the House, but failed in the Senate. There was nothing to do now but to make fresh issues of notes, although the previous law for this purpose contained a pledge that that should be the last. In March, 1865, a bill for $80,000,000 of "new tenor" was passed over the President's veto. There was some talk about heavier taxes on exports and imports, although there were none to be taxed. The last scheme was for a specie loan of $3,000,000, failing which there was to be confiscation of 25 per cent. of the specie in the Confederacy. The Richmond banks, which were most exposed to the application of force, advanced $300,000, and almost immediately thereafter the Confederacy collapsed. The question how the Government expenses were met after the compulsory funding act was put in operation in the spring of 1864, is answered tentatively by the supposition that old notes sent in to be exchanged for new ones were reissued, although they should have been cancelled. "Moreover," says Prof. Schwab, "the evidence is conclusive that the Government expenses during the last year of the war were chiefly met by creating a huge floating debt, represented, for instance, by large arrears, $400,000,000 to $500,000,000 in the War Department, and by accumulated unpaid warrants on the Treasury."

Every blunder that it was possible to commit in national finance was committed by the Confederacy, and on a gigantic scale. The initial one was the failure to tax. The idea that taxation to pay ordinary expenses and interest on loans would be sufficient for the emergency of a war was held in both Washington and Richmond at the beginning, but the North recovered sanity in time, and eventually enacted taxes nearly half sufficient to pay the war expenses without loans. The next blunder in Confederate finance was that of paying interest on loans in irredeemable paper. Some of our Northern men wanted to do so. Both Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the House, and Elbridge G. Spaulding, the "father of the greenbacks," were in this category, but the country was saved from that abyss. The third and fatal folly of the Confederacy was the compulsory funding act. No casuistry could disguise this step. It was repudiation, and it brought its own speedy punishment. If military events had not brought the Confederacy to an end in April, 1865, it must have collapsed financially about that time. In other words, the power to supply the army in the field with food, clothing, arms, and ammunition could not have continued much longer. The stage of impressment had already been reached, as it was reached near the end of the Revolutionary war. This was a resource which, as Washington foretold, could not last long. The blockade of the Confederacy, of course, intensified its financial difficulties. Secretary Memminger attributed his failure to it. Indeed, the Confederacy might have survived the errors of its Treasury Department if it had had free communication with Europe; the war might have had a different ending.

The separate State finances are of importance in connection with those of the Confederacy, as throwing light on the course of a paper currency unregulated by redemption in specie and unrestrained by anything except the whims of Legislatures. The "wants of trade" in respect of money are never so imperious as when governments are issuing irredeemable notes. Prices of commodities, both North and South, advanced faster than the price of gold. This was because dealers made an extra charge for goods, by way of insurance against fluctuations. The advance of prices absorbed the new currency and created an abnormal demand for more. This has been the experience of all countries which have had recourse to such paper. In the South the appetite was imparted to the State governments, to cities and counties, to banks, to railroad and other corporations, and finally the right of issue was assumed by private persons, such as tobacconists, grocers, barbers, and milk dealers, who issued "shin-plasters" which they gave out as change in the ordinary course of trade and promised to redeem in goods or services. Alabama began with an issue of $1,000,000 of State notes as early as February, 1861, and the amount was increased later to $3,000,000. These were receivable for State taxes. Georgia issued $18,000,000 of State notes redeemable in Confederate notes. Of course, these were in effect an addition of that sum to the Confederate currency. Mississippi made liberal issues to relieve the distressed cotton-planters. All the States east of the Mississippi River issued notes. The city of Richmond issued scrip in denominations from 25 cents to $2. Charleston, Pensacola, Augusta, and other cities followed suit. Georgia granted "banking privileges," which meant the right to issue notes, to two railroad companies. Factories, turnpike companies, insurance companies, and others assumed this right either with or without legislative authority. In short, the ideal of the Greenbackers was fully realized in Secessia before any Greenback party existed in the United States. Money was as nearly equal to the wants of trade as the printing-press could make it. The State Legislatures at last attempted to prevent the circulation of personal and corporate notes, but the evil had grown beyond their reach. Virginia passed three acts for this purpose, but they could not be enforced. People considered these private notes as good as the public ones (as they were), and so continued to accept them. The banks issued their own notes freely, since they were not obliged to redeem them, suspension having been legalized in all the States. South Carolina, in her bank restriction act, prohibited the payment of dividends in specie.

