

whose known character seems to be entirely of universal type. In the biological sciences the problem as to the living individual introduces entirely different questions and interests; and the problems of ethical individuality belong to still another realm of a decidedly special character. Finally, the problem of the ultimate place of the category of individuality in the world at large remains as an issue for general metaphysics. It is, nevertheless, a fair question for philosophical inquiry whether all these so various problems are not really much more closely connected than they seem, and whether a final definition which will hold for all forms of individuality may not yet be discovered. Cf. IDENTITY (individual).

*Literature:* the classic scholastic view of the problem is to be found in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologica*, P. I, passim—in particular, Q. xxx. art. iv; Q. xxix. arts. i, iii, and iv; Q. I. art. iv; Q. lxxvi. art. ii. DUNS SCOTUS, in his commentary upon the Sentential, in the first half of the sixth volume of his collected works (London ed. of 1639), discusses the problem of individuality in connection with his Angelology. See, in particular, 374 ff., 403 ff., 487 ff. SUAREZ, in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, sums up the scholastic opinions on the whole range of the problem in Disp. v: De unitate individuali, eiusque principio. FATHER HANPER, in his *Metaphysic of the School*, i. 208-90, reviews the same issues at length. See also the youthful dissertation of LEIBNITZ, *De principio Individuationis*, and his later discussions of the problem, in particular in the *Nouv. Ess.*, Lib. II. chap. xxvii. HEGEL treats our problem, in connection with the theory of universals, at the outset of the third part of his *Logik*. SCHOPENHAUER frequently, but always summarily, discusses the principle of individuation. For a collection of the passages in Schopenhauer see FRAUENSTADT, *Schopenhauer Lexikon*, i. 351. Amongst recent discussions that of SIGWART, *Logik*, Th. III. Abschn. II. § 78, may be mentioned. ROYCE has treated the topic at length in *The Conception of God*, 217-322, and in *The World and the Individual*; see also ORMOND, *Foundations of Knowledge*, Pt. II. chap. xii. (J.R.)

**Individual** (in biology): a single ORGANISM (q.v., in biology). (J.M.B.)

**Individual** (in logic) [as a technical term of logic, *individuum* first appears in Boethius; in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt of ἀτομον, a word used by Plato

(*Sophistes*, 229 D) for an indivisible species, and by Aristotle, often in the same sense, but occasionally for an individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individuals is τὰ κατ' ἐκαστα, Lat. *singularia*, Eng. *singulars*.] Used in logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by its mode of being to be so determinate. See PARTICULAR (in logic).

This definition does not prevent two distinct individuals from being precisely similar, since they may be distinguished by their hecceities (or determinations not of a generalizable nature); so that Leibnitz' principle of indiscernibles is not involved in this definition. Although the principles of contradiction and excluded middle may be regarded as together constituting the definition of the relation expressed by 'not,' yet they also imply that whatever exists consists of individuals. This, however, does not seem to be an identical proposition or necessity of thought; for Kant's Law of Specification (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 1st ed., 656; 2nd ed., 684; but it is requisite to read the whole section to understand his meaning), which has been widely accepted, treats logical quantity as a continuum in Kant's sense, i. e. that every part of which is composed of parts. Though this law is only regulative, it is supposed to be demanded by reason, and its wide acceptance as so demanded is a strong argument in favour of the conceivability of a world without individuals in the sense of the definition now considered. Besides, since it is not in the nature of concepts adequately to define individuals, it would seem that a world from which they were eliminated would only be the more intelligible. A new discussion of the matter, on a level with modern mathematical thought and with exact logic, is a desideratum. A highly important contribution is contained in Schröder's *Logik*, iii, Vorles. 10. What Scottus says (*Quaest. in Met.*, VII. 9, xiii and xv) is worth consideration.

(2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it might react, or have reacted, against my will.

