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By universal consent the 14th and 15th centuries are adjudged the most sterile in the history of French literature. The creative impulses and the imaginative traditions of the Middle Ages had then run out, and the new interests of the Renaissance had not yet distinctly asserted themselves. The literary historians are wont to mention a few stock names—Froissart and Eustache Deschamps from the 14th century; Commines, Charles d'Orléans, and Villon from the 15th. But the critical treatment of the period has come to be almost conventional in its character, and it is probable that there are not a dozen persons living who have a detailed first-hand acquaintance with the literary documents of the time. Current sources of information as to what was taking place in French letters during those long years are consequently almost entirely lacking. And yet now and then we stumble upon some literary phenomenon that makes us ask if, after all, this neglect has been wise. It is almost as dangerous to draw an indictment against a whole period as against a whole people.

Such a phenomenon, for example, is a group of romances (or, better, romantic novels) composed in the main in the last half of the 14th and the first half of the 15th century, which are noteworthy both because of certain distinct literary qualities they have, and because of their large diffusion in other European literatures in the form of translations. One of these tales is that known as 'Mélusine,' composed in its most widely current prose form at the very close of the 14th century, as a glorification of the family of Lusignan. Another is the delightful story of 'Pierre de Provence et la belle Maguelonne,' written towards 1459. A third is the tale of 'Pontus et Sidoine,' of about the same date as 'Pierre de Provence,' and similar to 'Mélusine' in that it was composed in honor of a great family, that of La Tour Landry in Anjou. In spite of their general neglect by the historians of French literature, we cannot but think that these romances deserve the careful attention of students.

For, to begin with, the manner of them is distinctly removed from that of the great romantic compilations of the 13th and 14th centuries, in which the already bewildering mass of adventurous and marvellous incident of the Arthurian and other romantic compositions of the 12th century was diluted to a veritable sea of fantastic inventions. The 14th century 'Perceforest,' for example, which served as a stop-gap between the Arthurian romances of the Middle Ages and the 'Amadis de Gaula' and its congeners in the Renaissance, is indeed, in its vagueness and indecision, its diffuseness and formlessness, the acme of literary fatuity. The author has neither a story nor actors for a story; no living fact appears in his pages. The outworn mediæval stuff simply goes echoing on until the reader sinks into a very drowse of attention. There is some excuse, therefore, for those who, judging all French narration of the period by examples like this, reject it as meaningless and valueless. It is too hasty a judgment, however, for the tales we have mentioned. In them we have essays in a new direction, an effort to use the imaginative stuff of mediæval romance in such wise as to make it verisimilar. Romantic adventure and even the marvellous find ample employment, and yet the dramatis personæ are vascular, to use Emerson's expression—if you stick a pin into them, they will bleed. The realism of the mediæval *fabliaux*, which was in the main due to the unromantic and often actually vulgar material employed in them, here strives to associate with itself the delights of the imagination.

Now, this fusion of the real and the romantic happens to be the quality which more than any other has given permanent success to literary narrations, from the 'Odyssey' to the works of the present day. In earlier modern literature, particularly in the great creative period of the Renaissance, we find this quality mainly in tales that had passed through Italian hands. But it is not uninteresting and not without significance that in France, before the influence of the Italian *novella* had been perceptibly felt there, an attempt should have been made to reach the same goal. To be sure, we are obliged to confess that the result was indecisive in many ways, that the experiment was not clearly and purposefully carried out. And yet it remains true that the tales which illustrate the experiment are both gracious and persuasive.

Another source of interest in these tales is their wide diffusion in translations or versions. As the biography of them is gradually brought into shape, we find that they were known from one end of Europe to the other. Indeed, it is hard to understand how stories so universally familiar should have dropped so entirely out of sight within so brief a space of time. Is such to be the fate of our Stevensons and Maupassants? To go into the details of this widespread diffusion would take us far afield, and we must refrain. It is enough for our present purpose to note that in England no less than on the Continent these stories were gladly received.

It is one of the two English translations of the 'Pontus et Sidoine' that Mr. Mather has printed in the present volume. The other, a version not completely independent of this, as Mr. Mather has judiciously shown, was printed by Wynkyn de Worde in 1511. As, however, only a single copy of this quarto, that in the Bodleian Library, is known to exist, Mr. Mather has the credit of being the first to make the story in its English form accessible to the modern reader. It was a task, as we have endeavored to indicate, well worth doing, and Mr. Mather seems to have accomplished it in a highly creditable fashion. His text, based upon the unique Digby MS. in the Bodleian, has been judiciously handled in the light of the French tale and of Wynkyn de Worde's English version. The introduction clearly sets forth the obligations of the original story to the Anglo-Norman tale of 'Horn et Rimel,' and discusses the known versions of it. Of interest here is Dr. W. H. Schofield's contribution of an account of the little-known Icelandic 'Pontus-Rímus,' of which we have as yet no edition. In short, Mr. Mather's book bears the marks of sound and industrious scholarship. There is but one serious criticism which we are disposed to make upon it, though we are far from certain that Mr. Mather deserves the blame. The proof-reading of the introduction, particularly in quotations from the French, is really very bad indeed, which is the more to be regretted since it throws a degree of suspicion upon the accuracy of the text as well. We doubt if the suspicion is justified, but we cannot honestly say that we do not feel something of it ourselves.

Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. By James Mark Baldwin. Macmillan. 1897. 8vo, pp. 574.

Prof. Baldwin here puts forth a sequel to his remarkable work on 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' which our readers will remember contained a most valuable body of observations upon two children. The aim of the present volume is "to inquire to what extent the principles of the development of the individual mind apply also to the evolution of society." But no insignificant part of the former volume was devoted to this same subject; so that the contents of the present work were largely anticipated in their outlines in the former publication. About five-sixths of this new book is occupied with the development of the individual consciousness, and is substantially a restatement of the author's previous results, without any gain in clearness.

The general position of the author, that the individual mind is produced by intercourse with other persons, while on the other hand society is the composite of the individuals, so that the two factors are inseparably conjugate, is certainly far from being novel, and no doubt Hegelians will see in it a new instance of the permeation of their master's doctrine. In point of fact, there are in these pages many indications of the great interest that Prof. Royce has felt in the labors of Prof. Baldwin. But what is entirely fresh is the discussion of that proposition upon the basis of rich stores of scientific observations.

In the previous volume the author showed how his observations had led him to admit three distinct stages in a child's knowledge of personality, those of persons as "projects, subject, and ejects." The first of these is the most difficult to understand, and it is itself subdivided into three imperfectly distinguished stages. The baby first distinguishes persons from inanimate things, according to Prof. Baldwin, by their moving about; and by the character of these movements it distinguishes one person from another. This is the state of consciousness during the first half-year of its life. But gradually it becomes impressed by the irregularities of some of the movables. The pendulum goes tick-tack with perfect uniformity, while the father sometimes notices the child and sometimes does not. Thus, persons become known as movables that are eccentric. In this irregularity Prof. Baldwin thinks that the child recognizes Agency; and after the second half-year and up to the age of two years, it is learning to recognize a special uniformity, or characteristic, in the peculiarities of each movable eccentric. This is a recognition of Personal Character. So far, persons are known merely as "projects." But now the child is beginning to act, and in acting it recognizes its own person as similar to the agents that are already familiar to it. It thus attains the second stage of knowledge of personality, that which connects its own feelings with the idea of agency previously acquired, bringing it to a sense of its own subjectivity, and a knowledge of Self, as subject. Finally, it hypothetizes for each of the other agents a corresponding subjectivity, and thus converts them into ejects.

Such is Prof. Baldwin's theory of the development of self-consciousness. As the title implies, the present book is largely an interpretation of phenomena connected with personal and social growth in the light of that theory. Great weight must certainly be attached not only to the describable observations of Prof. Baldwin, but also to those subtler intuitions which can only express themselves as his convictions that such and such are the thoughts and feelings of the child. But the above theory contains more than such observations, as we will venture to show. In the first place, it does not appear from the observations that, during the first half-year, the baby pays any attention at all to things that do not move. If it does not, then motion cannot serve to separate persons from things, but only to individualize the differently moving objects. In the second place, Prof. Baldwin may be quite correct in his insight into the infant's mind, so far as to perceive that the irregularity of persons is perplexing its mind, and also that some idea allied to that of Agency is present to it. Yet whether or not it is the former idea which suggests the latter, is not a question of observation but of inference.

There are several different ideas, mostly of an intellectual character, which might be denoted by the word Agency, but none of them have any logical connection with irregularity, which is mostly associated with the absence of any definite Agency. Now, although it is certainly conceivable that one idea should suggest another with which it has no logical connection, yet the hypothesis that any particular such illogical suggestion has taken place must remain quite gratuitous, unless a mass of facts can be adduced to support such an irrational connection. There is a great gulf between the idea of an eccentric, surprising thing and that of agency in any sense. We cannot help suspecting that, notwithstanding the close observation of Prof. Baldwin, the child has made innumerable *efforts* before the age of two, which the author assigns as the commencement of the subject-knowledge. If these efforts have escaped his keen eye, it is because they were so futile. Not only does the sense of effort necessarily involve a sense of resistance so as to objectify itself immediately as an I and a not-I, however rudimentary these conceptions may be; a sense of failure, which is sure to accompany the first efforts, must magnify the effort and the resistance, and thus stimulate the subjective tendency. It is very doubtful whether there is any earlier idea of agency than that which must thus come from futile effort. If not, Prof. Baldwin's "projects" are merely ideas of queer, eccentric, startling movables—the only distinct objects of the baby's world—and are in no proper sense ideas of personality. If we remove from the author's philosophy of society all that is said about "projects," it may lose a good deal of its freshness, but it will become more widely acceptable.

