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Kant (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 643). It is used by Crusius for psychology. (J.D.)

Norm (and Normality) [Lat. *norma*, a carpenter's square, a rule]: Ger. *Norm*, *Normalität*; Fr. *norme*, *normalité*; Ital. *norma*, *normalità*. (1) A standard type or pattern from which continuous departures are possible in opposite directions. (C.S.P.)

(2) In natural science: the usual, in form, size, and function. Normality is conformity to that usual.

Fluctuations and deviations from normality, both physical and mental, constantly occur, and when within moderate limits are still considered normal; when exceeding such limits they gradually pass into the ABNORMAL (q.v.). For examples of the use of this conception in psychological discussions see Maudsley, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*. (J.J.)

Norm and Normative (in the moral sciences): Ger. *normativ* (*normgebend*); Fr. *normatif*; Ital. *normativo*. The principle, whether truth or mode of reality, which controls action, thought, and emotion, if these are to realize their appropriate ends; the end as law. The norm of thinking is truth; of emotion, the beautiful; of volition, the good. These principles (and their corresponding philosophic disciplines) are hence termed normative. The three normative sciences are thus logic, aesthetics, and ethics.

Reference to a norm may be roughly taken to discriminate the philosophic from the natural sciences. The latter aim simply to describe phenomena and explain them in terms of laws or principles homogeneous with the facts. The explaining principles are, moreover, mechanical, having to do with conditions of manifestation in time. In the philosophic sciences, facts are interpreted with reference to their meaning, or value—their significance from the position occupied, or part played, by them in the total make-up of experience. The standpoint, moreover, is teleological, since the interest is not in the conditions of origin, but in the fulfilment of purpose in realizing their appropriate values. Whether this distinction is one of objective reality, or one of standpoint and method of treatment, is, however, itself a philosophic problem. According to some writers the distinction between concepts of origin and of value has a distinct ontological reference; according to others the significance is only methodological. That is to say, to the latter there are not two spheres, one of pure phenomena, the other

of ends and values; but the distinction is one of standpoint for purposes of description and explanation. Cf. ORIGIN versus NATURE.

The term norm is closely related to the terms criterion and standard. Criterion applies, however, more definitely to the process of judgment; it is the rule or mode of control as employed to assist judgment in making proper discriminations. A criterion of beauty is the principle employed in arriving at correct estimates or appreciations; a norm of beauty controls (or is supposed to control) the facts themselves in their own meaning. The criterion thus has a more subjective connotation. The standard is the principle used to measure value, and to lay off a scale of values. The standard of beauty is that type or form to which the facts conform in the degree in which the term beautiful is applicable to them. It differs from the norm in that the objectively regulating character of the norm is not necessarily ascribed to it. It agrees with the criterion in referring especially to the process of judgment or evaluation, but differs in that it takes some objective form as its adequate embodiment or manifestation. The criterion is the deciding principle in forming judgments; the standard is the principle which gives content to the adequate judgment. The norm which regulates the value of the facts may also, of course, be the standard by which their relative worths are measured, and the criterion by which the individual is guided in arriving at a correct apprehension of these worths. (J.D.)

Normal (in economics) [Lat. *normalis*, from *norma*, a rule]: Ger. *normal*; Fr. *normal*; Ital. *normale*. (1) In the broad sense, action which conforms to observed economic laws. 'The course of action which may be expected under certain conditions from the members of an industrial group is the normal action of the members of that group' (Marshall).

(2) In the narrower sense, a normal adjustment is one which represents conditions of economic EQUILIBRIUM (q.v.), e.g. normal price.

The term normal price was brought into prominence, if not actually introduced, by Cairnes. 'A normal price is reached when the product has so adjusted itself to the demands of consumers that the market price affords the current rate of profit to the producer, who enjoys no extraordinary advantage. We may contrast market and normal price by saying that a market price is one at which, for the

moment, the supply is equal to the demand; while a normal price is one at which, as long as the existing state of things continues, the production is likely to be equal to the consumption' (Hadley). Cf. SUPPLY AND DEMAND. (A.T.H.)

Normal (in law): Ger. *regelrecht*, *normal*; Fr. *normal*; Ital. *normale*. Pertaining to the ordinary individual. 'The rights of a child, a lunatic, or a corporation, are abnormal' (Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. ix. 119; xi. 144; xiv. 288).

