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the author's conclusions in others of the disputed questions we have mentioned.

Passages in a Wandering Life. By Thomas Arnold, M.A. London: Edward Arnold; New York: John Lane. Pp. ix, 268. Portrait.

With no ordinary interest we opened this book by a son of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, by the father of Mrs. Humphry Ward, a man known twice to have embraced the Roman Catholic faith, and consequently once to have departed from it. We are not disappointed. We are favored with the recollections of a transparently honest man, reared amidst the best of English surroundings, who can claim relationship and friendship with some of the best minds in the country, who has travelled much and thought more. It is written in a limpid style and a broad spirit. One-third of the volume is devoted to a nine years' residence in New Zealand and Tasmania, where Mr. Arnold married, and embraced Roman Catholicism, where the future Mrs. Humphry Ward was born; fifty pages are given to recent short visits to Sweden and to Rome; the rest of the book is occupied with Mr. Arnold's life in England and Ireland.

He displays a singular faculty for the description of natural scenery. A note-book written on the plan of the last chapter would be a delightful companion in Rome. He has the ability to make interesting the narrative of a voyage. But then a voyage A. D. 1847 in a sailing ship conveying some of the first New Zealand settlers, affords more scope than one of the present day in a steamer, with the date of arrival at the antipodes assured. We have entertaining notes on colonial settlement and bush life. The deepest interests of the book are, however, personal and spiritual. In the lives of many of Mr. Arnold's associates we realize afresh the extent to which the best-trained minds in England are brought into political service. We find many noteworthy individual sketches. Of Wordsworth:

"I must therefore give my own impressions, which range intermittently over a period of fifteen years. Wordsworth's figure was of a rather coarse make, and his step was heavy; the eyes were weak, and usually protected in some way or other; the aquiline nose was too large and thick to be called beautiful, and the mouth and chin, though far from weak, were without distinction. It was the beauty and nobility of the head, the width and poise of the forehead, the manifest adaptation of the 'tenement of clay' to house a majestic and many-sided intellect, which atoned for all minor shortcomings, and fixed the admiring gaze of the beholder. Clough's head, too, was beautiful, but Clough's head was not equal to Wordsworth's. Though capacious, it seemed hardly equal to the burden and stress of thought which it sometimes had to bear; in Wordsworth, one would say—setting humor aside—it was equal to *all* thoughts, and incapable of being disturbed from the just balance in which its Creator had poised it. Wordsworth, however, was a great poet, and his life was lived in a sense apart; and though he could discuss trivialities and domestic matters, and sometimes seem heartily amused by them, I suppose there was a general want of practicality, and the *esprit positif*, about him which raised a barrier between him and the Westmoreland people."

Of Mrs. Quillinan:

"Dora Quillinan was Wordsworth's only daughter. From the first [but I ever saw her, when Rydal La[ke] was frozen over and she gave my brother and me some useful hints with regard to skating upon it, the sense of unbounded confidence in her kind eyes, or rather in the tenderness or goodness which beamed from them, never left either of us."

Of Southey:

"Southey, though he lived far away at Keswick, was brought near to our daily interests by Wordsworth's affection for him. When I was about ten, and my brother a year older, my father took us with him one day to call at Greta Bank. As we shyly advanced, Southey rose up and came to meet us, shook hands with us both, and said with a smile, 'So, now, you've seen a live poet!' He was in no way handsome, but had the look of a hard student. Again I saw him in 1839, when Wordsworth brought him to call at Fox How."

Of Clough:

"In the years 1842-47 I was in close intimacy with Arthur Hugh Clough. . . . Between 1843 and 1845 there was a small society in existence at Oxford called the Decade. Among its members were Jowett, Arthur Stanley, Coleridge [afterwards Chief Justice], my brother, Chichester Fortescue, John Campbell Shairp, the present writer, and several others. Shairp has described two speeches made by Clough at meetings of the Decade. The impressions of the future professor of poetry seem to have been in unison with my own—that no member of the society spoke in so rich, penetrating, original, and convincing strain as Clough. He was not rapid, yet neither was he slow or hesitating; he seemed just to take time enough to find the right word or phrase."

