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ready known to the world, and have used without any hesitation any reliable author that could help me." As for the spirit in which these anecdotes are collected and arranged, it may be gathered from another passage of the preface. "That Napoleon had faults, was sometimes untruthful, cruel, even vicious, is admitted, but the good he performed, the great results he achieved, may possibly overbalance many of these unpleasant and bad qualities; and these, I think, in a great measure, are buried beneath his many noble deeds." The method pursued can be briefly indicated. Apart from a section on the chronology of Napoleon's life, there are five chapters which are devoted to the following subjects: "Boy and Man," "The Soldier," "Emperor and Statesman," "Exile and Philosopher," "The Man and the World." A lack of just perception in the choice of sources is the chief fault of this book, but it is not without other blemishes. The construction of sentences is sometimes defective, the subjects of the illustrations are not, as a rule, the best, and the most cursory glance reveals signs of carelessness. For example, the first line in the table of contents runs: "Napoleon: Boy and Man, 1767-1821," while the first sentence of the first chapter informs us that "Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769." As partial compensation, the printing is good, and there is an accumulation of much entertaining gossip.

"The Early History of Venice," by F. C. Hodgson (Dutton), is a work of both coordination and research. As may be inferred from the title, it begins with the foundation of the city, and its closing episode is furnished by the share which the Venetians took in the Fourth Crusade. No writer on the origin of Venice or on any portion of its history can fail to accentuate the broad cosmopolitan character of the relations into which it was brought by its unique position, but there is room for either failure or success in the treatment of this theme. Mr. Hodgson shows skill in selecting the main lines of a complicated development, and, without sacrificing the local aspects of his subject, lets us see clearly how the town bore itself towards its Italian neighbors as well as towards the trading communities of the Levant. In all respects this must be considered a narrative history rather than a study of municipal and commercial institutions or of social life. In his notice of Venetian government and administration, Mr. Hodgson dwells strongly upon the absence of feudal instincts and influences. "If we turn," he says, "from the external aspect of the city of Venice to the political principles that prevailed there from the earliest days, we shall find that, perhaps more than any other of the states that formed the Western Europe of the Middle Ages, it embodied the ideas that had been bequeathed by the Roman Empire." It was by the route of Constantinople that the ideas of municipal government and of imperial majesty came to Venice, for the first doges were Byzantine officers who gained their appointment in days when the exarchate of Ravenna was still more than a name. Dealing chiefly, as he does, with events, Mr. Hodgson is led to emphasize the exploits of great leaders like Pietro Orseolo II. and Enrico Dandolo, and to pass lightly over those

less palpable tendencies which are seized upon by the professed critic. We would not imply, however, that Mr. Hodgson is deficient in critical aptitude. His introduction gives proof alike of discriminating taste in the choice of authorities and of candor in avowing what he has not read. We are particularly glad to see that he has placed no reliance upon Daru, and that in using Gfrörer's 'Byzantische Geschichten' he is well aware of the author's bias against *Byzantinismus*. On the other hand, he seems less cordial towards Romanin than we could have wished. This is a scholarly and valuable book. It is also one which should prove attractive to medievalists at large.

—Francisque Vial, author of 'L'Enseignement Secondaire et la Démocratie' (Paris: Armand Colin), knows just what his views are and how to give them clear expression. Clear minds, hearts filled with the spirit of justice, unanimity in high national and personal ideals, willingness to sacrifice the selfish interest of the present for the general good of the future—this is what must be cultivated in the masses of the French democracy to insure its success as a form of political and social organization. The masses must feel and act aright, and they must feel and act together. But their feelings and actions will inevitably be determined, in preponderating measure, by the character of the education which they receive. If they are to be at one in their feelings and actions, if there is to be a truly distinctive national spirit, they must be a unit in the educational influences to which they are subjected in the formative period. With the Utilitarian theory of education, however, unity is impossible. To be consistent with its fundamental principle, that theory must ever tend to greater and greater division. Egoism, intellectual and moral anarchy, a stolid indifference to the higher social and political interests and responsibilities are its legitimate fruits. To the Liberal, and not the Utilitarian theory, then, France must look for the type of education which will satisfy the real needs of her democracy. And yet not to the Liberal teaching as it actually exists in the France of to-day. Liberal teaching itself has been taught in the flood of Utilitarianism and carried from its true foundations. It has gone from the general to the special, from principles to facts, adopting methods drawn from its enemies and foreign to its true character and aims. The author has the courage of his convictions sufficiently to take an actual programme of a course in the history of French literature, and set over against it such a programme as he would desire, in which the names of individual authors and other such narrowly specialized topics give way to the more general problems of literary evolution, with the understanding that the teacher is free to select the epochs, authors, and works best suited to throw light upon the problems under consideration. Neither the French democracy nor any other will guide its steps to any great degree in conscious deference to the reasonings of an educational philosopher; but M. Vial's book is none the less worth a careful reading, and may well have a deep influence on the inner circles of educational thought.

