

career. He was only twenty-three years old when he made his translation of the 'Cortegiano,' which was four times reprinted during the reign of Elizabeth. The most interesting portions of his diary relate to his travels in southern Italy and his account of German events in 1552, the year when Maurice of Saxony chased Charles V. from Innsbruck and extorted from him the concessions of Passau. One gathers from Hoby's description of the Terra di Lavoro and Sicily that these regions enjoyed a greater degree of prosperity at the middle of the sixteenth century than one might be inclined to suppose from a general knowledge of Spanish administration. As for the events of 1552, Hoby was in a position to get accurate intelligence from his brother, Sir Philip. We give a little anecdote regarding the Duke of Alva. At Innsbruck there dwelt in 1552 a gun founder, "one of the best in his science of all Christendom, a verie discrete and sober parson. This man (as he told my brother the tale) had a great peeces of artillerie in hand for the Duke of Alava, which he minded to carie into Spaine. Upon these peeces the Duke had caused to bee graven the armes of Philipp, Lansgrave of Hess, with his stitle, which was the Emperor's prisoner, and all for a certain vain glorie that men should beleave he had gotten them in the field by prowess of armes. The Lansgrave's sonn, who was in Duke Maurice's hoost, seeing those peeces there with his father's armes upon them, ceased upon them and tooke them away with him, giving to the gunn founder's wyff an hundred crowns to drinke." Sir Thomas Hoby became envoy to the Court of France in 1566, and died at Paris about four months after his appointment, aged thirty-six.

—An octavo of 543 pages (Longmans, Green & Co.) is entitled 'Higher Mathematics for Students of Chemistry and Physics,' by Dr. J. W. Mellor. It consists of a limping treatise on the calculus and matters connected therewith, including trigonometry, the theory of equations, and the like, to which are appended fifteen pages of numerical tables. It will prove a handy instrument for anybody who has not the same thing in more convenient form on his shelves; but its limitations will be a perpetual vexation. Such a book ought to be written by a master of the subject, a very different person from Dr. Mellor. Mathematics is useful to the physicist in two ways. First, it enables him to solve his own problems instead of employing a mathematician. In this respect it is a great convenience, but not indispensable. Secondly, it supplies him with fundamental conceptions and methods of thinking without which he never can rise from the ranks of the army of science. A volume like this can be of service only in the former way. The prime necessity for a chemist or physicist who proposes to do his own sums is a mastery of synthetic geometry. Beginning with the few doctrine of multitudes and ordinal numbers as a propædæutic, he should first familiarize himself with the results and methods of topics—the geometry of a universe of distortable but unbreakable things, no standard of straightness or of length being supposed. Next should come graphics, the doctrine of un-

limited straight lines, comprising perspective, projective geometry, graphical statics, etc.—invaluable tools, all. Next, metrics, comprising the elements of geometry, Euclidean and Non-Euclidean, the Brocard geometry, etc. Of all this synthetic mathematics Dr. Mellor gives not one word; and his book should have been entitled, not Higher Mathematics, but Mathematical Analysis. Passing to this, the student should begin with algebra and analytic geometry, of which Dr. Mellor gives extracts. He should then make himself as familiar with the calculus of finite differences in its entirety as with his mother-tongue. Dr. Mellor allots about twenty-five pages to the fringes of this subject. Then should come the differential calculus, including trigonometry and the theory of functions, in its fullest modernity. Here quaternions may be taken up. Finally, such subjects as probabilities, rigid dynamics, molecular dynamics, hydrodynamics, viscosity, aerodynamics, must be studied. It is a vast course; but one cannot take high rank among the coming generation of physicists or chemists at any cheaper rate. A hand-book of rules and formulae, of which there already are several, though none which accurately meets the need, would be, of course, an immense convenience. Numerical tables are best given in separate collections. A collection better suited to the uses of physicists than any now existing could easily be made, but in any case he would require his separate Crelle's 'Rechen tafeln.'