Of Dean Stanley:

"But the charm and fascination of his society cannot thus [from Mr. Prothero's Life] be adequately understood. Spontaneity genuineness, simplicity, characterized all that he did and said—nay, were distinctive of every movement and gesture. None that ever knew him could forget his engaging and delightful personality. The eyes, of heaven's own blue; the short, dark, hair curling over his head, till age straightened it somewhat and turned it gray; the quick short steps; the beautiful, childlike mouth; the eager, animated talk—the total impression of energy, guilelessness, courage, and veracity—who, to the end of the longest life, could forget all this?"

We have a somewhat unctuous reminiscence of the author's brother, Matthew Arnold:

"The whole family went up to Oxford in January, 1842, when my father read his first course of lectures as professor of modern history. My brother, in all the glory of a scholar's gown and three months' experience as a 'university man,' welcomed his rustic *Geschwister* with an amused and superior graciousness. We visited him at his rooms in Balliol at the top of the second staircase in the corner of the second quad. When he had got us all safely in, he is said to have exclaimed, 'Thank God, you are in!' and when the visit was over, and he had seen the last of us out on the staircase, 'Thank God, you are out!' But this tradition is doubtful."

Considering that Prof. Arnold's residence in Tasmania was during the most crucial period of the convict régime, it is to be remarked that he has nothing generally to say upon the subject; nor does he mention the names of Smith O'Brien, John Mitchel, or any of the 1848 Irish prisoners; nor at home, and long in Ireland, has he, except upon the Catholic University question, anything special to say upon home politics.

It was the Oxford Movement that bore him into Catholicism. It was his ingrained liberal tendencies that carried him out of it for a time—according to his own account, partly ill-health, partly failure sufficiently to distinguish between Liberalism in politics and in religion. Through all, he is never carried away by the enthusiasm of the neophyte. In Rome he "reluctantly, yet with full conviction," arrived at the belief "that it is now impossible for the lay people of united Italy (if it be assumed that the Italian Kingdom will endure), to consent to the installation of any other Italian city as the capital of that Kingdom." In Sweden, once Catholic, now so but to the extent of 1,300 in 5,000,000 of the population, which he visited mainly to see the Shrine of St. Bridget, he again "reluctantly admits," "the prospects of Catholicism . . . do not appear brilliant." Here, finally, is a man of fine intellect and the highest training to whom the Catholic Church has become all in all, "the one success which earth has still to show" (p. 235). Yet there is not in these pages a word of condemnation of those who continue out of its fold, nor a suggestion of a fear of their future condemnation. How can a doctrine be much longer officially maintained which is in the intercourse of life practically abandoned?

Introduction to Ethics. By Frank Thilly. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. 8vo, pp. 346.

The logical analysis of the conceptions connected with morals is one of the very best whetstones for the wits ever found; and it has never caused anybody to be burned at the stake! It is this of which Prof. Thilly has put together a convenient little handbook, in nearly alternate chapters historical and defensive of his own positions. In the latter parts, many things are well and forcibly put, yet we are not impressed that the volume will be treasured for their sakes. There is at least one long portion in which thought of no very forcible logical cohesion is administered in pretty dilute solution. In the historical parts, by separating the accounts of the controversies over separate questions, and by separating, under each question, the divergent lines of thoughts, without, however, mincing the matter very fine, the rationale of the sequence of opinions and the gradual penetration of thought further and further into the problems are brought out with force and clearness. This method of presenting the history of such a subject is amazingly superior to the chronological plan; but its full success would call for a very thoroughly considered taxonomy of the opinions. In this respect, the present volume is not quite what we could desire. Thus, the classification of the doctrines concerning the basis of right and wrong is substantially borrowed from Wundt (without acknowledgment, by the way). It is true that a tabular view on p. 128 shows some trifling departures from Wundt's scheme; but these have no perceptible effect upon the history.