Prof. Baldwin has a great deal to say of the influence of the child's own actions, particularly in his games, in shaping for him clear conceptions; and he rightly regards this truth as highly important. He adds that these very actions are for the most part imitations of the conduct of his elders, and thus the child's understanding becomes formed after the pattern of the grown-up people about him. All this he terms social heredity. Whether or not this begs a question will be a point sure to be discussed. The individual, says Prof. Baldwin, is the product of society, while on the other hand to all which he "inherits" from his family he imparts his own personal signature. Invention invariably accompanies imitation, although in very variable proportions.

Prof. Baldwin thinks that the "project" is recognized as the master of the "subject," and the "subject" in its turn of the "eject," and that the disposition of children to domineer over weaker children is a case under that rule. There are, he declares, two sorts of social influences, that which produces social organization and that which appears in particularizing and synthetizing actions of individuals. All individual variations are particularizations of earlier generalizations. The author is thus working his way toward the conception of a public self, and the further he proceeds the more he seems to be influenced by Hegel or Hegelians.

The matter of social organization consists, he says, of imaginations, knowledges, informations—a statement which, in its desire to minimize the individuality of things, betrays already the incipient sway of Hegelian tendencies. He uses the term "self-thought-situation" for the social situation implicated in the thought of self, where a dialectic process productive of the thought of self is plainly recognized. After that we are not surprised to be told that "every socially available thought implies a public self-thought-situation which is strictly analogous in its rise and progress to the self-thought-situation of the individual member of society." The author differs from Hegel only concerning a matter of detail, namely, in recognizing imitation as the bridge from the private thought to the public thought, which enables the self-thought-situation to become public. He considers that all that has been written by the School of Moral Sentiments concerning sympathy as imagining one's self to be in another's situation, is so much in favor of his own doctrine of the importance of the imitative process in the development of public consciousness.

The application of this to ethics, as developed in the chapter devoted to Rules of Conduct, is sufficiently smooth sailing. To those who think that in Morals, at any rate, conservatism is the safest course, and who are sceptical about the desirability of carrying any system of philosophy into practical applications until there can be a little more agreement among philosophers as to what is proved and what is not, the present volume, however interesting and important, will be deemed inferior to its predecessor in almost every respect. That it richly deserves the gold medal of the Danish Academy with which it has been crowned, there can be no doubt.

A Short History of the Royal Navy—1217 to 1688. By David Hannay. London: Methuen & Co. 1898.

This is the first volume of a history of the British Navy, which, commencing about 1217, is to finish with the end of the Napoleonic wars in a second volume. Much of the period covered by the volume just published has been somewhat obscure; but as of late years new matter has been published by the Navy Record Society, as well as derived from other sources, an opportunity for fresh treatment has been afforded to the author which he has not neglected. For one disposed to investigate more exhaustively the subjects treated, the author affords facility by giving at the head of each chapter the authorities drawn upon.

Although this history of the British Navy covers the same ground as the small one by Mr. Hamilton Williams, entitled 'Britain's Naval Power,' it is more exhaustive and detailed, and from its critical treatment appeals to an older and more professional class of readers. Still, notwithstanding its consecutive narrative, it maintains a popular character, wisely illustrating the various conditions and times by interesting incidents as well as by general descriptions and narrations.

It was in the years 1213 and 1217, from which this book dates, that began, properly speaking, the history of the British Navy. Previous to the earlier date, the royal ships had been used as transports and carriers between portions of the same dominion. With the loss of the Continental portion of this dominion during the reign of King John came another state of affairs. The French coast became that of an enemy, and for many a year afterwards the source of a possible invasion and attack. The two attempted invasions of 1213 and 1217 gave to the royal navy a different task, which it met successfully, not by waiting for the enemy's approach in its own waters, but by proceeding to sea and there meeting him. The success of the offensive-defensive expedition of the later date under Herbert de Burgh shows once and for all how Great Britain should meet such attempts at invasion or attack. As a rule, the lesson has been learned, and Englishmen rely upon their navy as the first line of defence, and the protection has never failed them, when the navy has been loyal and efficient, during a period covering nearly seven hundred years. While it is true that the great maritime Powers of the early and middle ages that preceded Great Britain were on the mainland, still the insular position that relieved her from invasions and the necessity of large standing armies has always counted much for her growth and stability as a sea Power. To this can be added her position towards the Atlantic Ocean. With the evolution of the sea-going ship and its growth in size and sea-keeping power, this ocean disappears as a barrier, and becomes the road which led and still leads to wealth and empire the world over.

The story of the mediæval navy of Great Britain is one of struggles against pirates and the neighboring French and Spanish. The nature of the seas and the weather about the British isles gave no scope for the galleys of the Mediterranean, and the ships developed into crafts of stouter build and greater radii of action. The fights of this period were affairs of no great moment, except those known as the battle of Huys and that of "les Espagnols sur mer." These two partook of the nature of regular engagements, and were not without elements of the picturesque. The seamen of those days were much given to acts of license and brutality, which became almost monotonous in repetition. To Henry VIII. much credit is due for his measures for improving the royal navy, both as to its material and as to its personnel, though it seems strange to us at this day, used to the British seamen and shipwrights as the first of their craft, to read that Italians were brought to England to serve both as seamen and as shipbuilders. Henry did not, however, propose to be dependent upon out-