SIR WILFRID LAURIER AND THE LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party: A Political History. By J. S. Willison. In two volumes. Toronto: George N. Morang & Co., Limited. 1903. Illustrated. Pp. 472 and 451.

Mr. Willison has been for some years the very successful and highly respected editor of the *Toronto Globe*, the chief organ of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's party. He has now exchanged that position for the editorship of an independent paper, his entrance upon which is a very interesting event in Canadian journalism. But we can scarcely expect him at once to doff the editor of the *Globe* and become the judicial critic of the leader and the party whose best advocate up to this time he has been. We must be satisfied if partiality is kept within bounds, and a reasonable measure of equity is extended to the other side.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier is a notable figure in Canadian politics. He is a Frenchman whose political character has been formed under British institutions, while he combines with that character French refinement, elegance, and tact. Not only is he an extremely pleasing speaker, both in English and in French, but he can adapt himself easily to the tastes and sentiments either of an English or of a French audience. He is, as a rule, studiously courteous in debate, and never, even in campaign speeches, is betrayed into anything violent or gross. Nobody questions his personal purity, at whatever he may be compelled to wink as a party leader. At the same time he is a complete and almost avowed opportunist. "The Prime Minister," says one who has just left his Cabinet, "has in fact no very strong opinion

on matters of this [fiscal] kind. He is an opportunist; his favorite doctrine being that each day should look out for itself." Sir Wilfrid is very happily gifted with a remarkable facility of presenting in the best light each of the successive positions into which by the current of events he is borne.

He is a Catholic, but very liberal; one of the school of Montalembert and Lacordaire, who, trying to combine Catholicism with liberty, died under a cloud of Papal displeasure. In Quebec he was numbered with the party Rouge, Liberals who are not revolutionary, though they respect the patriotic traditions of 1837, but are opposed to the political domination of the priest. There was a curious incident in this part of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's career. He was a member of the Institut Canadien, a literary society which was excommunicated in the mass for admitting anti-Catholic works. Guibord, a member of the society, died, and the Church sought to exclude him from burial in his lot in the Catholic cemetery, on the ground that he was excommunicate. Thereupon there was a lawsuit which at last went to the British Privy Council, the judges in which debated "with iron gravity," to use Carlyle's phrase, the question whether people under the ecclesiastical law of the Church of Rome could be excommunicated in the mass. The judgment was that the excommunication must be individual. Preparations were made to bury Guibord in his lot. The Catholics resisted. There was great danger of an affray; when the Bishop cut the knot by mounting the pulpit and declaring the ground in which the heretic was to be laid de-consecrated, so that the faithful around might rest uncontaminated and in peace.

Mr. Laurier passed from the Provincial Parliament at Quebec to the Dominion Parliament, where he was the chief of the French members, and soon by his eloquence won high place. When the French half-breeds of the Northwest rebelled, the heart of the French province was with them; Mr. Laurier then pleaded their cause and denounced the execution of Riel, the organizer of the rebellion. In burning words, which rose in judgment against him when he was committing himself and Canada to the excesses of British martial law in the Cape Colony.

The party styled Liberal, though without much reason, was at this time in opposition. Its leader, Mr. Alexander Mackenzie, a very honest and worthy man, though too much devoted to details, was supplanted in the leadership by Mr. Edward Blake, an eminent advocate and jurist, but, as a leader of men, out of place. Upon Mr. Blake's resignation, Mr. Laurier was presently called upon to lead the party in a general election against the Tories under their veteran, witty, and long successful chief, Sir John A. Macdonald. The history of that election given by Mr. Willison is curious. There was at the time no constitutional ground for a dissolution, but the Government, seeing that its protectionist policy—national policy, as it was called—was losing ground, resolved to snap a verdict. It was, however, necessary that some constitutional ground for a dissolution of Parliament be found, the expiry of its term should be assigned. The Government gave out that negotiations were on foot with the United States for reciprocity, and that it required a popular mandate. Our Secretary of State,

Mr. Blake at once put forth a note stating that no such negotiations were on foot between the two countries. An appeal was next made to the loyalty of the Dominion by pretending, without the shadow of a ground, that Mr. Laurier and his party were conspiring to betray Canada to the United States. The appeal, though not only dishonest but supported, as we learn from Mr. Willison's narrative, by dishonorable means, was successful, and Mr. Laurier remained in opposition.

