

Used in various connections: (1) In general, as good or bad style; idealistic or realistic style. (2) Historically, as classic, Gothic, romantic, Doric styles. (3) With reference to the distinctive traits of the respective arts, as picturesque, sculptural, musical, poetic style. (4) Of an individual, as 'in the style of Rembrandt.' (5) As an attribute of value, as 'this artist (or work) has style.'

Literature: VOLKELT, *Aesth. Zeitfragen* (1895), chap. iv; FECHNER, *Vorschule d. Aesth.* (1876), chap. xxvi; GUYAU, *L'Art au point de vue sociologique* (1889), chap. x; RIEGEL, *Die bildenden Künste* (4th ed., 1895), chap. x; SPENCER, *The Philosophy of Style, Essays*, ii; see also the aesthetic publications of VSCHER, KÜSTLIN, SCHASLER, VÉRON, RUSKIN, and CARRIÈRE. (J.H.T.)

Style (in sociology): CUSTOM (q. v.) of the more temporary and ephemeral sort considered as embodying models for imitation; equivalent to mode.

Made an important factor in the imitation theory of social propagation by Tarde (*Lois de l'imitation*). (J.M.B.)

Suarez, Francisco. (1548-1617.) Born of noble family in Grenada, he first studied law. But he entered the Order of Jesus, and devoted himself zealously to theology and philosophy. He taught in Rome, Alcalá, Salamanca, and finally in the high school of Coimbra. He died at Lisbon.

Subalternant: see SUBALTERNATION, and OPPOSITION (in logic).

Subalternate: see SUBALTERNATION, and OPPOSITION (in logic).

Subalternation [Lat. *sub* + *alter*, other]: Ger. *Subalternation*; Fr. *subalternation*; Ital. *subalternazione*. The relation of a particular proposition to the universal proposition having the same subject, predicate, and quality, that particular proposition ('Some S is—or is not—P,' called the *subalternate*) being regarded as following by immediate inference from that universal ('Any or all is—or is not—P,' called the *subalternant*). Cf. the diagram given under OPPOSITION (in logic). (C.S.P.)

Subconscious [Lat. *sub*, under, + *cum*, together, + *scire*, to know]: Ger. *halbbewusst*, *unterbewusst*; Fr. *subconscient*; Ital. *subcosciente*, *subconscio*. (1) Not clearly recognized in a present state of consciousness, yet entering into the development of subsequent states of consciousness.

(2) Loosely, the UNCONSCIOUS (q. v.). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

It is a least degree of consciousness, required by the law of continuity. We have (a) the conscious process given in attention, the 'focus' of consciousness; (b) the conscious process given in the state of inattention, or in the rest of the 'field' of consciousness; and (c) the subconscious process, which cannot itself attract attention, or be made the object of voluntary attention, until it has attained to stage (b), i. e. until it has ceased to be subconscious.

The facts which have led to the hypothesis of a subconsciousness are (a) the existence of blind conations, organic tendencies, &c., for which no conscious antecedent can be discovered; (b) the mechanization of complicated movements, such as piano-playing; (c) the appearance in 'memory' of ideas which seem to have cropped up of themselves, i. e. have no assignable physical or mental condition; (d) the phenomena of 'secondary' PERSONALITY (q. v.), &c. (E.B.T.)

These distinctions are those of 'degree' of consciousness, as contrasted with that of GRADE (q. v.) of consciousness. It is important that we separate carefully these functional phases in consciousness of content, from the genetic phases in the evolution of mind, whatever analogies may be discovered between them. The diagram given under PARALLELISM (psychophysical) illustrates the two series—the horizontal dotted line at each part has its differences of degree, the vertical dotted line gives differences of grade. In other words, at every grade of consciousness we find distinctions of degree. The term 'stage' (Stufe) is sometimes used for grade.

DISPOSITIONS (q. v.) generally are subconscious. Particular experiences often strike us, as when we are occupied with talking, writing, &c., of which we become aware only subsequently; at their occurrence they were subconscious. The subsequent state shows their working in the development of consciousness.

The terms 'subliminal' and 'marginal' are used to characterize the subconscious, both figuratively. That is subliminal which is below a theoretical THRESHOLD (q. v.) of consciousness; that marginal which is not in the focus of the field (after analogy with the field of vision; cf. Ll. Morgan, *Introd. to Compar. Psychol.*). Cf. UNCONSCIOUS, and PERSONALITY (disorders of).

To theories which accept 'unconscious' mind, the subconscious is a transition state through which presentations pass in coming to

the focus (attention). The Herbartian 'mechanism of presentations' (cf. HERBARTIANISM) did much to introduce the notions both of the unconscious and of the subconscious.

