

mentioned and something approaching criticism, and there is a better picture of the man. Some of the anecdotes are entertaining, and the matter is all less hackneyed. The illustrations are again almost all from engravings, but this is of less importance in the case of a literary painter like Landseer, who had nothing in common with the great masters but technical facility. The question in this case is rather whether the thing was worth doing at all than whether it is done in the right way.

Mr. Cadness is evidently a practical designer, but it cannot be said that he has produced a practical book on design. There are useful hints in it, and bits of good advice, but, as a whole, it is fragmentary, rambling, and unsatisfactory. Delivered by word of mouth to a class of students, and taken in connection with class work and individual criticism, it may have answered its purpose well enough; for the solitary student it takes far too much for granted, and is likely to prove confusing rather than helpful. Whether the book ever has been or ever can be written, on any other subject than perspective, from which the practical student of any branch of art could derive any real instruction, is, after all, more than doubtful, though he may, of course, get much assistance from books of plates of costume, ornament, or what not. His teaching he must continue to get directly from a master.

Except that he is a man with a robust interest in himself, to whom nothing that he has ever done or said can cease to be entertaining, it is difficult to see why Mr. Henley should have cared to reprint nine-tenths of the present volume. Not that it is bad—much of it is, for what it is, exceptionally good; but, after all, it is hack work. The matter is collected for the most part from various catalogues of various exhibitions where another man would have been content to let it lie. We all know the kind of brief "appreciation," semi-critical, semi-biographical, which is expected in such publications. Mr. Henley is too vigorous and self-confident a personality to be commonplace even in the execution of such tasks. He is sometimes illuminative, often sound, generally bumptious, and always picturesque; but a hundred-odd pages of such notes, many of them mere paragraphs, present a patchy and unsatisfying aspect. So to present them is, perhaps, in the author's own words, "to take one's self more seriously than he may do that would sit well with posterity."

Two longer essays, "A Note on Romanticism," with which it opens, and "A Critic of Art" with which it closes, go near to take the little book from the category in which we have ventured to place it. The first deals more with literature than with painting, and rather falls in grasp of the essential nature of the Romantic revolution in the latter art, but is readable and interesting enough. The second is a hearty tribute of admiration and personal friendship for the late R. A. M. Stevenson which it is good to have. It would be almost altogether admirable but for the hint of a sneer at the other Stevenson, whose name Mr. Henley rather unnecessarily persists in spelling "Lewis."

*The Principles of Logic.* By Herbert Austin Alkins. Henry Holt & Co. 1902. 8vo. pp. 489.

Amid the flood of logical treatises that gushes from the press, passes under our notice, and soon vanishes in the ground-mist, this book is distinguished by some slight differences from the uniform color of the general mass. We seem to detect in it the beginnings of a more living and effective thought. It is by no means a scientific treatise devoted to the exposition of the theory of scientific reasoning. It is didactic mainly, and extremely elementary—spoon-feeding for the puerile mind. The author is influenced most by Venn's helpful (though often mistaken) work with a somewhat similar title. He has studied Mill and Jevons. He has picked up an idea or two from Lotze. But the authors he seems most to esteem are of the grade of Whately and Minto. He declares his intention of treating logic in a thoroughly objectivistic manner.

Perhaps our readers would like to know what is meant by an objectivist treatment. We will explain. Every man who sits down to write a logic, unless he is to content himself with copying right and left without regard to consistency, as many do, must ask himself, "What am I to set up as the criterion by which to distinguish good reasoning from bad?" Good reasoning is reasoning which conduces to the truth; and every single act of reasoning feels itself to be pursuing a general method conducive to the truth. This indisputable fact suggests the objectivistic criterion according to which, in order to determine whether a given reasoning is good or bad, one must examine whether, from the nature of things, the method which the reasoning understands itself to follow must lead to the truth, supposing that there is any such thing as attainable truth, and supposing that it leads to any conclusion at all; and the method must lead to the truth in the sense in which the reasoning understands that this method leads to the truth. With more or less consciousness and consistency, oftener less than more, the mass of English logicians stand upon that ground. The Germans, on the other hand, regard our instinctive judgments of rationality to be the ultimate criterion. That which a man's reason deliberately approves is *ipso facto* good reasoning. This is the subjectivist position.

The subjectivist says to the objectivist, "So you distrust the instinct of rationality? To what, then, do you resort in order to establish or overthrow the validity of reasoning? Why, to reasoning itself! How, then, do you know that this critical reasoning is valid? Even if I grant you that it is so, what informs you of this? Nothing but the instinct of rationality, *par die!* So, then, you only come back to our criterion after an aimless beating round. You are compelled at last, willy-nilly, to place your trust in the instinct of rationality. Besides, your critical reasoning requires premises. On what do they rest? On experience, say you. Experience presents itself in the form of percepts; but premises are propositions, and so of a different nature from percepts. Moreover, not all your premises can be perceptual judgments. One, at least, must be more general. What can assure you of the truth of that, if you refuse to trust to instinct?"

