

# PURE EXPERIENCE — PURGATORY

It cannot be understood at all without reading Kant very attentively.

**Pure concept:** in Kant's doctrine, a concept imposed upon experience by the mind, not derived from it (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, I. Aufl., 220).

**Pure conversion,** in logic, is an unusual equivalent of SIMPLE CONVERSION (q. v.).

**Pure intuition:** in Kant's doctrine, the pure form of sensuous intuitions, 'which can be known *a priori* before all actual perception.' But it is impossible to suppose that Kant meant here previous in time to all perception. Indeed, it is by no means clear that Kant held that pure intuition, in the state of pure intuition, could come into consciousness at all.

**Pure judgment:** see *Pure proposition*, below.

**Pure knowledge:** knowledge of which sensation is not an element.

**Pure logic:** a phrase often used, but to which no distinct conception can be attached. The following explanation by Hamilton (*Lects. on Logic*, App. I) is as good an explanation as can be given: 'The doctrine which expounds the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, in so far as these lie in the forms of thought, & in the conditions of the mind itself, which is the subject in which knowledge inheres—this science may be called *formal*, or *subjective*, or *abstract*, or *pure logic*. The science, again, which expounds the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, in so far as these lie in the contents, materials, or objects about which logic is conversant—this science may be called *material*, or *objective*, or *concrete*, or *applied logic*. Perhaps we may say that *pure logic* is a logic deduced from hypotheses (which some will look upon as axioms) without any inquiry into the observational warrant for those hypotheses.

**Pure power, potentia pura,** is matter without form, *devoid* without energy or act.

**Pure probation, or proof,** is proof by deduction from hypotheses, or axioms, without any inquiry into the observational warrant for those premises. Such is the usual reasoning of geometry.

**Pure proposition, enunciation, or judgment:** a proposition *de inesse*, a proposition not affected by modality. The pure proposition, as something merely proposed or contemplated, might be considered as a sort of problematic proposition. But, in fact, it is generally identified with the assertory proposition.

**Pure reason:** in Kant's doctrine, the faculty of cognizing principles of knowledge quite *a priori* (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, I. Aufl., II, also 305, where the matter is explained at length, and the whole transcendental dialectic relates to pure reason).

**Pure representation:** in Kant, a representation, or immediate object of knowledge, which involves no experiential element (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, I. Aufl., 20, 50).

**Pure syllogism:** (1) properly, a syllogism both of whose premises are pure propositions.

(2) Applied by Kant to a syllogism in one of the direct moods, *Barbara*, *Celarent*, *Darii*, *Ferio*. Kant's doctrines of formal logic are very hasty, superficial, and inconsequent.

**Pure synthesis:** with Kant, the synthesis of a manifold not empirically given (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, I. Aufl., 77).

**Pure taste:** taste directed to beauty exclusively, not to other pleasing elements, such as magnificence, lubricity, fun, &c. (C.S.P.)

**Pure Experience:** a translation of *reine Erfahrung* (cf. *PURE*). The two principal usages are: (1) Pure experience is a mere succession of sensations, feelings, or images. As this is never experienced in ordinary life, Wundt, for example, calls it 'a conceptual fiction.'

(2) In contrast to such a psychological analysis of experience into its elements Averanius (*Krit. d. reinen Erfahrung*) denominates the world of the ordinary man the world of 'pure experience.' Reflection on this pure experience of every-day life leads to science and philosophy. (R.H.S.)

**Purgatory** [Med. Lat. *purgatorius*, a place of cleansing, from *purgare*, to cleanse]: Ger. *Fegefeuer*; Fr. *purgatoire*; Ital. *purgatorio*. A process of purification by suffering in an intermediate state after death, by means of which the departed soul is fitted for a higher state of existence.

Specifically, the state in which, according to Roman Catholic theology, the soul of the penitent who has died in the faith is purged by suffering from venial sins and from the temporal effects of mortal sins already forgiven.

