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TURNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

History of Philosophy. By William Turner, S.T.D. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1903. 8vo, pp. 674.

Some apology may be due to our readers for giving more than a line or two to a book which professes merely to be a one-volume text-book of the whole history of philosophy. But this is no ordinary third-hand compilation. The thorough reader of philosophy will find himself here confronted by a peer whose judgments are his own (barring in a sense those that touch dogma) in a larger proportion than is usual, the principal exceptions being that, in ancient and early mediæval history, imaginations of German higher critics are too easily assented to. As one goes through the volume, one becomes interested in considering the views of the author, and finds them mostly acceptable. Stückl's various writings, the manuals that have emanated from Stonyhurst, and sundry other books and articles had already produced upon us the impression that Leonine Thomism was a decidedly favorable standpoint from which to survey the course of philosophy; and the present volume bears out that impression. There is a reason why it should be so: the adherent of any modern school is a nominalist—that is, he believes in only a single fundamental mode of being, and his power of conceiving other modes has become atrophied from disuse. But a true Aristotelian, of whatever stripe, must recognize a germinal mode of being, a positive, substantial possibility, or potentiality, over and above actual existence, or *existence*. He is thus in a condition to understand both nominalistic and realistic conceptions of the universe. The most favorable standpoint, on this principle, should be that of the Scotist, who is habituated to thinking of three modes of being—matter, or the positively possible; form, or that whose being consists in its general governing of what in any way is; and heccetives, or positive elements of individual existence. Unfortunately no considerable Scotistic school of thought is now extant. Only a pragmatist, here and there, has a sort of affinity to Scotus.

Apart from all this, it has long been coming home to the philosophical world that a more thorough appreciation of the realistic theory is one of the prerequisites to philosophy's ever developing into a stable science. It is a chief merit of this little book that it furnishes a more intelligible and truer account of the development of scholastic realism than can be found in many a more pretentious history of philosophy. The system of St. Thomas Aquinas, beyond dispute one of the greatest that have ever been formed, is here expounded with accuracy and in some detail. The modification of that doctrine by Scotus—departing from it, roughly speaking, about as much as Aristotelianism departs from Platonism—is less sympathetically treated. The reasons for the modification are not explained, nor is the essential characteristic of it clearly set forth. What is said of it, however, is true enough; and that is more than the Scotist is accustomed to find in compendiums or even in books devoted to explaining the doctrine he follows.

Father Turner's account of the rise of scholasticism is particularly comprehensible, and in the main points just. During the three centuries and more that elapsed

between the 'De Divisione Naturæ' of Eriugena and the granting of the first distinctly recorded privilege to the University of Paris by Philip Augustus, A. D. 1200, we hear of some sixty teachers of philosophy; and of most of them we barely learn their existence. About a third of them, including all the most important, receive separate treatment by Father Turner, thus affording a tolerably definite idea of one side—the internal side—of the line of generation of scholasticism proper, the scholasticism of the University of Paris. The account given of the philosophy of the fourteenth and two following centuries does not satisfy us nearly so well. It is difficult to conceive that a person who had ever made any serious study of Ockham could have given so colorless a portrait of that strong and singular thinker, whose subsequent influence has been so mighty that a close examination of his thought was called for. The decay of scholasticism is largely attributed to nominalism; and no doubt there is some truth in that. For not only does nominalism render any religious philosophy impossible or absurd, but the empty formalism, oppressive triviality, and soporific verbosity of the mediæval nominalists—especially the later ones, though Ockham himself is hard to beat in the last particular—was calculated to disgust every lively mind. Yet, after all, the Scotists retained the upper hand in the most important centres to the last; it was not the Ockhams but the Dunses that most excited the resentment of the humanists; and it was, in part, because of this resentment that the modern world became nominalistic. Yet it should not be forgotten that the study of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies was an important factor in this.

