and contained a number of new discoveries. At about the same time a complete grammar of the Oscan-Umbrian dialects was announced by a Swiss scholar, Von Planta. Von Planta was also a member of Brugmann's *Gesellschaft* some six years before, and had been encouraged to continue his study of the Italic dialects. But he gave no sign of further activity, and at the time when the subject for the prize essay was assigned, Prof. Brugmann was not aware that he had been quietly but persistently at work along the same line. Still, only good resulted from this ap-

parent glut of products in a field which had long been neglected. Some of the most important new results were vouched for by their discovery by all three authors, and each work had its own special merits.

But another desideratum, a new collection of the material, had not yet been supplied, and it was also in 1892 that the first announcement was made of 'The Italic Dialects,' by R. S. Conway, who had also been a participant in Brugmann's *Gesellschaft* for a short period. For the Umbrian, to be sure, the material was still practically restricted to the celebrated Iguvian tables discovered at Gubbio in the fifteenth century, and the text of these is perfectly clear and well reproduced in the photographs published in connection with Bréal's edition. For the other dialects the various publications of the Russian Zvetaleff were in use. But where the reading was doubtful, as was not infrequently the case, the facsimiles of Zvetaleff were felt to be unsatisfactory guides to the establishment of the text. Moreover, a considerable number of new Oscan inscriptions had come to light and been edited in scattered articles.

In Prof. Conway's work which now lies before us we have a complete collection of all the material, inscriptional or otherwise, upon which our knowledge of the Italic dialects rests. The text of nearly all the inscriptions is based upon autopsy, made in the light of previous readings and conjectures. It may be mentioned here that the second volume of Von Planta's grammar, which appeared at the beginning of the year, is supplemented by a new collection of the inscriptions. These texts are also based upon autopsy, in some cases double, the author having made two trips to Italy for the purpose. But Von Planta's collection has not made Conway's book any the less welcome. Aside from the superior advantage of two pairs of eyes and two heads over one, the two collections are different in scope. That of Von Planta is a compact series of texts furnished as a supplement to a very comprehensive and complete grammar of the dialects. With Conway, the presentation of the material is the main object, this being supplemented by a brief outline of the grammar. His work is epigraphical rather than grammatical. The customary epigraphical data, such as size, provenance, form of alphabet, etc., are given with the greatest fullness, combined with other pertinent archaeological observations; witness the elaborate discussion of the somewhat mysterious *iorilae* dedications from Old Capua, or the minute measurements of the *mensa ponderaria* of Pompeii. Clearly no pains have been spared to make the external evidence absolutely complete, and in this lies one of the chief merits of the book. The new collation of the inscriptions has naturally produced a number of minor changes in the texts, but it cannot be said that there are many startling results. Scarcely any new words have been brought to light and few old friends have disappeared, though Von Planta has decided that the oft-quoted *divercium* of a Capuan inscription must be given up. A discovery made by both Conway and Von Planta in regard to a short inscription running around the neck of a small column (Conway No. 176) has yielded a neat result.

In addition to the inscriptions, including coin legends, our author has given us the