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'first and second intentions'; subjective designating the first intention, concrete substantiality, and objective the second intention, or this thing as constituted through a mental operation (Prantl, iii. 208; also the Index, for other similar uses of the term objective).

Gerson anticipated the modern use of the term, using the phrase 'obiectum vel substratum,' and speaks of an objective reason, 'ratio obiectalis,' which mediates real being in knowledge, 'having two aspects, as it were, an external and an internal' (Prantl, iv. 145). Descartes is true to the scholastic use, objective with him meaning always present to thought (existing *idealiter in intellectu*), and subjective that which is really in the things themselves (*formaliter in se ipsis*; *Medit.*, iii). Eucken (*The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought*) gives instances of the use of the term in the 18th century prior to Kant. The reversal of meanings in Kant is not hard to understand. The proposition 'I think' has transcendental value: that is to say, it is the function of the self-identity of thought, which, lying at the basis of the categories, is the fundamental *a priori* condition of all knowledge and experience. It cannot be regarded, however, as a thing, as substance, i.e. as soul. 'By this *I* or *he* or *it*, that is, the thing which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = x , which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 301, Müller's trans.). It is, then, just the absolute subject of all judgments; a significance which clearly enough connects the term with the Aristotelian and logical meaning. But the activity of this function, through the forms of sense and categories of understanding, is necessary to the constitution of objects in experience (of the empirical as distinct from the transcendent object or thing-in-itself); thus, epistemologically considered, if not ontologically, the pure 'I think' or subject has positive significance and value. Thus Kant says: 'If we drop our subject, or the subjective form of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in time and space, nay, space and time themselves, would vanish' (*ibid.*, 37). Thus, all the part played by mental activity in constituting empirical objects is repeatedly termed 'subjective.' A double sense is clearly contained here: on one side, this subjective is set over against the objective, when things-in-themselves—reality in its intrinsic nature—are in mind; it is the source of the phenomenal,

of that which has not unconditioned validity—tending towards the sceptical and illusory sense of the term. But, on the other hand, it is constitutive of objects as experienced, and therefore has complete (empirical) objectivity; indeed, because of its universal and necessary character, it is more 'objective' than any law or object found in experience itself.

Kant's successors, by abolishing the thing-in-itself, endeavoured to do away with this ambiguity. They endeavoured to give the pure 'I think,' or unity of thought, a completely objective sense; Kant himself having, indeed, admitted the possibility of the transcendental object being at the same time the subject of thinking (*ibid.*, 311). The subject thus becomes the activity which appears equally in mental processes and in the world of experienced objects. It differs from the soul-substance against which Kant had made his polemic, in being essentially activity rather than substrate, and hence by being considered in its functions in the structure of the world of knowledge, morals, and art, rather than in its isolated subsistence; and as transcending the historical, or empirical, individual mind. Such is its use in Fichte; and Hegel fixed the distinction in a classic way in the introduction to his *Phänomenologie* (*Werke*, 14) by saying the truth, the absolute, was to be apprehended as subject, not as substance. But this technical sense easily passed over into a loose, popular one, in which subject meant mind, soul, though with more psychological implication and with more reference (often very vague, however) to the part played by mind in the process of knowledge. Sir William Hamilton was chiefly influential in making the Kantian distinction of subjective and objective at home in English speech, Cousin and the other followers of German thought, in France. When members of quite the opposite schools, such as Spencer and Comte, adopted the terms, they were thoroughly naturalized, and are now in such general use as practically to have displaced the older senses.

Literature: EUCKEN, *Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought*, chap. i; and *Gesch. d. philos. Terminologie*, 203-4; Franck's *Dict. des Sci. philos.*, iv. 468-71; HAMILTON, ed. of Reid, 97, 221, 806-9; *Discussions on Philos.*, 5, 605; *Metaphysics*, i. 157-62. (J.D.)

Subject (in logic). (1) That of which something is asserted in the form of a proposition; its conventional symbol is *S*. (J.M.B.)