#### ROYCE'S WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

*The World and the Individual.* Gifford Lectures [on Natural Religion], Delivered before the University of Aberdeen. Second Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order. By Josiah Royce. The Macmillan Co. 1901. Svo, pp. 480.

Professor Royce's second and concluding volume discusses questions of intimate interest to everybody. It is more persuasive than the first, of which it enhances the significance. The design of the whole now comes out—to introduce into the Hegelian philosophy of religion such rectifications as must result from recognition of scientific conceptions worked out during the century now completing itself since that philosophy first appeared. Of these new conceptions, some are psychological, some logical; but the chief of them are the new mathematical ideas which cluster about that of an infinite multitude. Mathematicians, perhaps, still linger on the stage, who, in their best days, used to be quite positive that one cannot reason mathematically about infinity, and used to feel, like the old lady about her total depravity, that this cherished inability was taken away, the bottom would fall out of the calculus. Such notions are obsolete. Various degrees of infinity are to-day conceived with perfect definiteness; and the utter misapprehension of the metaphysicians about it, above all of Hegel, glares. As a first serious attempt to apply to philosophical subjects the exactitude of thought that reigns in the mathematical sciences, and this, not on the part of some obscure recluse whose results do not become known to the public, but on that of an eminent professor in a great university, to whom the world is disposed to listen with attention, Royce's 'The World and the Individual' will stand a prominent milestone upon the highway of philosophy.

Our space will permit only the most salient features of Professor Royce's theory to be roughly sketched. "An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning." In reference to meaning, logicians have never failed to recognize "quod fore in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellatur *U-2* adiectives significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia, sed universalia significantur." So John of Salisbury, Abelard's pupil, expresses the distinction. That for the most important signs the signification is intrinsic, the denotation (*quod nominant*) extrinsic, is generally recognized. Professor Royce marks the distinction by the terms Internal Meaning and External Meaning. He conceives of the internal meaning in a special way. Another writer, a quarter of a century ago, proposed this maxim: "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Carrying this pragmatic spirit a trifle further, Professor Royce holds that the internal meaning of an idea is a Purpose, instead of regarding it, with his predecessor, as a germinal purpose. This purpose—obscurely recognized, since not all to which it will lead is foreseen; partially fulfilled in being recognized, since a purpose strives first of all to understand itself; but mainly unfulfilled, since it would not remain a purpose after fulfillment—is

the internal meaning, or signification, or depth, of the idea. The purpose is vague—anything that refers to the future is more or less vague; and a sincere purpose to do a thing "right now" actually does it. The purpose is to do a thing under certain circumstances. Completely to define these circumstances, it would be necessary to give a biography of the purposer from birth, without any omission. The purpose is to do something in order to produce certain results. Completely to define the result accomplished must involve a complete representation of the agent's future life. In short, the complete fulfilment of any purpose, which alone is the external meaning of the idea, is no less than the entire life of the thinker. The reviewer will say, for clearness, that neither these nor the majority of the author's positions have been satisfactorily shown to be true (in the reviewer's opinion, but the author holds them to be perfectly demonstrated). The principal of them may rank as verifiable hypotheses possessed of the plausibility and other qualifications that render them eminently worthy of further examination, even if an engine of rare usefulness must be drawn away from other work for the purpose.

That the object of an idea, then, its external meaning, is of the nature of a sign could hardly be gainsaid. But Professor Royce finds it not only a sign but an idea; not only one idea but a "concrete" idea in the Hegelian sense, and that, not relatively, but perfectly, and so of the nature of life; and not only life, but an entire life. "The Being of the real object of which you now think, means a life that expresses the fulfilment of just your present plan."