This is the stoical definition of a reality; but since the Stoics were individualistic

nominalists, this rather favours the satisfactoriness of the definition than otherwise. It may be objected that it is unintelligible; but in the sense in which this is true, it is a merit, since an individual is unintelligible in that sense. It is a brute fact that the moon exists, and all explanations suppose the existence of that same matter. That existence is unintelligible in the sense in which the definition is so. That is to say, a reaction may be experienced, but it cannot be conceived in its character of a reaction; for that element evaporates from every general idea. According to this definition, that which alone immediately presents itself as an individual is a reaction against the will. But everything whose identity consists in a continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual. Thus any portion of space, so far as it can be regarded as reacting, is for logic a single individual; its spatial extension is no objection. With this definition there is no difficulty about the truth that whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially the same thing; and whatever fulfils the present definition equally fulfils the former definition by virtue of the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, regarded as mere definitions of the relation expressed by 'not.' As for the principle of indiscernibles, if two individual things are exactly alike in all other respects, they must, according to this definition, differ in their spatial relations, since space is nothing but the intuitional presentation of the conditions of reaction, or of some of them. But there will be no logical hindrance to two things being exactly alike in all other respects; and if they are never so, that is a physical law, not a necessity of logic. This second definition, therefore, seems to be the preferable one. Cf. PARTICULAR (in logic). (C.S.P.)

**Individual (social).** (1) A single human being. (2) Hence, by development of the ideas of separateness and completeness, a human being in a marked degree differentiated from others: a centre of social influences.

The history of the concept individual is important both in psychology and in sociology. The individual has been conceived as independent of and antecedent to society, as correlative with society, and as dependent on and created by society. All of these conceptions are presented in Aristotle's *Politics*, where the distinctions are made that in genesis individual and society are inseparable, that in will and

conduct the individual is independent or free, while in moral perfection he is created by the state. The political philosophy of Hobbes' *De Corpore Politico* assumes the antecedent completeness and sufficiency of the individual. Modern psychology and sociology demonstrate the interdependence of individual and society (cf. Baldwin, *Social and Eth. Interpret.*). See also INDIVIDUALISM. (F.H.G.)

**Individual Psychology:** Ger. *Individual-psychologie*; Fr. *psychologie individuelle*; Ital. *psicologia individuale*. That department of psychology which investigates the psychological individual considered as different from others, i.e. having for its subject-matter psychological variations among individuals.

Particular questions on which work has been done are: (1) the psychology of TEMPERAMENT (q.v.); (2) of mental TYPE (q.v.); (3) of mental differences of the sexes (see SEXUAL CHARACTERS); (4) of GENIUS (q.v.); (5) of mental DEFECT (q.v., also special types of defect); (6) of the CRIMINAL (q.v., also CRIMINOLOGY); (7) of classes, professions, &c., considered as based upon individual differences. Cf. VARIATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

**Literature:** BIBLIOG. G, 1, e; lists, sub verbo, in the Psychological Index, 1 ff.; BINET and HENRI, *Année Psychol.*, ii. (1896) 411 (a résumé and exposition); DILTHEY, *Sitzber. Akad. Wiss. Berlin* (1896), 295. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

**Individual Selection:** Ger. *Personalselektion* (Weismann); Fr. *sélection entre individus* (Y.D.), *sélection individuelle* (better than *personnelle*—J. A. Thomson); Ital. *selezione individuale*. The survival of the individual organism or animal under the operation of NATURAL SELECTION (q.v.), as distinguished from the survival of parts, cells, germinal elements, &c. (cf. INTRASELECTION), which are supposed to be selected by an analogous method.

This rendering of Weismann's Personal-selektion for the original Darwinian view of the survival of the individual—for which, moreover, it was earlier used—is better than the literal translation 'personal selection.' Personal selection suggests 'conscious selection' by a person, and it is better to reserve it for that. See SELECTION. (J.M.B., C.L.L.M.)

**Individualism:** Ger. *Individualismus*; Fr. *individualisme*; Ital. *individualismo*. (1) Exclusive or excessive regard for self-interest.

(2) The doctrine that the pursuit of self-interest and the exercise of individual initiative should be little or not at all restrained

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