After the death of Sir John A. Macdonald and his successor, Sir John Thompson, the Conservative party was broken up by internal dissension and treachery. Mr. Laurier and his party then came into power. Their election platform had been free trade, or at least tariff for revenue only; and their leading economist, Sir Richard Cartwright, a man of great ability and force, had been always the sworn foe of protection. But they presently showed that they appreciated the political, perhaps also the financial, influence of the protected manufacturers, and began to talk of the respect due to vested interests and of stability of tariff. To stability of tariff, however, they still adhere, refusing to listen to the demands preferred by the protected manufacturers, of course on patriotic grounds, for further measures of protection.

Mr. Laurier now shone forth in a new and very striking character—that of a French Premier, and the great man of the French province enthusiastically attached to British institutions and connection. The pledge of his attachment was a tariff giving a preference of 33 per cent. to British goods. His rewards, besides the medal of the Cobden Club, to which his title was somewhat equivocal, were knighthood, a seat in the British Privy Council, and an enthusiastic ovation in England, where all eyes were fixed upon him as he rode in the Jubilee procession. Advocates of an Imperial Zollverein and Imperial Federation believed that they had at last found their man, and the sight of Imperialism embodied in a French-Canadian might well gladden their hearts.

Canadian Tories were filled with chagrin at seeing their clothes thus stolen by the Liberal chief. But the belief that England was going back to protection never had much foundation. The British grain duty, which raised the hopes of protectionists high, has been abandoned. The Canadian preference in favor of British goods has been cancelled. The dream of Imperial Zollveredners is at an end. So, probably, will soon be the dream of Canadian contribution to the British army and fleet.

A signal instance of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's opportunism is his conduct with regard to the reform of the Senate. The Canadian Senate is not elective, but is appointed by the Crown; that is, practically, by the head of the party in power. The long reign of Sir John A. Macdonald had filled it with Conservatives. Sir Wilfrid then moved earnestly for a reform of the Senate. Deaths have now reversed the balance, and though scandalous proof of the need for reform has recently come to light in the shape of an attempted sale of a Senatorship for a contribution to the party fund, Sir Wilfrid Laurier speaks of Senate reform no more.

The political cable which binds Canada

to the Imperial country has, by successive concessions of self-government, been worn to the last strand; and of that strand about the strongest thread is the extraordinary craving of Colonials for Imperial titles and decorations. Sir Wilfrid Laurier is not the sort of man by whom that distorting influence is likely to be especially felt. No one would suspect him of being a sycophant or a title-hunter. But he is a knight and a Privy Councillor; and it is not in human nature that these titles, and the connection with the court and aristocracy of England which they involve, should fall in some degree to affect his sentiments and his course.

It was generally believed that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was unwilling to participate in the South African war, but yielded to the fear of being outbid in loyalty by the Conservative Opposition, to the clandestine influence of Downing Street, and to the solicitations of a low agent of the South African Company, combined with militarist excitement. Mr. Willison, who could hardly fail to know the truth, does not contradict the common belief. The resolutions of the Canadian Parliament framed by its leader justify participation in the war on the ground that her Majesty is suzerain of the Transvaal Republic, and that "her Majesty's subjects now settled in that region are suffering under political oppression"; the political oppression consisting in the requirement of a seven years' term for naturalization (the British term being five years, with the additional requirement of the sanction in each case of the Secretary of State), while the Outlanders, for whom the concession of a shorter term was demanded, had recently invited foreign invasion.

