

her attempts to apply her theories merely served to set all classes in an uproar, and to bring about some serious open revolts.

—More curious and interesting, in the same volume, is the article by M. Vinavert, a lawyer of St. Petersburg, on "French Influence upon Russian Codification under Nicholas I." The *Stod*, or systematic code of laws in Russia, in fifteen volumes, was prepared under the direction of Speransky, at the command of Nicholas I. Speransky had been the greatest statesman under Alexander I., admired everything French, and fairly adored Napoleon I., especially after the interview at Erfurt between the two Emperors, at which he was present. In 1810 Speransky elaborated a civil code which was, in great part, copied from the Code Napoléon. As the war of invasion of 1812 approached, his French sympathies—in particular this civil code—raised a tremendous storm against him, and in 1812 he was banished to a remote province and subjected to the strict surveillance of the police. In 1821 he was allowed to return to St. Petersburg, and appointed a member of the Council of State. When a section of his Majesty's Chancellery was formed, in 1825, to edit the Code, Speransky was not placed at the head of it, but the work fell into his hands, and his chief was warned by the Emperor that he would be held responsible for any actions in the line of those committed by Speransky in 1810—i. e., for any copying from the French code; Russians being persuaded that they possessed, of native origin, everything requisite. But Mr. Vinavert has cleverly analyzed the Code prepared under these conditions, and finds that Speransky got his own way, after all, using half a dozen different devices to conceal his borrowings. Meanwhile, in his Introduction, Speransky asserted that "the articles of the code were set forth without the slightest change, in the very words employed by the ukases on which they were based"; and that "all our wealth in this line belongs to us by right, was acquired by us, and contained nothing borrowed."

Mr. Vinavert explains, in detail, several of Speransky's disingenuous and baffling methods of procedure, and shows how, in many cases, the law, which was clear in the Code Napoléon or in Pothier, has been rendered obscure by the manner in which the Russian editors handled it. Mr. Vinavert's labors on this subject are very instructive and important.

—Prof. Ernest W. Clement is the Atlas supporting the little world of the Asiatic Society of Japan in the latest publication of its Transactions. Volume xxx., part I., contains but two papers, both by this author, one on "Japanese Calendars" and the other on "A Chinese Refugee of the Seventeenth Century." In more senses than one, the Japanese have plenty of time. They have solar, lunar, Japanese, Chinese, and Occidental time, two national calendars, and several chronological year periods or era-systems. Of the two vernacular calendars, one called *Ki-gen* (history-beginning) starts in the mythology of 660 B. C., and the other, *Meiji* (enlightened rule), began after the accession of the present Emperor Mutsuhito. The country people and most of the Buddhists still observe the old style of reckoning based on the twelve signs of the Chinese zodiac and the sexagenary circle, or period of sixty years. This

"cycle of Cathay," in all its divisions and subdivisions, rests upon, or at least receives its terminology from, the ancient philosophy of China. The old Japanese hour was one hundred and twenty minutes long, and the order of numbering was not what to us is the logical order, one, two, three, etc., but followed a style of computation based upon the multiples of nine ($1 \times 9 = 9$, $2 \times 9 = 18$, $3 \times 9 = 27$, $4 \times 9 = 36$, $5 \times 9 = 45$, $6 \times 9 = 54$), and in each case the tall figure of the product was chosen as the name of the hour (9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4). In announcing time by the bell, three preliminary strokes were always struck, in order to warn people that the hour was about to be sounded; hence, to avoid confusion, the numbers, 1, 2, 3, were not used. In most old Japanese clocks there was but one hand or pointer, which stood still while the dial went around it. Despite watches and modern clocks, it will probably take the average Japanese, of the thirty-five millions in the empire, several generations to get accustomed to such trifles as "minutes" and "seconds"—common words for which did not exist in the old vernacular, at a time when "punctuality was the thief of time." The full calendar for 1902 and the list of year periods from n. c. 660 to the present Meiji, with much interesting folk-lore and illustrations of the Zodiacal animals, are given. To his previous studies of the Chinese refugee scholars who fled to Japan on the fall of the Ming Dynasty, causing a renaissance of learning something like that of the Greek scholars in Europe from Constantinople, Professor Clement adds another study of one who was a priest, a physician, and an engineer. The Transactions are to be had at the Librarian's Office, 56 Tsukiji, Tokio.

