

lished a series of articles in Dutch journals (afterward expanded in two large volumes) in which he showed that the pretensions made on behalf of Koster had no sound basis in history. He did what no one before had done so thoroughly, for he sifted evidence and examined records with uncommon critical discernment. Although he wrote with needless asperity, his reasoning was accepted as conclusive by many partisans of Koster, who were led by him to believe that the real inventor of printing was John Gutenberg of Mainz.

Moved no doubt by emulation, Dr. Hessel of Oxford, England, undertook a similar sifting of the evidence that had been published in favor of Gutenberg. He showed that fables and forgeries had been devised to cover supposed weak spots in the histories written about Gutenberg, and that his records also needed further investigation. He does not deny that Gutenberg printed before 1455, but he does lead the reader to doubt that he was sole inventor, or even the master spirit in the invention of printing. It is certain that Gutenberg had forerunners.

A French investigator in the archives of Avignon reports that one Christopher Valdfoghel had there introduced, before the period of Gutenberg in Mainz, a new "art of writing with metal letters." No specimen of Valdfoghel's workmanship was discovered, nor is it known what methods he used; but it is possible that he was attempting to invent printing with metal types. We have also some new evidence that Mentilin of Strassburg was a successful and an industrious printer in that city at or before the publication of the two great Bibles attributed (and denied) to Gutenberg.

One of these Bibles is known as the Bible of Forty-two Lines, or the Mazarin Bible, so called from its discovery in the library of Cardinal Mazarin. This Bible, now in the National Library at Paris, contains in its two volumes two colophons, professedly written by the illuminator of the books, certifying that his work was done at Mainz in the year 1455. These colophons, with other evidences, have led to the conclusion that this Bible must have been printed in Mainz before 1455. Mr. Moon challenges the credibility of these colophons, and names bibliographers of authority who believe that they were not written by the illuminator. The other Bible is known as the Bible of Thirty-six Lines, or the Pfister Bible, or the Bamberg Bible, so called because Albert Pfister of Bamberg is known to have used its types in several of his little books. It has no printed date, nor has any copy been found with an early written date. The types of the two Bibles are different as to size, but they resemble one another in form, and should have been made by the same printer; but there are historic difficulties in the way of this hypothesis. The Bible of Forty-two Lines always has been regarded as the first, because it had a written date; but there are bibliographers of authority who maintain that the Bible of Thirty-six Lines was the first product of the new art. If the authenticity of the written date of 1455 is proved a forgery, then the relative priority of the two Bibles is still an open question.

Now comes George Washington Moon (well known as the rasping critic of Dean

Alford's 'Queen's English'), with a thin quarto of 47 pages, in which he challenges the priority of these Bibles. He asserts that they were printed in too workmanlike a manner, and that neither one could have been the first product of the new art. He begins with a recital of the oldest printed testimonies in favor of Gutenberg, and adjudges their merits as history with creditable impartiality; but he shows, as Dr. Van der Linde had done before him, that the repetition of an early statement by an uncritical writer adds nothing to the credibility of that statement. Nevertheless, he insists that the testimony of the earliest writers on the subject should not be put aside entirely. He quotes one old writer who said that the 'Catholicon' was the first printed book. He prefers the internal evidences in early printed books to the assertions of contemporaneous writers, for many of them had no exact knowledge of the mechanics of printing, and, without intending to mislead, did mislead seriously. He compares the appearance of print in early books not by the types of letters only, but by marks of punctuation and other trifles of typographical practice that have been overlooked. He says that the acknowledged characteristics of earliest printing are:

