

beyond the cleverness of the forger. The handwriting might have been imitated, but a forger could only by a triumph of genius have grasped that yielding side of Mary's nature which appears in the Casket Letters. As Mr. Lang says: "That any forger should have known Mary so well as to place her, imaginatively, as regarded Bothwell, in the very attitude which we see that, on occasion, she chose later to adopt in fact as regarded Norfolk, is perhaps beyond belief. To myself the internal evidence of style seems rather in favor of considerable and compromising portions of the letters." Besides the Casket Letters, there are the Casket Sonnets; and, though these were rejected by Brantôme and Ronsard, who thought from Mary's previous verses that she could not have written so uncouthly, the prima-facie reasons for accepting them are not slight.

Notwithstanding his willingness to look adverse evidence squarely in the face, Mr. Lang must be called a friend of Mary Stuart. Either from forethought or incidentally, he does her service by representing in such an unfavorable light the men against whom she strove for power. Lethington he admires on the score of superior cleverness, though morally as bad as the rest. "Few are the good men, rare are the good deeds, that must meet us in this tragic History. 'There is none that doeth good; no, not one.'" In politics, murder was a rule of the game; in the pursuit of pleasure, every one followed his own devices. Moray was a shifty hypocrite, "looking through his fingers" at murder whereby he profited. Morton was born with falseness in the blood, and "his sanctimonious snuffle is audible still." Mary at least was born with a good heart. "She was no natural dissembler, and with difficulty came to understand that others could be false. Her sense of honor might become perverted, but she had a strong native sense of honor."

Mr. Lang is a hard hitter, and this volume is not one which will command anything like universal assent. It is bound to displease Mary's champions, while it runs even more counter to the strictly Calvinist view of the Queen and her generation. At present a settlement of the debate is out of the question, and it may long remain so. In the meantime, it is enough that Mr. Lang should have written a very clever, exhaustive, and well-informed account of Mary's struggles with her enemies and with her fate.

GIDDINGS'S INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY.

Inductive Sociology: A Syllabus of Methods, Analyses, and Classifications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws. By Franklin Henry Giddings. The Macmillan Co. 8vo, pp. xviii, 302.

Perhaps the best way to convey to our readers an idea of what they may expect to find in this volume will be to give a brief account of the contents of one of its more elaborate chapters, that upon Concerted Volition. We find this chapter to be divided into four parts: (1) The Rise of Concerted Volition; (2) On Coöperation; (3) On the Modes of Concerted Volition; (4) The Laws of Concerted Volition. Under the head of the Rise of Concerted Volition are considered,

first, its subjective conditions, and, secondly, its objective conditions. The latter are said to be principally, (1) Developed Communication (the press, etc.), and (2) Association in meetings. Since it is our business to criticize and doubt, we ask ourselves whether this enumeration of the objective conditions evinces a thorough historical study. Volition is not desire nor passion; it is action. Now does history show that a passionate state of public temper is transmuted into volition by those two influences alone; or does it show that, upon the top of them, some startling act of apparent violence is usually requisite besides? Was our civil war brought from smoke to flame by the attack on Fort Sumter, or the Franco-German war by the supposed insult to the French Ambassador, or our difficulty with Spain by the destruction of the *Maine*?

Under the head of Coöperation, we note that Professor Giddings is not one of those who would make this the essential fact of society. But, on the other hand, neither is he one of those who conceive that it, like responses to stimuli, is divisible into the two grand divisions of coöperative volition and competitive volition, and who opine that these two are pendants to one another; roughly speaking, of equal importance in sociology. So far is he from accepting this view that no chapter of his book is devoted to competition. In all his pages there are but a dozen lines in which the word occurs, and there only as one of two topics. Is this factor of human society, then, not worth any special study? The nature of coöperation is analyzed and found to involve four factors—common interest, perception of what others are doing, intercommunication, and mutual confidence. Its causes are inquired into with the result that men first find that they are virtually coöperating, and then do deliberately what they began to do instinctively or accidentally. Other influences, however, are recognized as secondary. Coöperation is found to have four forms. Two are simple—that in which all do the same thing, and that in which there is division of labor. Two are complex; but the definitions are not very clear, and the division, though possibly useful, is somewhat artificial. Perhaps we should say that the line of demarcation is artificial; for two classes may be as really separate as two branches of a tree, and yet it may be equally impossible to find any real defining line between them. Distinctions in the extent of coöperation are noticed, as well as the distinction between public and private coöperation.

