

*sive omnia eius attributa.* Leibnitz defines substance as the ultimate logical subject, and holds that there are an infinite number of substances, each independent of all the rest, but all, nevertheless, dependent upon God.

Locke, Berkeley, Hume tend to regard substance merely as a name for the form in which sensible qualities are combined, and to minimize the importance of the conception; Berkeley, however, allows that the soul is a substance, but without defining what he means thereby. Kant first clearly disengages the notion of that which is permanent through change as the only meaning of substance which is applicable to the existents which we know. He seems, however, to regard the conception of the ultimate logical subject as different from this, and as the proper definition of substance, denying only that any existent conforming to this is accessible to human knowledge. In the philosophy of this century, which tends to consider all the existents known to us as largely, if not wholly, phenomenal, substance has been generally regarded merely as the unknowable real existent, upon which in some sense they depend. (G.E.M.)

**Substance** (in theology): Ger. *Substanz*; Fr. *substance*; Ital. *sostanza*. That which is one and immutable in being; the ground of properties and changes in things; the divine nature in its essence as transcending personal distinctions. Cf. SUBSTANCE.

The Greek term *ousia* is used to express the subsistent element in things and the immutable and unitary divine essence. In his being, God is one and immutable, but in his energizing the distinctions of personality arise. In the thought of the Christian writers, while personality is conceived to be less fundamental than the unitary nature of the divine, yet on the other hand it is not regarded as a mere mode of manifestation. Modalism is a heresy in Christian thought. Cf. HOMOUSIA. (A.T.O.)

**Substantialism**: see SUBSTANTIALITY THEORY.

**Substantiality Theory or Substantialism** [for deriv. see SUBSTANCE]: Ger. *Substantialitätstheorie, Substantialismus*; Fr. *substantialisme*; Ital. *sustanzialismo*. (1) In general, the theory that there are real substances, or distinct entities, underlying phenomenal facts or events.

(2) Its more definite meanings depend upon, and vary with, that which it is opposed to.

(1) As opposed to phenomenalism, it asserts that substances 'mind' and 'matter' exist,

and are known to exist with as much certainty as are particular physical and psychical facts.

Hamilton says: 'Philosophers, as they affirm or deny the authority of consciousness in guaranteeing a substratum or substance to the manifestations of the Ego and Non-Ego, are divided into Realists or Substantialists and into Nihilists or Non-Substantialists' (*Lect. on Metaphys.* i. 294). In a somewhat more limited sense, the term is used to denote the belief of those who hold to a separate self or soul distinct from the phenomena of consciousness, as over against that view which regards the soul as simply the sum-total of conscious activities or modes, the latter school being called 'Actualists' (so Hibben, *Problems of Philos.*, 79), and the theory 'Actuality Theory' (cf. Eisler, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Actualitätstheorie'*, for numerous citations).

(2) As opposed to the dynamic theory of matter, substantialism holds that matter cannot be resolved into 'centres of force,' or modes of energy, but that mass is a necessary and irreducible concept, over and above that of motion, in considering the physical constitution of the universe. (J.D.)

**Substantive and Transitive States** (in psychology): Ger. and Fr. not in use; Ital. *stati mentali sostantivi e transitivi* (Ferrari). Substantive states of mind are those which represent sensible terms: nouns, verbs, adjectives, &c.; transitive states are those which represent relations: such things as are expressed by prepositions, conjunctions, &c. 'Relational states' might be a better term for the latter. (W.J.)

The terms were originally used by James, *Princ. of Psychol.*, i. 243 ff. (J.M.B.)

**Substantive Law**: see ADJECTIVE LAW.

**Substitution** (in logic) [Lat. *substitutio*]: Ger. *Substituierung*; Fr. *substitution*; Ital. *sostituzione*. (1) Most properly, the removal of a term from a proposition (not necessarily the whole subject or predicate) and the insertion of another term in its place.

The idea that reasoning consists essentially in doing this is an old one, and Jevons maintained that inductive reasoning consists in the substitution of similars. In fact, this would describe presumption, or abduction, in a general way. But there has been great confusion of induction with abduction, and of pure induction with induction affected by other kinds of considerations; cf. PROBABLE REASONING (3). The word in this sense is in wide use among logicians to-day.