- "No title-page, preface, table of contents, or of rubrics.
- "No colophon, pagination, catch-words.
- "No signature or lettering for marking separately printed sheets.
- "No marginal notes or footnotes.
- "No headings to pages or to chapters, and no space between chapters.
- "No large printed capitals (as initial letters) and no small letters as guides to the maker of the initials.
- "No diphthongs or quotation marks.
- "No marks of punctuation, except the dot, and this dot was always above the lower lining of the letters.
- "No register of lettered signatures and no errata.
- "No printer's name or place of printing and no date.
- "Only Gothic or semi-Gothic type.
- "Only one long s and one short s.
- "Only one straight and one curved r.
- "Only one size of each small letter.
- "Only one size and one form of each capital.
- "Only one form of each double letter.
- "Only one form of each single letter or abbreviation.
- "The i never dotted; it was either with an acute or circumflex accent.
- "The first and last leaf always blank.
- "An irregular or uneven number of lines in mated columns."

The two Bibles previously mentioned do not conform to all these characteristics of early printing. As they have different forms of the same letter, and as one of them shows four kinds of marks of punctuation, and has other peculiarities, Mr. Moon decides that they cannot be rated as the first or even as very early products of the new art. They show improvements upon a still earlier and a cruder practice of printing.

The only book that approximates the characteristics specified by Mr. Moon is this rare and undated edition of the 'Catholicon' in his possession, and described by him as the "65-line A Catholicon" from its peculiar form of the capital A. This Catholicon, a folio of 800 pages, the combination of a Latin grammar and dictionary, had been a book of high authority for nearly two centuries, and it was undoubtedly a book to be selected by an early printer as certain of ready sale. It seems to have been printed from new and sharp

types in a creditable manner, but it betrays on the part of the printer remarkable ignorance of, or indifference to, the niceties of typography which have been listed by Mr. Moon. He gives a facsimile of a paragraph of this Catholicon. It conforms to his standard of the characteristics of early printing in all features but one: its capital letters are neither Gothic nor semi-Gothic, but a fair form of Roman letter, fully as correct as the Roman capitals shown by Swoynhelm and Pannartz at Subiaco in 1465. Even the small or minuscule letters of this Catholicon incline more to the Roman than the semi-Gothic style.

Who printed this edition of the Catholicon? Mr. Moon does not hazard a direct answer, but he points to the significant circumstance that it is one of a series of four volumes (the earlier ones undated, and without name or place) printed by Mentilin of Strassburg, and that the second volume of the series, 'Speculum Doctrinale,' is printed in the types of this "65-line A Catholicon," but its types show wear and have new capital letters. The reader is led to form his own conclusion that it should have been printed about 1445, and probably by Mentilin of Strassburg.

It is already established that Gutenberg was experimenting in or practicing printing in Strassburg as early as 1440, and that he had associates with whom he was at variance. Mentilin's name was not mentioned in their law-suit against Gutenberg, but Mentilin did practice printing in that city for many years after the alleged departure of Gutenberg to Mainz. There is no record of any work done by Gutenberg between 1442 and 1448, but it is not at all probable that he was idle. It is possible that this Catholicon might have been printed in Strassburg at or about 1445, but whether with or without the aid of Gutenberg, is uncertain.

*Ethics: Descriptive and Explanatory.* By Sidney Edward Mezes. The Macmillan Co. 1901. 8vo, pp. 435.

Professor Mezes of the University of Texas has been known to the general public as a scholar of Howison, and as one of the four authors of the sympotic book, 'The Conception of God.' He there produced upon us a mixed impression, for his intellect seemed not to have quite so keen an edge as is called for in philosophy; and yet here and there conceptions appeared so simple and obvious, and yet so novel, that one ransacked one's memory in the endeavor to recall any anticipation of the remark. Much the same impression is renewed by the present book. Hard work and solid has been put into it; and, of course, the harvest must have proportionate value. Parts of the treatise are admirably worked out, and are, at any rate, instructive, even if their conclusions are rejected. But hard work is not all that is required in dealing with such a subject.