(2) That part of a proposition whose function it is to 'indicate,' or denote, what it is of which the proposition is a SIGN (q.v.), and which it signifies, or indirectly images, in the predicate.

[What follows presents a view of propositions, a propos of 'subject,' developed on the basis of the theory of 'signs'; it may be compared with the more commonly received view given under PROPOSITION. (J.M.B.)]

Whether or not every proposition has a principal subject, and, if so, whether it can or cannot have more than one, will be considered below. A proposition may be defined as a sign which separately indicates its object. For example, a portrait with the proper name of the original written below it is a proposition asserting that so that original looked. If this broad definition of a proposition be accepted, a proposition need not be a symbol. Thus a weathercock 'tells' from which direction the wind blows by virtue of a real relation which it would still have to the wind, even if it were never intended or understood to indicate the wind. It separately indicates the wind because its *construction* is such that it must point to the quarter from which the wind blows; and this construction is distinct from its *position* at any particular time. But what we usually mean by a proposition or judgment is a symbolic proposition, or *symbol*, separately indicating its object. Every subject partakes of the nature of an index, in that its function is the characteristic function of an index, that of forcing the attention upon its object. Yet the subject of a symbolic proposition cannot strictly be an index. When a baby points at a flower and says, 'Pretty,' that is a symbolic proposition; for the word 'pretty' being used, it represents its object only by virtue of a relation to it which it could not have if it were not intended and understood as a sign. The pointing arm, however, which is the subject of this proposition, usually indicates its object only by virtue of a relation to this object, which would still exist, though it were not intended or understood as a sign. But when it enters into the proposition as its subject, it indicates its object in another way. For it cannot be the subject of that symbolic proposition unless it is intended and understood to be so. Its merely being an index of the flower is not enough. It only becomes the subject of the proposition, because its being an index of the flower is evidence that it was *intended* to be. In like manner, all ordinary propositions refer to

the real universe, and usually to the nearer environment. Thus, if somebody rushes into the room and says, 'There is a great fire!' we know he is talking about the neighbourhood and not about the world of the *Arabian Nights' Entertainments*. It is the circumstances under which the proposition is uttered or written which indicate that environment as that which is referred to. But they do so not simply as index of the environment, but as evidence of an intentional relation of the speech to its object, which relation it could not have if it were not intended for a sign. The expressed subject of an ordinary proposition approaches most nearly to the nature of an index when it is a proper name which, although its connection with its object is purely intentional, yet has no reason (or, at least, none is thought of in using it) except the mere desirability of giving the familiar object a designation. Among, or along with, proper names we may put abstractions, which are the names of fictitious individual things, or, more accurately, of individuals whose being consists in the manner of being of something else. A kind of abstractions are individual collections, such as the 'German people.' When the subject is not a proper name, or other designation of an individual within the experience (proximate or remote) of both speaker and auditor, the place of such designation is taken by a virtual precept stating how the hearer is to proceed in order to find an object to which the proposition is intended to refer. If this process does not involve a regular course of experimentation, all cases may be reduced to two with their complications. These are the two cases: first, that in which the auditor is to take any object of a given description, and it is left to him to take any one he likes; and, secondly, the case in which it is stated that a suitable object can be found within a certain range of experience, or among the existent individuals of a certain class. The former gives the *distributed* subject of a *universal* proposition, as 'Any cockatrice lays eggs.' It is not asserted that any cockatrice exists, but only that, if the hearer can find a cockatrice, to that it is intended that the predicate shall be applicable. The other case gives the *undistributed* subject of a *particular* proposition, as 'Some negro albino is handsome.' This implies that there is at least one negro albino. Among complications of these cases we may reckon such subjects as that of the proposition, 'Every fixed star but one is too distant to show a true disk,' and 'There are at least two points

