

determination by pure practical reason, the basis of his ethics: this he calls its freedom. 'The critique of practical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically conditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground of determination of the will' (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Introd.). (J.S.)

Practical Religion: Ger. *praktische Religion*; Fr. *religion pratique*; Ital. *religione pratica*. That department of PRACTICAL THEOLOGY (q. v.) which has for its aim the upbuilding of the religious life in the community and the individual. Practical religion embodies itself in practical activities and in writings adapted to the religious needs of the time. (A.T.O.)

Practical Theology: Ger. *praktische Theologie*; Fr. *théologie pratique*; Ital. *teologia pratica*. That department of theology which treats of the corporate life of the Church, in its functions of government, edification, and worship.

Since Schleiermacher, who raised this discipline to its true dignity, practical theology has held a place co-ordinate with the exegetical, historical, and systematical branches. Of the three modes in which organic Christian life expresses itself—creed, code, and cult—practical theology in the broad sense would embrace the two latter. It includes homiletics as one of its departments, though the latter term is sometimes used as its equivalent, covering the subject of catechetics, liturgics, and polity.

Literature: NITSCH, *Prakt. Theol.*; BICKERSTETH, *Christian Student's Biblical Assistant*. (A.T.O.)

Practice (or Praxis) (in ethics) [Gr. *πρᾶξις*]: Ger. *Praxis*; Fr. *pratique*; Ital. *condotta*, (*la*) *praxis*. Conduct, or moral activity, as distinguished from the strictly intellectual life.

Aristotle distinguishes practice (*πρᾶξις*) from (1) theory or science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and (2) production (*τέχνη*). Unlike the former, it implies the presence of irrational desire, and consists in the regulation of the latter by reason; unlike the latter, it is its own end, and produces nothing beyond itself, i. e. it is AUTOTELIC (q. v.). (J.S.)

Practice (in psychology): Ger. *Übung*; Fr. *pratique*; Ital. *pratica*. (1) Any sort of activity considered as preparing for (see PREPARATION), habituating (see HABITUATION), or exercising in (see EXERCISE) the function or functions brought into play.

Practice applies to mind or body and covers the three special cases distinguished

in the definition, for each of which foreign equivalents are given sub verbis.

(2) Used for repetition in general, together with its effects, in REACTION TIME (q. v.) experimentation. Cf. Wundt, *Physiol. Psychol.* (4th ed.), i. 356.

Literature: that of FATIGUE (e. g. HENRI, *Année Psychol.*, iii), and of REACTION TIME (e. g. ANGELL and MOORE, *Psychol. Rev.*, iii. 1896, 245; BUCCOLA, *Legge del tempo*, 1883, chap. vi). See also PLAY (especially the 'practice theory' as developed by GROOS, *Play of Animals*, Eng. trans.). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Practice Theory (of play): see PLAY.

Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism [Gr. *πραγματικός*, versed in affairs]: Ger. *pragmatisch*, *Pragmatismus*; Fr. *pragmatique*, *pragmatisme*; Ital. *prammatico*, *prammatismo*. (1) This term is applied by Kant to the species of hypothetical imperative which he otherwise denominates 'counsel of prudence,' and characterizes as 'assertorial,' those, namely, which prescribe the means necessary to the attainment of happiness, an end which we may postulate for all sentient beings (*Grundlegung z. Met. d. Sitten*, ed. Rosenkranz, 42; Eng. trans., Abbott, 34). (J.S.)

Pragmatic anthropology, according to Kant, is practical ethics.

Pragmatic horizon is the adaptation of our general knowledge to influencing our morals.

(2) The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: 'Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.' (C.S.P.)

The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions. (W.J.)

This maxim was first proposed by C. S. Peirce in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January, 1878 (xii. 287); and he explained how it was to be applied to the doctrine of reality. The writer was led to the maxim by reflection upon Kant's *Critic of the Pure Reason*. Substantially the same way of dealing with ontology seems to have been practised by the Stoics. The writer subsequently saw that the principle might easily be misapplied, so as to sweep away the whole doctrine of incommensurables, and, in fact, the whole Weierstrassian way of regarding the calculus. In 1896 William James published his *Will to Believe*, and later his *Philos. Conceptions and Pract. Results*, which pushed this method to such extremes as must tend to give us pause. The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action—a stoical axiom which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought. Nevertheless, the maxim has approved itself to the writer, after many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively high grade of clearness of thought. He would venture to suggest that it should always be put into practice with conscientious thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. Indeed, in the article of 1878, above referred to, the writer practised better than he preached; for he applied the stoical maxim most unstoically, in such a sense as to insist upon the reality of the objects of general ideas in their generality.

A widely current opinion during the last quarter of a century has been that reasonableness is not a good in itself, but only for the sake of something else. Whether it be so or

not seems to be a synthetical question, not to be settled by an appeal to the principle of contradiction—as if a reason for reasonableness were absurd. Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmatism in the manner in which C. S. Peirce applied it, but includes that procedure as a step. (C.S.P.)