To this the English logician replies, "I am not skilled in your artificial instruments

of thought; so, if you please, we will consider the very facts themselves. You speak of man's having an instinct of rationality. I suppose you mean that a man is sometimes constrained to believe a thing without being able to say distinctly how he is constrained, and that among the things which he is so constrained to believe is that numerous consequences are reasonable. If this is your meaning, then when you talk of 'trusting' to the instinct of rationality, you mean that we should acknowledge that we cannot help regarding a consequence as perfectly evident. When we are under such compulsion, it is altogether out of our power to have the smallest shade of doubt; and we seem to see plainly that we never could be brought to doubt it. To call the recognition that a proposition seems beyond all possible doubt and perfectly evident 'trust,' and to give this as a reason for following my first impressions of rationality in cases where I can and do entertain doubt, is as if you were to say to a man who had been compelled to surrender his watch to a highwayman, that, since he has already 'trusted' the highwayman with his watch, he will behave inconsistently if he refuses to go bail for him when the police catch him. A man's voluntary conduct cannot be compromised by anything beyond his control. To ask whether a given method of reasoning is good or bad is either mere pretence, or it implies a doubt whether the reasoning be good or not; and such criticism is idle unless the man has some control over his reasonings. In fact, it is next door to absurd to say he has a doubt and yet can exercise no control over his thought. The moment he sees room for doubt, he does doubt; and to ask him to decide according to the prompting of instinct, which is, more probably, a loose association of ideas, is to ask him to surrender reason altogether."

That is the way in which the dispute stands at this moment; the German not yet, apparently, having taken cognizance of what has been said only out of Germany. We can, however, imagine the discussion to be carried a few steps further, somewhat as follows:

*The German:* "But after all, why not trust to the instinct of rationality? You know that instinct is incomparably keener and surer than reason."

*The Englishman:* "Would you counsel the entire abandonment of reason? If you are only thinking of cases in which the dicta of instinct are imperative and unconditional, I have already admitted that then there is no option, for the proposition which instinct so urges upon us appears evident. But what if uninstructed instinct should say, 'I incline to prefer method A to method B,' while whispering, as she always does in those cases if you listen well, 'but, really, you must not trust to me'; while reason, on her side, makes it clearly evident that, in the long run, method B must lead to the truth, and there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent method A from going hopelessly wrong?"

*The German:* "You English are for ever talking of the 'long run.' What is this 'long run'?"

*The Englishman:* "It is a succession of instances, as they present themselves in experience, indefinitely long, yet not endless."

*The German:* "Well, I might, perhaps, admit that pure science, which can afford to wait a century, or, if need be, five centuries,

or indeed any time not endless, before coming to a conclusion, might trust to reason's 'long run,' provided instinct, on reconsideration, compels it to do so. But how about an individual who has to make up his mind promptly concerning a practical proposition, and be ready to act when the occasion arises?"

*The Englishman:* "The individual should consider that his case is of insignificant importance in comparison with countless other cases."

*The German:* "Yes, yes; we know how lofty is your British altruism, especially when it happens to be altruistic altruism; but the practical man had better do what his instinct teaches him is reasonable without regard to your objectivistic logic."

*The Englishman:* "Equally without regard to your subjectivistic logic; unless he is to do what he likes not because he likes, but because your system teaches that he likes to do as he likes."

This explanation will serve to show what the strictly objectivistic treatment is that Professor Aikins professes to adhere to. We shall not pretend to be neutral. We think that the objectivistic method is the only way of enlightening instinct; and that wherever logical rules are to be of any use, they must be rules of objectivistic logic. But Mr. Aikins professes to strike an original path only in applying the objectivistic method to necessary reasonings, where no rules of logic are needed—for that which is evident cannot be made more so. Moreover, he chiefly has in view practical reasonings where men must be guided by instinct or lose all claim to good sense. Neither is Mr. Aikins at all consistently objectivistic. If he had not told us so, we never should have discovered that he made any endeavor to be so. He talks of "the three laws of thought" in the good old way, the somewhat obsolescent way. He speaks of "the test of inconceivability"; thus making it something to be trusted to, and thus surrendering the key to the English position. He ought to have said, "I will not make inconceivability a test; but whatever, with all my efforts, I cannot entertain the smallest doubt of, I won't pretend to criticize." The best we can say is, that the author appears to recognize, in some measure, the futility of the common books, and makes some endeavors to do better. Whether it be from immaturity, insufficient reading and reflection, or lack of vigor of thought, he has not succeeded to any striking extent. But he writes in an agreeable style and makes himself intelligible to every boy. There is a list of exercises filling nearly sixty pages of fine print; and many of these are very good indeed. There is also a sufficient index.

*A Short History of Germany.* By Ernest F. Henderson. Two volumes. Pp. xii, 517, viii, 171. The Macmillan Co. 1902.