Purgatory, in its general sense, is a feature of the doctrine of transmigration in Eastern and Western thought. As held specifically by the Roman Catholic Church, it is not in any sense an extension of probation, but is purely expiatory in its character. Only penitents are admitted into purgatory. The Romish Church teaches that the inmates of purgatory

## QUALITY

the four 'concepts of the understanding' from which Kant derives his four classes of categories, is equivalent to intensive quantity, 'quantity' standing for extensive; a usage which reflects the common treatment of extensive quantities as groups of particulars, each of which may be called a separate thing, whereas intensive quantities are treated as single predicates; but it has never established that confusion between quantity and quality which it implies. From Hegel proceeds a modern tendency to hold that the categories of quality, quantity, and relation are all self-contradictory, and to obscure the distinctions between them; but at the same time, consciously or unconsciously, a pre-eminence is assigned to quality, since some philosophers avow the view that relations are to be interpreted as qualities of the things related, and most imply that the most ultimate form in which all truths can be expressed is as predicates of several subjects, or, by preference, of one—mistakes which are chiefly due to the neglect of a thorough inquiry into the nature of predication and the consequent failure to perceive that even predicates are only related to their subjects, and that in several different ways. Cf. the following topics, and see LATIN AND SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY (4).

*Literature:* LOCKE, *Essay on the Human Understanding*; SIGWART, *Logik*; BRADLEY, *Appearance and Reality*.

**Quality** (in grammar and logic). (1) Take a sentence in which a common noun or adjective is predicated of a proper noun, and imagine that there is something in the reality which corresponds to the form of the proposition. Then imagine that this form of fact consists in a relation of the objective subject, or substance, to one being, the same correlate for all cases where the same noun or adjective is predicated in the same sense, and that imaginary being, whether looked upon as real or merely as a convenience of thought, is a *quality*. Thus, if anything is beautiful, white, or incomprehensible, this consists in its possessing the quality of beauty, whiteness, or incomprehensibility.

(2) But in a more proper sense the term quality will not be applied when the adjective, like *incomprehensible*, is conceived as signifying a relation. Thus, whiteness will be, in this narrow sense, a quality only so long as objects are thought as being white independently of anything else; but when this is conceived as a relation to the eye, 'whiteness' is only a

quality in a looser sense. Locke defines quality as the power of producing an idea, which agrees with the above explanation tolerably.

Qualitas, having inevitably reached an excessively vague use, was in the Roman schools taken to designate almost any character or characters for which no other name was at hand. Thus arose a variety of special senses. Thus in grammar the difference between nouns which had a plural and those which had not was called a difference of quality; as was the difference between the personal pronouns and *qui, quis*, &c.

(3) In logic: the distinction between the affirmative and the negative PROPOSITION (q.v.) has been called the distinction of quality in propositions by all logicians, without interruption, from Apuleius, in the 2nd century of our era, to our own contemporaries.

Kant, in order to round out a triad, added a third quality, called LIMITATIVE (q.v., 1), that of 'Sortes est non homo,' with a distinction from 'Sortes non est homo.' This will not bear criticism; but Kant's authority and the force of tradition have caused it to survive. As long as the universe of characters is unlimited, it is obvious that any collection of objects have some predicate common and peculiar to them. This being the case, as ordinary syllogistic tacitly assumes it is, the distinction between affirmative and negative propositions is purely relative to the particular predicate. No doubt many logicians have assumed that negative propositions are distinguished from ordinary affirmative propositions in not implying the reality of the subject. But what, then, does 'Some patriarch does not die' mean? Besides, all admit that propositions *per se primo modo* do not imply the existence of the subject, although they be affirmative. At any rate, the resulting syllogistic, if consistent, is very objectionable. If, however, the universe of characters is limited, as it is in ordinary speech, where we say that logical inconsistency and mandarin oranges have nothing in common, then the system of formal logic required will be a simple case of the

logic of RELATIVES (q.v.); but the distinction of affirmative and negative propositions will become material or absolute, the forms of simple categorical propositions then being:

Any *A* possesses every character of the group *B*.

Any *A* wants every character of the group *B*.

## QUALITY — QUANTITY

Any *A* possesses some character of the group *B*.

