

Persecution (illusions of; mania of) [Lat. *persecutio*, a following after, pursuit]: Ger. *Verfolgungsvorstellungen*, *Verfolgungswahnsinn*; Fr. *manie de la persécution*, *idées délirantes de persécution*; Ital. *delirio* (or *idee morbosa*) *di persecuzione*. In the realm of morbid DELUSIONS (q.v.) a most frequent and persistent form is that which ascribes the patient's abnormal sensations, pains, distress, and mental troubles to the mischievous plotting and persecutions of some one or more persons or agencies.

This so often constitutes the salient mark of the mental malady, that it has received this special name, and in typical cases it is characterized by definite symptoms and stages of development. The condition often begins with hallucinations of hearing, by which are brought to the patient all manner of threats and secret messages. At first these may be resisted, but later they come to dominate the entire life and thoughts of the patient. He is suspicious of every approach, discovers hidden allusions in all that is said or done; believes that a certain person or persons are plotting his destruction, are tormenting him with denunciations or maledictions, and so on. His energies are devoted to devising ingenious ways to avoid and thwart his persecutors. Cf. MONOMANIA. (J.J.)

Perseity (1) and (2) **Per se** [Lat. *perseitas*, *per se*, through itself]: Ger. *Perseität*; Fr. *perséité*; Ital. *perseità*. (1) Literally, the conception of self-included existence, but in its technical use the term applied to the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of good to the divine will. Cf. ST. THOMAS (philosophy of).

The Scotists held that good was the arbitrary creation of the divine will, in itself superior to it; the Thomists held that will in its adequate expression is essentially moved by the concept of the good as presented in reason, and that this relationship of reason and will holds in the divine nature as well as in the human. The *perseitas boni* is the essential rationality of the good. See Windelband, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.*, Eng. trans., 332. (J.D.)

Scotus says there are two kinds of 'perseity,' that of a demonstration and that of a predicate which belongs immediately to its subject.

(2) *Per se* translates καθ' αὐτό, καθ' αὐτόν, &c. Similar phrases occur in ordinary Greek. Plato, for example, in the *Theaetetus*, speaks of ἐπιστήμη ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὃ τι ποτ' ἔχει ἢ ψυχῇ, ὅταν αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν παρατεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. But in Aristotle

it first becomes a term of art (see Bonitz under ἐαυτοῦ). He enumerates four or five different meanings of it, from which we are led to infer that he did not himself invent it. Two such passages are *Met.*, Δ. xviii. 2, and *Anal. Post.*, iv. There are others, but they are less clear. *Per se* cannot very well be understood without some understanding of the phrase *secundum quid* (καθό). Aristotle says:—

'*Secundum quid* is said in several senses. In one sense it is the species (εἶδος) and essence of anything; thus, that *secundum quid* a man is good is itself good. Another sense is in what anything first comes into existence, as colour in a surface. In the first sense the *secundum quid* is the form (εἶδος); in the second it is the matter and first subject of anything. And, generally speaking, *secundum quid* refers to a cause. "*Secundum quid* comes a man" is "on what account comes he?"; and "*secundum quid* does he paralogize," or "does he syllogize," is "what is the cause of the paralogism" or "the syllogism?" Furthermore, *secundum quid* is said in reference to position in space; as "*secundum quid* stands he," or "*secundum quid* is he walking." In such phrases it denotes position and place.

'Consequently, *per se* is necessarily said in different senses. In one sense, *per se* refers to the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of anything; as, "Callias is *per se* Callias," that is, the very essence of Callias. It also refers to whatever is involved in the definition of anything (ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἔστιν ἰσχύει), as "Callias is *per se* an animal"; that is, that he is an animal is implied in the word, or animal is what Callias is. The phrase is further applied in case anything in its origin assumes any character in itself or in what belongs to it (εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ δέδεκται πρότερον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινῶν); thus white is *per se* a surface, and man is *per se* alive, since the soul, which is part of man, receives life in its very origin. Further, that is *per se* which has nothing else as its cause. Thus there are many causes of man, such as being an animal, being biped, &c.; yet still man is *per se* man. Further, whatever belongs to one thing alone, and in so far as it is alone, is *per se*; so that what is abstract (κεχωρισμένον) is *per se*.'