Wundt's arrangement may be exhibited as follows:

Theories of the Basis of Morality.

A. The Moral Law is externally imposed.
B. The Moral Law is rational:
  I. Its end is happiness:
    1. that of the agent,
    2. that of the community.
  II. Its tendency is improvement:
    1. of the agent,
    2. of the community.

The most serious defect of this classification lies in its subdivision of rationalistic theory into only two branches, splitting upon the insignificant question of whether the end is completely attainable or not. This results in several inconveniences. It is very unjust to utilitarianism (one of the few theories of morals which have manifestly brought about any amelioration of society), by separating it only slightly from hedonism proper, or the doctrine that the lowest motive from which a rational being can act is at the same time the highest possible, and in short the only possible, motive. It overlooks entirely the very familiar view which makes the prolongation of the agent's conscious life the highest end. It confuses the morality which takes as its end the perfection of the individual man in a predetermined respect, say, by the substitution of altruistic for egoistic motives—with the morality which aims at the perfection of the individual in the sense of giving him whatever characters the future study of the question may show to be most desirable; and it falls into a like confusion in regard to theories which aim at the perfection of society. Moreover, it altogether fails to mark the world-wide difference between taking the perfection of society or of the individual as the *ultimate* end, and supposing a perfectionment to be brought about, so far as it is brought about at all, by natural selection, in which case the ultimate end is not perfection, but that toward which alone all natural selection works, to wit, the virtual fecundity of the race. Finally, it leaves out of account the possibility of so conceiving the ultimate end that it shall not be limited either to the individual or to human society. If we conceive that there is a methodical ideal—like order, or rationality—neither specifically psychical nor physical, which somehow has a power of developing itself in thoughts and things generally, then whatever furthers this progress is good, and *vice versa;* and such a conception refuses to be limited to any particular matter of realization.

Considering the imperfections of the classification with which Prof. Thilly has worked, it is much to his credit that he has, with little departure from accuracy, made the history appear clear and rational. We shall note a few small points to show that this book, like every other, has to be read critically. In the history of the theory of conscience, Hartley is placed after Bentham—a chronological displacement induced by the imperfection of the classification, and aggravated by the fact that the dates of publication are not commonly given, but only those of the different writers' birth and death. Some write their most characteristic works early, others later. Kant is placed among the perfectionists, contrary to his own energetic protests. He maintains that one must not act to bring about any definite result, but simply from the idea of duty. Herbert Spencer is refused a place among the evolutionistic moralists. He is, in truth, so vacillating that it is hard to say whether this is correct or not. It would have surprised Leslie Stephen to find himself in quite a different class from Spencer; and, whether this is right or not, neither he nor Darwin ought to be placed among perfectionists. True, they hold that conduct ought to realize an ideal, but not as its ultimate end. On the contrary, the ideal itself is, according to them, simply a result of natural selection, which acts solely to make some race or races dominant. Thus, the ultimate end for them is not inward but outward. Hume, in reference to his theory of conscience, is classed with Hutcheson. But he really followed Hartley, in the main; and where he disagrees with Hartley, he disagrees still more with Hutcheson. To Bernard Mandeville is attributed 'the proposition that greed and other selfish passions contribute more to the public good than benevolence does; and this proposition, being placed in quotation marks, will be understood to be the *ipsissima verba* of that author. This is approximately the opinion of some modern political economists of repute, but it was categorically repudiated by the author of the 'Fable of the Bees,' who was acute enough to see that it no more came within the scope of his inquiry, than it does into that of political economy, to determine what is and what is not for the public good. That which he undertook to prove was, that *if a nation desires expansion and splendor,* then it must have a rich and vicious class as the condition precedent to success in that career; but he added his private opinion that expansion and splendor do not really conduce to the happiness of a people, and therefore not to their "well being," if by that is meant their happiness. The last words of the fable are:

"They flew into a hollow tree,
Blest with content and honesty."