In aim and method the present work is fully as original as it ought to be. The author belongs to that school of ethics which is probably nearest right—that is to say, to the school which makes tribal tradition a main factor of morality, and which is thus enabled to frame an evolutionary theory of it. But although the author is thus in the van of ethical exploration, a

certain old-fashioned and conservative color—attributable, perhaps, to temperament and Texan environment—strongly tinged his theory. Now, conservatism in morals is most needed in practice; and, of course, is theoretically defensible. But that defence itself is not conservative: on the contrary, it is rationalistic; and in pure theory, especially in a theory of aims, conservatism is irrational and out of place. The writer effects a reconciliation of his conservatism (which is very likely unconscious) with his advanced views by exaggerating more than usual a prevalent tendency which we venture to think that the majority of philosophers of our day carry too far—we mean the tendency to base everything in philosophy upon the psychical sciences. The immense success of scientific psychology during the last forty years has very naturally given it a weight in men's minds that ought not in philosophy to be accorded to any merely special science, which is precisely what psychology has all along been striving and struggling to be. On the contrary, it is now generally admitted that psychology, like general physics, necessarily takes for granted a *Weltanschauung* or outline system of metaphysics. Now, metaphysics can have no satisfactory grounding except upon a scientific logic; and logic rests on ethics to a degree that few are aware of. So if there be no other basis for ethics than psychology, which is a third story above it, the whole erection floats on air. Ethics as a positive science must rest on observed facts. But it is quite a different thing to make it rest on special scientific observation, and still more so to base it upon scientific conclusions. The only solid foundation for ethics lies in those facts of every-day life which no skeptical philosopher ever yet really called in question.

Now, Mr. Mezes is so far from taking this view that he maintains that the whole business of the moralist consists in saying what men mean by morality, in describing what they hold to be moral, and in explaining how they come to do so. This is a most interesting and valuable study, but it is ethical anthropology, not pure ethics; and to limit ethics in this way is to be faithless to the first duty of a moralist, as such. "Ethical writers do not in any proper sense," he says, meaning that they overstep the bounds of their province when they do, "judge conduct or issue pronouncements as to what is right or wrong. Their more modest task is to discover and record men's genuine judgments as to what is right or wrong." Let us see how this view of ethics works. A judge, let us suppose, has brought before him a case in which a man has suffered injury for which he claims damages of another. Whether damages ought to be paid in such a case is often, we know, a delicate and puzzling question. We will follow Professor Mezes in using a much too simple illustration, which ought to puzzle nobody. "Take," he says, "the case where A's cattle break out of their enclosure, in spite of A's having used all the care he reasonably could have used, or could learn to use, and destroy B's valuable crop in an adjoining field." This case (or rather another far more difficult) puzzles the judge, and he takes it under advisement. He naturally looks into works on ethics, and, finding nothing pertinent in modern books, is driven to the scholastic treatises. Now, there is nothing in the whole

scholastic logic more justly an object of derision for any modern thinker than its weak confusion of thought in its doctrine of causes; nor, in that whole doctrine, is there any more manifest absurdity than the distinction between a *proximate* and a *remote* cause. When we meet with an application of it in the scholastic commentary on the Sentences, it stands out as (to such more nonsensical than the rest as to be comical; but that anybody should be made to suffer because of any consequence of such metaphysical jargon is outrageous flippancy. Yet it is just this outrage that the judge is driven to commit, or to pretend to commit, because the ethical writers have not expounded right and wrong in a sufficiently luminous and reasonable form.

Professor Mezes follows them. He maintains that A, the owner of the cattle, ought to reimburse B for the injury done by them to his crop, because A is the *proximate cause* of B's suffering. If he would not follow the decisions of Texas courts as the ultimate evidence concerning right and wrong, he could not fail to see that the real reason why the judge awards damages to B is that to allow a private person to undertake a business humanly sure in the long run to injure his neighbors (and all the more so if he "cannot learn to use" suitable preventive measures), and then to allow him to pocket all the profits, and make his neighbors pay for incidental losses, would be to bring himself and his court into public contempt and into no little danger. That was the judge's real reason. But in days gone by (perhaps not yet in Texas) if a judge could decide a case justly, and yet by a process of metaphysical reasoning the less intelligible the better, he was regarded with awe by the vulgar; and that was one motive for his seizing upon that argument when he could get no modern light.