Besides nominalism, Father Turner holds the chief cause of the decay of scholasticism to have been Averroism, especially the proposition that what is true in philosophy may not be true in theology. Is it not singular how most men regard this proposition as simply abominable, while another proposition, differing from it chiefly in being more general, is by many if not most men considered as the capstone of good sense—we mean the proposition that what is true in theory may be false in practice? The meaning of this is, of course, that a correct deduction from a theory may, in consequence of the impossibility of any general theory taking into account all the factors which affect experience, be found quite contradicted by experiment. Nobody will be more alive to this than modern mathematicians. What, then, is it that Averroes adds to this that makes his proposition so abominable? It is that if a deductive conclusion is so abhorrent to one's most intimate conscience that to accept it would be to break up one's whole system of moral habitudes, it is better to adhere to natural or quasi-natural sentiment, and to suppose that some undetected error affects the philosopheme, although it appears evidently to follow from axioms. Averroes advanced his proposition on the occasion of such a contradiction presenting itself in his own experience. He was in a situation similar to that of one of those religious speculators whom we sometimes read of in the newspapers, who reason it out that it is their duty to burn their children alive or commit some other enormity. Is it really so

abominable, in such a case, to do as Averroes did rather than to follow apparent reason to the destruction of all that one has been accustomed to hold sacred? Father Turner says that the proposition of Averroes is contrary to the basic principle of scholasticism. Undoubtedly it is so, in so far as the general proposition that what is true in theory may be false in practice is contrary to the basic principles of the theory. But that is not to say that the acceptance of the proposition is unfavorable to further and closer study of the theory. Would it not be a truer account of the decadence of scholasticism to say that any purely deductive theory, like those of scholasticism, must eventually exhaust its interest owing to all the important consequences having been already made out? Pure mathematics is saved from exhaustion only by starting new sets of hypotheses as the former ones become uninteresting.

However, there was an entirely different order of causes tending to disintegrate scholasticism which Father Turner perhaps considered beyond the scope of this manual. Namely, there are certain incongruities necessarily accompanying a priesthood, sacred things—such as masses and intentions of masses—being bought and sold like railway securities; a court, like profane courts, a hotbed of vice and iniquity, etc., etc., which seem natural enough to a barbarian like the European of the ninth or tenth century. Now scholasticism itself, together with other agencies, had cultivated men's minds up to the point where such sordid and vile things, interwoven with the most holy, inevitably produced upon the lay mind an intense disgust which, where there was a certain degree of intellectual strength, made a readiness for unbelief, if not unbelief itself. Then, just as we all know that crude forms of punishment may answer well for very young children, but would have disastrous effects at a later age, so the barbaric manner in which the Church always treated heresy prevented its expression, and so not only rendered unbelief invulnerable, but added to it a cynical hypocrisy which disinclined minds to any philosophy like scholastic realism. For this hypocrisy said to itself, with a shrug of the shoulders, "I believe what I see, and nothing else." There is enough of it eating the bread and butter of the Catholic Church to-day to illustrate what we mean (not without force) to anybody who is at all acquainted with that communion. Combine causes such as these, and the æsthetic fashion of mind that the Constantinopolitans imported into the West, with the inevitable exhaustion of a deductive treatment of theology, and causes for the dissolution of scholasticism seem only too abundant.

We regret that the limits of our columns forbid our considering Father Turner's interpretations and criticisms of modern philosophy, which are always interesting, and under a good teacher will prove stimulating to the thought of the student. This effect will only be heightened by there being occasional little exceptions to be taken. We will illustrate these by two instances, one of criticism and one of interpretation. Namely, Father Turner calls Locke "superficial." Now, it is hardly conceivable that anybody, in the light of modern psychology, should deny what Father Turner probably means. But how will the neophyte under-

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stand the word "superficial"? Superficiality is the opposite of penetration. It is the effect of not having thought much about the propositions one enunciates. One of Locke's most remarkable traits, shown on every page of his masterpiece, is that every section brings the fruit of enough thought to furnish forth a considerable essay. Not defective penetration, but the failure to take into consideration other circumstances than those which he has studied—that is the characteristic fault of Locke.

