

NEGATIVE

shorter form, permitted by language, for 'that *a* is *b* is false,' or 'that *a* is *b* is non-occurrent.' Cf. JUDGMENT, ad fin. (O.L.F., J.M.B.)

Negative [Lat. *negativa*; a term appearing first in logic in Boethius, in place of the previous *abdicativa*, although *negatio* was much earlier. It translates Aristotle's *ἀποφασις*. Cognate words were used by Plato, and even earlier]: Ger. *verneinend*; Fr. *négatif*; Ital. *negativo*. Involving NEGATION (q. v.), either in the second application of the logical sense, or in the metaphysical sense given under that term.

Negative abstraction is an act of abstraction derived from considering something which does not possess the character considered.

Negative (or necessary) condition: see NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION.

Negative criterion: a criterion which is a negative condition; a test. Most criteria are of this sort.

Negative discrepancy: see DISCREPANCY.

Negative distinction: a mutual real distinction separating anything from its negation; as the distinctions of heat and cold (no heat), light and darkness (no light), sound and silence (no sound).

Negative idea: see *Negative name*.

Negative mark: a mark which consists in the non-occurrence of a positive phenomenon under certain conditions.

Negative name: a common name which characterizes an object by its want of some character. 'I appeal,' says Locke, 'to every one's own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow), does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an idea in his mind as a man himself, though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative names, which stand not directly for positive ideas, but for their absence, such as *insipid*, *silence*, *nil*, &c., which words denote the positive ideas, *taste*, *sound*, *being*, with a signification of their absence' (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, II. viii. 5).

Negative negation: see NEGATION.

Negative syllogism: any syllogism of the second figure, or the *modus tollens*, where the reasoning, turns upon the change of quality. The canon of syllogism, that nothing can be concluded from two negatives, is inaccurate. What is requisite, in non-relative syllogism, is that the middle term should be once dis-

tributed and once undistributed. Darapti and Felapton, which appear to violate this rule, only do so because one of the premises, so far as it is efficient, is virtually a particular. What is requisite is, that one of the interlocutors should select the individual denoted by the middle term in one premise and the other in the other.

Negative whole is one which has no parts; as God, the soul, &c. (O.S.P.)

Negative term. Negation arises first, without doubt, in connection with the judgment—it is a secondary function of thought, which presupposes the existence of positive judgments (Hamilton, Sigwart, Wundt). It is true that the concept cat, cannot be formed by the child except by separating out a certain quality-complex from a background of all that is other than cat; but this background exists in its mind only vaguely, like images upon a retinal periphery, and until it has become a distinct object of consciousness it does not constitute a concept. Later, thought permits itself to affirm not only that *a is not b*, but also that *a is not-b*. The concept *not-b* is, in many cases, no more difficult to form than the concept *b*; it is frequently hard to greet an acquaintance or to cut him, is positive and which is negative—to be immortal means to continue to live, and to be mortal means not to continue to live. But this similarity between positive and negative terms holds only so long as the quality which constitutes their signification is one and indivisible. Terms in general are implements for holding together a certain group of objects, each in the possession of a certain complex of marks; a negative term has for its denotation all other objects in the universe of discourse, whatever that may be, and for its connotation the absence of some one at least of the elements of the complex of marks signified by the positive term. The group of objects to which a negative term applies is all the objects other than those to which the positive term applies; for signification there is not, it is true, any mark common to this group of objects (for in general they have no such mark), but this is merely to say that a negative name has no positive concept corresponding to it (Keynes). The significations of the positive term and of the negative term are very different; the one involves a combination of quality-elements, the other an alternation of absences of quality-elements. When, therefore, Lotze says that it remains for ever

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