The remainder of Prof. Schwab's work treats of the Southern banks, of the prices of commodities, of speculation and trade during the war, of Southern industries, and of the military despotism of the Confederate Government. These chapters are much more attractive to the general reader than the financial history. As regards the Confederate finances proper, Professor Schwab has left very little for any future gleaner in the same field. All available sources of information seem to have been searched. The Confederate archives and the State legislative records, the newspapers of the period, and the biographical and historical matter now in print, from which side lights are cast upon the Ways and Means of the Confederacy, have been laid under contribution, and the whole has been subjected to the analysis of a trained economist. Prof. Schwab does not fail to render his tribute to the tremendous energy put forth by the South during the war. "The Southern cause," he says, "evoked as much devoted loyalty as has been put forth by any cause in history; and that cause was supported at a cost greater than in any similar conflict. The Southerner's sacrifices far exceeded those of the Revolutionary patriots."

That the author wins a high rank in both economical and historical writing, will, we think, be the verdict of all persons competent to pass judgment on a treatise of this kind. Moreover, the work needed to be done. It is remarkably free from errors, but we note one on page 128, where it is said that "on November 20 and 21, 1860, the Virginia banks suspended *in company with the New York banks*." This is surely a slip of the pen. There was no bank suspension in New York at the date mentioned, but there was a severe commercial crisis following the announcement of Mr. Lincoln's election to the Presidency.

BERKELEY'S WORKS.

The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., Formerly Bishop of Cloyne; including his Posthumous Works. With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and an Account of his Life. By Alexander Campbell Fraser. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: H. Frowde. 1901. 4 vols., 8vo, pp. xc. + 627; vi. + 415; vi. + 412; viii. + 611.

It was a rare event, and truly astonishing, that a man without anything like a transcendent intellectual power should make a decided impression upon the philosophical thought of every country in Europe, such as Mr. Fraser did make by his former edition of Berkeley's works, which appeared in 1871. Berkeley was, there is no need to say, already very celebrated the world over; and in English-speaking countries no young metaphysician failed to read his 'Principles of Human Knowledge' or to talk about his theory of vision. His 'Theory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained,' had reached its second edition in 1860, only one hundred and twenty-seven years after its first publication; but this second edition, a very pretty one, too, had been little read. In Germany, identically the same theory—dressed in modern conceptions, as no intelligent modern reader would fail to dress it for himself—was attributed to Helmholtz, whose real services in the matter were analogous to those of Messrs. Harper & Bros. in 'Harper's Latin Dictionary.' The compartment of the brain in which men stored what little they fancied they knew of Berkeley was their cabinet of bibelots. Fraser's publication, which was not merely an edition, but an exposition by a student burning with the conviction of the present appositeness of Berkeley's method, was a veritable event in the history of European thought. The present edition is not a revision of that other, but quite a new one, and, considered simply as an edition of Berkeley's works, distinctly a better one. Dr. Fraser is now in the eighties, and so in condition to expound the 'Siris,' which breathes all the wisdom of a philosophical and learned old age, with greater insight than he could possess thirty years ago. It ought now to be a happiness to him to find that the generation which has derived from him an impulse into Berkeleyan studies has at last quite gone

beyond him in the understanding of Berkeley, in perception of his errors, and in recognition of his effective eminence in philosophy.