Robert's Primer of Parliamentary Law, for Schools, Colleges, Clubs, Fraternities, etc. By Joseph Thomas Robert. Doubleday & McClure Co. 1900.

The object of this book is very plainly stated at the start. The author proposes to "make a text-book in Parliamentary Law so simple that the average High-School teacher can make it plain to the average High-School pupil." We will frankly express our disapproval of the whole idea. At the same time we are ready to acknowledge that this Primer, which consists almost entirely of dialogues and examples to show the method of instructing High-School boys, and possibly Western legislatures, is very well prepared.

When Mr. Robert says that the various public bodies are working each in its own way, and that he has examined all English and American works on parliamentary law, and yet does not give the name of a single author, he does not deal fairly with his readers. Throughout New England and the Atlantic States generally, including the District of Columbia, there is an authority most generally accepted, This is, of course, Cushing's Manual. We will show later that no new text-book is required on the subject; but we will first dispose of Mr. Robert's heresies. His idea is to give every member of any public assembly such a smattering of law as will make him think that he knows as much as the presiding officer. No better plan could be invented to cause trouble, and to reduce such meetings to riotous mobs. No assembly of any size can transact business properly unless it has full confidence in a presiding officer, who shall be honest, impartial, and thoroughly versed in the principles and details of parliamentary law. Striking examples of this may be found in the House of Commons and Congress. In Parliament the Speakers have been highly honored, supported by all parties, and then, on retiring, rewarded with peerages. In Congress there have been some famous parliamentarians elected as Speaker, as, for example, Winthrop, Banks, Blaine, Randall, and Carlisle. We may add that the Legislature of Massachusetts and the Common Council of the city of Boston have distinguished themselves by great attention to parliamentary law, and that their rules have been extensively copied and observed throughout New England.

One of Mr. Robert's special fads is the idea that every motion must be seconded (see note on pp. 24-25). In both branches of the Massachusetts Legislature it is specially provided by a rule that no second is necessary. In the Common Council of Boston the same custom prevails, except that, by a special rule, an appeal from a decision of the Chair must be seconded. The requirement of a second is unnecessary, and only leads to wrangling and delay.

Mr. Robert also (pp. 52-53) has a good deal to say about a parliamentary inquiry. By this he means that "a member desiring information as to any rule or form relating to business already acted on, or now under consideration, or which he wishes to bring before the Assembly, may rise to a parliamentary inquiry." This means that he may interrupt a member who has the floor and is speaking. This idea of a parliamentary inquiry has made a slight inroad into the work of the Boston Common Council, but probably nowhere else in New England. It is a stupid innovation, unnecessary and prejudicial to the proper transaction of business. The old, sensible rule was, that a member obtaining the floor was to be protected from any interruption. There was a motion of privilege which could be made, but which was confined to a matter affecting the whole body, and not simply the individual member. If, for example, a member should discover signs of a fire in the hall, or a dangerous accident to the heating apparatus, or the presence of an unauthorized person in the members' seats, or, possibly, outrageous conduct by one of the members—it being clearly a matter which could not wait—he might rise and call the attention of the Chair to the fact. But no debate was allowable. In popular bodies where discipline had been loosened and the Chair had lost its grip, a bad custom has sprung up by which members have risen to make personal explanations under the pretence that it was a privileged matter. This is another bad innovation, and ought not to be countenanced.

We will now revert to our previous allusion to real authorities. The Massachusetts Senate provides that "The rules of parliamentary practice comprised in the revised edition of Crocker's 'Principles of Procedure in Deliberative Bodies,' and the principles of parliamentary law set forth in Cushing's 'Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies,' shall govern the Senate in all cases to which they are applicable, and in which they are not inconsistent with the rules of the Senate, or the joint rules of the two branches." The order in the lower branch specifies no more than that the rules of parliamentary practice shall govern the House; but this is construed to be the same as the Senate rule. The Boston Common Council has the following rule: "The rules of parliamentary practice as contained in Cushing's 'Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies' shall govern this Council in all cases to which they are applicable, and in