

than to call it an abstraction. If the distinction of matter and form could have any value at all, it was the substantial forms that were, properly speaking, forms. If the Scotists could really specify any natural class, say man—and physics was at that time in no condition to raise any just doubt upon that score—then they were perfectly justified in giving a name to the intelligible characteristic of that class, and that was all the substantial form made any pretension to being. But the Scotists were guilty of two faults. The first—great enough, certainly, but relatively inconsiderable—was often referred to, though not distinctly analysed and brought home to them. It was that they were utterly uncritical in accepting classes as natural, and seemed to think that ordinary language was a sufficient guarantee in the matter. Their other and principal fault, which may with justice be called a sin, since it involved a certain moral delinquency, was that they set up their idle logical distinctions as precluding all physical inquiry. The physicists and Scotists, being intent upon widely discrepant purposes, could not understand one another. There was a tolerably good excuse for the physicist, since the intention of the Scotist was of an abstract and technical kind, not easily understood. But there was no other excuse for the Scotist than that he was so drugged with his metaphysics that ordinary human needs had lost all appeal to him. All through the 18th century and a large part of the 19th, exclamations against the monstrosities of the scholastic dogma that substantial forms were entities continued to be part of the stock-in-trade of metaphysicians, and it accorded with the prevalent nominalism. But nowadays, when it is clearly seen that physical science gives its assent much more to scholastic realism (limited closely to its formal statement) than it does to nominalism, a view of the history more like that here put forward is beginning to prevail.

In the following terms, mostly Kantian, prepositional phrases express the qualifications.

*Form of corporeity*: a very common term of scholasticism, originating with Avicenna, and used by Aquinas (*Summa Theol.*, pars i. cap. lxi. art. 2), but more particularly by Scotus (in his great discussion *Opus Oxon.*, IV. dist. xi. 9. 3, beginning 'De secundo articulo dico') and by all his followers. The point is, that the rational soul, being purely spiritual, cannot confer corporeity upon the human body,

but a special form, the form of corporeity, is requisite. Suarez and others, generally Thomists, as well as Henry of Ghent, denied this on the ground that a species has but one form. Thus a great metaphysical dispute arose. It sprung from the study of the doctrine of transubstantiation. See Cavellus, *Suppl. ad quaest. Scoti in De Anima*, disp. 6, which is in the Lyons ed. of Scotus, tom. ii.

*Form of cognition*, in Kant's doctrine, is that element of knowledge which the matter of experience must assume in order to be apprehended by the mind. Kant seems to have been thinking of legal forms which must be complied with in order to give standing before a court. So an English sovereign, in order to be crowned, must, as a 'matter of form,' swear to an intensity of loathing for Romish dogmas which he probably regards with great coolness. Kant's definitions are chiefly the following:—

'In the phenomenon, that which corresponds to the impression of sense, I call the matter of it; while that which constitutes the fact that manifoldness of the phenomenon is intuited as ordered in certain relations, I call the form of the phenomenon' (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 1st ed., 20).

'All cognition requires a concept, be it as imperfect and dark as you will; and this, in respect to its form, is always a universal which serves as a rule' (ibid., 106).

'The transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possible cognition, through which, consequently, all objects of possible experience must a priori be represented' (ibid., 118).

'There are two factors in cognition; first, the concept by which any object is thought—that is, the category; and secondly, the intuition by which that object is given. For if the concept had had no corresponding intuition, it would be a thought, no doubt, as far as its form goes; but having no object, no cognition whatsoever [he means, whether true or false] of anything would be possible by it; since, so far as I should know, there would be nothing, and perhaps could be nothing, to which such a concept would be applicable' (2nd ed. of the *Deduction of the Categories*, § 22).

'It is not more surprising that the laws of phenomena in nature must agree with the understanding and its a priori form, i.e. with its power of combining any manifold, than that the phenomena themselves must agree with the a priori form of sensuous intuition.

For just as phenomena have no existence in themselves, but are merely relative to the mind, as having senses, so laws do not exist in the phenomena, but are merely relative to the mind in which the phenomena inhere, that mind exercising understanding' (and see the rest of this passage, ibid., § 26).

