

to pleasure or interest as the immediate, or individual, spring of action.

(4) Metaphysically, it is that which determines orders of fact or truth; which possesses superior and primary reality. While in the three previous senses the term principle has a regulative or normative sense, metaphysically this meaning is combined with the older sense of constitutive objective reality. The metaphysical principle includes the three notions of element, cause, and regulating law.

Greek philosophy began with the search after the principle in the literal sense: that original reality (*a*) from which other things are derived, and (*b*) out of which they consist. In the sense (*a*) it was implicitly or explicitly dynamic, a force, a causal power; in the sense (*b*) it was static, an element of subsistence. The first meaning led up to Aristotle's form (*εἶδος*) as a principle; the second to his matter (*ἕλη*). Modern thought, with its clearer distinction of subject and object, has tended to differentiate the notions of element, cause, force, and law, with the results stated above. The term 'first principles' is used technically to express primary intuitions, truths to which assent must be given without any further reason or ground. (J.D.)

Principle (in phrases): see AGREEMENT, DIVISION (in logic), Individuation under INDIVIDUAL, SUFFICIENT REASON, Döppler's principle under HEARING (Sound), various logical principles, as e.g. ECONOMY, and Homogeneity under SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

Priority (with **Prior** and **Prius**) [Lat. *prior*, earlier; *prius*, first]: Ger. *Priorität*; Fr. *priorité*; Ital. *priorità*. These words are used in about a dozen different senses in philosophy, although only five are specially recognized. They are enumerated in the mnemonic verses,

Tempore, Natura, prius Ordine, dic et Honore,

Effecto Causam dicimus esse prius.

(1) *Priority in time* is considered by Kant to be dependent upon the peculiar constitution of the internal sense (though he does not attempt any inquiry into the constitution further than that it places objects in time). Now, so far as effects in the outer world are due to forces, it seems to be proved that they follow the law of energy. In that case, though connection and continuity in time are important, yet the flow of time one way rather than in the reverse way is unmeaning. There is no effect that follows after its cause. Cf., however, CAUSE AND EFFECT, and see TIME. The law of energy

amounts to this, that the instantaneous accelerations of the motions of particles depend solely upon the relative positions of those particles at that same instant; and what follows after depends upon what now is, in the same way precisely, and is calculated by the same laws, as what went before depends upon what now is. Thus, in respect to the direction of its flow, time seems to be, if not purely a psychological affair, at any rate not purely a dynamical affair. Those physical phenomena which proceed in one direction and not in the reverse direction, and which seem to be well explained, such as the viscosity, diffusion, and conduction of gases, may all be explained by principles of probability.

From the point of view of causality exercised by our ideas and upon our ideas, the relations of *prius* and *posterius* present a different problem. Our wishes and endeavours cannot change the past in the least degree; and the future cannot affect our senses. The past affects the senses, and more and more strongly the nearer it is; our will can affect the future, and more and more strongly the nearer it is. The consequence is that the whole procedure of investigating the past and the future is different from the problem as regards real time.

This kind of priority is divided by the schoolmen into priority *quoad existentiam* and *quoad generationem* (that is, the older of two is the prior).

(2) In a meaning allied to temporal priority, Aristotle sometimes speaks of sense as *prior* to reason.

(3) That which is at an earlier stage of development is also called prior to that which is more matured; boyhood is said by Aristotle to be prior to manhood.

(4) So matter is prior to form; and potency to energy.

(5) The simple is prior to the complex; as a point to a line, a line to a surface, a surface to a solid.

(6) The rudimentary is prior to the recondite in order of exposition.

(7) In order of arrangement, the thing reached sooner is prior to that reached later.

(8) The relatively independent is prior to the relatively dependent, as substance to accident, and parts to whole.

(9) That caused thing which is nearer the cause, in any of the four senses of cause, is prior to that which is further from the cause.

(10) That is 'prior in illation' from which

the posterior follows as a rational consequence.

(11) The more general is prior to the more special.

(12) That which is more honourable or higher in rank or dignity is prior to that which is less so.

