On its intensive side, the tendon sensation has been found to obey Weber's law, thus resembling the sensation of pressure. Cf. HAPTICS, and ORGANIC SENSATION. (E.B.T.)

Literature: KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol., 142, 162; GOLDSCHEIDER, Du Bois-Reymond's Arch. (1889, 3 arts.); MÜLLER and SCHUMANN, Pflüger's Arch., xlv; BEAUNIS, Les Sensations internes; CLAPARÈDE, Le sens musculaire. (E.B.T.-J.M.B.)

Tenet: see DOGMA.

Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb. (1761–1819.) Born and educated at Erfurt, he became Privat-docent in 1788 at Jena, and lectured on the history of philosophy. He became assistant professor at Jena in 1798. From that time until 1819 he was engaged in writing his history of philosophy in eleven volumes. After 1804 he was professor of philosophy in Marburg, where he died.

Tense: see CONJUGATION (in grammar), and cf. GRAMMAR.

Tension (sensations of): see STRAIN SENSATION.

Tenure (of land) [Lat. *tenere*, to hold]: Ger. *Art der Lehnbarkeit*, (2) *Lehen, Erbbesitz*; Fr. *tenure*; Ital. *possesso della terra*. (1) The right of holding property in land.

(2) The kind of right by which property in land is held.

English tenures are based on the feudal system, under which each proprietor (tenant) held under a feudal superior to whom he owed some feudal service, the ultimate superior being the king. This has become so interwoven with their political constitution, that although the many ancient feudal tenures are now practically reduced to one—that of free and common socage—English courts still treat the heritable qualities of land as not subject to variation in favour of those claiming under foreign adoptions, legitimations, or marriages of a kind not permitted by English law. See Dicey, *Conflict of Laws*, Introd., 32, chap. xxii. Feudalism viewed all land as the fruit of conquest, and its owner as invested with the rights of a conqueror, as to jurisdiction as well as property. Roman law viewed it as acquired by virtue of a civil act of the state —a grant, passing property, but not any sovereignty or jurisdiction. 'At Rome, property was derived from political rights, rather than political rights from property' (Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, i. 168). The English colonies in America were generally settled under charters specifying that the lands were to be held of the king, as the lord, in free and common socage, as of some specified English manor. *Military tenure* required of the tenant military aids and services, uncertain as to the time of their performance, because dependent on military necessities. *Free socage tenure* required free, honourable, and certain aids or services, not of a military character, or in some cases fealty only; and *free and common socage tenure*, of the king, was a tenure by mere fealty. Colonial practice and legislation soon made land titles there, generally, *allodial*, i.e. an absolute fee simple estate of inheritance, not held of any superior (see Kent, *Commentaries on American Law*, iii. 509). Allodial tenure preceded feudalism on the continent of Europe, and was less absolutely superseded by it there than in England. The French Revolution turned France into a country of small proprietors in fee (see *Code Civil*, Liv. II. tit. ii). *Freehold tenure*: an estate held under no superior for a life or some uncertain period.

Kinship is the first basis of civil society, and when the nomad tribe settles down upon a fixed territory, the land becomes the bond of union, in place of the connection by blood. Land tenures are at first common, then individual. See Maine, *Ancient Law* (103), *Village Communities*, and the *Early Hist. of Inst.* (72, 188).

Literature: BLACKSTONE, Commentaries, ii. chaps. v, vi; LORIA, Analisi della proprietà capitalistica; Systems of Land Tenure in Various Countries, edited for the Cobden Club by J. W. PROBYN; the works cited above. (S.E.B.)

Teratology [Gr. τέρας, monster, + λόγος, science]: Ger. *Teratologie*; Fr. *tératologie*; Ital. *teratologia*. The science which treats of malformations or monsters.

Under this are included cases of particularly abnormal formations, such as supernumerary members, absence or deficiency of limbs, double monsters (Siamese twins), one creature with two heads, hermaphrodites, acephalic monsters, &c. On the mental side these are of interest as indicating the correlation of abnormal physical with abnormal mental conditions, and as illustrative of the effects of brain deficiency or peculiarity. They fall under VARIATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (q. v.). In anthropology, mythology, and folk-lore, monsters have always been a subject of speculation and myth. See MONSTER (also for literature), and SPORT. (J.J.)