There follows a somewhat elaborate analysis of the work of coöperation. The practical activities of a social population are said to have four modes, Appreciation, Utilization, Characterization, Socialization. This had been said in an earlier chapter. Appreciation is liking or disliking a thing. By Characterization is meant adapting ourselves to things; by Socialization, adapting ourselves to our social environment. Now, granting that this is a good division of the results of our activity, can it be truly said, or not, that these four results of activity give rise to four forms of coöperative work? To make this out, the author first defines Culture as the coöperative development of appreciation. We must all admit there is such a thing. Perhaps it

is what is commonly called fashion or the prevailing taste of an historic period. Professor Giddings says there are three orders of ideas belonging to it—the linguistic, the animistic, and the scientific. Apparently, this is where Science is pigeon-holed in his scheme of society. But if there be anything more distinctly foreign to science than another, it is appreciation, in the sense of liking or disliking. The scientific interest of things disgusting is just as great as that of the most sugared sweets.

We now come to the third division of the chapter, on Modes of Concerted Volition. The like-mindedness is either Instinctive, Sympathetic, Dogmatic, or Deliberative. The instinctive is seen or read of in the squatter. Of the sympathetic, the subjective factors are said to be (1) impulsive like-response; (2) suggestibility; (3) reciprocal consciousness of kind; (4) the suggestions of shibboleth, etc.; (5) imitativeness; (6) contagious emotion. The objective factors are communication with physical conditions, and the crowd. Sympathetic like-mindedness especially enriches cultural activities. It is manifested especially in panics, revivals, sympathetic strikes, riots, and similar phenomena. Dogmatic like-mindedness is traditional, customary, and conservative. Its subjective factors are belief and deductive reasoning. Its objective factors are the communication of common beliefs and authoritative instruction. Its contribution to coöperation lies chiefly in its conversion of common ideas into differentiated traditions and of common activities into customs. It is marked by partisanship, reliance on legislation to regulate private conduct, deference to tradition, and some other phenomena. Deliberative like-mindedness is characterized by critical thought and well-coördinated action. Its chief subjective factors are public opinion and inductive research. Its objective conditions are freedom of speech and of meeting. Without giving all Professor Giddings's items, we may sum them up by saying that he conceives that this kind of like-mindedness brings rationality into every department of coöperative work. It is found in the most advanced modern nations. Now follow thirteen pages of tables of questions to be investigated as to the state of concerted volition in any society.

Finally, we reach the fourth division of the chapter, that on the Laws of Concerted Volition. The formulation of these betrays imitation of a bad model, that of Tarde, who is one of that well-known type of Frenchmen who copy the phraseology of mathematics, as if that possessed, in itself, a secret virtue of rendering vague ideas precise. Thus, we are told that "impulsive social action tends to extend and to intensify in a geometrical progression." Mathematicians, we are aware, speak of one variable increasing geometrically, while another increases arithmetically; but what (if anything) may be meant by saying that a quantity varies in geometrical progression without reference to any second quantity, we must confess transcends our powers to divine. Nor do we see that imitation can be so measured that it is worth while to attempt to say what the mathematical nature of the function is that connects it with another quantity. For the present, such ideas seem irrelevant. At any rate, the meaningless expression must excuse our suspecting that there is nothing more val-

