

of its object without any action necessarily taking place which should establish a factual connection between sign and object. If this was the meaning of Burgersdicius, his *thema* is the same as the present writer's 'symbol' (see SIGN). (C.S.P.)

**Theocracy** [Gr. *θεός*, God, + *κρατος*, government]: Ger. *Theokratie*; Fr. *théocratie*; Ital. *teocrazia*. Government by a god or gods.

The first known government, even when patriarchal, was theocratic. The most highly developed was perhaps the Jewish. The Mohammedan governments and the government (till lately) of the Papal States may be taken as modern instances. Theocracy is not involved in the mere recognition (as in classical Greece) of a divine power or powers over and above the political heads of the nation. In a theocracy the divine power, through his representative (the priests) or his word (e.g. the Koran), takes part in the actual political government. It is not enough for the ruler (as in ancient Rome) to be sometimes also the priest; in a theocracy it is the priest who is the ruler. (J.B.)

**Theocracy** [Gr. *θεός*, God, + *κρατος*, mixing, a mingling with the divine]: Ger. *innige Verbindung mit Gott*; Fr. *absorption en Dieu*; Ital. *teocrazia*. That state of mystical blessedness attained by the Neo-Platonic or Hindu theosophist when by ascetic preparation and contemplation he overcomes the barrier which separates his individual consciousness from the Absolute One and loses himself in the divine essence.

The state here defined is not an exclusive possession of Neo-Platonists and Hindumystics; it is in some sense the ideal of all mysticism. It is the tendency of the mystic to escape definition and distinction in the spheres of both thought and feeling. This presupposes a distinctionless unity as its goal, which, emotionally contemplated, is the mystic's ideal of heaven. (A.T.O.)

**Theodicy** [Gr. *θεός*, God, + *δικη*, justice]: Ger. *Theodicee*; Fr. *théodicée*; Ital. *teodicea*. A department of theology or philosophy which has for its aim the vindication of the goodness and justice of God in view of the existence of evil in the world; or, more technically, that department of theology or philosophy of religion which treats of the nature and government of God and the destiny of the soul.

Although many theodicies were developed before Leibnitz, he was the first to employ the name distinctively in his *Essais de Théodicée*, which appeared in 1710, since which

the term has been in common use. The central issue in theodicies is the problem of evil in view of which the two opposing views of optimism and pessimism have been reached; the latter is the despair of its solution, and has received its classical utterance in Schopenhauer. The easy optimism of Leibnitz is no longer in vogue, and recent thought is pretty well divided between pessimism and the Kanto-Lotzian tendency to seek refuge in the demands of the moral judgment.

**Literature**: LEIBNITZ, *Essais de Théodicée*; WERDERMANN, *Neuer Versuch zur Theodicee* (1848); BENEDICT, *Theodicaea* (1882); J. YOUNG, *Evil and Good* (1861); SCHOPENHAUER and LOTZE, *Philosophies of Religion*; ROYCE, *The Conception of God*; and *Studies in Good and Evil*. See also RELIGION (philosophy of). (A.T.O.)

**Theogony**: see MYTHOLOGY.

**Theological Ethics**: Ger. *theologische Ethik*; Fr. *éthique théologique*; Ital. *etica teologica*. ETHICS (Christian). Ethics treated as a department of moral theology, and proceeding on the assumption of the absolute authority of Scriptures.

**Literature**: see ETHICS (Christian), and MORAL THEOLOGY. (A.T.O.)

**Theology** [Gr. *θεός*, God, + *λόγος*, word or science]: Ger. *Theologie*; Fr. *théologie*; Ital. *teologia*. That part of the philosophy of religion which treats systematically of the Deity, his nature, attributes, and relations, and the grounds and limits of our knowledge of him.

**Biblical theology**: the systematic treatment of the doctrines of the Christian religion as contained in the Bible and developed in the history of the Church.

In the general sense, theology is a department of general philosophy. Biblical theology arises out of the application of principles of rational construction to the content of Christian revelation. Biblical theology is ordinarily divided into four branches—exegetical, historical, systematical, and practical or moral.

