

**Major** [Lat. *maior*, greater]: Ger. *Dur*; Fr. *majeur*; Ital. *maggiore*. One of the two fundamental scales or keys of modern music. Expressed in 'whole tones,' it runs: 1, 1, 1-2, 1, 1, 1, 1-2. Cf. MINOR, and TRIAD.

This is the natural diatonic series, represented by the series of musical tones starting from C. It corresponds to the Greek Lydian, and the ecclesiastical Tonic. Cf. Helmholtz, *Sensations of Tone*, 274.

A major interval is that form of the interval which is greater by a semitone than its corresponding minor. A major chord is a chord containing the major third above the fundamental. A major tone is one the vibration ratio of which is 8 : 9, as contrasted with the minor 9 : 10. Cf. Parry, in *Grove's Dict. of Music*, ii. 200. (E.B.T.)

**Major and Minor** (extreme, term, premise, *satz*, &c., in logic): Ger. *Ober- and Unter-* (*Begriff*, &c.); Fr. *majeur* and *mineur*; Ital. *maggiore* and *minore*. The subject and predicate of the conclusion of a syllogism are called the extremes (*τὰ ἄκρα*, by Aristotle), because they are only brought together by the agency of the third term, called, on that account, the middle term (*ὁ μέσος ὄρος*, Aristotle). Of the two extremes, the one that is the predicate of the conclusion is called the major extreme (*τὸ μείζον ἄκρον*, Aristotle), because in a universal affirmative proposition (the typical formal proposition) its breadth is the greater, while the subject of the conclusion is the minor extreme (*τὸ ἐλάττω ἄκρον*, Aristotle).

Whether the expressions major term and minor term, for the major and minor extremes, are grammatically accurate or not, they are consecrated by usage through the scholastic period. The major and minor premises are respectively those which contain the major and minor extremes. Aristotle (*L. Anal. Pr.*, ix) calls the former *ἡ πρὸς τὸ μείζον ἄκρον πρότασις*, 'the proposition about the major extreme.' (C.S.P.)

**Majority** (in law): see INFANT.

**Make-believe**: Ger. (1) *Vortäuschen*, *bewusster Schein*; Fr. (1) *faute, faux semblant*; Ital. (1) *finzione*. (1) The indulgence in SEMBLANCE (q. v.) with consciousness of, or for the sake of, the effect upon another.

As is pointed out under semblance, that state of mind may involve self-illusion or not. In the higher forms of semblance, there is the keeping up of the artificial situation without self-illusion, but with direct reference to the effect upon an observer, a more or less explicit attempt to make another believe,

and so to sham. It is recommended that the term make-believe be confined to this more particular aspect of the consciousness of semblance. The term sham—especially the verbal forms (e.g. shamming)—may well be used as a synonym. The shamming of disease and the symptomatic forms of deception in certain diseases, known as malingering, illustrate make-believe.

(2) The consciousness of unreality attaching to certain mental constructions, notably those of play and art. See SEMBLANCE (also for foreign equivalents), which is preferable in this broad meaning; and cf. ART AND ART THEORIES.

(3) Used in biology for the attitudes of feigning (e.g. the opossum's feigning death), a form of SEMBLANCE (q. v.) which is largely instinctive, and probably only slightly, if at all, conscious. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

**Male** [Lat. *masculus*]: Ger. *männlich*; Fr. *mâle*; Ital. *maschio*. The primary meaning refers to the individual capable of producing spermatozoa or the homologous elements in the lower animals or in plants. By extension it is applied (1) to characteristics of a male individual, especially such as are sexually distinctive; (2) to the spermatozoa or other sexual elements produced by a male individual or the male gland of an hermaphrodite. Cf. SEX. (C.S.M.)

**Malebranche, Nicolas**. (1638-1715). Born of a wealthy and respectable family. He was too poor in health to attend school. Studied theology at the Sorbonne. Read Descartes in 1664, and devoted himself to philosophy.

**Malevolence** (or **Malice**) [Lat. *malevolentia*]: Ger. *Bosheit*, *Böswilligkeit*; Fr. *malice*, *méchanceté*; Ital. *malevolenza*, *cattiveria*. The disposition to bring pain or misery to another or to take pleasure in it.

The nature of malevolence and the possibility of disinterested malevolence have been discussed by the English moralists. Hutcheson describes 'disinterested malice or delight in the misery of others' as the highest pitch of what we count vicious; and, according to Butler, 'the utmost possible depravity which we can in imagination conceive is that of disinterested cruelty.' At the same time, both doubt the possibility of its being genuinely disinterested. 'Human nature,' says Hutcheson, 'seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or a sedate delight in the misery of others'; and Butler holds that 'as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as ill-will in

P 00816