The antiquary studies the past for its own sake; the historian, for the purpose of making the present intelligible. The present is influenced, perhaps not more profoundly, but in more directions, by the near past than by the remote; and in historical writing it is as legitimate as it is usual to describe the remote past with relative brevity and to amplify the narrative as it approaches the present. Mr. Henderson, however, in his *Short History of Germany*, carries this method further than is

defensible without some indication, in the title of the work, of his plan of treatment. To the period or periods from the battle in the Teutoburg forest to the election of Rudolf of Hapsburg as Emperor—nearly thirteen centuries—he gives but one-eighth of his total space, and in another eighth he conveys the reader through almost two and a half centuries, and down to Martin Luther. At this point the method of presentation changes almost abruptly. Room is found for careful characterization of leading persons and for illustrative details. To the period that begins with the posting of the ninety-five theses and ends with the Peace of Augsburg (1517-1555) even more space is allotted than to the longer and more recent period within which the narrower Germany attained Constitutional government and national unity (1815-1871). In reality, therefore, Mr. Henderson's work is a history of Germany from 1517 to 1871, with an introductory sketch covering the preceding fifteen centuries.

This introductory sketch is not nearly so well done as is the remainder of the work. It is, of course, much more difficult to write history at the rate of ten or twenty pages to the century than at the rate of two hundred pages to the century; but the thing can be done if the writer is able to discern the chief trend of events, and has the courage to suppress or put in the background all facts of secondary importance. Oddly enough, Mr. Henderson has displayed this ability and courage much more conspicuously in the chief part of his work than in the introduction. His history of Germany from 1517 to 1648 is almost exclusively a history of the Reformation and the religious wars; from 1648 to 1871 it is practically a history of the rise and aggrandizement of Prussia. In the introduction we grope vainly for any such leading motives. These might well have been found in the gradual formation of a German nationality, and in the persistent but unsuccessful effort to give to this nationality a satisfactory political organization. We do not say that these tendencies are not set forth; but they are not set in the right relief, chiefly because this part of the work is cumbered with details improper to so brief a sketch. Moreover, the author's treatment of the Middle Ages is unsympathetic and one-sided. He does not make the reader understand the historical necessity of feudalism; he does not appear to appreciate the historical mission of the Roman Church, nor the immense services it rendered to Germany and to Europe. He impresses upon the reader only the absurdities and oppressions of a decadent feudalism and the abuses of a corrupt church. The best that can be said of this part of the work is that the author is familiar with recent German work—at least with purely historical work—and that, as regards the naked facts, he is accurate. If he were more familiar with the historical investigations of German lawyers and economists, his construction of the facts would, we think, be sensibly modified, and his presentation of the mediæval church and the feudal state would gain in clearness of outline and in solidity.

The deficiencies of this introduction are the more to be regretted because they may prematurely discourage readers who would find the body of the work both profitable and enjoyable. Those who wish to get what is really best in the book will do well to

begin at page 228 of the first volume, with the chapter entitled "German Life on the Eve of the Reformation." It is at this point that the conscientious reader who has begun at the beginning and has not fallen out on the road, loses the sense of being crammed with imperfectly elucidated facts. Not only are the central movements of German history since 1517 brought out in bold relief, but the story is made interesting. Mr. Henderson has no mean power of characterization, and the leading personages not only are in most cases justly estimated, but are vividly presented. He has also a keen appreciation of dramatic situations, and is not afraid to give it play. If his style is somewhat journalistic, it is on the whole good of its kind. Purists will be shocked by the omnipresent split infinitive, and a critic need not be a purist to be pained when "down" is treated as the past participle of the verb to flow (vol. II, p. 391). There is also a redundancy of purely decorative adjectives. These, however, are minor blemishes in writing that has the positive merits of making the author's meaning clear and of holding the reader's attention.

As regards the substantial value of the work, we may repeat what was said of the introduction, that the author is familiar with the recent literature, and we may add that for the period subsequent to 1517 he has evidently done considerable work in the sources, especially in memoirs. Here again, however, the economic basis of the historical development is not always sufficiently emphasized, and matters of public law are in many cases treated with a vagueness that suggests the caution of uncertainty. Diplomatic negotiations, also, especially where legal questions are involved, are rather hazily sketched, and sometimes the technical point at issue is not brought out. It is quite possible that the author's appreciation of these matters is more precise than his treatment shows: it is conceivable that he is afraid of wearying his readers if he calls upon them for any exact thinking. If this is the ground of his superficiality, we think that he has committed an error of judgment. Those who wish really to understand things have rights which a serious author should not disregard, and readers of the other sort will slide over technicalities with little friction.

Mr. Henderson's point of view is Protestant and Prussian, but the Protestant bias, in his case, is not so strong as the Prussian. He fails, indeed, to do full justice to the Roman Church, but he does not fail to show up the weak sides of the Protestant Reformation and of the reformers. His leaning toward Prussia makes him more one-sided, and his construction of modern German history is essentially the same as Treitschke's. He takes Frederick the Great's Silesian claims much more seriously than they were taken by that monarch himself, and his attitude toward William I. and Bismarck is one of complete sympathy. The victorious cause, however, has always a presumption in its favor, and it usually pleases not only the gods, but also the historians. Mr. Henderson's book is certainly the best work in English for the period which he really covers—from the beginning of the Reformation to the establishment of the new German Empire.

The work is fairly, though not exhaustively, indexed, and there is, at the end of