

quity of the constellations, which undoubtedly go back to the very beginnings of astronomy, could have been conveyed by mentioning that Alexander is said on good authority to have sent home from Babylon astronomical records going back to 2300 B. C.; and the "Phænomena" of the Macedonian poet Aratus, which, according to an ancient witness, depicts a globe, really describes the heavens as they were 2300 B. C. But this way of stating the minimum age of the constellations would not answer the purpose, because it supposes the reader to have sufficient logical power to follow an argument intelligently. There are no tables nor lists pretending to completeness (except that a list of the signs of the zodiac has been admitted, probably because the traditional methods of young ladies' academies make a good deal of signs of the zodiac); nor is there any attempt at summing up, or an account in any respect thorough of the present state of any branch of research. At the same time, the book reflects to-day's current opinions among English astronomers, and, touching most of the questions of descriptive astronomy now uppermost (and not too difficult), has its value, and will be used to advantage in schools of a certain character. There is no transcendental accuracy about the work in any particular.

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**Dynamic Idealism: An Elementary Course in the Metaphysics of Psychology.**

By Alfred H. Lloyd. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1898. 16mo, pp. 248.

**Practical Idealism.**

By William De Witt Hyde. Macmillan Co. 1897. 8vo, pp. 335.

Attributed to Peirce by Fisch in *First Supplement* (internal evidence). Peirce owned a copy of *Dynamic Idealism* which he had annotated. This review is unassigned in Haskell's *Index to The Nation*, vol. 1.

Alfred Henry Lloyd (1864-1927) was a Harvard man through and through: A.B., 1886; A.M., 1888; Ph.D., 1893. For several years, Lloyd was professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. In reply to William James' *The Will to Believe*, Lloyd penned *The Will to Doubt* (1907). An honorary LL.D. was conferred upon him in 1924 by the University of California.

It is pretty confident to preach such brand-new theory as Mr. Lloyd's, unpassed upon by any jury, as an "elementary course." Far be it from us to pronounce this or that general attitude in philosophy unsound, for nothing is established in that science as yet. The author of this little book at least makes his own position perfectly clear, and develops it with no feeble thought and with an unusual power of compact expression. Whoever succeeds in doing that, in the present unsettled state of opinion, renders a service to philosophy. Though the book shows many marks of digested study of other philosophers, the author does not attain to mastery of his idea. It masters him; it is his element; he fails to comprehend that other minds do not share in it. This fundamental idea is nothing new or rare. Outside the garden where philosophers converse, it is the common opinion. Namely, it is, that Doing is higher than either Being or Knowing, and necessarily includes them both. So axiomatic does this seem to Mr. Lloyd that he is capable of such

assertions as this: "Science is never only for science's sake. Men have often appeared to think that science as a body of knowledge was its own end, but obviously to think so long is quite impossible." Now, as a matter of historical fact, real scientific men, in every age when science has been animated by a vital spark, have one and all pursued science for its own sake. Of a piece with that, is Mr. Lloyd's claiming the support of Aristotle, whose *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς* is a development of Being, and not a mere Doing, and who might probably have said: "Doing is never for doing's sake. Obviously to think that it is so for long is quite impossible. Doing for doing's sake is what we call pastime; it cannot form the staple of life." Do not let us be understood as arguing the question; we only point out how immersed the author is in his own mental element.

This leading idea, taken in itself, is nothing but the usual Philistine apotheosis of brute force. It naturally allies itself with dualism, since an action is essentially an accident of two individual things. And accordingly we find that all philosophers who have adopted it have been given to abrupt distinctions between pairs of opposites—such as right and wrong—to the neglect of any gradation from one extreme to another. Yet the elaboration of the idea has by no means always been so homogeneous as to include a belief in the duality of body and soul. On the contrary, no philosophy ever appeared more satisfactory to the class of minds who are attracted to this idea or was more thoroughly believed in by matter-of-fact respectability, than Stoicism, which moulded this principle into a system of the most wooden materialism. Stoicism, we can hardly doubt, has been secretly entertained by millions throughout the Christian era—at any rate, down to the introduction of ether and chloroform. Their conduct is not otherwise explicable.