The subconscious and 'unconscious' have been hypostatized to do many marvellous things; art has been made the product of the subconscious, the genius has been endowed with a wonder-working 'subconscious'; all of which means that certain mysteries of endowment are not open to introspective analysis—certainly to those of us who have them not—and because they are not spread out on the tablet of consciousness, the subconscious, it is held, plays the greater part.

The terms 'semi-' and 'half-conscious' are loosely used for sub- or vague consciousness.

Literature: WARD, art. Psychology, *Encyc. Brit.* (9th ed.), xx. 47 f.; BALDWIN, *Handb. of Psychol.*, i. (1890) 57; KÜLPE, *Outlines of Psychol.*, 190, 291; TITCHENER, *Exper. Psychol.*, i. 194; *Primer of Psychol.*, 256. See also UNCONSCIOUS, and BIBLIOG. G, 2. c. (E.B.T.—J.M.B.)

Subcontrary [Lat. *sub* + *contra*, against]: Ger. *subconträr*; Fr. *subcontraire*; Ital. *subcontrario*. Two propositions having the same subject and the same predicate, if so related that they can both be true, but cannot both be false, are said to be subcontraries; the relation is called 'subcontrary' OPPOSITION (q. v., with diagram).

The ordinary doctrine is that 'Some S is P' and 'Some S is not P' are subcontraries. Thus, 'Some phoenixes rise from their ashes,' and 'Some phoenixes do not rise from their ashes.' But it is better to regard both as false when their subjects are non-existent. (C.S.P.)

Subject (-ive) [Lat. *sub*, under, below, + *iacere*, to throw]: Ger. *Subjekt*, *subjektiv*; Fr. *sujet*, *subjectif*; Ital. *soggetto*, *soggettivo*. (1) The material or content of a thought or discourse, as distinct from that with which the thought is concerned; or OBJECT (q. v.), subject-matter.

(2) Hence, the substantive, the real.

(3) That which is the source and centre of the process of thought, or, more widely, of all psychical processes—the self, ego, mind. In this latter connection *subjective* assumes two meanings: (a) that which is concerned with, or arises from, mental operations, as distinguished from the objective as appertaining to the external and material world; (b) that which is merely mental; the illusory; that which lacks validity; that which is not

universal, but confined to some one individual, and to him because of something accidental in his make-up.

In aesthetics, subjective and objective are often opposed to one another as designating two types of criticism: the former, that into which the personality of the author enters; the latter, impersonal, impartial, and more or less cold.

The term begins with a logical sense in Aristotle, which, however, as is usual in Greek thought, has an ontological meaning as well. Logically, it is the subject of a proposition, or of a discourse, that of which something is asserted, *ὑποκείμενον*. But Plato had distinguished between *ἄνομα* as subject and *ῥῆμα* as predicate, the *ἄνομα* being the noun or substantive, the constant as against the changing verb, which thus connotes *οὐσία*, essence (*Theaet.* 206, and *Crat.* 399). Aristotle even more explicitly identifies the subject with the substrate, the SUBSTANCE (q. v.)—which, indeed, is only the Latin translation of his *ὑποκείμενον*. This, as indeterminate subject, is *ἄλη*, matter; but as determinate, it is specific individual being, genera being only secondary subjects. It can be subject only, never predicate (see Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, i. 217 ff.; Ueberweg, *Logic*, 143-4; Trendelenburg, *Hist. Beitr.*, i. 13-34, and 54-6). According to the Stoics (Prantl, op. cit., i. 428-32; Trendelenburg, op. cit., 221), the subject is one of the four fundamental categories, and designates being without quality, and, therefore, the ultimate subject of all judgment; the unqualified—the pure universal. As such it is the receptacle in which the formative or seminal reason works.

Here we have a complete fusion of the logical and ontological senses. Apuleius and Capella (Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, i. 581, 676) used the terms *subdita* and *subjectiva* as technical terms for the subject of a proposition or judgment; while Boethius for the first time (so Prantl, loc. cit., i. 696) makes use of the terms *subjectivum* and *praedicatum*. In this form the term passed into scholastic thought. As might be expected, we owe to a nominalist, Occam, the first exposition of its real form and its logical sense (*ad existentiam, ad praedicationem*, Prantl, loc. cit., iii. 368). It is to Scotus that we owe the distinction of subjective and objective in the sense which persisted practically till the time of Baumgarten and Kant.

Scotus identified the two terms with the familiar distinction of Arabian thought of