—The yearly consumption of morphine, cocaine, ether, and similar drugs grows out of proportion to the increase of population and to the legitimate demands of medicine. The vice of addiction to narcotics accounts for this. Its immediate consequences are less obvious than those of alcoholic intoxication, but have quite as disastrous ultimate effects, and their very elusiveness makes the slavery more inexorable. We may not discuss here its probable causes, and can only insist that the use of narcotic drugs is a fascinating peril, whose gravity increases with its charm, and from which escape by self-help is practically impossible. 'Morphinism, and Narcomanias from Other Drugs' (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders & Co.) is the somewhat inexact title of Dr. T. D. Crothers's hospital and other experience, and his deductions therefrom, in book form. His warnings and his advice are good, especially as applied to the more mischievous poisons, and his general deductions may be accepted with confidence. But we can hardly commend this as a model book. There are lapses in construction, and especially there is frequent failure to give exact references when authorities are cited. The latter is apologized for in a general way in the preface, but the deficiency is none the less tantalizing when the reader wishes to consult the originals. Should the precise data have been lost, it would be quite worth while to recover them, as might easily be done through the superb Surgeon-General's Library and Catalogue. The following case is gravely made a part of the record (p. 303): "Some very curious instances of coffee intoxication have been

reported. One, of a prominent general in a noted battle in the civil war: after drinking several cups of coffee he appeared on the front of the line, exposing himself with great recklessness, shouting and waving his hat as if in a delirium, giving orders, and swearing in the most extraordinary manner. He was supposed to be intoxicated. Afterwards it was found that he had used nothing but coffee."

PAULSEN'S KANT.

Immanuel Kant; His Life and Doctrine. By Friedrich Paulsen. Translated from the Revised German Edition by J. E. Creighton and Albert Lefevre. With a Portrait. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. 8vo, pp. xix, 419.

Of the three "parts of the soul," as they used to be called, Sensibility, Energy, and Thought, Kant was decidedly deficient in the first and by no means a hero in the second. That he was genuinely great in thought would seem to be overwhelmingly proved by Valhalla, from the manner in which he has commanded the attention of all subsequent thinkers. Yet very many of these thinkers, if not most of them, would hold Kant to have been wrong in almost every one of his arguments. Let us re-examine his capacities in sensibility, energy, and thought.

As for sensibility, we call to mind a single passage in Kant's writings as having been admired aesthetically. It is the well-known parallel between the starry heavens above and the moral law within. That genuine eloquence must be attributed to this passage is sufficiently attested by the general admiration it has excited, for it clothes an ethical doctrine which, nakedly presented, would be repugnant to the majority of admirers of the passage. This seems to be the one passage in all Kant's writings that can really be called fine. Professor Paulsen is of opinion that Kant might have become one of the great writers of Germany. He gives sundry reasons for thinking so—

such as that Kant's style is marked by great emphasis, that he has a goodly stock of fine phrases and no little ingenuity in bringing them in, and that his "waggishness" is strongly marked. There is no reason to suppose that Kant might not have made a good writer, like anybody else, had he been trained under a good master. Any exaggeration of tone would have been repressed, his elegant extracts dismissed, and his wit subjected to good taste. A good writer, of course; but whether a great writer, or not, is one of those questions of which Kant himself would have said that they transcend the limits of possible experience. Measuring his sensibility by known facts, we find that his style, though it has qualities which excite the gratitude of a student who many times rereads and deeply ponders every section, is devoid of any other grace than that of keeping to the point—is not even always grammatical. Kant never contemplated matrimony, and apparently was never in love. He never had an unreasonable attachment. Though for years he was a distinguished lecturer on physical geography, he was never moved to go to look upon a mountain, never even tramped to the neighboring sea, never saw other town than his own little East Prussian capital. In sensibility, then, Kant must be rated as below the average.