In the preamble of the first of the two conventions with the Transvaal (1881) the term "suzerainty" was used; but it was distinctly limited to foreign relations; while in regard to domestic affairs, including, of course, the regulation of the franchise, "complete self-government" was assured. In the second convention, that of 1884, the word "suzerainty" was omitted, evidently by design, and the 'Annual Register' of the year describes the effect of the convention as "Suzerainty of England over the Transvaal abolished; England only reserving the right of veto on treaties with foreign Powers, except with the Free State and the northern Kaffir tribes." Mr. Chamberlain

had himself said that "to go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his state, with which successive Secretaries of State standing in that place had repudiated all right of interference, would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise." Lord Salisbury had said that the Boers had absolute control over their internal affairs. Mr. W. H. Smith, a Conservative leader of the House of Commons, had said, "It is a cardinal principle of that settlement [the Convention of 1884] that the internal government and legislation of the South African Republic shall not be interfered with." The Jameson raiders were tried under the Foreign Enlistment Act for fitting out an expedition against a foreign state at peace with Great Britain. The Lord Chief Justice had on that occasion defined the Transvaal as a "foreign state with which her Majesty was in friendly treaty relations." He said:

"The position of the South African Republic is determined by the two Conventions of 1881 and 1884. The result is, that under these Conventions the Queen's Government recognize the complete independence and autonomy of the South African Republic, subject only to the restriction contained in the Convention of 1884, to the effect that that state should have no power to enter into any treaties without this country's consent, except as regards one or two minor states, one of which is the Orange Free State."

Did Mr. Laurier know these facts when he led the Canadian Parliament to rest its recorded justification for engaging in a war with a people who had never done Canada any wrong, on the existence of the suzerainty and the obligation to enforce political reform? Destiny can hardly apply a more decisive test to the character of a statesman than by setting him to choose between a possible loss of office and consent to an unjust or unnecessary war. That test was put to the character of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier chose consent to the war.

HEGEL'S LOGIC INTERPRETED.

Hegel's Logic: An Essay in Interpretation. By John Grier Hibben. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1902. 12mo. Pp. 313.

Hegel made easy; Hegel brought to the level of the meanest capacity. It is really surprising how clear these things can be made, if they are disencumbered of some tangles which are perhaps not so essential as they have been thought to be. The first pages delight one; but as one reads on, one begins to think that the effect is very much as if one were to explain to a child of five in the clearest terms, quite on the plane of its thought, all the facts and truths of life, domestic and social. That that child would understand life just as an adult understands it, is true in the same measure that Professor Hibben's reader will understand Hegel's philosophy as Hegel understood it. Those parts of Hegel's doctrine which set ordinary logic at defiance—that is to say, the wool and warp of his whole work—are treated as being merely a manner of phrasing. As we turn over the leaves, our eye lights often upon such expressions as "only an epigrammatic expression" (p. 36), "his epigrammatic manner" (p. 139), "striking epigram" (p. 37), "an enigmatical form" (p. 115), "the Hegelian figure" (p. 157), "could be taken in a figurative rather than a literal sense" (p. 113), "in his characteristically paradoxical manner" (p. 152), "a paradox, as thus expressed" (p. 151). Once only do we find any intimation that to Hegel himself these things were more than that; and even then it is passed by without one full sentence being given to it.