Literature: for a discussion of the normal rules of human conduct see HEINECCIUS, *Elementa iuris Naturae et Gentium*, Lib. chap. i. § 4, and chaps. iii and iv. (S.E.B.)

Normal School: Ger. *Lehrerseminar*; Fr. *école normale*; Ital. *scuola normale*. An educational institution for the preparation of teachers, chiefly for elementary schools; a training college for teachers.

The work of well-equipped normal schools embraces three kinds of activity: (1) instruction in the theory of education as founded upon psychology, ethics, and sociology; (2) instruction in the subject-matter to be taught; (3) direct contact with the problems of teaching in a model or practice school. In thirty-two of the United States the normal school has become an integral part of the public school system.

Literature: see Reports of Normal School Section of the Nat. Educ. Assoc. in the 'Proceedings' from 1871 to the present; also art. on 'Normal Schools' in Johnson's *Univ. Cyc.*, revised ed. (C.D.E.G.)

Normal or Standard Stimulus: Ger. *Normalreiz*; Fr. *excitant normal*; Ital. *stimolo normale*. The stimulus taken as a standard in a series of experiments in which the stimulus is varied with reference to this standard. Cf. PSYCHOPHYSICAL MEASUREMENT METHODS. (J.M.B.)

Normative: see NORM.

Nota notae [Lat.]: The logical principle *Nota notae est nota rei ipsius*, that is, the predicate of the predicate is the predicate of the subject, which is laid down in several places by Aristotle as the general principle of syllogism. The principal passages are as follows:—

'When one thing is predicated of another as its subject, whatever is said of the predicate can also be said of the subject' (*Categ.*, iii. 1 b 10).

'Whatever is said of the predicate will hold also of the subject' (*Categ.*, v. 3 b 4).

'We say that something is predicated universally when nothing can be admitted as coming under the subject of which the predicate will not hold; and the same thing holds of negation' (1 *Anal. pr.*, i. 24 b 28). The term *nota notae* is from the first words of the original of this passage.

'Of whatever the species is predicated, the genus is predicable' (*Topics*, Δ. i. 121 a 25).

Some writers (as Hamilton, *Lects. on Logic*, App. VI. ii) imagine a distinction between the *nota notae* and the *dictum de omni*. Some have been so extravagant as to attribute the former to Kant, in whose *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit* (1762, ii) it is very likely that the precise phrase '*nota notae est nota rei ipsius*' first occurs, though similar phrases, such as '*cui conveniunt notae eidem quoque convenit nomen*,' are common in Wolf's and other logics of the 18th century. But it is clear that in Aristotle's mind it was one principle, essentially that which De Morgan well called the principle of the 'transitivity of the copula.'

Aristotle, in the last but one of the above passages, seems to regard the *nota notae* as following from the definition of universal predication. To say that 'Any *S* is *P*' is to say that of whatever *S* is true, *P* is true. This amounts to deriving the transitivity of the copula from the transitivity of illation. If from *A* follows *B* and from *B* follows *C*, then from *A* follows *C*. This, again, is equivalent to the principle that to say that from the truth of *X* follows the truth of the consequence that from *Y* follows *Z*, is the same as to say that from the joint truth of *X* and *Y* follows *Z*. (C.S.P.)

Note [Lat. *nota*, a mark, a sign]: Ger. (1) *Klang*, (2) *Note*, *Tonzeichen*; Fr. (1) *son*, (2) *note*; Ital. *nota*, *suono*. (1) A 'musical' or COMPOUND TONE (q.v.), as specifically determined in a musical scale. Cf. CLANG.

(2) The written or printed symbol of the musical tone. (E.B.T.—J.M.B.)

Note-blindness: Ger. *Notenblindheit*; Fr. *cécité musicale* (or *notale*); Ital. *cecità musicale*. An infrequent symptom in disorders of the aphasic type, in which there is a loss of the power to read musical notes; it is thus, in the realm of music, the analogue of ALEXIA (q.v.). Cf. AMUSIA, and SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J.)

Nothing (Hegel's *Nichts*): see HEGEL'S TERMINOLOGY, sub verbo. Cf. also NON-BEING.

Notion: Ger. *Begriff* (concept), *Gedanke*