Energy is of two kinds; that which reacts upon the outer world, and that which inhibits one's own impulses. We must be careful not to mistake a deficiency of either kind for an excess of the other. Kant was never moved to any enterprising action, nor even to making any troublesome observations. On the occasion of his being reprimanded for his religious philosophy by minister and king, the little fellow meekly promised to say no more upon the subject. It is true that he was seventy years of age; but then he was a bachelor, without dependents, and by far the most illustrious person in Germany, not even perhaps excepting Goethe. He declares, in a well-known paper, that he has read Swedenborg's 'Arcana Cælestia.' If he really did that, it was the most heroic effort of his life. He would have been better employed in reading Hume's 'Essays' or 'Treatise on Human Nature,' which concerned him more than any other books in the world; but Paulsen is quite right in saying that he never did read Hume in the sense of apprehending his meaning. It must be granted that Hume is an enigmatical writer. His so-called "easy" writing makes hard reading enough. It allows the superficial student to read into it ideas that the author never intended to express, especially the student unacquainted with what was going on in the English world of letters of the period. But take the ordinary traditional logic. A schoolboy can master that. Yet Kant's pamphlet on the 'Falsche Spitzfindigkeit' is devoted to setting forth as a novel discovery of Kant's own the very doctrine of the reduction of syllogism taught in every book of traditional logic. The only real novelties it contains are two or three absurd blunders. Kant probably did read Baumgarten's 'Metaphysica'; but one must doubt mightily whether he ever really read any other book of philosophy.

These things are most significant. In self-control Kant appears to be a prodigy. A man more systematic than he would not be reckoned among the sane. When, during his afternoon constitutional, he reached a certain corner, the good people of Königsberg would pull out their watches, not to see whether Herr Professor Doctor Kant was on time, but to see whether their watches were going right. His more important books were put together, as he expressed it, architectonically. That is, just as architects, until recently, used to insist upon designing buildings upon an arbitrary plan supposed to have certain merits, but not determined by the purposes which the buildings were to subserve; just so, Kant would enslave himself to an elaborate system of divisions and subdivisions—*Haupttheile, Theile, Abtheilungen, Bücher, Hauptstücke, Abschnitte, and Paragraphen*—laid down beforehand, not arising from the peculiar character of his theme, but supposed to be dictated *a priori* by reason and to be derived from the idea of pure reason. Such method either bespeaks extraordinary self-control or a singular defect of *clan*. Several circumstances besides Kant's apparent inability to read a work on philosophy somewhat incline us to the latter hypothesis.

At any rate, it was exclusively in the way of thought that Kant can be deemed great, if he was great at all. There are different kinds of thought: there is mathematical thought, that works by diagrams; there is

the thought which, from observing a fragment, divines a whole; and there is logical analysis. Kant was certainly not a mathematician. In scientific theorizing, however, he was decidedly strong. He is accounted by astronomers the author of the Nebular Hypothesis. In his younger days, he was a physicist; and he always remained a physicist who had taken up philosophy (naturally, less strikingly so as his powers declined), contrasting in this regard with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, not to speak of Baader, Günther, etc., who were all theological students, and as strongly with Jacobi, Fries, Krause, etc., who came to philosophy by the route of theology; and even, more or less, with Schopenhauer, Herbart, Beneke, and all the others before Fechner and Lotze, who, at any rate, breathe rather the atmosphere of the seminary than that of the laboratory. Every scientific reader feels the philosopher of Königsberg to be of his kindred.