common to all the circles osculating any given curve.' The subject of a universal proposition may be taken to be 'Whatever object in the universe be taken'; thus the proposition about the cockatrice might be expressed: 'Any object in the universe having been taken, it will either not be a cockatrice or it will lay eggs.' So understood, the subject is not asserted to exist, but it is well known to exist; for the universe must be understood to be familiar to speaker and hearer, or no communication about it would take place between them; for the universe is only known by experience. The particular proposition may still more naturally be expressed in this way, 'There is something in the universe which is a negro albino that is handsome.' No doubt there are grammatical differences between these ways of stating the fact; but formal logic does not undertake to provide for more than one way of expressing the same fact, unless a second way is requisite for the expression of inferences. The latter mode is, on the whole, preferable. A proposition may have several subjects. Thus the universe of projective geometry being understood, it is a true proposition that 'Whatever individuals *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* may be, there are individuals *E* and *F* such that whatever individual *G* may be, there is an individual *H*, and an individual *I*, such that, if *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* are all straight lines, then *E* and *F* are straight lines, each intersecting *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D*, and *E* and *F* are not coincident; and if *G* is a straight line, not coincident with *E*, and not coincident with *F*, and if *G* intersects *A*, *B*, and *C*, it does not intersect *D*, unless *H* is a one-sheeted hyperboloid of which *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* are generators, and *J* is a set of generators of *H*, to which *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* all belong'; or, in our usual phraseology, any four straight lines in space are intersected by just two different straight lines, unless these four straight lines belong to one set of generators of a one-sheeted hyperboloid. Such a proposition is called a relative proposition. The order in which the selection of individuals is made is material when the selections are different in respect to distribution. The proposition may relate to the frequency with which, in the course of ordinary experience, a generic event is of a certain species. De Morgan wishes to erect this into the general type of propositions. But this is to overlook a vital distinction between probability and that which a universal proposition asserts. To say that the probability that a calf will not have

more than six legs is *x*, is to say that in the long run, taking calves as they present themselves in experience, the ratio of the number of those with not more than six legs to the total number is *x*. But this does not prevent there being any finite number of calves with more legs than six, provided that in the long run, that is, in an endless course of experience, their number remains finite, and does not increase indefinitely. A universal proposition, on the other hand, asserts, for example, that any calf which may exist, without exception, is a vertebrate animal. The universal proposition speaks of experience distributively; the probable, or statistical proposition, speaks of experience collectively. (C.S.P.)

Subject (of experiment): one upon whom a psychological experiment is made.

Other terms in use are 'reagent' and 'reactant' (not recommended), though in a more restricted sense. Cf. also SENSITIVE, and MEDIUM. (J.M.B.)

Subject-consciousness. That phase of consciousness which has objects. See SUBJECT (3), and Subject-self under SELF. (J.M.B.)

Subjective Selection [not in use in the other languages]: see SELECTION (in psychology). The function of selection by or through consciousness, considered as aiding in the survival of the creature which exercises it.

Used by James Ward (*Encyc. Brit.*, 9th ed., art. 'Psychology') as a function of accommodation to and selection of the creature's living environment; and later (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*) as a factor in the evolution of the species. Ward cites ORGANIC SELECTION (q.v.) as invoking the principle along similar lines (ibid.), but his article in the *Encyc. Brit.* does not seem to make use of subjective selection as a factor of 'determination' in the theory of descent. Cf. also 'conscious' SELECTION (in biology). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Subjective Sensations: Ger. *subjektive Empfindungen*; Fr. *sensations subjectives*; Ital. *sensazioni subiettive*. Sensations of the special senses arising independently of a stimulus external to the organism.

The use of the term 'subjective' in this connection is open to grave objection. The 'subject' referred to is not the psychological subject or 'self,' but the body as distinguished from its environment. We speak of the retina's own light to denote those visual sensations which arise independently of extra-organic stimulus. Perhaps we might extend

this usage and speak of the ear's own sound, and in general of the 'own' sensations of the various special senses. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)

As illustrating the German usage, cf. the 'subjektive Linien' of Schumann, *Zeitsch. f. Psychol.*, xxiii. 4. (K.G.)

Subjectivism [for deriv. see SUBJECT]: Ger. *Subjektivismus*; Fr. *subjectivisme*; Ital. *soggettivismo*. (1) The theory which denies the possibility of objective knowledge, which limits the mind to consciousness of its own states; as such, equivalent to subjective idealism.