Berkeley is, in truth, far better entitled to be considered the father of all modern philosophy than is Kant. It was he, not Kant, who first produced an *Erkenntnisstheorie*, or "principles of human knowledge," which was for the most part correct in its positive assertions. It was he, more than any other single philosopher, who should be regarded as the author of that method of modern "pragmatism"—*i. e.*, the definition, or interpretation, of conceptions by their issues—which equally distinguished the thought of Kant, but which neither philosopher grasped clearly enough to formulate it in general terms. With two exceptions, we can think of no great factor of Kant's method of attacking a question which is not more or less emphasized in Berkeley's. One of these two is the doctrine that existence is not a form to be conceived, but a compulsive force to be experienced (which is prominent in Kant's refutations of Berkeley and of the ontological proof that there is a God; and indeed everywhere). This was of British origin: it is the doctrine of Scotus. Indeed, in Kant's thought, generally, there is hardly anything but his architectonic method that is not more in the line of English tradition and development than it is in the German line. Even where he appears least English, he is following Cudworth. There was, undoubtedly, the Leibnizian influence; but, apart from its dogmaticalness and its unclearness, that is not very German, either. One of the greatest weaknesses of Berkeley is shared by Kant in a lesser degree. We mean his Ockhamism, or refusal to acknowledge any being *in futuro*, or any mode of being whatever except that of individual existence. Even the Ockhamist Stuart Mill defines matter as a "permanent possibility" of sensation; but, for the more consistent Ockhamist, Berkeley, possibility is absolute nonentity: material objects must, when men have them not in view, be all along actually present to the Divine mind, or they would collapse into utter nothingness.

Berkeley's importance in psychology is best exhibited by setting down a few dates. It must be borne in mind that the association of ideas had never been lost sight of by students of Aristotle. Thus, the younger Scaliger reports that his father used often to say that the thing he most ardently wished to understand better was the causes of "reminiscence." Now, reminiscence was nothing but the Aristotelian name for the action of the association of ideas. Here is a little chronological table which exhibits in a nutshell more than we could find space otherwise to set down:

1661. Glanville in his 'Vanity of Dogmatizing,' sketched in a word or two what subsequently became Berkeley's theory of vision.

1687. Locke's 'Essay concerning Humane Understanding.'

1688. The 'Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion' of Malebranche, which somewhat develops Glanville's idea.

1709. Berkeley's 'Essay towards a New Theory of Vision.'

1710. Berkeley's 'Principles of Human Knowledge.'

The 'Théodicée' of Leibnix.

1713. Arthur Collier's 'Clavis Universalis,' which was a quite independent development of the same ideas as those of Berkeley's Principles.

1731. Gay's 'Dissertation on the Fundamental Principles of Virtue.' This first put forward the principle of association as the one great law of all mental action, and is, therefore, one of the most epoch-making of works. Yet Gay does not appear in the 'Dictionary of National Biography' nor in Allibone nor in the supplement. His first name is unknown to us. Hartley (who calls him the Rev. Mr. Gay, and tells us that he wrote this anonymous 'Dissertation'), confesses that he had been put upon his line of thought by him. He published another little book on the subject in 1747, two years before Hartley's 'Observations on Man,' but probably after Hartley's 'Conjectural Quædam,' the date of which we do not know.

1732. Wolff's 'Psychologia Empirica.'

1739. Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature' (first two parts). Hume, who was directly influenced by Berkeley, first clearly distinguishes between association by resemblance and by contiguity.

1749. 'Hartley's Observations on Man,' fully developing the action of association.

1782. Kant's 'Critic of the Pure Reason,' which is psychologically, in some important respects, behind Berkeley.

This table is enough to show that Locke, Berkeley, and Gay ought to be regarded as the three original precursors of modern psychology.