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table beneath it than the simple remark that where there is a tendency to imitate, the imitation of imitations will multiply imitations. The second law is, that "Impulsive social action varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means." Here again, the language is to a mathematician repellent. Is anything more meant than the truism that when men are in the habit of acting reflectively, they are less under the dominion of impulse? If so, why should it not be expressed non-mathematically? So, likewise, why cannot a sociologist content himself with saying that, other things being the same, the older a tradition is, the more it overawes men, instead of laying it down that "tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity"? The use of mathematical phrases in the other laws leads the reader to suppose a mathematical proportion is intended here. There are several other laws which the reader will find in the book. If this class of writers would study the mathematical theory of measurement — say, Clifford's "Analytical Metric" — sufficiently to perceive how such talk as theirs must appear to those who understand what quantity is, we believe that all such phrases would disappear from their pages. Prof. Giddings's work would only be strengthened if this were done.

Perhaps there may be persons who do not reckon the syllabus as a distinct form of literary composition, but there is none which calls for a severer classicality, meaning by that the effect resulting from an abhorrence of the too much, and from long pondering every sentence, as if papyrus were costly and the use of the stylus laborious. It has been the mathematicians who have most excelled in it. A syllabus needs to be a feat of intellectual strength, under pain of sinking to an exhibition of a wooden model, less like science than a painter's mannikin is like a man, by far; for a mannikin may take an expressive pose. The specimen we have given will have convinced the reader that Prof. Giddings is a man of no mean analytic power. Such a scheme as he has drawn up will have its utility in the incipient state of sociological science, even if it is not what a syllabus of sociology ought to be. The index is like the book itself. It is not perfect; but it is much more than pretty good.

Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century. By Henry Grey Graham. Macmillan. 1901.

It was the intent of Plutarch, as he tells us in beginning his life of Alexander, not to write histories, but only lives. For, he explains, the noblest deeds do not always show men's virtues and vices, but oftentimes a light occasion, a word, or some sport makes men's natural dispositions and manners appear more plain than the famous battles won, wherein are slain ten thousand men, or the great armies, or cities won by siege or assault. So Mr. Graham declares his aim to be not so much to give a history of the literature produced by Scotsmen in the eighteenth century as an account of the men who made it. In this undertaking he has been helped very little by such diaries and correspondence as abounded in England and have enabled us to reconstruct the social life of that

age, for the Scots were not addicted to diaries, and if letters were written, few were preserved.

Nor is much to be gained from biographies, for those who wrote them thought it beneath the dignity of literature to mention such trivialities as Plutarch eagerly caught up. Dugald Stewart wrote the Lives of Reid, of Robertson, and of Adam Smith; but he was careful not to draw their frailties from their dread abode, and disclosed their merits only in sounding platitudes and stately periods. Even in 1811, when the relatives of Dr. Carlyle of Inveresk thought of publishing his autobiography, which is a mine of instructive gossip, "they were discouraged by those whom they consulted—Adam Ferguson among the number—on the ground that the incidents and anecdotes were too unimportant to interest the public." Adam Smith, it is true, said in his lectures on rhetoric that he was glad to know that Milton wore lachets in his shoes instead of buckles; but this Plutarchian touch must have offended the pedantic taste of the day. Fortunately, before it was too late, the artificial proprieties of Lord Kames ceased to shackle literature, and a few inquisitive spirits rescued some of the oral traditions, which, like the old ballads, were on the point of sinking into oblivion. What was thus preserved Mr. Graham has cleverly sifted and assorted to make this entertaining volume.

