

terms cited below; Fr. *perspicuité*; Ital. *perspicuità*. Perspicuity is said to be an adjunct of truth variously defined. A perspicuous concept is defined by Burgersdicius as one which represents its objects clearly, distinctly, and fully (*Inst. of Met.*, I. xix. 2). Kant, in the *Logik* by Jäsche (Intro., viii), after remarking that aesthetic distinctness (*Deutlichkeit*) often causes objective, or logical, obscurity, and vice versa (as if he had been reading Mill's *Logic* or *Liberty*!), defines perspicuity (*Helligkeit*) as the union of objective and subjective distinctness. Hamilton (*Lects. on Logic*, xxiv) defines a perspicuous definition as one 'couched in terms intelligible, and not figurative, but proper and compendious.' (C.S.P.)

Pertinent [Lat. *pertinere*, to reach to, pertain, be pertinent]: Ger. *zur Sache gehörig*; Fr. *pertinent*; Ital. *convenevole*. In the doctrine of *obligationes*, in logic, pertinent is applied to a proposition whose truth or falsity would necessarily follow from the truth of the proposition to which it was said to be pertinent, and also of a term either necessarily true or necessarily false of another term to which it was said to be pertinent (cf. the *Cent. Dict.*). (C.S.P.)

Perturbation [Lat. *perturbatio*, confusion]: Ger. *Verwirrtheit*; Fr. *perturbation*, *trouble*; Ital. *perturbazione*. Mental perturbation is a condition of disquiet or hesitancy; a restlessness or absence of mental tranquillity. As such it is a normal mental experience, but in extreme degrees, or when of protracted duration, it is characteristic of abnormal conditions. (J.J.)

Perversion [Lat. *perversio*, a turning about]: Ger. *Perversion*; Fr. *perversion*; Ital. *pervertimento*, *perversione* (ethical). A degeneration or morbid alteration of the instincts, feelings, habits, or modes of thought.

These occur in many forms of insanity and in individuals of morbid, neurotic heredity. Perversions of taste, perversions of the sense of pain, a perverted moral sense have been noted in hysteria, in mania, in idiocy, &c. (Cf. these terms, and also especially MORAL INSANITY, and DEGENERATION.) Sexual perversions have been extensively studied, and are in most cases regarded as symptomatic of nervous or mental disorder; a special case is inversion or homosexuality—sexual instinct directed towards persons of the same sex.

Literature: HAVELOCK ELLIS, *Studies in the Psychol. of Sex*, i; *Sexual Inversion* (1897);

KRAFFT-EBING, *Psychopathia Sexualis*; MOLL, *Conträre Sexualempfindung* (1891). (J.J.)

Pessimism: see OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM, and cf. MELIORISM.

Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich. (1746–1827.) Educated in theology and law, his health failed and he devoted himself for some time to farming. Established a school for poor peasant children (1775); failed (1780). Devoted himself to literature for eighteen years. Took charge of an orphan asylum in Stanz (1798–99). Assisted in opening a school in Burgdorf Castle (1799). Elected member of deputation sent by the Swiss to Paris (1802). In 1804 he removed his school to Münchenbuchsee. He removed to the Yverdon Institute the same year. Retired to Neuhof, his earlier farm (1825). He is called the founder of modern pedagogy.

Petitio Principii [Lat. This is a not very good translation of Aristotle's phrase τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (or ἐν ἀρχῇ) αἰεῖσθαι, to beg what was proposed in the beginning]. It is a FALLACY (q.v.) of a relatively high order, inasmuch as it cannot exist unless the conclusion truly follows from the premises. To accuse a man of begging the question is in reality a plea which virtually admits that his reasoning is good. Its only fault is that it assumes as a premise what no intelligent man who doubted the conclusion could know to be true.

A very necessary, though not always sufficient, precaution against this fallacy is to ask oneself whether the reasoning rests upon any observations, or inductions from observations, or even trustworthy hypothetic inferences from observations, which really involve the conclusion, relating to those matters of experience in reference to which the conclusion is important; and if relating to those things, whether in such a way and so closely that that conclusion really can have been implicitly asserted in those premises. For example, to take an illustration partly fanciful, a man proposes to prove the reality or possibility of clairvoyance to me by proving to me that the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles. If, he says, you can sit in your study and know that this is true in the most distant parts of the universe, why may not an exceptionally gifted person know many facts about what happens only a hundred miles away? Upon that, I ask myself whether geometry rests upon any observations concerning clairvoyance or anything like clairvoyance. Nay, the consequence which my arguer has pointed out seems so cogent, and