But suppose the reader to ask, How can an idea, so microscopic a piece of a life, contain within its implication a distinct feature corresponding to every feature of the entire life of which it is only a part? This difficulty is happily removed by the author in a way which ought to be instructive to those metaphysicians whose horizon is limited by the walls of a theological seminary. He resorts to Gauss's conception of an *Abbild*, which has played a great rôle in mathematics. That is to say, he likens the idea representing the entire life to a map of a country lying upon the territory of that country. Imagine a map of England, absolutely perfect in its minutest details, to lie upon the soil of England, without covering the entire country it maps. Upon this map would be shown the very ground where the map lies; and the map itself, in all its minutest details. In this map of the map, the map will be shown again; and so on endlessly. Here, then, will be a part fully representing its whole, just as the implicit meaning of the idea is supposed to represent the entire life. It is to be noticed that, each successive map lying well inside the one which it immediately represents, unless there be a hole in the country which a ring-shaped map encloses, the endless series of maps will converge to a single point, which represents itself throughout each and every map of the series. In the case of the idea, that point would be the self-consciousness of the idea. An idea, being a state of mind with a conscious purpose, must evidently be self-conscious.

There, then, would seem to be a beautiful and a needed (though not a complete) confirmation of the aptness of the metaphor.

Yet here the author recoils, and refuses to admit the continuity, or even the analytic continuity, of the map. He insists that no representation represents itself; a hard saying, which exact logic appears directly to refute. "The world of Self," he says, "whatever continuity of internal structure it may, in some aspects, possess, is, in its principal form of expression, embodied in a discrete series of . . . individual expression. . . . Experience at any moment shows how I am conscious of my . . . approaches to selfhood in any way in the form of a discrete series in which one stage . . . is followed by the next." The argument which supports this assertion is not assented to upon all hands. If it be true, there are but two alternatives: either, notwithstanding this, in the respects in which an idea represents an entire life there is continuity, or, at least, a higher infinity than that of the simple endless series; or else the doctrine that to an idea a reality must in some shape correspond must fall to the ground.

According to Professor Royce, an idea fails of being a Self only because it is general and not perfectly determined; which the reader may deem a dark saying unless the sword of Hegel is invoked to cut the knot. Its implicit or germinal inward meaning would, then, be a little Self, representing the entire life as its external meaning. In a similar way, the Self of the man is perhaps included within a larger Self of the community. On the other hand, the man's Self encloses intermediate selves—the domestic Self, the business Self, the better Self, the evil spirit that sometimes usurps his sovereignty. Of course, the system of delineation for the larger and for the enclosed selves will be different. Here the author draws support from the psychological doctrine of what he calls the "time-span," a doctrine which, so far as it has really been placed beyond important doubt, amounts to little more than that our image of the events of the few seconds last past is, or is very like, a direct perception, while our representation of what happened a minute or so ago is relatively . . . a far more mediate character. This phenomenon had already been seized upon by several Idealistic writers as affording a refutation of dualism; but there is no better way of appreciating the large calibre of Royce's thought than by comparing their styles of putting this idea to the service of metaphysics with his. He imagines that the greater selves will naturally have vastly longer time-spans than the lesser selves. Now a consciousness whose time-span, or "specious present," or "empirical present," as it is variously called, was a thousandth of a second or a thousand years would not ordinarily be recognized as a consciousness at all by a human observer of its external manifestations. The time-span of the All-enclosing Self must cover all time; and this gives a sort of support to the imagination if we wish to reconcile foreknowledge and free will after the manner of Boethius, St. Augustine, and others.

Every reality, then, is a Self, and the selves are intimately connected, as if they formed a continuum. Each one is, so to say, a delineation; with mathematical truth we may say, incongruous though the metaphor is, that each is a quasi-map of

the entire field of all the selves, which organic aggregate is itself a Self, the Absolute Idea of Hegel. So far as a philosophical conception can be identified with God it is God.

All reasoning goes upon the assumption that there is a true answer to whatever question may be under discussion, which answer cannot be rendered false by anything that the disputants may say or think about it; and further, that the denial of that true answer is false. This makes an apparent difficulty for idealism. For if all reality is of the nature of an actual idea, there seems to be no room for possibility or any lower mode than actuality, among the categories of being. (Hegel includes modality only in his Subjective Logic.) But what, then, can be the mode of being of a representation or meaning unequivocally false? For Hegel, the false is the bad, that which is out of harmony with its own essence; and since, in his view, contradiction is the great form of activity of the world, he has no difficulty in admitting that an idea may be out of harmony with itself. Prof. Royce, however, seems almost to resent the idea that anybody could suppose that he denied the validity of the distinction of truth and falsehood. He is fairly outspoken in pronouncing sundry doctrines false (a word Hegel hardly uses), even if we do not quite hear his foot come down; and nothing does he hold more false than the usual form of stating the distinction now in question, namely, that a true proposition corresponds to a *real matter of fact*, by which is meant a state of things, definite and individual, which does not consist merely in being represented (in any particular representation) to be as it is. For example, if I dream that I find I can float in the air, this matter of dream is not matter of fact, for the reason that the only sense in which I can float in the air is that so my dream represented the matter. Now Prof. Royce offers to demonstrate by necessary reasoning that the statement—or, as he expresses it, that "to be real means to be independent of ideas which relate to that being"—is false. His argument to this effect will serve as a sufficiently characteristic, but rather favorable sample of his general style of argumentation.