**Literature**: BELLARMINE, *Disputationes de controversiis fidei*; F. W. H. J. GASS, *Gesch. d. protestantischen Dogmatik*; Church Histories in general; HAGENBACH, *Hist. of Doctrines* (Eng. trans. by H. B. Smith); Herzog's *Real-Encyc.*; also Schaff-Herzog's *Encyclopedia*; Metzger and Welte's *Kirchenlexicon*; McClintock and Strong's *Encyclopedia*; systematic theologies, by HODGE, SHEDD, &c. (A.T.O.)

**Theology** (dogmatic): Ger. *dogmatische Theologie*; Fr. *théologie dogmatique*; Ital.

*teologia dommatica*. The system of theological doctrine developed dogmatically; that is, by a method whose ultimate appeal is not to reason, but to authority, either that of Scripture or of Scripture and tradition combined.

The basis of dogmatics in the Roman Catholic Church is a union of Scripture and tradition, while in the reformed churches, as a rule, the authority of tradition is rejected, and the dogma rests on the sole authority of Scriptures.

**Literature**: see THEOLOGY. (A.T.O.)

**Theophany** [Gr. *θεός*, God, + *φαίνεσθαι*, to appear]: Ger. *Theophanie*; Fr. *théophanie*; Ital. *teofania*. (1) General: the revelation of himself which the Deity makes through his works.

(2) Special: God's revelation of himself in Christophanic form: in the Old Testament, in the Shechinah; in the New, in the incarnation, birth, baptism, and second coming of Christ. See CHRISTOPHANY.

In the general sense, the whole world may be regarded as a theophany or manifestation of the divine. In the special sense, God always appears in the person of the Son. (A.T.O.)

**Theophrastus of Eresus**. (cir. 370-288 B.C.) A Greek philosopher, pupil of Aristotle, for thirty-five years head of the Peripatetic School after the latter's death. See PERIPATETICS.

**Theorem** [Gr. *θεώρημα*]: Ger. *Theorem*, *Lehrsatz*; Fr. *théorème*; Ital. *teorema*. A demonstrable theoretical proposition. (C.S.P.)

**Theory** (in science) [Gr. *θεωρία*, a contemplation, speculation]: Ger. *Theorie*; Fr. *théorie*; Ital. *teoria*. A general principle or formula propounded for the purpose of explaining phenomena, as the 'theory of gravitation,' or the Newtonian theory.

In modern nomenclature it is confined to principles the truth of which has at least a large measurement of plausibility, in contradistinction to a hypothesis, which is propounded as a tentative explanation, the truth of which is to be verified or disproved by subsequent research. (S.N.)

The whole aim of science is to find out facts, and to work out a satisfactory theory of them. Still, a theory does not necessarily lose its utility by not being altogether true. It must be intelligible and diagrammatical, or it has no title to the name *theory*. The facts to which it refers are not necessarily facts of experience; they may be relations of pure mathematical forms. A theory is properly a result of systematic scientific con-

sideration, not of mere casual suggestions; and thus the word bears a somewhat eulogistic implication in contrast to 'view.' Theory is opposed to fact; the latter meaning, in this connection, that which is forced upon us by perception; while theory is the part of science which is contributed by the intellect and confirmed by experiment. Theory is also opposed to practice; because a theory is a scientific product, and a pure, or theoretical, theory has regard to science alone, and is often in conflict with the practical theory, which ought preferably to be the guide of immediate action. But the latter is as truly a theory as the former, and ought equally (when practicable) to be a product of scientific examination. That which science recommends for its own use in a secular investigation may be different from what it prescribes as a basis for instant action.

Every theory has its beginning in hypothesis. For, except perhaps in pure mathematics, the presumptive adoption of a hypothesis is the only possible way of framing a judgment concerning things beyond perception; unless we consider instinctive judgments as an exception. Neither is the situation essentially otherwise in pure mathematics. A mathematical theory supposes a broad conception of the forms to which it relates. This is known to be true of them only by a process of demonstration, which in many cases has to wait for several years for its accomplishment, and in all cases must be subsequent to the first beginnings of the theory. It may be that a quasi-induction has created a belief in a mathematical theorem before it has been demonstrated. But a valid and genuine induction is not possible in pure mathematics, for the reason that genuine induction essentially relates to the ratio of frequency of a specific phenomenon to a generic phenomenon in the ordinary course of experience. Now in pure mathematics, which deals with figments of our own creation, there is nothing at all to correspond accurately to a course of experience. Suppose we find, for example, that in a complicated development there is a certain regular relation among the first terms. If there is no obscure demonstrative insight which assures us that this *must* be, it is quite possible that, as the series goes on, a state of things may intervene which interferes with that relation, and if so, the proportion of terms that will accord with that formula will presumably be very far from 1:1. There is, therefore, no security of the nature which belongs to induction, that as the instances

are multiplied the observed ratio will indefinitely approximate to the true ratio. This sort of induction, therefore, has no other validity than such as belongs to a hypothesis which suits the facts as far as we yet know them. If it is to be called an induction, it is a degenerate induction differing very little from hypothesis. It may properly be said, then, that even a pure mathematical theory is developed out of hypotheses.