Whoever has dipped into Hegel ever so little will ask in astonishment how it is possible to interpret him so. The explanation seems to be that the master's incessant overstraining of reason, without which his system could not have been put together, seems in this disciple, as in many another, to have had the effect of destroying all the tenacity of his thought and leaving it lax and flaccid. Here is a professor of logic who cannot even state the ordinary doctrines of his own discipline accurately. "The general standpoint was that thought presents to us

alternative judgments, one of which must be wholly true and its opposite wholly false." Who ever maintained such a position? The opposite of the wholly true is that which is more or less false. But, in accordance with this, Professor Hibben claims that "it is only when his [Hegel's] entire system is unfolded that we can have any basis for judging" it. Until a man's whole say is said, one will generally be unable to pronounce that it is wholly true; but he need sometimes go but very little way before betraying that it is more or less false, or even quite unscientific. "The traditional law of logic known as that of excluded middle [meaning the principle of excluded middle] is enunciated thus: 'that of two opposite predicates, one, and only one, can be assigned to one and the same subject.'" Now if a professor of logic deliberately teaches what he ought to know is false, how can we otherwise excuse him, or avoid one or another more serious accusation of him, than by saying that he is a loose thinker? The principle of excluded middle does not belong to the so-called "traditional" logic, since, although it occurs in Aristotle as a definition of the kind of opposition called contradiction, and in other passages in dissent from a statement of Plato's, yet it plays no important part in Aristotle's system, and was first made a fundamental principle by Wolf. The whole purpose of the name and of the enunciation of the principle is to render it clear that what Professor Hibben wrongly states as this principle involves two distinct principles: first, that an affirmative and its corresponding negative predicate—as "black" and "not-black"—cannot both be true of the same definite subject, in the same definite respect; and second (and this is the principle of excluded middle) that of two such predicates one or the other must be true of any single individual.

The author is equally unsuccessful in explaining the "principle of sufficient reason." He calls it "the fourth law of thought, which is associated with the name of Leibniz, and is known as the law of sufficient reason, viz.: 'Everything must have its sufficient ground,'" and he proceeds to expound it in two or three pages. This principle, for such it is usually called, not only is "associated with the name of Leibniz," but was originated by him in a more exclusive sense, perhaps, than that in which any other philosophical principle of equal renown can be attributed to any one author. Nothing bearing more than a faint resemblance to it has been found in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza, or any other philosopher, not even in Jakob Thomassius. It is variously worded in German, but usually somewhat thus: "Alles Zufällige hat seinen zureichenden Grund." Here, the German word *Grund*, corresponding to *raison* in Leibniz's formula, should be translated "reason." Whatever Hegel meant by *Grund*, it is not the "reason" of this principle. Another inaccuracy in Prof. Hibben's statement of it, though usual enough, lies in the words "must have." Leibniz was far too nominalistic to think that existing things really have reasons. He may seem to say so, using the phrase "there is a reason"; but what he means and sometimes says is, that a "sufficient reason for the thing's being as it is can be found out by the intellect." One of the recent treatises on logic formulates the principle

very correctly, at least on one side of it, as follows: "Jedes behauptende Urtheil ist zureichend zu begründen." It is undoubtedly implied by Leibniz that a really sufficient reason must refer to some operative condition of the reality of the fact. But to assert, as Hibben and some other Hegelians have done, that Hegel's theory of reality ("Die Lehre von Wesen") is implied in the 'Monadologie,' is simply to put into a strong light the deleterious effect upon the brain of much reading of Hegel.

If we had the space to give to it, we could show that there are few, if any, statements in this book concerning the ordinary doctrines of logic or concerning the present state of logical discussion that are anything like accurate. Professor Hibben's own thought, in the few instances in which he has permitted himself anything like a free use of reason, is washy; and the maxims that he holds up for admiration—virtually, for example, that precise definitions, and precision generally, should be eschewed—are calculated to confuse discussion and to prevent its issuing in the test of experiment. Such, for instance, is the maxim "that every term which we employ in philosophical thinking should represent . . . an idea of universal and necessary significance, and that such a notion cannot have a one-sided, abstract, and rigid meaning." The proper maxim should be that ideas of universal and necessary significance and of a world of protean application may be taken one or two at a time as the subject of philosophical reflection; but that this reflection is of no use or meaning except so far as it is expressible in rules having reference to some conceivable practical upshot of all the thinking; so that it is the one-sided, abstract, and rigid conceptions that ought to be the philosopher's tools. Civilization, so far as physical science—including physiology and bacteriology—has had a hand in it, is the result of trying to find out what one-sided, abstract, and rigid formulæ express the way in which events will happen; and quite amazing is Professor Hibben's assertion that experientialists hold that "it is the function of thought to interpret experience, and not to anticipate it."