Having given us to understand that he is going to disprove the proposition, he opens his argumentation by declaring that he does not know what the proposition means. Thereupon, he proceeds to propound a general maxim of procedure for all cases in which one has to refute a proposition without knowing what it means. It is to begin by assigning to it its "most extreme form." This certainly does not signify the most extremely defensible meaning, but rather the most extremely indefensible meaning that the language will bear. The proposition having been refuted in this extreme sense, it will only be necessary afterwards to argue that other interpretations make no essential difference. This maxim, one would suppose, would prove very serviceable to anybody who should have any large amount of that sort of refutation to perform. In accordance with this maxim, Prof. Royce begins by assuming that realists hold that no idea in the slightest degree determines the real object of it, whether causally or in any other manner. Whether this does not overstep the limits of admissible interpretation, seeing that a realist who

meant this would deny that any promise can really be kept, or that any purpose can influence the real result, the reader must say. At any rate, it would not seem to be a difficult position to refute.

Now in order that he may get the realist where he wants him, there are two acknowledgments which Professor Royce endeavors to extort from him. To bring him to the first, the author assumes the principle that all causal action is reciprocal, or of the nature of reaction. This is evidently contrary to popular opinion, which holds that while the past has exerted some efficient causality upon the future, the future cannot have any effect, in the strict sense of that word, upon the past; and that while the future may have influenced the past by final, or ideal, causation, the past cannot possibly influence the future as the aim of the future. The reader may judge whether a realist of so extreme a type as that which Professor Royce has set up would or would not admit that the real object of an idea cannot have influenced the idea, in the absence of any attempt on the part of Professor Royce to prove his general principle of reciprocity. If he would not, old-fashioned logic (which Hegelians, it is true, hold in high contempt) would pronounce the attempted demonstration to be a bald *petitio principii*.

In order to extract the second acknowledgment from the realist, Professor Royce produces an argument which would seem to have as much force for one kind of realist as for another. He supposes two objects, B and R, to be related to one another as the realist supposes the Being, or the real object of an idea, and the Representation, in the form of an idea of that object, to be related; and he undertakes to define the relation between them. "The definition in question," he says, "is, as a mere abstract statement, easy." One would think so. The realist simply says that B is not constituted by its being represented in R; that is, he says that the fact that B is as it is, would be logically consistent with R's representing it to be otherwise. But in place of this easily comprehensible relation, what fantastic attempt do we find at the definition that was pronounced to be so easy! Professor Royce will have it that the realist holds that the relation is such that no matter how R may be metamorphosed, it is logically possible for B to remain unchanged. In such a sense, what two things in the world are independent? Change the problematic madness of Hamlet into the pacification of the Philippines, and it will become logically inconsistent with the continuance of great disturbances there. But change the doubtful representation by Shakspeare that the fictitious Hamlet was unhinged into the representation that the Philippines were pacified in 1901, and it will not have the slightest logical consequence for the real state of things. The truth is, that Professor Royce is blind to a fact which all ordinary people will see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist's opinion is that it is one thing to be and another thing to be represented; and the cause of this cecity is that the Professor is completely immersed in his absolute idealism, which precisely consists in denying that distinction. It is his element, and there is total reflection at its surface. That, however, is what Professor Royce asks the realist to admit as a premise. The conclusion which he de-

duces from it is that if B is linked as cause to any determination of R, there must be a *tertium quid* by the mediation of which the causation takes place. Now the premise is absurd; and the formal rule is that from an absurd premise every conclusion must be allowed to be logical; that is to say, it is needless to dispute its logicity, the premise being false. The argument, therefore, cannot be called formally bad; nor can we object that a few lines below, in a restatement of the conclusion, B's being linked as cause gets changed into B's having any causal or other linkage.

