

the universe of a specified general description; as 'Some dragons breathe fire.' If we hold that the particular proposition asserts the existence of something, then the precise denial of it does not assert the existence of anything; as 'No dragon breathing fire exists.' It is, therefore, not true that from such precise denial any particular proposition follows, such as 'Some dragon does not breathe fire.' For if there is no dragon that does not breathe fire, this is false, although it may be true that there is no dragon that breathes fire. (C.S.P., C.L.F.)

This rule is not, of course, intended to apply to relative logic, in which there is frequently occasion to make a change from one copula to another—a change which is not contemplated in the ordinary logic. For instance, of the two propositions, 'Some woman is adored by every Catholic,' 'Every Catholic adores some woman,' the second follows from the first; to decide whether the first follows from the second or not, some further explicit convention as to the existence of terms which enter the proposition not as simple subject or predicate is necessary. (C.L.F.)

For instance, from the particular proposition, 'Some woman is adored by all Catholics,' it follows that 'Any Catholic that may exist adores a woman,' i.e. 'There is no Catholic that does not adore a woman,' which is the precise denial of 'Some Catholic non-adores all women,' which is a particular proposition. From this, in turn, it follows that a woman adored by all Catholics does not exist, which is the precise denial of the first proposition, 'Some woman is adored by all Catholics.' Of every particular proposition the same thing is true. Thus, if 'Some crow is white,' it follows that 'No inevitable consequence of whiteness is wanting to all crows,' which is the precise denial of the particular proposition, 'Some inevitable consequence of whiteness is wanting to all crows.' Thus, from every particular proposition follows the precise denial of a particular proposition, but from no precise denial of a particular proposition can any particular proposition follow. But this does not extend to a *simple* particular proposition, such as 'Something is white,' since to say 'Something is non-existent' (which the analogous treatment would yield) is an absurdity, and ought not to be considered as a proposition at all. (C.S.P., C.L.F.)

**Particulate** [Lat. *particulatim*, bit by bit. *Particularis* appears in Apuleius. *Particulatio* is used by Martianus Capella to

mean breaking up into bits. *Particulare* and *particulate* are met with, not very often, in Albertus Magnus and others, to mean to *particularize*, *particularized*, whether in words or metaphysically of an essence]: (not in use in other languages). Particulate is used by recent writers chiefly in the sense of consisting of, or concerned with, particles. They appear to know nothing of the traditions of the word, but to have formed this adjective from *particle*, since *particular* bears a different meaning. (C.S.P.)

**Party** (in law) [Lat. *pars*, a part]: Ger. *Partei*; Fr. *partie*; Ital. *partito*. (1) A person directly concerned in a lawsuit, either as a plaintiff or a defendant.

(2) A person concerned in any legal transaction, e.g. a *party to a contract*, a party to a question in dispute. *Act of party*, a voluntary act, as distinguished from 'act of law.' Land is conveyed by act of party, inherited by act of law. *Party to the record*, a party to a lawsuit named as such in the written process or pleadings; *party in interest*, one not so named, but who has a beneficial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. (S.E.B.)

**Parva Logicalia** [Lat.]. In scholastic logic the departments of that science go by the names of books. Thus, the *logica vetus* embraces what is treated in the 'predicables,' or introduction, of Porphyry, in Aristotle's *Categories*, and in the *Peri hermeneias*; the *logica nova* treats of the remaining subjects of the *Organon*; and finally the *parva logicalia* is the name at once of certain tractates and of the subjects treated in them—to wit, suppositio, relativa, ampliatio, restrictio, appellatio, distributio, exceptivae, reduplicativae, incipit et desinit, alienatio, exponibilia, consequentiae, syncategoremata, insolubilia, copulata, positio propositionum in esse, status, decensus et ascensus, obligationes, &c. (C.S.P.)

**Pascal, Blaise**. (1623-62.) Born at Clermont in Auvergne, and carefully educated in Paris, he very early developed remarkable abilities as a mathematician. About 1644, he came under the influence of the Jansenists of Port Royal. His attention was fixed chiefly on religion, morals, and philosophy for the remainder of his life.

**Passion and Passive** [Lat. *passio*, the trans. of Gr. *πάθος*, from *πάσχειν*, to suffer]: Ger. *Passivität* (*leidend*, *passiv*); Fr. *passion* (*passif*); Ital. *passività* (*passivo*). Generally passion is the condition of being acted upon, of being affected, receptive; opposed to action. Passive is the corresponding adject-