When we think of the stupendous amount of close study which intellectual men of every stripe have bestowed upon Kant, and when we ask ourselves, What is it, then, which has attracted all this attention? We are led to answer, it was his power of constructing a theory, which is the kind of intellectual feat that marks the man of science—the Young, the Faraday, the Darwin. We shall not, of course, be misunderstood as saying that constructing theories made any of them the great men that they were, any more than it did Kant. As a scientific man beneath the skin, Kant is comparatively free from the besetting fallacy of the philosophers, which may be described, without exaggeration, as consisting in producing arguments to prove a *plurion*, at most, and in concluding a light-year, at least. Kant, perceiving in some measure this universal fault of the philosophers, naturally led to his evident ambition to be the arbiter of philosophical disputes. But he could have exercised this office only in the weak manner of the Eclectics, allowing so much weight to this consideration and so much to another diametrically opposed to it.

If he had not fortunately been gifted with a great strength in logical analysis, that enabled him at once to do full justice to the arguments and tendencies of both sides, and to make both contributory to a third unitary conception. Yet even his logical analysis would not have sufficed, if it had not been for a supereminent share in a characteristic that may be remarked in all the more powerful scientific intellects, the power of making use even of conceptions that resisted his logical analysis, and of drawing from them nearly the same conclusions as any clear mind would have done that had analyzed them. We cannot, in a few words, make our meaning very clear; but one might say that an ordinary intelligent mind has an upper layer of clear thought, underlain by muddled ideas; while in Kant's mind there appears to be a pure solution down into those depths where daylight hardly penetrates. He thinks pretty correctly even when he does not think distinctly.

The volume under consideration contains a careful account of Kant's place in history, of his life and character, and of his philosophy, by one of the most accomplished and popular of the German philosophers of to-day. It is not a suitable guide for a beginner in Kant. The 'Critique of the Pure

Reason' is, perhaps, as wholesome a book as a student of force could find with which to begin the study of philosophy. But the only accompaniment to it that is advisable at first is a textual comment. Such books as Paulsen's are best left for later perusal. We need not say that the student must not allow himself to imagine that in going through the 'Critique' for the first time without preparation he can understand Kant entirely, far less duly estimate him, until he has read the discussions which led up to the 'Critique.' Deeper students will find this volume interesting and convenient. It leaves hardly any question of metaphysics untouched.

We have said that it is drawn up with care. We will now give two specimens of its inevitable inaccuracies. In summing up Kant's historical position, Paulsen says that to have cleared the ground and pointed the way to a poetic naturalistic pantheism as the fundamental form of the conception of the world, is the imperishable service of Kant. This not only forgets that Lessing introduced "poetic naturalistic pantheism" the year before the 'Critique' appeared, and that its propagator, Goethe, was uninfluenced by Kant, but conveys the idea that Kant's importance is exclusively theological and poetical; and accordingly, in the summary of his philosophy, his scientific writings are left unmentioned, and, throughout, his relations to theology are made infinitely more important than his relations to what is generally called science. But Kant, as we have said, was, on the contrary, mainly a man of science—not oblivious of aspirations towards God, freedom, and immortality, but yet dwelling in the realm of experience; and his theory of cognition—its general design, at least, and some of its corner-stones—still stands, as far as scientific thought is concerned, firmly established. Under these circumstances, and since he himself was not a pantheist, it is unjust to sum him up as a forerunner of what he condemned.

The following is an example of another kind of inaccuracy. On p. 147 we read:

"How synthetic judgments *a posteriori* can have actual validity seemed to him to be no problem at all. If he had raised the question, it would have shattered the whole structure of the 'Critique.' He would have been forced to reply that there can be no such judgments; synthetic judgments *a posteriori* are a *contradictio in adjecto*."

Compare this with the following from page 8 of the 'Critique of the Pure Reason':

"In synthetical judgments, I must have, in addition to the concept of the subject, A, something else, X, upon which thought may react, in order to cognize a predicate, B, as belonging to A, although not a part of it. In empirical, or experimental, judgments there is no difficulty in fulfilling this condition. The X is merely the complete experience of the object of the concept A, which is but a part of that experience. [Having expanded this remark very clearly, he concludes:] Experience, then, is that X which extends beyond the concept A, and upon which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate B with the concept A is founded."