The other instance to which we shall refer is that Father Taylor says that Descartes, in his reply to Gassendi, "protested that the [*Cogito*] *ergo sum* is not an inference." This was Dugald Stewart's notion; but it is not tenable. Descartes often said that the *Cogito ergo sum* was not a syllogism or an enthymeme, nor founded on the syllogistic theory of reasoning. Yet even that hardly gibes with his version of it in the 'Principia.' It is true that he calls it "tanquam rem per se notam simpliciter intuitu." But what he means is that when one considers that one thinks, one at once perceives thereby that one exists. He thus makes the knowledge of one's existence an effect of the knowledge that one thinks. As Cousin said, "Le *dono je suis* n'indique-t-il pas un lien logique? Comme Descartes emploie toujours ce mot quand il raisonne, n'est-il pas naturel de croire que ce même mot a le même sens que partout ailleurs, et ce rapport des termes ne marque-t-il point celui des procédés intellectuels? Si le *dono* n'a pas ici un sens logique, pourquoi Descartes ne l'a-t-il pas dit?"

We have found so much fault with the book that our readers may not understand why we like it so much. It is because it is neither a machine-made compilation nor a vague essay, but is the work of a real student of the history of philosophy. We may add that its statements are formally distinct and explicit, as befits a book for beginners and a text-book. There is a thirteen-page index of proper names, and of such subjects as Absolutism, Academies, Accadian traditions, Aesthetics, Agnosticism, Air currents of the Stoics, Antinomies, Arabian philosophy, Arianism, Astronomy, Atomists.

The Tempest. Edited by Mark Harvey Liddell. (The Elizabethan Shakspeare.) Doubleday, Page & Co. 1903.

From the printer's note at the end, it appears that this volume had been already several months in process of manufacture before "Macbeth," the first volume of the edition, was published in April, 1903. The adherence of the editor to every detail of the form and method of the previous volume is, then, not to be regarded as a wilful ignoring of the very considerable mass of criticism which greeted the result of the first stage of his labors. It is none the less to be regretted that the serious faults already pointed out should continue to mar one of the most costly and elaborate productions so far attempted by American scholarship. Some of these, of course, inhere in the very conception of the work. The distribution of the comment round three margins of the text, the failure to restrain it within the limits of the same

page as the corresponding text, and the absence of paragraphing in the notes, continue to puzzle and bewilder the reader; and these cannot well be altered without changing the character of the edition. The absence of line-numbers, except at the top of the page, however, is a defect which could easily be remedied.

On the less mechanical side, the treatment of the text remains open to serious criticism. The arbitrary spelling of the First Folio is retained throughout, and the editor frequently implies that this has the authority of Shakspeare himself. This, of course, is not certain or even probable; and a good defence for troubling the reader with the eccentricities of an unknown seventeenth-century type-setter exists only when an exact reprint of the Folio is being attempted. But no such attempt is here made. The stage directions, the arrangement of verses, the punctuation, the capitals and italics, and even the dialogue itself, are all tampered with; so that one has many of the disadvantages of a facsimile without its authority.

The material in the notes has the same merits and defects as were to be found in Mr. Liddell's "Macbeth." Learning and ingenuity are here in abundance, and the professed student of Elizabethan English grammar and idiom will find much interesting material brought together; but he will constantly find himself wishing that Mr. Liddell had written a dictionary, and not buried his findings among masses of elementary and irrelevant comments on Shakspeare.

In the more erudite parts of his work the editor is unduly dogmatic at times. Explanations which the scholar would gladly take as suggestions become annoying as absolute assertions. Thus, on the line, "What cares these roarers for the name of king?" the note says, "ROARERS, 'rioters,' for the boatswain's use of the word in this connection implies the EL meaning 'riotous person,' cp. 'to roare, . . . to murmur, to show themselves discontented' Alvearie; 'roarer' is also a regular term for 'blustering fellow,' 'bully.'" This use of "roarer" is, of course, well known, but in the present passage it is quite as likely to mean just "roarer."

