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*Leiden*; Fr. *souffrance*; Ital. *dolore, patimento*.  
(1) Continued PAIN (q. v.) or UNPLEASANTNESS (q. v.).

(2) Sometimes used instead of passion as a translation of *πάθος* (*pati*), one of the CATEGORIES (q. v.) of Aristotle. (J.M.B.)

**Sufficient Condition and Indispensable Condition** (in logic). See NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION.

**Sufficient Reason**: Ger. *Satz vom zureichenden Grund*; Fr. *principe de raison suffisante*; Ital. *legge della ragione sufficiente*.

(1) This phrase was made a term of philosophy, if not invented, by Leibnitz. In the *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce*, he says (but this is far from being the first time in which he signals the principle): 'It is necessary to resort to metaphysics and to make use of a great principle, not much employed, to the effect that nothing takes place without reason (*rien ne se fait sans raison suffisante*); that is to say, that nothing occurs for which one having sufficient knowledge might not be able to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is as it is and not otherwise.'

It is impossible to understand what Leibnitz means by this, without careful study of his works. There are two difficulties. In the first place, Leibnitz confounded under this phrase two entirely different ideas which he failed to discriminate. In the second place, in order to understand Leibnitz's position here, it is necessary to take into account, on the one hand, the thorough individualistic nominalism, with which he began his philosophical life and never consciously surrendered, and on the other hand his recognition of intellectual relations in the universe of which that nominalistic metaphysics involves the denial. His singular and complicated metaphysics is the outcome of his struggle to reconcile those two incompatible positions.

His sufficient reason is not an efficient cause, but a utility, or, in a broad sense, a final cause. But a nominalist cannot admit that an immediate final cause exists. Leibnitz, however, makes it true. For a realist, the real is nothing but the immediate object of that which is true. But Leibnitz has another notion of truth. Thus, in a letter to Arnauld (quoted in Latta's accurate and convenient exposition, p. 61, note beginning p. 60), he says: 'Always in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is in some way comprehended in that of the subject, *praedicatum inest subiecto*;

otherwise I know not what truth is'; and in other passages he shows that for him truth is a relation between notions. Yet, as a nominalist, he could not hold that these notions immediately correspond to anything real. Consequently, he does not say that there really is a sufficient reason, but that anybody favourably situated would be able to render a sufficient reason. There is nothing real that corresponds to it immediately. Remotely, the purpose of God may correspond to it. Thus, the world of reality and the world of truth are completely sundered; for the former, Leibnitz is a pure individualistic nominalist; for the latter, on the contrary, he is an intellectualist. When he says, for example, that that which has no sufficient reason is 'necessarily' non-existent, he uses the adverb of logical not of metaphysical modality. He does not hold that real things are either emanations or entelechies of anything corresponding to a sufficient reason, but that is how the mind is affected. But when he comes to the ultimate sufficient reason of contingent truths, which is God, he ceases to draw the distinction between the world of thought and the world of being; and this exception introduces difficulties into his system. But Leibnitz confounds two things under his word 'reason.' The idea which principally governs his doctrine is that a reason is an explanation of the utility of that of which it is a reason; but he includes under the same word any explanation of the logical necessity of the object, the why it follows from a general law. Hence, in many cases, his sufficient reason fulfils the function of an efficient cause. It would be quite possible to quote passages from Leibnitz which conflict with this account of his conception. In order that the reader should apprehend it as he did, it would be requisite that his mind should be in the same unclear condition, which is not possible after one has once attained a superior grade of clearness. We can account for his implicit contradictions, but cannot reproduce his apprehension of them when we once see them to be contradictions.

It is to be remarked that Renouvier and Prat, in their rehabilitation of Leibnitzianism, reject the principle of sufficient reason (*La Nouvelle Monadologie*, 41, note 29).