We thus find that Kant does consider the very problem which Professor Paulsen says he does not consider. He does not, indeed, consider it in all its branches, but he does so quite sufficiently to show that his answer, had it been more complete, would have borne not the slightest resemblance to the absurdity which Professor Paulsen says he would have been drawn

into. The answer that Kant gives is easily susceptible of natural expansion to cover every possible phase of the question, quite in opposition to the theological logicians of Germany. Kant looked upon such questions as a clear physical thinker would—that is to say, in a manner of which Professor Paulsen has not the least conception.

We will add one word concerning the title of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft.' The word *Kritik* already existed in German, meaning a critical writing. But Kant declares, with all his emphasis, that that is not the word he uses. He borrows a word from the English of Hobbes and Locke, and spells it (in his first edition) with a C. He used it, as the English writers had done, to mean the art or science of criticising. Since this word *critic* exists in our language in that meaning, and is, in fact, the very word Kant borrowed, while the word *critique* is English, if at all, only in the sense against which Kant almost violently protests, the first word of the title should be restored to its English form 'Critique' in translation.

In the best philosophical use of English words, "reasoning" is a well-known operation of a mind, and "reasoning power" (or, less well, "reason") is the faculty of performing it. "The Reason" is a totally distinct faculty by which we are supposed to know the truth of first principles. "Reason" means nothing more nor less than conformity to the best result of deliberation. Kant, not being insane, did not propose to criticise Reason. Neither did he criticise the Reasoning Power, unless to approve it in one paragraph. But what he chiefly criticised and had reference to in his title was the faculty of knowing first principles, *The Reason*. Consequently, his book, the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' is a work concerning 'Critique of the Pure Reason.'

The Lower South in American History. By William Garrett Brown. Macmillan, 1902. Pp. xi, 271.

The three papers which give title to this volume of essays are an interesting attempt to exhibit the conditions, social, economic, and political, which characterized the lower South between 1820 and 1860, and which caused it to exercise during that period so marked an influence on the course of national affairs. Between the lower South and the upper South there were, as Mr. Brown points out at the beginning, marked differences. The society of the lower South, from South Carolina to eastern Texas, was, to be sure, sprung largely from Virginia and Carolina, but it was a selected stock of energetic men to whom the material conquest of a new and wonderfully fertile country was an attractive task; and when, with the retirement of Monroe, the ascendancy of Virginia came to an end, the influence which Virginia had wielded in national affairs was taken up and continued, not by New England or the newer West, but by the "Black Belt." It is this vigorous and masterful society that Mr. Brown, unable to see, in the pictures of it drawn by such writers as Cairnes and Olmsted, "a true likeness of that which was," has endeavored to analyze and weigh.

The illustrative State with which he particularly deals is Alabama. In 1850, at the end of thirty years of Statehood, Alabama

had a population of about three-quarters of a million, three-sevenths of whom were slaves. The 335,000 slaves, however, were owned by less than seven per cent. of the white population, while less than ten thousand whites owned three-fourths of the negroes. The average annual value of the cotton crop, the principal product, was \$20,000,000, practically all of the cotton going to New England or to Europe. While thus contributing largely to the prosperity of the East, the cotton States also offered to the West the best market for corn, bacon, and mules, not even the most progressive planters always growing food enough for their own demands. In the "concentration of land and slaves in fewer hands, in the greater immediate profitability of agriculture, and in the greater rapidity with which lands were exhausted" (p. 37), the industrial life of Alabama and the lower South was marked off with most distinctness from that of Virginia. The poor whites in the hills and sand barrens were a class apart, apparently as unaffected by slavery as they are by freedom now. Among the planters, a high degree of religious interest accompanied a small measure of intellectual concern. The best men in Alabama went into politics, though without a resulting marked predominance of the planter class. Government was democratic; after the Jeffersonian order of democracy; "governors and legislators were chosen from various social ranks; many prominent men were distinctly of the self-made type" (p. 44). It was a social régime that bred personal ability and masterfulness, and developed powers of business organization, while the patriarchal character of its home life long continued to have, alike for strangers and those who lived under it, an undeniable charm.

