

Literature: E. B. WILSON, *The Cell* (2nd ed.); O. HERTWIG, *Die Zelle*; HENNEGUY, *La Cellule*; DELAGE, *L'Hérédité*. See also under LIVING MATTER. (C.S.M.)

Prototype: see TYPE AND TYPOLOGY (in religious philosophy).

Protozoon [Gr. *πρῶτος*, first, + *ζῷον*, animal]: Ger. *Protozoon*, *einzelliges Tier*; Fr. *protozoaire*; Ital. *protozoo*. An animal constituted by a single cell, or a group of similar cells. The cells may be multinucleated, and the body of the cell may be very considerably differentiated. Cf. AMOEBA, AGAMOGENESIS, and CONJUGATION.

Literature: O. BÜTSCHLI, *Protozoa*, in Bronn's *Thierreich* (1880-2); E. R. LANKESTER, art. *Protozoa*, in *Encyc. Brit.* (9th ed.); A. SEDGWICK, *Textbook of Zool.* (1898); Y. DELAGE and HÉROUARD, *Zool. Concrète*, i (1896); CALKINS, *The Protozoa* (1901). (C.S.M.—E.S.G.)

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. (1809-65.) Political writer and sociologist. Born and partly educated in a village near Besançon, he was forced, by lack of means, to become a type-setter. In 1837 he won admission to the Paris Academy, and the Academy of Besançon awarded him a three-year stipend of 1,500 francs annually. In 1849 he was committed to three years' imprisonment for attacking the president of the Republic. His literary activity continued unabated, and in 1858 he was again committed for three years. He escaped to Brussels, returning to Paris in 1860, after the general amnesty, where he died.

Prove: see PROOF.

Providence [Lat. *providentia*, from *providere*, to foresee]: Ger. *Vorsehung*; Fr. *providence*; Ital. *provvidenza*. The preordaining and regulative agency of God in the world as distinguished from his creative and sustaining activities.

Providence is an essential feature of the notion of the divine government, and implies not only power, but conscious care and solicitude. It presupposes a divine plan and provision, and involves personal attributes in the deity. In Christian belief a distinction is recognized between God's general providence and the special providence which has regard to the 'fall of a sparrow.' The Stoics recognized providence in a general sense, but denied special providence, which seemed to them to conflict with universal causation. (A.T.O.)

Provisional [Lat. *pro* + *videre*, to see]: Ger. *vorläufig*; Fr. *provisoire*; Ital. *provvisoriale*. Temporarily adopted: applied most

appropriately to any ratio resulting from inductive inquiry; for the value obtained will presumably be increased or diminished on further investigation. (C.S.P.)

Proximate [Lat. past participle of *proximare*, to approach, but it is used to translate *proximus*, next. The word occurs in Glanvil's *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, but in no English treatise on logic before Watts]. In philosophy, synonymous with IMMEDIATE (q.v., also for foreign equivalents), though not so strong.

Proximate cause and effect: an obscure term, like most of the terms of Aristotelianism, which acquired some practical importance owing to the courts holding that a man was responsible for the proximate effects of his actions, not for their remote effects. This ought to determine what should be meant by *proximate cause and effect*; namely, that that which a man ought to have foreseen might result from his action is its *proximate effect*. The idea of making the payment of considerable damages dependent upon a term of Aristotelian logic or metaphysics is most shocking to any student of those subjects, and well illustrates the value of PRAGMATISM (q.v.). Burgersdicius, who is one of the clearest of the Aristotelians, says: '*Proximate cause* is taken in two senses, to wit, *in suo genere* and absolutely. An absolutely proximate cause is one which constitutes its effect, not merely immediately, but by its mere existence; so that, if it exists, its effect (*causatum*, for Burgersdicius is not limiting his remarks to efficient causes) necessarily exists. The proximate cause *in suo genere* is that which immediately constitutes its effect, that is to say, without the intervention of anything else of the same order concurring to produce the effect.' Interpreting this in the light of pragmatism, the man should be held responsible for what might naturally be expected, or feared, as the result of his action; but not for effects depending upon subsequent occurrences which he could not anticipate. Burgersdicius continues: 'One thing may have many causes, proximate *in suo genere*, but only one absolutely proximate. . . . So the proximate material cause of man is his body; the efficient, his father; the formal, his rational soul; the final, *bene esse*.'

Proximate knowledge is direct knowledge of a thing, not knowledge through something else. Better called *direct knowledge*.