These five senses are, then, (1) that a substance exists *per se* and not *per accidens*; (2) that an analytical proposition is true *per se*, or formally, and not as matter of fact; (3) that any character which a thing necessarily assumes by virtue of existing, belongs to it *per se*, and not *secundum quid*; (4) that which a thing

causes of itself it does *per se*, and not *per aliud*; and (5) that which any abstraction, *quod* that which it is, is, does, or suffers, is *per se* and not *secundum quid*.

The second of the above senses is called *per se primo modo*; the third is called *per se secundo modo*; but a different explanation from the above is often given. In reliance particularly on a passage in Aristotle's *Met.*, Z. v, it is said that a predication is *per se secundo modo* where the definition of the predicate contains the subject.

Another important expression is 'known *per se*.' A proposition is known *per se* if, and only if, it is cognoscible from its own terms but not cognoscible in any other way. For instance, that the letters on this page are black is not known *per se*, because it may be proved by testimony. Nor, on the other hand, is the doctrine of the Trinity *per se*, though it cannot be proved; for it is not self-evident. It has to be received on faith. But there was a great controversy between the Thomists on the one hand and the Scotists with the Nominalists on the other, as to whether, in the above definition, the word 'terms' was to be taken *objective* or *formaliter*. See the Conimbricenses in I. *Anal. Post.*, iii. (C.S.P.)

Perseverance (of the Saints) [Lat. *per + severus*, strict]: Ger. *Beharrlichkeit*; Fr. *persévérance*; Ital. *perseveranza*. A doctrine of the Calvinistic creeds, thus stated in the Westminster Confession: 'They whom God hath accepted in the beloved, effectually called and sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end and be eternally saved.'

The doctrine of perseverance is founded partly on predestination and the decrees and partly on the nature of regeneration as the birth of a new spiritual nature. It is argued that the decree cannot be thwarted and that the work of regeneration is too radical to be undone. The doctrine is rejected by Arminians, who condition continuance in the new life on the free choice of the will. Man may be truly converted, they argue, and then fall away and become finally reprobate. Calvinists admit the possibility of temporary lapses, but contend that it is never final where conversion has been real and genuine. See CALVINISM.

Literature: HOOKER, The Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect; CALVIN, Institutes; works of JOHN WESLEY and CHARLES HODGE. (A.T.O.)

Persia (religion in ancient): see ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Persia).

Persistence (in physics): see CONSERVATION OF ENERGY.

Persistence (of the external world): see BELIEF, and cf. PERMANENCE, and INERTIA.

Person and Personality [Lat. *persona*]: Ger. *Person, Persönlichkeit, Personalität*; Fr. *personne, personnalité*; Ital. *persona, personalità*. An individual—and individuality—considered as having the higher reflective, intellectual and moral, attributes of man.

The idea of personality, in its ethical significance, has been influential in modern ethics, especially of the idealistic and intuitional types. Its origin is partly Christian, partly Roman. The latter conception of personality was essentially legal; and it is in this sense that Hegel uses the term to express the most abstract and external view of morality, the person being the subject of rights. The Christian idea of the absolute moral worth of personality is central in the ethics of Kant, for whom man as a rational being is an end-in-himself and a law unto himself. It is also the standpoint of the Neo-Hegelian ethics of self-realization. For the Scottish school the moral life is essentially personal. (J.S.—J.M.B.)

The term is an objective one, correlative with the psychological or subjective meanings given to PERSONAL IDENTITY and REFLECTION (see those terms). That is, 'consciousness of personal identity' is a way of expressing, from the subjective standpoint, the fact of objective personality; though the best usage would seem to restrict the subjective side of personality to the higher stages of personal consciousness which carry the social distinction between the 'self' and the 'not-self.' The term 'personal' is used both strictly as an adjective of person in the above sense (it is so recommended) and also to mean private to oneself.

Literature: see under SELF, PERSONAL IDENTITY, and INDIVIDUAL. (J.M.B.—G.F.S.)

Person (in law). A being of any sort having rights and duties under the law; the legal subject, of which rights and duties are attributes (Pollock, *Jurisprudence*, chap. v. 108).

Such a human being is a *natural person*. *Artificial, conventional, moral, juristic, or juristical persons* 'are such groups of human beings or masses of property as are in the eye of the law capable of rights and liabilities' (Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. viii. 84; Markby, *Elements of Law*, § 138). The person entitled