What the representatives of the cotton States in Congress stood for was,

"not slavery alone, . . . not agriculture alone, but the whole social organism, the whole civilization, whose decay in Virginia had been arrested by the rise of the States from which they came. They were committed to the maintenance, in the most progressive country in the world, of a primitive industry, a primitive labor system, and a patriarchal mode of life. They held that their main industry could be successfully prosecuted only with slave labor, and while it was so prosecuted it tended to exclude all other forms of industry. Its economic demands were imperative; its political demands were hardly less imperative. Economically, it demanded that the fewest possible restrictions be placed upon the exchange of its two or three staple products for the products of other countries, and that it be permitted to extend itself constantly to fresh lands. Politically, it demanded protection from criticism and from social and humanitarian reforms and changes" (pp. 57, 58).

In this contention the lower South could count on the support of Virginia and the upper South, and had little difficulty in making allies among the manufacturers of New England and the farmers of the West. The first clash over protection showed the firmness of the cotton States, though the majority of their public men were too strongly devoted to Jackson and the national idea to follow South Carolina into nullification; and the Walker tariff of 1846 was "more clearly in accordance with the principles of free trade, more clearly contrary to protectionist ideas and devices, than any other tariff law since 1789" (p. 66). The same determination to defend a

system was shown in the effective opposition to internal improvements, while the absence of cities caused the South to take a "country view" of public finance, to favor State banks, with a currency easily expanded at harvest time, and to oppose a national bank. Yet, although on all these points the influence of the lower South was against the development of a strong national Government, the majority, probably, of the great planters, at the division of the old Republican party, became Whigs rather than Democrats.

The primary cause of the final struggle Mr. Brown finds in the differing mental and moral habits of the sections. It was, he says,

"the belated concern of the Northern mind about the things of the spirit, not its absorption in material enterprises, that boded ill to the plantation system. It was the North's moral awakening, and not its industrial alertness, its free thought, and not its free labor, which the Southern planter had to fear. The New England factory made no threat, the town meeting did. The Northwestern wheat farms and pork-packeries and railways were harmless; but Oberlin College and Lovejoy's printing-press and the Underground Railway were different. . . . [The true danger] was in that freedom of individual men which had made the North prosper, and in that national feeling, that national theory of the Government, that national antagonism to whatever was weak or alien under the flag, which had resulted from the development and the denser peopling of the North. The final conflict came only when these things were thrown clearly into competition with the picturesque Old World social system, the limited nationalism, the unprogressive industrial contrivances of the South for the occupation of new lands" (pp. 88, 89).

Yet, as Mr. Brown points out, while the South struck at abolition, not only because abolition was hateful to it, but also because, if it would preserve its own social structure, it could not do anything else, it did not stand on the defensive alone. There was a vigorous counter-movement in favor of slavery to offset the Northern denunciation of it. From the standpoint of the Southern leaders, the presence of the negro in the South could be met only by keeping the negro in subjection and building a society with slavery as one of its foundations. Such an adjustment of race relationships as Mr. Bryce has lately spoken about, in which the superior race shall grant to the inferior the full measure of actual equality before the law, seemed to the men of the South fifty years ago, as it seems to many of their descendants to-day, too visionary to be seriously worth trying.

Of the remaining papers in the volume, three—on William L. Yancey, "the orator of secession," on the resources of the Confederacy as set forth in Professor Schwab's recent book, and on the Ku-klux movement—appeared originally in the *Atlantic*, and were favorably commented on at the time. The others, entitled respectively "A New Hero of an Old Type," and "Shifting the White Man's Burden," are printed now for the first time. The "new hero" is Hobson, whom Mr. Brown, apparently writing from personal acquaintance, praises with much rhetorical warmth and glow. The subject of the other is the disfranchisement movement in the South, in which Mr. Brown, though anxious to do justice to the motives of those responsible for it, naturally finds no solution of the race question in its political phase, nor any progress towards free government. In so