*Form of forms*. Francis Bacon says 'the soul may be called the form of forms,' which would be a pretty conceit, were it not plagiarized from the serious doctrine of Aristotle: *ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν* (432 a, 2).

The terms *matter* and *form* are used in certain peculiar ways in logic. Speaking *materialiter*, the matter of a proposition is said to be its subject and predicate, while the copula is its form. But speaking *formaliter*, the matter of a proposition is, as we familiarly say, the 'matter of fact' to which the proposition relates; or as defined by the scholastics, 'habitus extremorum adinvicem.' The second tractate of the *Summulae* of Petrus Hispanus begins with the words: 'Propositionum triplex est materia; scilicet, naturalis, contingens, et remota. Naturalis est illa in qua praedicatum essentia subiecti vel proprium eius; ut, homo est animal; vel, homo est risibilis. Contingens est illa in qua praedicatum potest adesse et abesse subiecto praeter subiecti corruptionem; ut, homo est albus, homo non est albus. Remota est illa in qua praedicatum non potest convenire cum subiecto; ut, homo est asinus.'

Of a syllogism, the proximate matter is the three propositions; the remote, the three terms. The form, which ought to be the *ergo*, by the same right by which the copula is recognized as the form of the proposition, is said to be 'apta trium propositionum dispositio ad conclusionem ex praemissis necessario colligendam.' But Kant, in the *Logik* by Jäsche, § 59, makes the premises the matter, and the conclusion the form. (C.S.P.)

*Maxim* (in ethics) [Lat. *maxima sententia*, opinion of greatest weight]: Ger. *Maxime*; Fr. *maxime*; Ital. *massima*. (1) Any important principle for the regulation of conduct.

(2) A technical term in Kant's ethics: a practical principle regarded by the agent as valid for his own will.

In this latter sense a maxim is distinguished from a practical law. The latter is regarded as objectively valid, or valid for the will of every rational being. Morality consists, according to Kant, in the objective law becoming also the subjective maxim of the will; and his moral imperative is accordingly ex-

pressed in the terms, 'Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.' Cf. Kant, *Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft*, Pt. I. Bk. II. chap. i. §§ 1 and 7. (W.R.S.)

*Maxim* (in logic). A widely received general assertion or rule.

The earliest writers, so far as has been shown, to use *maxima* as a substantive were Albertus Magnus and Petrus Hispanus. The former (*Post. Anal.*, lib. I. cap. ii) makes *maximae* constitute the seventh of thirteen classes of propositions which may be accepted, though they are uncertain, so that they differ widely from *dignitates*, or axioms. He says, 'Maximae propositiones opinantur esse quae non recipiuntur nisi in quantum sunt manifestae. Et putat vulgus commune et alii simplices et non periti quod sint primae ex sui veritate communicantes omnem intellectum; sicut est ista propositio, Mendacium est turpe,' &c. Hamilton quotes, but gives an unverifiable reference to, a sentence in which Albertus makes *maxima* another name for a *dignitas*. Petrus Hispanus (*Summulae*, v) says, 'Maxima est propositio qua non est altera prior neque notior'; and he divides commonplaces into two kinds, called Maxim and Difference of Maxim. This phraseology was so generally followed that it is surprising that Frantl's attribution of it to Albert of Saxony (who simply copies the *Summulae* here, almost verbatim) should have found any acceptance. Blundeville and other early writers of logic in English take the word from the *Summulae*. It was also adopted into English law. The meaning now tends to return to that used by Albertus. Kant (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 1st ed., 656) defines a maxim of reason as a subjective principle derived not from the character of the object, but from the interest of reason in such perfection of cognition as may be possible; and in the *Critic of the Practical Reason* he endeavours to make out something analogous in that sphere. In the *Logik* by Jäsche (Einleitung III) he defines a maxim as an inward principle of choice between different ends. (C.S.P.)

*Maxim* (legal): Ger. *Rechtsregel*, *Grundsatz*; Fr. *maxime de droit*; Ital. *massima giuridica*. The sententious expression of an established rule of law in a short form, which has become authoritative by long use and general approval; a legal axiom. Such a maxim has the force of law, e.g. 'Causa proxima, non remota, spectatur.'

The use of maxims is common to all