Term [Lat. *terminus*, trans. of Gr. ὅρος, literally a boundary; there is a Greek word

τέρμα; but it is not used in a logical sense]: Ger. *Terminus*; Fr. *terme*; Ital. *termine*. (1) One of the principal parts of a PROPOSITION (q.v.). If from the proposition ' Socrates is mortal' we strike out the separate indication of the subject we have '—— is mortal'; and this ought to be regarded as a term. It is usually stated that 'mortal' is the term; but if there is any difference, it should rather be '—— is mortal.'

In most languages no separate word 'is' is required to assert that 'Socrates is mortal'; and as long as Greek was the language of logic, in which an *is* may be inserted or may be omitted, little importance was attached to the *is*. But the Latin logicians of the 12th century began to regard this as essential, and thus made a distinction between ' is mortal' and 'mortal,' which relates to the peculiarities of a small class of languages. Thereafter logicians, and especially nominalists, began to regard terms no longer as parts of propositions, but as general names having an existence and meaning irrespective of any potential proposition. In most languages there appear not to be any such nouns, or very few. In Semitic languages, for example, common nouns are thought as parts of verbs, approaching the nature of participles, as most of them in fact are. It is, therefore, scarcely more true that they are mere names than that our words 'seeing' and 'dying' or 'moriturus' are names. There is in connection with them the idea of their being fragments of possible propositions, and so much so, that the mere adjunction of two of them makes a proposition.

If, however, we are to take *term* as meaning a word used as the sign of (to *designate*) an independent individual object, then it is proper to notice that there are many other signs of that nature. We may therefore generalize the meaning of ' term,' and define it (in the general sense) as a sign which does not separately indicate its object, and therefore cannot separately determine its interpretant.

The ordinary logics overlook *relative* terms. 'Anything whatever is mother only of things loved by itself' is a proposition beyond dispute, since it is true or false. Therefore it must have a predicate: this is, ' is mother only of things loved by'; or it may be taken to be, ' is mothered only by lovers of'; or, ' loves everything mothered by'; or, ' is either lover of or not mother of'; &c. Relative terms once admitted, it becomes evident

that every verb is a term, the difference between 'loves' and 'lover' being merely that the rules of grammar prescribe different syntax for them. On the other hand, there are various words used in propositions which are not terms, because they cannot take the place of proper names. 'Any' may be considered as meaning 'Whatever is,' or 'The individual which the reader selects,' and so as a term; and in like manner 'Some' may be taken as meaning 'The object the wise friend of the speaker selects,' or something of the sort. Relative pronouns, however, together with the letters *A,B,C,* &c., often used as relative pronouns of an improved kind, if symbols at all, are so extremely like indices that they may for ordinary purposes be so considered.

Abstract terms are matters of extreme importance in all difficult reasoning. Thus, in geometry, we define a *point* as a completely determinate place, an *instant* as a completely determinate time, and a *particle* as that which in any instant is at one point and not at any other. But in a time not completely determined a particle *moves*. We express that by introducing the abstract term *line* as the place in which a particle may be in the course of time. The advantage of doing this is that it enables us to consider relations of lines and their motions, which we could not have done without the abstraction.

(2) A relation is said to have *terms*, which are the objects thus related the one to another. So we speak of the terms of a ratio or proportion.

Absolute term: a term like a common substantive word which connotes nothing.

Ampliate and *ampliative terms*. An ampliative term is a term which when in the predicate causes its subject, the ampliate term, to denote more than before. Among ampliative terms are reckoned by Scotus (in I *Priorum,* qu. xvi) verbs in future and past tenses, and future and preterite participles; also such verbs as *potest, contingit,* and names derived from them; also *significo, intelligo, promitto,* and the like, and in general every verb whose object may be indifferently a present or future thing.

Concrete term: a term not abstract, whether it be a substantive or purely denotative term (according to the mediaeval doctrine) or an appellative or connotative term.