But to-day we live in an age whose prevalent spirit is intensely idealistic, even verging upon the mystical; and in a forest it is impossible to look far over the general level of the treetops. And so, in this book, we find the deification of force clothing itself in a "Dynamic Idealism." It is a strange phrase, a wondrous seething snow. It accurately names an emulsion of philosophical opinions that one would not have believed could ever be worked up into so homogeneous, substantial, and inviting a mayonnaise as Mr. Lloyd has managed to compound. The philosophy in its entelechy is as far as possible from deserving the disparaging epithets we apply to its first principle. Not only will it not be affected by the philosophically unregenerate, but it may be doubted whether even the élite will be able to accommodate themselves to it.

New systems of idealism nowadays get patented in such swift succession that novelty's self has long ago worn out its novelty. But this little book, it must be confessed, has something of the interest of a novel; for the reader's curiosity becomes whetted to learn by what surprise Mr. Lloyd will bring about a marriage between Dynamism and Idealism. In the first place, in order to detach Action from its inherent bruteness and impart to it an intellectual character, he defines it as relation—not relation such as our minds confer at will, but relation in the very real fact itself. Undoubtedly an action is a pairing *in re* of two things. It must also be admitted that nothing has an intellectual character except relations. Some readers may suggest that those relations which are intellectual are not mere pair-

ings, but rather mediations—that is to say, gatherings of threes, or, in Aristotle's language, syllogisms. Mr. Lloyd, however, does not notice this objection, and our purpose is only to sketch the contents of the book, not to criticise it. But, having thus described action as relation *in re*, or real pairedness, and having identified this pairedness with the mind, Mr. Lloyd seems to be as far from monism as ever; for are not the things paired one thing, and is not the pairing of them an accident over and above their matter? To avoid this result, Mr. Lloyd, as a second step, denies the separate existence of the correlates paired. According to him, nothing really exists but pure pairedness (his word is *relationship*) without any pairs of objects to be paired. That this doctrine must be classed as idealism is beyond dispute. Its upshot resembles Hegelianism. Here, then, is dynamic idealism. For all details we must recommend the reading of the volume, only copying the brief summary which the author prints over against his title-page: "Relationship among things is the criterion neither of a life nor of a mind that exists apart from the substance of the universe. It is, however, the criterion of substance itself, and as the central truth about things it bears this witness: *The universe itself lives; the universe itself thinks.*"

Calculated for the meridian of Chautauqua, Mr. Hyde's 'Practical Idealism' is a manual of wholesome sentiments forcibly put. "Its practical aim precludes the discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems." That is to say, it is not scientific. At the same time, it was requisite to strengthen the heart of the semi-student by making him feel that he is studying philosophy. The author says that "philosophy is . . . tempted to forsake her mission as . . . guide to noble living, for the . . . technical craft," etc. In short, readers are taught to believe that Aristotle's great conquest for speculative science, in separating it sharply from questions of conscience and the like, was a great mistake and ought forthwith to be surrendered. Precisely that defines the efforts of the philosophical reactionists of to-day. As far as science is concerned, every shot they fire will fall harmless to the ground. But what their effect may prove to be upon the life and morals of their adherents, will depend upon the wholesomeness of calling that scientific which is not scientific. Were "practical idealism" plainly to confess itself to be no more than good wholesome feeling, sanctioned by the experiences of millennia, its practical aspects might be far more satisfactory than any scientific, and therefore merely provisional, hypothesis could be.

To mingle the two—philosophy and practical wisdom—is to invite vagueness and confusion, such as we here see, where the conflicting logical principles of Mill, Jevons, Sigwart, Bradley, are jumbled together, where calling pure sensation a "continuum" is said to mean precisely the same thing as calling it a "confusion," and where the reasoning of Socrates in the 'Gorgias' is held up to admiration. Some of his criticisms of psychologists and logicians will give more aid and comfort to those who wish to separate speculation and conduct than the author seems to be aware. We believe that, in the long run, it will be found dangerous to teach Chautauquans that they are to "guide their conduct" by what may recommend itself to them as philosophy.