It must be said, however, that he goes rather too far in omitting the noblest deeds and dwelling on the "light occasions." It is well enough to describe the clothes, the gait, the manners, the follies, the personal oddities and defects of by-gone worthies; but more than this is necessary to understand a "character." Mr. Graham is very rigorous in his exposure of corpulence. Some of his heroes were indisputably gaunt; but he eagerly notes all tendency to adipose deposit, and "paunchy" is his favorite epithet. We are told much about Hume; but the chief impression that we receive is that he was fat. On page 35 he is called "the obese philosopher"; at page 36 he is "becoming fatter"; he is "portly"; his "physical exuberance" is to pass into "unwieldy corpulence." At page 39 he has a "broad, fat face," and his corpulence is "vast." On page 42 we read of his "bulky body," and on page 43 of his "unwieldy self." At page 45 he is a "portly man"; at page 46 he is "ponderous"; his face is "broad and fat," his person "corpulent"; he distributes "fat, amiable smiles." His face continues "broad" on the next page, on the next he is "ponderous," then he is a "corpulent pagan," then he is "fat," and his "fatness" and "corpulence" are again referred to, as well as his "huge paunch" and "ponderous frame," and at last the grave closes over his "huge, corpulent form." That should end the matter, but when he is mentioned in other parts of the book we have to be reminded of his fleshiness.

This illustrates the vice of Mr. Graham's style. Often he fails to be sympathetic and appreciative because he is trying to be effective. He has a jaunty, superior manner, and looks down on his subjects with amused and sometimes contemptuous condescension. He has acquired Macaulay's tricks of style, and it is no more than fair to say that he does the tricks nearly as

well as his master. Nor can we deny that he is graphic; his pictures of individuals and of society are vivid and impressive. After we overcome our annoyance at his affectations, we are fairly captivated by his entertaining stories, his incisive criticisms, his lively descriptions. Never was there such an age for "characters"; uniformity was not expected, nor even conformity. Every one was poor, and even those who passed for rich lived on incomes which day laborers would now think meant starvation. The muse was cultivated literally on oatmeal, and little of that; although drink was a prime necessity. With a moderate excise and active smuggling it was abundant, and was, according to our standards, almost the only luxury of the time.

The housing of the better class was mean, gloomy, and cold, and the general filth was appalling. To get a suit of clothes was the event of a lifetime, and people could no more vary their raiment according to fashion than leopards can change their spots. It signifies much when men can count on finding their friends wearing the same coats for years, and every coat as distinguishable as the features of the wearer. It means that men have opinions and habits of their own, and care not whether they suit the prevailing taste. Even George III. could appreciate sturdy individuality, and we are ready to forgive the awful misdeeds enumerated by our forefathers in justifying the Declaration of Independence, when we read of his message to that Jacobite of Jacobites, Laurence Oliphant, the laird of the "Auld House of Gask" and father of the gifted Lady Nairne: "The Elector of Hanover presents compliments to the laird of Gask, and wishes to tell him how much the Elector respects the laird for the steadiness of his principles."

None of these sketches is better than that of Lord Monboddo, whose whims were only less amazing than the sincerity with which he believed in them. He was to be seen in court, sitting among the clerks, having quarrelled with his fellow-judges because they had found against him in a case wherein he was personally interested. He held that all knowledge was of Greek origin, and, following ancient customs, daily anointed himself with oil, after bathing; the latter practice being as much out of vogue with his contemporaries as the former. Carriages and sedan-chairs being unknown to the Greeks, he would not enter them, although if it rained when he came out of the Parliament house, he would put his wig into a chair and walk by its side. He held to our descent from simian ancestors, questioning travellers as to their meeting with survivals of the lost appendage, and even watching at bedroom doors, when children were expected, to catch the midwives snipping off their tails. He was well mated on the bench with Lord Hailes, who once dismissed a cause because a document had the word "justice" spelt without the final "e," and with Lord Hermand, who would smite his bosom as he gave an opinion, exclaiming: "My laards, I feel my law—I feel it here." Worthy of their company was Lord Kames of the "Elements of Criticism," who was interested in everything from law to letters, and so devoted to agriculture that he allowed a pet pig to sleep in the same bed with him. His industry and inquisitiveness never flagged, and two days

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