Proximate matter is matter in a state in which it is prepared for the reception of a

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form. The proximate matter of a syllogism consists in its propositions, as distinct from the remote matter, which consists in the terms.

Proximate object of a directive (as we now say, normative) science is a certain one of the objects of practice, as distinguished from the object of doctrine. In speculative sciences there is only one object, the object of doctrine. In practical sciences there is besides an object of practice, which is that upon which it is designed to produce an effect. In a normative science, such as logic, there are two objects of practice—the *proximate*, which is the operation or action which is regulated, such as reasoning, and the *remote*, which is that in which that action takes place, such as a mind or a science conducted by many minds.

Proximate witness, testimony. There is hardly any such thing in English law. It is the witness who testifies, not to his own experience, but to facts which he knows by the immediate testimony of others. (C.S.P.)

Proximate (or Second) Cause: see CREATION.

Prudence [Lat. *prudentia*]: Ger. *Klugheit*; Fr. *prudence*; Ital. *prudenza*. Foresight or prevision of the consequences of our actions, and the guidance of conduct by such foresight.

This was regarded by Socrates as the indispensable condition and the absolute guarantee of virtue: 'virtue is knowledge.' It was also emphasized by certain members of the Cyrenaic school, and by the Epicureans. Butler tended to co-ordinate prudence with virtue, making the former the sphere of SELF-LOVE (q. v.), the latter that of CONSCIENCE (q. v.). The earlier hedonists, like Paley and Bentham, affirmed the coincidence in the experience of the individual, either present or future, of prudence and virtue, of egoism and altruism. The evolutionists hold that a tendency towards such coincidence is to be recognized (cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, chap. xiv); Leslie Stephen, however, regards this effort as no less hopeless than the attempt to square the circle or to discover perpetual motion (*Sci. of Eth.*, chap. x. § 35).

Sidgwick regards prudence as an equally intuitive principle with benevolence and justice: 'I hold with Butler that "reasonable self-love and conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man," each of which we are under a "manifest obligation" to obey' (*Meth. of Eth.*, pref. to 2nd ed., cf. Bk. III. chap. xiii).

Pseud- or Pseudo- (in compounds) [Gr. *ψευδος*, a lie]: Ger. *pseudo-*, *falsch*; Fr. *pseudo*; Ital. *pseudo*, *spurio*. False, spurious, feigned.

Examples are: PSEUDAESTHESIA (q. v.); pseudochromaesthesia, the imaginary perception of colours in connection with sounds (see SYNAESTHESIA); pseudamnesia, an illusion or mistake of memory in which a person seems to remember that which he never experienced; pseudopsia, false vision, hallucination; instances under MIMICRY (q. v., in biology). (J.J.)

Pseudaesthesia [Gr. *ψευδής*, false, + *αἴσθησις*, sensation]: Ger. *Pseudästhesie*; Fr. *pseudesthésie*; Ital. *pseudestesia*. Illusion of sensation.

Applied especially to the cases in which irritation of the nerve at the point of amputation of a limb (e. g. stump of the arm) produces the sensation normal to the end-organ of the limb which has been removed (e. g. felt as if in the hand). (J.M.B.)

Psyche [Gr. *ψυχή*, breath, life, soul, from *ψύχω*, to blow]: Ger. *Psyche*; Fr. *psyché*; Ital. *psiche*. (1) The Greeks conceived man as having a 'double,' a second, shadowy counterpart or likeness of the bodily existence, the *ψυχή*. This was not contrasted with the body in the way in which the psychical is now contrasted with the corporeal. It was rather conceived as a 'breath,' a thinner more subtle body, which formed the animating principle in life, left the body at death through the mouth or through a wound, and after separation from the body had an existence too unsubstantial to be called life.

Such was the Homeric conception. A more definite existence and influence were implied in the cultus of the souls of the dead which was maintained by families; and the worship of the gods of the underworld, especially the cultus of Demeter in the Eleusinian mysteries, directed men's attention towards the 'other world.'

(2) In the worship of Dionysus, which was introduced from Thrace and subsequently modified by contact with Apollo-worship, the 'psyche' becomes the primary superior half of man's nature. Exiled from some previous dwelling-place into the body, its life in this bodily state is a penalty rather than a privilege. It escapes temporarily in ecstasy (*ἔκστασις*) or frenzy induced by the sacred music or by fasting, and at such times becomes united to the god and inspired (*ἐνθεος*) by him. The true home of the psyche is not in the lower world, but beyond the stars.

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