The principle of sufficient reason may very well be understood to express our natural expectation or hope to find each unexpected phenomenon to be subject to reason and so to be intelligible. But to entertain this hope for each is not necessarily to entertain it for

all. At any rate, it is easy to see that, however strong the tendency may be, it does not amount to any such absolute and inductible necessity as attaches to the law of contradiction, by the side of which Leibnitz and many Germans have placed it. Moreover, however important this tendency of thought and this truth about the universe may be in reference to the development of science, nevertheless, like the principle of the uniformity of nature, its strictly logical application to add force to arguments is very limited indeed. The *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* stand in no need of any such general principle to be perfectly apodictic. It is essential to no broad division of reasoning. As a general rule, when we infer that a particular phenomenon, or set of phenomena, which seemed surprising at first, is to be explained as a consequence of a fact or law not directly observable, the argument is not appreciably strengthened by a separate assumption that the phenomenon has some explanation; although there are special cases in which it can be fortified by a similar, but more definite, premise. (C.S.P.)

(2) In logic: 'Every act of thought requires or presupposes another act of thought upon which it is based' (Eisler). This is made one of the fundamental laws of thought by earlier German writers, but English writers do not in general enumerate it as such.

It is more properly regarded as a principle of psychology—the mind requires some ground for its acceptance of any proposed proposition; but this has nothing to do with logic as such. It is hardly a general principle, and when it is active it is incomplete. The non-thinking mind accepts propositions as given to it, and asks for no reasons; if a mind is alert, it seeks not only for the reasons but also for the consequences of things. Every proposition is a centre for backward and forward

streamers—the things which prove it and the things which it proves, and one function is no more fundamental and no more compelling than the other. Some propositions are richer in consequences, some excite us more to look for their antecedents; our moral, spatial, and logical intuitions have for us many consequences but no antecedents. The final proposition in which we shall sum up all that it is possible to know about the universe will have very complex grounds for its validity, but it will have no consequences. If the so-called principle of sufficient reason needs to be formulated at all, it should have standing

side by side with it the principle of invariable consequence; here is exhibited, as everywhere else, the fundamental quality of thinking, its duality. Both axioms, in their objective expression, might be expressed in one in the sentence: *Occurrences in the world are linked together in series*; or, *Reasoning is possible*. (C.L.F.)

The principle has played a great rôle in philosophy, many great philosophers taking a hand at giving it formulation. Perhaps the most famous after Leibnitz is Schopenhauer (as below), who develops a 'fourfold root' of the principle, i. e. (1) 'law of reason for Becoming' (*principium rationis sufficienter fieri*); (2) 'law of reason for Knowledge' (*prin. rat. suff. cognoscendi*); (3) 'law of reason for Being' (*essendi*); (4) 'law of reason for Conduct' (*agendi*), or 'law of Motivation.' These formulations are also given (in detail), together with many citations from other philosophers and logicians, by Eisler, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe*, 'Grund (Satz vom)'. (J.M.B.)

*Literature*: LATTI, Leibnitz (1898); URBAN, Hist. of the Princ. of Suff. Reason, Princeton Contrib. to Philos., i (1898); and Psychol. Rev., iv. (1897) 361; the Histories of Philosophy, 'Leibnitz'; SCHOPENHAUER, Die vierfache Wurzel d. zureichenden Grundes; systematic works on logic. (C.S.P., J.M.B.)

**Sufism** [Arab. *Tasawwuf*, the becoming or being a *Sâfi*. The word is from *sîf*, 'wool'; the equivalent *pashmina-pûsh*, 'clad in wool,' occurring commonly in Persian. Attempts to connect it with *σοφός* in the West, and with the Arabic root *safâ*, 'purity,' in the East, must be regarded as purely fanciful. Woollen clothing typifies adherence to the primitive simplicity enjoined by Islâm, and rejection of the pomps, vanities, and luxuries of the world; a fact clearly brought out by the historian al-Mas'ûdî in his account of the 'orthodox caliphs,' especially in what he says of 'Umar': Ger. *Sufismus*; Fr. *Soufisme*; Ital. *Sûfismo*. The more or less pantheistic and idealistic system of mysticism prevalent in Muhammadan countries, especially in Persia.

According to their own view, the Sûfis are simply esoteric Muhammadans, holding the essential, inner doctrine which lies at the root of Islâm. The pantheistic idealism which, more or less clearly, the extreme Sûfis profess, is based on certain verses of the Qur'an, such as 'Thou didst not shoot when thou didst shoot, but God shot' (alluding to the Muhammadan archers at the Battle of Bedr); and on certain