Berkeley must, by all accounts, have been a man of extraordinary eloquence. His inducing Parliament unanimously to grant £20,000 for his Bermuda project is an example of this. His ardor was of the purest; and what he believed, he believed with his whole soul. We cannot, in this, at least, agree with what Fraser says of 'The Theory of Visual Language Vindicated,' that "its blot is a tone of polemical bitterness directed against Shaftesbury." On the contrary, it seems to us that that remark is a striking illustration of the decadence of Christian belief in our days. The courtesy and self-restraint of Berkeley's severe strictures upon the mischief done by Shaftesbury's writings could not easily be paralleled by any utterance of the present generation coming from a man who was deeply in earnest about the evil he attacked. Every stoic, such as Shaftesbury was, was a thorough materialist; and, as such, an atheist to Berkeley's apprehension, whatever he might fancy himself to be. As for the majority of the free-thinkers, Berkeley, who had heard their private conversation, did not think them to be under any such illusion concerning their own position. But a man may easily think that he believes what he does not believe. For example, Berkeley himself, and Fraser for him, cannot admit that an opponent of Berkeley treats him fairly unless he begins by admitting that Berkeley believes in the existence of matter in the sense in which the world at large believes in it. But for an opponent to grant that would obviously be to surrender his whole position. The true question is whether Berkeley has not overlooked certain of the constituents of the ordinary, instinctive notion of matter.

Fraser's own contribution to the development of the Berkeleyan doctrine is sufficiently indicated by the following sentence from his preface: "His Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may encourage those who see in a reasonable *via media* between Omniscience and Nescience the true path of progress under man's inevitable venture of reasonable Faith." To find the development of this idea, one must turn to the author's 'Philosophy of Theism.' Then if one desires Berkeley's works as completely as possible, one will further procure his 'Life and Letters,' by Prof. A. C. Fraser. A thorough student of Berkeley will want all that.

Whether for an ordinary reader of philosophy—putting aside the question of price—this edition or that in Bohn's "Philosophical Library," published three years ago, is to be preferred is a delicate question. The text of either is excellent, although neither, we are sorry to say, respects Berkeley's punctuation, which is a part of his style. Probably the Bohn edition is most scrupulously accurate. That it omits such things as the diary in Italy is really no objection. Its most serious omission is the commonplace-book of notes for the preparation of the 'Principles.' This is rhetorically interesting; but it throws less light on the development of Berkeley's views than would be expected. The Bohn edition gives the Latin works (of which one, 'De Motu,' is not altogether devoid of importance), only in translation; the Fraser edition only in the original. Berkeley's Latin has a certain academical elegance; but it is a garb which does not set so comfortably on his thought as a homelier English. In regard to additional matter, each edition has something one regrets to miss in the other. Much more is attempted in this way in the Fraser edition. Nothing is really indispensable but Berkeley's own forcible and persuasive language; and the Fraser notes form sometimes an officious, one had almost said an impertinent, interruption to a philosopher who is quite able to manage the English language for himself. The new life prefixed to the Fraser edition is much fuller and somewhat more accurate than Mr. Arthur Balfour's capital biographical introduction to the other. Neither biographer has suggested that the good bishop's very sudden and very quiet death may—in view of the oceans of tar-water that he was accustomed to swill—have been due to an overdose of carbolic acid. It is quite certain that the Bohn volumes are prettier and lighter and more agreeable to read; but their editor, we feel sure, would concur in the judgment that the new Fraser edition is the most valuable that has yet appeared or is likely to appear, for as long as one can foresee.

The Relations of Geography and History. By the Rev. H. B. George. Oxford: The Clarendon Press; New York: Henry Frowde. 1901. Pp. 296.

Mr. George, who is a Fellow of New College, Oxford, has been for many years an enthusiastic a student of military campaigns as though he were an army chaplain. His researches necessarily induce a strong conviction of the close connection between geography and history, and Mr. George has performed a real service by putting together in this volume the principal conclusions to which his wide learning and accurate scholarship have led him. The book consists practically of two sections. In the first the author discusses the general

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