Professor Royce, armed with his wrong definition of realism, goes on to a dilemma to show that, whether the realist says that real things are one or are many, he equally involves himself in contradiction. But, although the characteristics of his style of argumentation become even more prominent in that dilemma, the exigencies of space forbid our following him further. But we should like to say one word to this powerful and accurate thinker who has been so completely led astray in his argumentation by his Hegelian logic: Absolute idealism depends, as Hegel saw that it did, upon assuming that position at the outset. If your refutation of realism is addressed to students who are already absolute idealists at heart, we will not undertake to say whether it will be serviceable for the development of that doctrine, or not. But if it is addressed to realists themselves, it must conform to the logical principles recognized by realists, or be nugatory. Now you know very well that realists do not admit that matter of fact can be apodeictically demonstrated. You ought to know, and surely you do know, that if you drive them into a corner, they will simply modify their admissions so far as may be necessary to avoid self-contradiction, and that from the very nature of apodeictic proof it is absolutely impossible to close off such escape in arguing about matter of fact. The history of the doctrine of parallels illustrates what logic shows to be necessarily the state of the case. But the question of realism is a question of hard fact, if ever there was a hard fact; and therefore your method must be revolutionized if you are ever to convince any master of logic.

#### SCHEIBERT'S SWORD AND PEN.

*Mit Schwert und Feder: Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben.* Von F. Scheibert, königlich-preussischem Major z. D. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Son; New York: Lemcke & Buechner. 1902.

Autobiographies are always interesting if written with candor and some literary skill, and if, in describing men, conditions, and events, they supply illustrative details not found in historical works. In what Major Scheibert presents to us he is candid enough, although his judgment and the accuracy of his information frequently appear very questionable. He went through the ordinary course of study in the Gymnasium, intending to devote himself to the study of architecture; but, discouraged by the poor prospects of advancement in that line, and by the "impressions made upon him by the commotions of the year 1848," he joined the military profession for the purpose of becoming an officer of engineers. He describes

his career with some vivacity, and tells us of the clever things he did in peace and war, and of the credit he got for them from his superiors—some of them men of high rank and renown—with unconcealed satisfaction. But his success, so far as it consisted in official recognition of his merits, was far from being all he desired; for when he reached the dangerous "Major's Ecke" (the "major's corner")—that is, the rank in the military hierarchy from which the Prussian Government carefully selects those who are considered fit for the higher grades—he was dropped from active service and relegated to private station with a meagre pension not sufficient to support him and his family in comfort. According to his own account, he was a jolly companion among his fellow-officers, amusing them as well as himself with droll conceits and mirth-provoking pranks, which no doubt made his friends regret his unpropitious retirement. Pressed by poverty, he took to the writing of books, as he himself confesses, to keep the pot boiling; and, as a list appended to the present volume shows, he wrote twenty-five of them on all sorts of subjects connected with the military profession. To the necessity of writing so much may be owing the somewhat slipshod character of his literary style, and the abundant padding with matter of no consequence which is observable in the work before us.

Of special interest to American readers is that part of the autobiography which touches the author's experiences in our civil war. He was sent by his Government to America for the particular purpose of observing, on the occasion of the impending operations against Charleston, the utility of the new methods of protecting fortifications as well as ships with iron armor, and the effect produced by rifled cannon upon earthworks, masonry, and iron sheathings. It was the intention of his Government that to this end he should report himself at the headquarters of the Union forces; but as he believed he could observe things better from the inside of the attacked place, and as his sympathies were altogether on the side of the South, he was permitted at his own request to make his way to Charleston, not, indeed, as an emissary of the Government, but as a "private gentleman" and at his own risk. He succeeded in running the blockade on a British vessel, and put himself in communication with the military authorities of the Confederacy, who received him very kindly.

There being at the time nothing of great moment going on in or around Charleston, he betook himself to Virginia, where he was hospitably welcomed by Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, the famous cavalry leader, and subsequently by Gen. Lee himself. He was present at the battles of Chancellorsville and of Gettysburg, but the stories he tells add little, if anything, to the stock of our knowledge. His observations of men and events are of the most superficial kind, and he frankly confesses that his judgment is colored by his sympathies. He tells us that he began an address on our civil war which he delivered after his return home, with the words: "Gentlemen, if you expect to hear from me 'objective history,' you will be disappointed; I was heart and soul a Southerner; I can warm myself only for one cause." This characterizes all his stories as well as his reflections.

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