One of the distinctive features of Professor Mezes's book is a seventy-page chapter on Justice, in which legal decisions are followed, often in a way which will be repugnant to right-minded readers, and yet not so exclusively that the chapter can be said to constitute an exposition of the traditional legal conception of justice. Professor Mezes defines ultimate good as "the welfare of all sentient beings," but he is doubtful whether it is worth while to have any regard for the welfare either of *beetles* (are these sentient beings in Texas?) or of criminals of all classes. The last exclusion is characteristic, we are sorry to say. But when we ask what he means by "welfare," in place of a definition, nothing is vouchsafed but a *division* of "welfare," in which there are two or three dozen items, such as "easy activity," "sense of personal attractiveness," "sense of solvency," "satisfaction from social standing," "sense of divine favor," "national pride," "self-control," "a body of well-poised spontaneous activities," "systematic ideas of rights and duties," "sagacity." There are those who will think that all this is on a pretty low plane, and we do not see much in the list about the welfare of earth-worms, etc., notwithstanding the insistence upon "all sentient beings."

The best thing in the book is the psychological analysis of conscience, which is decidedly noticable. We could hardly have expected the terminology to be reformed. The scholastic writers mark two things which they distinguish by the terms *synderesis* and *conscience* (the latter nearly in

the sense in which it is a household word). The interest of progress in ethical discussion calls upon us to come to agreement about the use of technical terms. But each of us is attached to his own habit, and will not surrender it unless it can be shown clearly to violate a law to which he has given in his allegiance. A code of rules is needed, in framing which we cannot do better than to be guided by the taxonomists, who have had, of all men, most experience in dealing with similar difficulties. If we do that, our first rule, subject, perhaps, to a few general but well-defined classes of exceptions (the fewer the better), will certainly be that every technical term of philosophy ought to be used in that sense in which it first became a technical term of philosophy. This will, generally speaking, result in the greatest accord between the language of philosophy and the vernacular, of which the word *conscience* will be an example. As for that other thing which a good many moralists call conscience, some other name ought to be given to it, preferably a new word. At any rate, not *synderesis*, of which the original meaning, we are convinced, is not that which Siebek assigns to it. Professor Mezes, whose definitions are mostly of doubtful accuracy, distinguishes between conscience about others' acts and conscience about one's own. But a stay-at-home conscience does the most to render earth habitable.

As we rise from the reading of the whole book, we find ourselves saying, If this is what morality is, we are disposed to sympathize with Henry James, the elder, in his very limited respect for morality.

*A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages.* By Stanley Lane-Poole. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901. Pp. xvi, 322. Map and 101 illustrations.

This is the sixth volume in the great history of Egypt now publishing, and covers, in spite of its title, the period from the Arab conquest in 640 to the conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. The seventh volume will treat the Ottoman period from 1517 to the present day.

There can be no question of the learning and skill which Professor Lane-Poole has brought to bear on a complicated and abstruse subject. Hereditarily and personally interested in Egypt and in the glories of its history and civilization, he has added to the merely picturesque that definite exactness in dates which marks the modern historian. Few men have at their command such a skeleton for the history of any part of the Muslim world as he has drawn from his labors among the coins of the British Museum. He has also had access to the unique collection of materials which M. van Berchem has made for his *Corpus Inscriptum Arabicarum*. The Ethiopic and Syriac sources, too, have been open to him. It will thus be seen that he has been able to use much wider and more exact information on his subject than was the case with Well, his only serious competitor. As for Sir William Muir's volume on the Mamluks, the remark on it, page 317, is unfortunately true, but would also be better away. At the best, that book covers only a small part of the present field.

It was probably exigencies of space which led to the few weaknesses here and there to criticism. Thus, it must be said

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