No theory in the positive sciences can be supposed to satisfy every feature of the facts. Although we know that the law of gravitation is one of the most perfect of theories, yet still, if bodies were to attract one another inversely as a power of the distance whose exponent were not 2, but 2.000001, the only observable effect would be a very slow rotation of the line of apsides of each planet. Now the lines of apsides all do rotate in consequence of perturbations, which virtually do alter slightly the sun's attraction, and thus such an effect would probably only produce slight discrepancies in the values obtained for the masses of the planets. In very many cases, especially in practical problems, we deliberately go upon theories which we know are not exactly true, but which have the advantage of a simplicity which enables us to deduce their consequences. This is true of almost every theory used by engineers of all kinds. The most extraordinary departure from the known facts occurs when hydrodynamics is applied, where the theory is in striking opposition to facts which obtrude themselves upon every spectator of moving water. Nevertheless, even in this case, the theory is not useless.

In all the explanatory sciences theories far more simple than the real facts are of the utmost service in enabling us to analyse the phenomena, and it may truly be said that physics could not possibly deal even with its relatively simple facts without such analytic procedure. Thus, the kinetical theory of gases, when first propounded, was obliged to assume that all the molecules were elastic spheres, which nobody could believe to be true. If this is necessary even in physics, it is far more indispensable in every other science, and most of all in the moral sciences, such as political economy. Here the same method is to begin by considering persons placed in situations of extreme simplicity, in the utmost contrast to those of all human society, and animated by motives and by reasoning powers equally unlike those of real men. Nevertheless, in this way alone can a base be obtained

from which to proceed to the consideration of the effects of different complications. Owing to the necessity of making theories far more simple than the real facts, we are obliged to be cautious in accepting any extreme consequences of them, and to be also upon our guard against apparent refutations of them based upon such extreme consequences.

Whewell makes a great point of the relativity of the distinction between theory and fact. This is an important point that ought not to be overlooked. Every fact involves an element supplied by the mind, which if not, properly speaking, theory, is analogous to theory. On the other hand, serious errors of logic will result from not taking account of the difference between the intellectual elements already involved in the perceptual facts and scientific theories. A theory is a result subject to criticism, meaning by criticism, not the consideration of whether or how far an object is beautiful, useful, or the like, but the passing of a judgment as to whether the object *ought* to be as it is or as it is proposed to make it. If this judgment is adverse, the theory can and will be altered; and it will not be maintained by anybody until it is put into a shape to withstand his criticism. But it is perfectly idle, in this sense of the word, for anybody to criticize what he cannot help; and, like other idle and unamiable practices, it is also highly pernicious. Now all the subconscious work of the intellect in framing a percept and a perceptual judgment is beyond our control, and therefore not subject to logical criticism. It simply has to be accepted. Kant, perhaps, did not sufficiently appreciate this when he undertook to study the critic of such mental forms as space, time, unity, reality, &c.; but, after all, his deduction of the categories is merely in outcome that knowledge cannot be had on other terms; that is, that they are inevitable. Perceptual judgments, therefore, are, for the purposes of logical criticism, absolute facts without any admixture of theory. If a theory does not square with perceptual facts it must be changed. But the impressions of sense from which it is supposed that the percepts have been constructed are matters of theory. If the percepts were proved not to square with the impressions of sense, it would not at all be the percepts that would have to be reformed, for they cannot be reformed; it would be, on the contrary, that theory, that the percepts are constructed out of impressions of sense, that would have to be modified. (C.S.P., C.L.F.)

**Theory of Knowledge:** see EPISTEMOLOGY, and cf. GNOSEIOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, and METAPHYSICS.

**Theosophy** [Gr. *theosopía*, divine wisdom]: Ger. *Theosophie*; Fr. *théosophie*; Ital. *teosofia*. (1) A stage into which philosophic reflection passes when its primary data are God and an organ through which he is revealed or mystically intuited.