It is of course legitimate to demand a reason for reasonableness; to do so is only to ask why we think—a question to which a genetic answer would seem to be afforded by certain forms of pragmatism. We may say (cf. SELECTION, in psychology) that reasonableness, or truth, is due to practical adjustments, and that the system of truths is developed by the selection of concrete relationships which 'work.' But it is quite another thing to make this genetic account of the origin and selection of 'truth' a philosophy of reality. For just the general or universal meaning of the system as a whole, the purpose or function which the concrete items selected as 'workable' subserve, and the environment or real world in which the entire movement takes place—all these are by definition outside the sphere of operation of pragmatism. Pragmatism is really an attempt to construe all reality 'retrospectively'—as adequately given in the system of concrete practically derived truths—i.e. as empirical 'science'; and while nominalism may invoke it, it still remains to prove nominalism. Cf. what is said under ORIGIN *versus* NATURE. In the words of Peirce (comment on this article): 'Nominalism, up to that of Hegel, looks at reality retrospectively. What all modern philosophy does is to deny that there is any *esse in futuro*.' Urban (*Psychol. Rev.*, July, 1897) holds that while the concrete details of empirical knowledge may be due to 'utility selection'—as practical 'workables'—yet the structural principles of thought cannot be so accounted for. They have no application *as generals*, and so would

have to the pragmatist no adequate 'reason for being.'

The definition by W.J. above, however, seems, by including 'experiences to be expected,' to broaden the application of the principle.

Literature: besides the works of PEIRCE and JAMES, as cited, see CALDWELL, *Pragmatism*, in *Mind*, Oct., 1900; MILLER, *Philos. Rev.*, viii. (1899) 166; cf. CLIFFORD, *Lect. and Essays* (1886), 85 ff.; also the literature of SELECTIVE THINKING. (J.M.B.)

Praiseworthy: Ger. *preiswürdig*, *lobenswerth*; Fr. *méritoire*; Ital. *lodevole*. See APPROBATION, MERIT, and WORTH.

Prayer (rite of) [Lat. *precarius*, from *precari*, to beseech]: Ger. *Gebet*; Fr. *prière*; Ital. *preghiera*. The most characteristic form of worship, and consisting in spoken or unspoken petitions to the object of worship, and accompanied ordinarily with praise, confession, and thanksgiving. (A.T.O.)

Pre- and Post-millenarianism: see MILLENARIANISM. *Pre-millenarianism*: the belief that the second coming of Christ is to precede the millennial era, and that he is to reign in person on earth during that period.

Post-millenarianism: the belief that the second advent will occur at the close of the millennial period and be followed by the general resurrection and the last judgment.

Literature: see references under MILLENARIANISM. (A.T.O.)

Precise [Lat. *praecisus*, abridged through Fr.]: Ger. *präcis*; Fr. *précis*; Ital. *preciso*. (1) Having that element of accuracy which consists in strict curtailment of superfluity. A precise narrative is one from which subjective interpolations have been rigidly excluded. A precise definition is one from which inessential characters are excluded. The definition of a circumference as 'an untermimated line in a plane, everywhere at the same distance from a point within,' will be rendered precise by cutting off the word 'within.' In English the word is used more vaguely than in French.

(2) In physics it means having a very small error in consequence of the conscientious application of the most refined methods of measurement.

(3) In older writers the adjective is sometimes applied to a noun to signify that that noun is to be understood in its precise sense, without reference to accidental characters often associated with it. (C.S.P.)

Precision [Lat. *praecisio*, through Fr.]:

Ger. *Präcision*; Fr. *précision* (in all the senses of the English word; but in the technical logical sense it is obsolete in Fr.); Ital. *precisione*. (1) A high degree of approximation, only attainable by the thorough application of the most refined methods of science.

(2) Its earlier meaning, still more or less used by logicians, is derived from a meaning given to *praecisio* by Scotus and other scholastics: the act of supposing (whether with consciousness of fiction or not) something about one element of a percept, upon which the thought dwells, without paying any regard to other elements. Precision implies more than mere discrimination, which relates merely to the essence of a term. Thus I can, by an act of discrimination, separate colour from extension; but I cannot do so by *precision*, since I cannot suppose that in any possible universe colour (not colour-sensation, but colour as a quality of an object) exists without extension. So with *triangularity* and *trilaterality*. On the other hand, precision implies much less than dissociation, which, indeed, is not a term of logic, but of psychology. It is doubtful whether a person who is not devoid of the sense of sight can separate space from colour by dissociation, or, at any rate, not without great difficulty; but he can, and, indeed, does do so, by *precision*, if he thinks a vacuum is uncoloured. So it is, likewise, with space and tridimensionality.

Some writers called every description of abstraction by the name *precision*, dividing precision into the real and the mental, and the latter into the negative and the positive; but the better usage named these *abstraction*, divided into *real* and *intentional*, and the latter into *negative* (in which the character from which abstraction is made is imagined to be *deniable* of the subject prescinded) and into *precisive abstraction* or *precision*, where the subject prescinded is supposed (in some hypothetical state of things) without any supposition, whether affirmative or negative, in respect to the character abstracted. Hence, the *brocard*: *abstrahentium non est mendacium* (generally enunciated in connection with the *De Anima*, III. vii. 7). Scotus (in II. *Physic.*, *Expositio* 20 *textus* 18) says: 'Et si aliquis dicat, quod Mathematicis tunc faciunt mendacium: quia considerant ista, quasi essent abstracta a motu, et materia; quae tamen sunt coniuncta materiae. Respondet, quod non faciunt mendacium: quia Mathematicus non con-