In the Introduction, Mr. Liddell's work is much more intelligent and better proportioned. The discussion of the sources of the play is clear and scholarly. In the matter of the date he accepts with a modification the view of Tieck and Garnett. These scholars have argued that "The Tempest" was written for the marriage of the Princess Elizabeth and the Elector Palatine in February, 1613. Mr. Liddell, impressed by the autumnal spirit of the play and the masque of Ceres in the fourth act, and by the fact that Ferdinand and Miranda are betrothed but not married, concludes that Shakspeare prepared it for the betrothal ceremonies planned for the previous autumn. Owing to the death of Prince Henry, the betrothal was postponed, and later performed without public festivities; so it is argued that Shakspeare would merely hold over his betrothal play and touch it up for the wedding itself in the beginning of the following year. But neither these reasons nor Garnett's attempts to identify the characters of the play with personages at court seem sufficiently to discount the statement of the

cautious and learned Malone, based upon documents now lost, that the comedy "had a being and a name in the autumn of 1611."

The more purely literary criticism contained in the Introduction and scattered through the notes is often interesting and suggestive. The weakness here, as in the "Macbeth," is in Mr. Liddell's persistent attempts to trace a parallelism in the motives of the greater plays. The following paragraph gives an instance, and not an extreme one, of the tendency.

"It was Macbeth's fervent wish to net up the train of consequence flowing from his act, and through this suspension of cause and effect gain at one stroke success. It seems as if this poetic thought, this intervention of the human will into the designs of God, had suggested itself to Shakspeare as the theme for a play in which 'the trammelling up' would be to a nobler end. Unlike Macbeth, Prospero justifies his usurpation. The 'Tempest' is thus, though so brief and shadowy, one of the most suggestive of Shakspeare's plays; and, being a comedy in the Elizabethan sense of a tale ending happily, it belongs with the great tragedies—Hamlet, 'Macbeth,' Othello, and Lear, making for them a kind of complementing Epilogue in which the poet hints at the proper interpretation of his greatest work. For in it is answered the question which the tragedies put: Is life necessarily bound in shallows and in miseries, all cheerless, dark, and deadly? Will man, then, like the base Indian, throw his pearl away? Is it a question of to be or not to be, the latter alternative only prevented through respect of what dreams may come when we have shuffled off this mortal coil? Is it a tale of sound and fury signifying nothing? Are we only such stuff as dreams are made of, our little life rounded with a sleep—a sleep and a forgetting?"

It is to be observed that it is here assumed that the great tragedies are questions, the answers to which are to be sought outside themselves. This is silently to impeach the conclusions of the great mass of critics, who have found in these dramas an attempt to solve as well as to raise profound problems as to the significance of life. Further, it is assumed that each tragedy is simply a different form of the same question. But an examination of the succession of statements of it will show that this identity can be made out only by an unwarrantable straining, and this straining is constantly evident in the further attempts to work out the idea stated in the passage which has been quoted. In the interpretation of individual plays a wise caution is called for in the attributing to Shakspeare of conscious and deliberate metaphysical purpose in the choice and treatment of his subject. In dealing with groups of plays this necessity for caution is greatly increased. What Mr. Liddell has to contribute would be no less useful to the Shakspeare student if it were given as suggestion rising out of the play, without dogmatic assertion about what the dramatist meant to put into it.

The Opening of the Mississippi: A Struggle for Supremacy in the American Interior. By Frederic Austin Ogg, Instructor in History in Indiana University. The Macmillan Co. 1904. Pp. xi., 670.

The title of Mr. Ogg's book is not altogether an accurate indication of its contents. That he realizes this is apparent from the explanation which he feels bound to offer in the preface, where he says: "This book is intended primarily to be a

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