But, notwithstanding all we have said, it remains true that, if one does not care to trace and examine that movement of Hegel's thought which is supposed to be accurate, but wants only so much of his results and their relations to one another as is viewy and broad, then this book furnishes what one desires with greater success than any other we have seen. Of course, it is confined to the 'Encyclopædie,' and almost entirely to the 'Logik,' and that mostly as Hegel himself left it. It is a syllabus for lectures.

But all these Hegelians—Harris, Wallace, Hibben, Everett, etc.—who dog the steps of their master in almost textual comments, are profoundly, unfaithful to the spirit of Hegel and of his philosophy. The 'Logik' was intended to be a mirror of the whole development of mind; and Hegel, with all that romanticism that was characteristic of his epoch, was far more essentially and determinedly a man who wished to be up to date in all his mental development. Now ninety years have passed before us since the 'Logik' was written;

and the result is that it now condemns itself. In the first place, the system, not in its deeper and truer spirit, but as it is worked out, and notwithstanding a sop tossed in one of the closing sections, is anti-evolutionary, anti-progressive, because it represents thought as attaining perfect fulfilment. There is no conceivable fulfilment of any rational life except progress towards further fulfilment. The 'Logik' is supposed to mirror the history of mind; and its first step is made to correspond to Thales, who ninety years ago seemed to stand at the threshold of thought. Thales, however, lived only twenty-five centuries ago; and we now know that men read and wrote fifty centuries before him, while the development of mind began countless eons before man became man. And it is evident enough that all Hegel's categories properly belong to his third grand division, the *Begriff*. What, for example, could be more monstrous than to call such a conception as that of Being a primitive one; or, indeed, what more absurd than to say that the immediate is abstract? We might instance a dozen such self-refutations. That the Hegelians should have allowed the obviously unsuccessful development of the doctrine of *Wesen* to stand all these years uncorrected, is a striking instance of the mental fossilization that results from their method of study. A powerful and original study of what the true Hegelian doctrine of *Wesen* should be, according to our present lights, might breathe some real life into a modified Hegelianism, if anything could have that effect.

RECENT FICTION.

The Untilled Field. By George Moore. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.

Darby O'Gill and the Good People. By Herminie Templeton. McClure, Phillips & Co.

Cap'n Simcoe's Store. By George S. Wasson. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Middle-Aged Love Stories. By Josephine Daskam. Charles Scribner's Sons.

The Adventures of Harry Revel. By A. T. Quiller-Couch. Charles Scribner's Sons.

It is common to account altogether for the sorrows of Ireland by her wrongs, and to suppose that if you give the Irish peasant the land, you will secure for that sick nation health and wealth. There are, however, intelligent Irishmen who probe deeper into the causes of national depression in Ireland, and of these Mr. George Moore is not the least outspoken. In a dozen short stories, or rather studies, he dwells on the lack of vitality among the peasants of Catholic Ireland, the lack of all romance in their lives, the utter joylessness that is not to be explained away by economic causes. "In the country districts Irish life is one of stagnant melancholy; the only aspiration that comes into their lives is a religious one. It will be said that the Irish are too poor to pay for pleasure, but they are not too poor to spend fifteen millions a year upon religion."

Mr. Moore's contention is, that unless something is done to stop the constant drain of the population into the priesthood and the conventual life, the Catholic laity will become extinct in a generation. There are only two ideas in Catholic Ireland: emigration and the priesthood. At the opening

P 61014