(2) Any theory which attaches great importance to the part played by the subjective factor in constituting experience; e.g. Kantianism in its doctrine of the subjective origin of the forms of perception (space and time) and the categories of conception.

(3) The theory, in ethics, which conceives the aim of morality to be the attainment of states of feeling, pleasure or happiness (Kölpe, *Intr. to Philos.*, sects. 14, 30). Cf. OBJECTIVISM.

Subjectivistic products of all sorts (no less than the producers) are said to have 'subjectivity.' (J.D.)

Subjectivity (the, in theology): Ger. *Subjektivität*; Fr. *subjectivisme*; Ital. *soggettivismo*. (1) That tendency which seeks the organ and criteria of religious truth in the intimations of the inner consciousness rather than in history and objective revelations.

The subjective tendency dominates mysticism as distinguished from scholasticism and rationalism; also quietism and all forms of religious profession in which the last appeal is to the inner spirit. The schools of Schleiermacher and Ritschl are subjective in their appeal to Christian consciousness as the immediate source of religious truth. But they are saved from pure subjectivity: Schleiermacher, by his appeal to the historic consciousness of a religious community, and Ritschl, by his appeal to a historic Christ. (A.T.O.)

(2) Any thought which explicitly adopts or defends the subjective standpoint or method has the character of subjectivity; see SUBJECTIVISM. (J.M.B.)

Subject-self: see SELF.

Sublation [Lat. *sub* + *ferre*, to bear]: Ger. see below; Fr. *enlèvement, suppression*; Ital. *soppressione*. (1) Removal.

(2) A word proposed to translate Hegel's 'Aufheben.' 'Superseding' has also been

suggested. See HEGEL'S TERMINOLOGY, Glossary, 'Aufheben.' (C.S.P.)

Sublime [Lat. *sublimis*, lofty]: Ger. *erhaben*; Fr. *sublime*; Ital. *sublime*. An aesthetic value in which the primary factor is the presence or suggestion of transcendent vastness or greatness, as of power, heroism, extent in space or time.

It differs from greatness or grandeur in that these are as such capable of being completely grasped or measured; whereas the sublime, while in one aspect apprehended and grasped as a whole, is yet felt as transcending our normal standards of measurement or achievement. Hence two elements emphasized in varying degree by different writers, and probably varying in different observers: (1) a certain baffling of our faculty with feeling of limitation, akin to awe and veneration; (2) a stimulation of our powers and elevation of the self in sympathy with its object.

The element of magnitude in beauty was noted by Aristotle, and given by him a prominent place in tragedy; but the earliest extant determination of the sublime as a distinct conception is in the treatise *περί ὕψους* ascribed to Longinus, but now supposed to be of earlier date (1st century A.D.). In modern times it was given especial prominence by Burke (*Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful*, 1756) and Home (*Elements of Criticism*, 1761), who sought a psychological and physiological explanation.

According to Burke it is caused by 'a mode of terror or pain,' and is contrasted with the beautiful—not a part of it. Kant also distinguished it as a separate category from beauty, making it apply properly only to the mind, not to the object, and giving it a peculiar moral effect in opposing 'the interests of sense.' He distinguished a 'mathematical' sublime of extension in space or time, and a dynamical of power. Most subsequent writers on aesthetics have tended to bring the sublime within the beautiful in the broader sense, i.e. have recognized its aesthetic quality as closely related to beauty.

Literature: KANT, Critique of Judgment, §§ 23 ff.; SEIDL, Gesch. d. Erhabenheitsbegriffs seit Kant (1889); FECHNER, Aesth., xxxii; G. ALLEN, Origin of the Sublime, Mind, iii. 324; SULLY and BAIN, Psychologies; RIBOT, Psychol. des Sentiments (1896), 339 ff. Nearly all the works on aesthetics cited under AESTHETICS and BEAUTY treat the sublime. (J.H.T.)

Subordination (or **Inclusion**, in logic)