

For logic considered as the art and science of drawing conclusions, and of testing the validity of purported conclusions drawn by others, there is no difference between the simple proposition 'Whatever is *a* is *b*' (1) and the compound proposition (i.e. the proposition about propositions) 'Whenever *a* is *b*, it-follows-that *c* is *d*,' or 'That *a* is *b* entails that *c* is *d*' (2). But for that ultimate analysis of the meaning of the proposition which properly comes within the domain of psychology or of epistemology, but which has usually been given over to the logician, there is a distinct difference between them. In the case of (1), the full import is that the universe is such that the assumed substratum for those affections of consciousness which we have summed up under *a* is coincident in time and space (that is, occupies the same point of space at the same instant of time) with the corresponding substratum of the sensation-congeries *b*. This is what is at the bottom of our affirmation that the objects *a* are identical with some of the objects *b*. But when we affirm in (2) identity of occurrence of *a* is *b* with some cases of occurrence of *c* is *d*, the mind makes (one knows not why) a far less complete fusion of *a* is *b* with *c* is *d* than it makes of *a* and *b* in *a* is *b*; thus *a* is *b* may be an occurrence in South Africa, and *c* is *d*, however invariably attendant upon it, may be an occurrence in China; all that is affirmed is sufficiency in the antecedence of the protasis for the occurrence of the apodosis. Thus in 'Whenever the bell rings, the curtain falls,' our whole system of interpretation of conscious experience imposes upon us a far closer fusion in the *bell* which *rings*, and in the *curtain* which *falls*, than in the compound event which is constituted by their conjoint occurrence. There is more frequently perhaps an interval of time permissible in the compound event than in the compound object, but that makes no difference in the distinction here insisted upon. There is a certain fixed, continuing substratum in the case of *a* which later comes to be *b*; and there fails to be any such bearer of the event *a* is *b*, which is followed by the event *c* is *d*. (C.L.F.)

The forms of words which embody existential judgments ('sea-serpents exist') and impersonal judgments ('it rains') have occasioned much discussion. The former is discussed under JUDGMENT, where the alternative theories are also stated. As to the impersonal, the view indicated under PRE-DICATION is very current and goes very well

with the theory of the existential. It makes the subject of the impersonal the entire sphere of reality (cf. UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE) within which the observed or indicated phenomena present themselves. Genetically (and linguistically), the impersonal is a very early form. The child says merely 'rain,' assuming the world of fact to which his and others' experience are common. Cf. INDEX (in exact logic).

Literature: see the authors cited; the literature under the topics referred to; the general treatises on LOGIC, and BIBLIOG. C, 1, *b*, and 2, *l*. (J.M.B., C.L.F.)

Prosody [Gr. *προσῳδία*, what accompanies the song]: Ger. *Prosodie*; Fr. *prosodie*; Ital. *prosodia*. The term prosody is used by the Greek grammarians in relation to all the marks, including accents, breathings, quantities, &c., which might be added to the letters in the writing of lines of verse. In modern use it applies solely to the recognition of rhythmical form in verse. This rhythm is dependent on the orderly recurrence of long syllables in quantitative verse, of stressed syllables in accentual verse. (B.I.W.)

Prospection (-ive) and Prospective Reference: see ORIGIN *versus* NATURE.

Prostration [Lat. *prostratio*, an overthrowing or subverting]: Ger. *Prostration*, *Er-schöpfung* (exhaustion); Fr. *prostration*; Ital. *prostrazione*. A serious and often sudden loss of strength; likewise a great depression; e.g. the mental and physical prostration sequent to the loss of a friend, to the shock of an accident, &c. Cf. SHOCK.

The term 'nervous prostration' indicates the feebleness and depression characteristic of NEURASTHENIA (q.v.). (J.J.)

Prosylogism [for deriv. see SYLLOGISM]: Ger. *Prosylogismus*, *Vorschluss*; Fr. *prosylogisme*; Ital. *prosillogismo*. A syllogism whose conclusion is a premise of another. See CHAIN SYLLOGISM, and EPISYLLOGISM. (C.S.P.)

Protagoras. (480 cir.—411 B.C.) Studied under Democritus. Lived and taught in Athens. He was the first who taught philosophy and rhetoric for money, and the first to call himself a Sophist.

Protanopia [Gr. *πρῶτος*, first, + *ἀν* + *ᾠραμαι*, fut. *ᾠσομαι*, I see]: Ger. *Protanopie*; Fr. *protanopie* (suggested); Ital. *protanopia* (suggested). The name proposed by v. Kries for what was formerly called red-blindness.

It is now known (especially by means of the monocular cases) that partial COLOUR-BLINDNESS (q.v.) or dichromasy, with a few exceptional