Connotative term: a term which, in addition to 'supponere pro,' or directly denoting something, also *connotes* that that principally

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denoted thing has some essential or accidental aspect. Such is ' white,' which means 'having whiteness.'

Denominative term: a NAME (q.v.).

[*Designate term* (and *designation*): a term which is used to indicate merely a particular object or class of objects; the application of such a term is 'designation.'—J.M.B.]

Discrete term: a term which denotes one sole individual, but this may be an individual collection, or system.

Exponible term: a syncategorematic word making a proposition exponible, that is, exceptive, exclusive, reduplicative, inceptive, comparative, &c. (C.S.P.)

Negative term: any portion of experience (whether complicated or not) can be conceived of as a single term a; *all* of what is *other than* it is then regarded as the negative of that term, and is represented by *non-a* (or by $\bar{a}$). The negative has, therefore, two properties: (2) it fills up the whole of the rest of the field of thought (whether that be absolutely all that is conceivable or merely the immediate subject of discussion), and (1) it is in some essential respect distinct from its positive, so that there can be no object which is at once a and $\bar{a}$; in other words, (1) nothing is both, and (2) everything is one or the other. If, following the grammatical device by which we say *large round table* for a thing which is at once *large and round and* a table, we write $a\,b$ for things which are at once a and b, and if we write $a+b$ for things which are a or b; if, moreover, we write o and ∞ for nothing and everything respectively, and $<$ for *is*, or *implies*, we may express these two elements of the definition of the negative thus:

(1) $a\bar{a} < o,$ (2) $\infty < a+\bar{a}.$

The second is commonly called the principle of *no tertium quid* or of the excluded middle; the first, the principle of contradiction. But a and $\bar{a}$ are called contradictory terms (and in the case of propositions p and $\bar{p}$ are said to exactly *contradict* each another); it is a pity, therefore, to give the name of principle of contradiction to one only of the two conditions which they must satisfy. It would be much better to call (1) the property of exclusion (or mutual exclusion), and (2) the property of exhaustion (or conjoint exhaustion). These two properties of being mutually exclusive and conjointly exhaustive may be possessed by any number of parts of a whole; thus *equal to, greater than,* and *less than* exhaust the relation of relative size and exclude each

other—they may be regarded as a contradictory triplet. When we abstract from all other properties of objects and think of them simply under the aspect of quantity (that is, in mathematics), we state these two properties at once in the form of a so-called axiom; (3) the whole is equal to the sum of its parts; that is, is not greater than (there is no overlapping) and is not less than (there is no falling short, no unoccupied space, no *tertium quid*) its parts when put together. But as thus stated, this axiom is tautologous; what is the meaning of *its parts,* if not the two properties restated in the axiom? It would be better to substitute for this axiom a postulate: things can be separated up into parts which are *distinct* and *constitutive,* that is, which do not overlap and which together fully make up the whole, or which are *exclusive* and *exhaustive.* And as thus stated the postulate applies to the concepts or terms of logic as well as to the quantities of mathematics.

Every term has a negative unless it fills up the whole universe, in which case its negative is non-existent: $\infty < a$ is the same thing as $\bar{a} < o$. It can be proved that to a given term there is only one negative (Grassmann; Whitehouse, *Universal Algebra,* i. 36). What is the negative of a term which is itself a negative? It must be *all* of that which is *other than* that negative, but this takes us back to the original positive term, or the relation of ' being a negative of' a term is a reciprocal relation; that is, $\bar{\bar{a}} = a$. This last is, therefore, not, as Sigwart thinks, another axiom, or postulate, but a derived proposition. (C.L.F.)

Terminism and **Terminists**: see OCCAMISTS.

Terminology. [The various sections of this article are supplementary to the terminological matter of the DICTIONARY. The sections are arranged by languages, and in each the terms are in alphabetical order. Cross-references from one of these lists to another always have the word 'above' or 'below' to distinguish them from cross-references to the main topics of the work. In cases in which the recommendation supplements or modifies that made under a leading topic, a cross-reference is made to that topic. The terms included here are indexed in the general Indexes to vol. ii, along with the matter of the DICTIONARY generally, so that the entries in those Indexes suffice for the whole text.— J.M.B.]