Prius natura, as practically used by Aristotle, seems often to convey no clear notion. But he certainly calls the *prius dignitate* and *prius causalitate* both *prius natura*. The usage of the Aristotelians is to call that *prius natura* which is prior in consecution or in causality. That is prior in consecution which is such that if something else is supposed it is supposed, but which being supposed something else is not thereby supposed. Thus, if two are supposed, one is supposed; but one being supposed, two is not thereby supposed. Hence, one is prior to two. *Prius causalitate* is either *prius natura generantis* or *prius natura intendente*. *Prius natura generantis* is the priority of the simple to the complex, as of the parts to the whole; *prius natura intendente* is the priority of the perfect to the imperfect, as of the whole to the parts. But this hardly seems to agree with Aristotle (646 a 25). *Prius nobis* (πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον) is what is prior in the order of learning, or more easily known. (C.S.P.)

Privacy: see PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.

Private [Lat. *privatus*, not public, from *privus*, single]: Ger. *privat* (the occasional use of *geheim* is significant of the early identification of *private* and family concerns); Fr. *privé, particulier*; Ital. *privato*. (1) Strictly pertaining to (a) a single individual (e. g. a private life), or (b) a group of individuals (e. g. a private company).

(2) A person who holds no public office or military commission is a private person, soldier, &c. Cf. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.

(F.H.G.—J.M.B.)

The conception of (1) private affairs, and (2) a private person, is extremely dim in tribal communities, and becomes quite distinct only in high civilizations. PUBLIC (q.v.) and private are fully differentiated only when civic organization has arisen. Distinction (2) antedates the oldest written decisions of English common law. 'Any private person (and a fortiori a peace officer) that is present when any felony is committed is bound by the law to arrest the felon, on pain of fine and imprisonment, if he escapes through the negligence of the standers by' (Blackstone, *Commentaries*, Bk. IV. chap. xxi). (F.H.G.)

Private Law [Lat. *ius privatum*]: Ger. *Privatrecht*; Fr. *droit privé*; Ital. *diritto privato*. That part of law which looks mainly to individual interests and relations, as distinguished from public law, which looks merely to public interests and relations.

The line of demarcation cannot be precisely drawn. In the pursuit of remedies provided by private law, the state is never an actor, unless for the protection of rights of individuals, or of rights of its own not directly flowing from its sovereign character. Proceedings of the class last mentioned are sometimes classed under the remedies of public law (see Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. xvi. 330; Pollock, *Jurisprudence*, chap. iv. 94). Private law comprehends the law of private property and obligations, including succession, the domestic relations, and, in a certain sense, civil procedure.

'Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat: privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem' (*Inst. of Just.*, i. 1, *de iustitia et iure*, 4). (S.E.B.)

Privation [Lat. *privatio*, trans. of Gr. *στέρησις*]: Ger. *Beraubung*; Fr. *privation*; Ital. *privazione*. The negation or absence of what is natural or customary, i. e. of habit.

Thus, blindness is privation of sight. See Aristotle's *Praedicamenta*, chap. x; also *Met.*, I (the book *περὶ μωρίας*), iv. 1055 b 2, and Δ. xxii. (C.S.P.)

Aristotle especially attributes privation to matter (*ὑλη*) conceived as if lacking form (*εἶδος*) (*Met.*, 1055 b 13). To the scholastics evil is the privation of good. Cf. Eisler, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe*, 'Beraubung,' 'Privation.'

The adjective form *privative* (Gr. *στερητικός*) denotes, as in *privative PROPOSITION* (q.v.), the presence of privation. (J.M.B.)

Privative: see PRIVATION.

Privilege (in law) [Lat. *privilegium*]: Ger. *Vorrecht, Privilegium*; Fr. *privilege*; Ital. *privilegio*. (1) A beneficial faculty or immunity conferred by a state upon one or more persons.

(2) As used by civilians, an implied hypothecation of a person's property, given by law to secure his obligations. See the French *Code Civil*, Liv. III. Tit. 18.

Breach of privilege: a violation of the privileges belonging to a legislative body or its members. Question of privilege: a question raised in such a body, touching its privileges or those of any of its members.

In ancient Rome a *privilegium* was a law specially directed against an individual,