(2) Writers on the logic of RELATIVES

(q. v.) follow the mathematicians in the very bad use of this word to signify the operation of changing the order of a finite series of objects, and consequently define it in logic as a totally unlimited dyadic relative of which no individual is relate to two correlates or correlate to two relates; or as a dyadic relative of which every individual is relate to just one correlate and correlate to just one relate. The mathematicians begin to show some symptoms of dissatisfaction with this ill-chosen word; so that logicians would do well to change it at once to *permutation*. Cf. MATHEMATICS, and NUMBER. (C.S.P.)

**Substitution** (in theology, Christian). That feature of the scheme of redemption in which Jesus Christ is represented as taking the sinner's place, and giving satisfaction for the broken law and purchasing righteousness for the sinner.

The doctrine of substitution presupposes the necessity of propitiation either by the sinner or his substitute. Jesus Christ becomes the expiatory sacrifice that satisfies the requirements of divine justice and renders the exercise of pardoning grace possible, while the obedience of Christ constitutes a righteousness which may be imputed to the sinner for his justification.

*Literature*: EDWARDS, Sermons on Justification by Faith alone and Wisdom displayed in Salvation, iv (Worcester ed.); ANSELM, *Cur Deus Homo?*; ATHANASIUS, *Contra Arianos*; AUGUSTINE, *De Pecc. Mun.*; OXENHAM, *Doctrine of the Atonement* (1881); SHEDD, *Hist. of Christ. Doctrine*; the Confessions of the Anglican, Lutheran, and Presbyterian churches. Cf. IMPUTATION, and ATONEMENT. (A.T.O.)

**Substrate or Substratum**: see SUBSISTENCE, and cf. SUBSTANCE (4), and ESSENCE.

**Subsumption** [Lat. *subsumptio*]: Ger. *Subsumtion*; Fr. *subsumption*; Ital. *subsumzione*. A proposition practically putting a case under a rule; as the minor premises of the first figure of SYLLOGISM (q. v.). (C.S.P.)

The 'subsumption theory' is the older logical view that the subject of a proposition is 'subsumed' under the predicate. (K.G.)

**Succession and Duration** [Lat. *sub + cedere*, to yield; and Lat. *durare*, to last]: Ger. (1) *Aufeinanderfolge*, (2) *Dauer*; Fr. (1) *succession*, (2) *durée*; Ital. (1) *successione*, (2) *durata*. Duration and succession are correlated aspects of CHANGE (q. v., 2) in that in which individual IDENTITY (q. v.) is presupposed.

The identity is such as to include in the unity of an object, recognized as the same or different, determinations which cannot be present together. These determinations are then said to succeed each other, and the object which they qualify is said to endure or to have duration. See TIME, TIME PERCEPTION, and TIME SENSE. (G.F.S.—J.M.B.)

The successive determinations of the identical object all form part of its being, irrespective of the question whether they have taken place, are now taking place, or are going to take place. So long as it has not changed in those characters which give it unity and continuity of interest for the subject attending to it, and so constitute it an individual identity for this subject, all its other temporal vicissitudes are integral constituents of its total existence. When it has once changed in those characters which constitute its individual identity, it cannot change any more, because it has ceased to exist. But all other changes are part and parcel of its individual unity, as truly as legs, seat, and back are parts of a chair. We must therefore refuse to accept Kant's dictum that 'only the unchanging changes.' Kant appears to have divided the changing object into two parts, one remaining materially identical, i. e. indistinguishably alike, and the other consisting in a series of differences arising and disappearing after one another. On this view the difference cannot be said to change; they only succeed each other. Kant infers that it is the materially identical element or the 'unchanging' which changes. This is not merely a paradox; it is a real absurdity, which only disappears when we substitute the conception of individual for that of material identity.

A materially identical object may endure although it does not change. But its duration is always apprehended in relation to some other object (or objects) which does change. The changes necessary to the apprehension of its duration may be merely the sequence of moments of time in the abstract, or they may be merely changes in the psychical state of the subject which takes cognizance of it. (G.F.S.)

**Succubus** [ML. *succubus*, from *sub + cubere*, to lie]: Ger. *Succubus*; Fr. *succube*; Ital. *succubo*. An alleged nocturnal demon consorting with human beings.

Witches were tried and convicted of producing offspring through such agency. Cf. WITCHCRAFT. (J.J.)

**Suffering** [Lat. *sub + ferre*, to bear]: Ger.