(2) A form of Buddhistic thinking which from the postulate of a divine principle deduces the fundamental law of things, a vibratory movement of evolution and involution, the application of which in the sphere of psychic life leads to the process of perpetual reincarnation.

In the first or general sense most oriental thinking is theosophic. Modern thought first became distinctively so in Neo-Platonism, but the tendency has survived down to the present, and has taken on various embodiments.

The Buddhistic form is a direct importation from the East, and has Madame Blavatsky for its great apostle. It has many votaries, and seems to be a growing cult. Cf. MYSTICISM.

**Literature:** PLOTINUS, *Enneads*; PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, *Theologia mystica* and *De divinis nominibus*; works of JACOB BÖHME and SWEDENBORG. For the special forms, see Johnson's *Cyclopedia*, art. *Theosophy*; WM. Q. JUDGE, *The Ocean of Theosophy* (1893); SINNETT, *Esoteric Buddhism* (1883); RAMA PRASAD, *Nature's Finer Forces* (1890). (A.T.O.)

**Therapeutics** (mental): see PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS, and MIND-CURE.

**Thesis** [Gr. *thesis*, a placing or setting; also, in the modern sense, and apparently sometimes to mean merely a universal proposition]: Ger. *These*; Fr. *thèse*; Ital. *tesi*. An assertion formally stated preparatory to a regular defence of it by argumentation.

The Latin form *positio* is less formal in its implication. The denial of a thesis preparatory to regular counter-argumentation is sometimes called the *antithesis*; but this is rarely used except with reference to Kant's antinomies. In geometry, the abstract statement of a theorem is called the *enunciation*, or first enunciation; the statement with reference to the diagram being called the second enunciation, or statement. The latter is also called the *ecthesis*, or *exposition*. For other meanings of thesis, see *The Century Dictionary*. (C.S.P.)

**Thing** (in law). Ger. *Ding*, *Sache*; Fr. *chose*; Ital. *cosa*. The object of a RIGHT (q.v., in law).

It must be something capable of standing in a relation to the human will; it may be either material, or an object or group of objects only discernible by the mind (Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. viii. 85). *Simple thing*: one that can be comprehended, externally, by a single act of recognition, e.g. a horse. *Compound thing*: one to be comprehended only on a view of its several acts or properties, separately considered, e.g. a house. *Intellectual things*: those not material, e.g. an obligation, a copyright. *Divisible things*: things divisible without destroying their essential character or value. A house or horse cannot be thus divided; a pair of horses or block of houses might be (see Pollock, *Jurisprudence*, chap. vi). *Thing in action*, or *chose in action*: a thing not in the possession of the person with reference to its relation to whom it is considered. Not being in his possession, he, if the owner, may be forced to bring an action in order to get it. *Things fungible*: those which can be replaced by others of the same kind without loss to the owner, e.g. a barrel of flour of a certain brand. See RES. (S.E.B.)

**Thing-in-itself:** see NOUMENON, DING AN SICH, and KANT'S TERMINOLOGY, Glossary, 'Ding an sich.'

**Thinking:** see THOUGHT.

**Thinking** (in educational method). In general, the exercise of the intellect, specifically, in grasping the significance of facts presented in instruction.

Nearly all stages of school methods give the pupil's mind some exercise in thinking, but the phase of thinking deemed important enough to be designated as a stage or 'step' in method is the formation of generalizations. Dürpfeldt classifies the mental movements formed in a complete act of learning as follows: (1) Observation, (2) Thinking, (3) Application. Other writers, like Ziller and Rein, divide this second stage into Association and Generalization. See FORMAL STEPS, REFLECTION, and METHOD (in education). (C.D.E.G.)

**Thisness** [ME. *this*]: Ger. *Diesheit* (Wolff); Fr. *écceité*; Ital. *ecceità*. Trans. of Lat. *haecceitas*. See LATIN AND SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY, II, and cf. Eisler, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe*, 'Haecceitas.' (J.M.B.)

**Thomas à Kempis.** (1380-1471.) Born at Kempen, near Cologne; was for seven years novitiate; entered, about 1407, the cloister of St. Agnes as regular canon, became superior, and died there. He belonged to the Brotherhood of the Common Life, founded by Ruysbroek and Geert de Groot.