yet the line of reasoning so inadmissible, that I go up to the garret to exhume my old Euclid or Legendre, to see how it is proved that sitting in my study I can know what the angles of the triangle whose vertices are at Sirius, Arcturus, and Fomalhaut, may sum up to. I find it is done by assuming that certain propositions about space are self-evident. Now, this may be safe enough so far as that sort of reasoning has been millions of times verified. But nothing of the sort has been, or can be, verified exactly; and for such monstrous triangles a divergence from exactitude in the formula may be large, although for terrestrial triangles it be too minute for detection. In short, I am led to see that there must be a *petitio principii* in any argument which, resting merely on common sense, concludes the exact truth of any matter of fact. (C.S.P., C.L.F.)

Petrus Hispanus (Peter of Spain). (1226-77.) A scholastic logician who became Pope John XXI.

Phacoscope: see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, III, B, (1).

Phantasm [Gr. φάντασμα, an appearance]: Ger. *Phantasma*; Fr. (2) *fantôme*; Ital. (2) *fantasma*. (1) Used formerly (as equivalent to the Greek φάντασμα) to mean mental pictures or revived images of all sorts. (J.M.B.)

(2) Applied to hallucinations of forms or spectres, whether occurring under normal or quasi-abnormal conditions; apparitions.

The appearances provoked by a dose of opium or hashish, the phenomena of dream-life, the forms conjured up by the excited imagination of religious devotees, the spasmodic or habitual externalizations of the visualizing faculty, may all be spoken of as phantasms. In the literature of the Society for PSYCHICAL RESEARCH (q.v.) the term has received a more specialized meaning, and 'phantasms of the living' is applied to the apparition to a friend or relative of persons still living but approaching death, and as if premonitory of such death. The term phantasmagoria was applied to the raising or recalling of the spirits of the dead, as formerly practised, or as imitated by natural agencies; or again to any series of illusory figures, as those occurring in dreams or hallucinations. (J.J.)

Phariseeism [Gr. Φαρισαῖος, Pharisee; Heb. *parush*, separated]: Ger. *Pharisäertum*; Fr. *pharisaïsme*; Ital. *fariseismo*. Self-righteousness in religious profession combined with over-scrupulousness in the observance of forms. Historically, the principles of the Jewish sect

of Pharisees, who in religion united orthodoxy with belief in the authority of oral traditions, and in politics were opposed to foreign dominance and ideas.

The Pharisees first appeared as a party of that name in the reign of John Hyrcanus, 135-105 B.C. From the beginning they represented national exclusiveness and opposition to foreign and especially Greek influences. They were orthodox believers, in opposition to the free-thinking Sadducees. They were the educated class and the intellectual and moral leaders of their time, and, in spite of their shortcomings, stood distinctively for the best elements in Judaism.

Literature: WELLHAUSEN, *Die Pharisaei und d. Sadusaei* (1874); *Encyc. Brit., arts. Israel and Messiah.* (A.T.O.)

Phase [Gr. φάσις, from φαίνω, to make to appear, to make visible]: Ger. *Phase*; Fr. *phase*; Ital. *fase*. One of a series of definite forms, or modes of appearance, or specific characters which one and the same subject-matter presents either successively, or from different points of view.

It is often used as synonymous with aspect, but strictly speaking is differentiated by referring to successive, instead of simultaneous, modes of manifestation. It also involves a shade less reference to the subject or percipient, 'aspect' indicating a certain distinction introduced by the way the subject looks at the matter. (J.D.)

Phenomenalism [Gr. φαίνεσθαι, to appear]: Ger. *Phänomenalismus*; Fr. *phénoménisme*; Ital. *fenomenismo*. (1) The theory that all knowledge is limited to phenomena (things and events in time and space), and that we cannot penetrate to reality in itself. Cf. PHENOMENON, EMPIRICISM, AGNOSTICISM, and POSITIVISM.

(2) The theory that all we know is a phenomenon, that is, reality present to consciousness, either directly or reflectively; and that phenomena are all that there are to know, there being no thing-in-itself or object out of relation to consciousness.

This latter is the philosophy held by Shadworth Hodgson. Cf. also IMMANENCE PHILOSOPHY (q.v.). It is obvious that the two senses differ radically from each other, the first having its point in the assertion of a real but unknown thing-in-itself; the latter in its denial. (J.D.)

Phenomenology [Gr. φαινόμενον, that which appears, + λόγος, doctrine, theory]: Ger. *Phänomenologie*; Fr. *phénoménologie*; Ital.