Any *A* wants some character of the group *B*.

Some *A* possesses every character of the group *B*; &c.

(4) Quality, even in Aristotle, is especially employed to denote characters which constitute merits or demerits; and this word is remarkable for the number of specialized meanings that it bears. Since Kant it has been employed to designate the distinction of clear and obscure, or distinct and confused, &c. See the preceding topic.

Quality is distinguished as primary, secondary, secundo-primary, essential or substantial, accidental, manifest, occult, primitive, original, elementary, first, derived, real, intentional, imputed, passible, logical, propositional, active, alterant, affective, predicamental, &c. (C.S.P.)

**Quality** (mental or psychic): Ger. *psychische Qualität*; Fr. *qualité mentale*; Ital. *qualità mentale*. (1) Those attributes of mental contents which do not wholly consist in relations, and have a distinctive character which is not merely constituted by their being more or less than something else.

(2) See SUBSTANCE (4).

The quality of contents of consciousness as such is distinguished from such quantitative attributes as INTENSITY, EXTENSITY, and COMPLEXITY. See those terms. (G.F.S.—J.M.B.)

**Quality and Quantity** (aesthetic). Aesthetic value may be considered under two aspects, quantity and quality, according as it is referred to the magnitude and numerical relations of the aesthetic object or its elements, or, on the other hand, to the intrinsic nature of the object or elements.

Under quantity fall, e.g., limit, rhythm, numerical unity, multiplicity, magnitude (the great, vast, little, pretty), symmetry, proportion, &c.; under quality, the characteristic, significant, charming, unity of kind, contrast, harmony, &c., with various modifications such as the tragic and comic.

The logical terms quantity and quality were applied to the aesthetic judgment by Kant, but in the sense above noted the aesthetic usage was introduced by Herbart and Zimmermann and elaborated by Köstlin.

*Literature:* ZIMMERMANN, *Asthetik* (1865), 36 ff.; KÖSTLIN, *Asthetik* (1869), 76 ff. (J.U.T.)

**Quantification of the Predicate:** see QUANTITY (in logic).

**Quantitative Hedonism:** see HEDONISM, and ETHICAL THEORIES.

**Quantity** [Lat. *quantitas*, amount, from *quantus*, how much]: Ger. *Quantität*; Fr. *quantité*; Ital. *quantità*. (1) The experience and attribute of more or less. (J.M.B.)

(2) Notion of: the thought of the existence of parts within a whole considered in abstraction from the special nature of the parts or of the whole. (G.F.S.)

The fundamental conception of quantity is expressed in the so-called axiom, 'the whole is greater than the part.' In reality, this is a definition; for the whole is a whole just because it is greater than the part, or, in other words, includes the part. It is true, of course, that one whole may be greater than another. But this means the first may be conceived as included within the second; it means that the first might be conceivably substituted for a part of the second. Here it is necessary that the special nature of the whole or its parts should be more or less completely abstracted from. Let one whole be a group of three sheep and the other a group of five. It is obvious that this particular collection of three sheep cannot be contained in that particular collection of five. But if we abstract from the individual identity of the particular sheep, and consider them only in their general character as belonging to the class sheep, the substitution becomes possible. The group of three is smaller than that of five because it could be substituted for a part of the five group, without making any difference to it, considered abstractly not as a collection of just these sheep, but of any sheep whatever. The same holds good for a group of three sheep and another of five cows, if we abstract not only from individual identity, but also from the specific nature of sheep and cows, and consider them merely as animals. The final abstraction is reached, so far as discrete quantity or number is concerned, when we consider the components of a group merely as distinguishable objects of thought. Cf. NUMBER CONCEPT.

The same analysis applies in principle to continuous quantity. A continuous quantum contains parts which by their nature are not separately distinguishable, and therefore cannot be expressed by a number. But this makes no difference to the general concept of quantity. One line in space is greater than another when, on abstracting from difference in position, &c., we see that the second could be substituted for a part of the first without making any difference to it.

The greatest difficulty arises in the case of