

remark that the intent is the consciousness of the general nature of the END-STATE (q. v.) of an intellectual process before it is reached; and in mental progress toward an IDEAL (q. v.) we have successive stages of 'intent.'

(G.F.S.—J.M.B.)
Intention [Lat. *in + tendere*, to stretch]: Ger. *Absicht*; Fr. *dessain*; Ital. *intenzione*. The purpose in view in any action, along with all the consequences of the action, so far as foreseen to be certain or probable.

The distinction in any act of *intentio*, *actio*, and *finis* is found in Gregory I (540-609 A. D.): cf. Ziegler, *Gesch. d. christ. Eth.*, 247. The definition above given agrees with that of Sidgwick (*Meth. of Eth.*). The intention is thus the action from the internal or agent's point of view; and the internal character of morality is brought out by laying emphasis on the intention rather than on the external results or consequences. Intentions have been distinguished as immediate or remote, outer or inner, direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious, formal or material. See J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics* (3rd ed.), 60, 61.

The best German usage of *Absicht* seems to be in agreement with this, the distinction between means and ends (*Zwecke*) being marked. *Absicht* is the end for which there may be alternative means (Meinong, *Psych.-eth. Untersuch. zur Werttheorie*, 94, 95; Höfler, *Psychologie*, 473, 518). Where, according to Meinong (loc. cit.), the end is directly pursued, without means, *Absicht* becomes *Ziel*—a usage not general, however. Cf. DESIGN, and see TERMINOLOGY (German). Intention, in the broader ethical sense of entire moral INTENT (q. v.), a determination of disposition or character, is rendered by the German *Gesinnung* (Höfler, loc. cit.).

(J.M.B.)
Intention (first and second, in philosophy) [Schol. Lat. *intentio, prima et secunda*]. Used in a series of scholastic distinctions (both *intentio* and *intentionalis*), for which see LATIN AND SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY, 13, 14; revived in modern philosophy to indicate the distinction of knowledge as direct (first) and reflective (second) intention. See INTENTION (in logic), and cf. REFLECTION.

Literature: HODGSON, *Philos. of Reflection*, Index; citations in EISLER, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe*, 'Intentio'; GOELENUS, *Lex. Philos.*, 253.

(J.M.B.)
Intention (in law). The purpose of an act; it is often imputed, without regard to its actual existence.

A man acts at his peril. If loss to another naturally ensues from his voluntary act, he is liable, although it is neither intended by him nor due to his negligence (Holmes, *The Common Law*, 82; Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. viii. 93; Pollock, *Jurisprudence*, chap. vi. 138). Crime rests on intention; but he who does a criminal act is held to have intended the actual and natural result, although in fact he may have intended only a much less grave offence. Contracts rest on agreement, presupposing an intent to assume an obligation, but the law often implies the intent. 'Such an intent may be implied, although it be certain that it never actually existed, but not unless the parties are in such relations that each ought to have had it' (Beers v. Boston and Albany Railroad Co., 67 Conn. Law Reports, 425). Cf. RESPONSIBILITY (legal).

Literature: authorities cited above; also BENTHAM, *Mor. and Legisl.*, i. chaps. vii, xii. § 2.

(S.E.B.)
Intention (in logic) [Lat. *intentio*, with the same meaning in Aquinas (*Summa Theol.*, I. 9. 53, is the principal passage); in classical writers an act of attention (and so Aquinas, *ibid.*, I. ii. 9. 38, art. 2, and elsewhere); from *in + tendere*, to stretch. Aquinas seems sometimes to use the term for a mode of being (*ibid.*, I. ii. 9. 22) and sometimes for a relation (*ibid.*, I. 9. 29, art. 1; 9. 76, art. 3, and esp. art. 4)]. A concept, as the result of attention.

First intentions are those concepts which are derived by comparing percepts, such as ordinary concepts of classes, relations, &c. *Second intentions* are those which are formed by observing and comparing first intentions. Thus the concept 'class' is formed by observing and comparing class-concepts and other objects. The special class-concept, *ens*, or what is, in the sense of including figments as well as realities, can only have originated in that way. Of relative second intentions, four are prominent—identity, otherness, co-existence, and impossibility. Aquinas defined logic as the science of second intentions applied to first.

(C.S.P.)
Interaction [Lat. *inter + actio*, action]: Ger. *Wechselwirkung*; Fr. *interaction*; Ital. *interazione*. (1) The relation between two or more relatively independent things or systems of change which advance, hinder, limit, or otherwise affect one another.

(2) The relation of mere uniform occurrence of such systems together.

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