

he does not fear death, and he knows how to live for an ideal." That type of man is more needed than the worshipper of the full dinner-pail. It is likely that Mrs. Eckstorm knows the nature of the Penobscot man better than our pessimistic parson.

*Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy.* By Robert A. Duff. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; New York: The Macmillan Co. 8vo. pp. 516.

Baruch de Spinoza died on the twenty-third of February, 1677; and when he shall have been dead for two centuries and a half, it is safe to say that a higher rank in philosophy will be commonly accorded to him than ever before. The vicissitudes of his fame, and not of his fame only, but of the understanding of his doctrine's prevalent color, have been unparalleled by those of any other modern philosopher, and are more surprising—yes, and more discreditable to readers of metaphysics—than those which the estimation and interpretation of Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus have undergone, since different civilizations must be expected, to apprehend such all-permeating conceptions very differently. When Spinoza's principal works appeared, as they first did shortly after his demise, in one collection, the judgment of Leibniz was that they merely traced out a little further some consequences of Cartesianism; but they soon got that brand "atheistical" scorched upon them that has not entirely worn off to this day. The original meaning of it was that they displayed that incipient tendency toward regarding the books of the Bible with the eye of historical criticism which had no little popular vogue about 1700; but before long, as in so many instances, the word was retained while the meaning of it was entirely changed, as one can see by turning to Bayle's "Dictionnaire," where Spinoza is set down, without misgiving, as a materialistic pantheist. When Malebranche called the doctrine an "épouvantable et ridicule chimère," the phrase reflected a curiously jumbled misapprehension. About the middle of the century Wolfius honored Spinoza with a refutation, and a definitive judgment seemed to have been reached on all hands that his philosophy merited notice only for its oddity. Then, as the century drew toward its close, the sort of people who gape in admiration of Jakob Boehme, first in Holland and afterward in Germany, took up, as a help or substitute for that, a mystical and sentimental Spinoza fad. Herder caught the infection; and later, Moses Mendelssohn; and still later, Goethe and Schiller. Of course, all these literary folk looked upon the geometrical form of the "Ethica" with simple awe. So, indeed, or almost so, did all readers of Spinoza until recently, although it is the only thing in his books that is ridiculous, the only thing about the man that is not venerable. The celebrated philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi made a more serious study of the "Ethica"; and he and, more particularly, Hegel brought in that conception of its metaphysics which exaggerates the rôle that idealism plays in it; albeit its idealism is, in truth, very remarkable, considering that Berkeley was not born until several years after Spinoza died.

The importance that the Hegelians at-

tributed to the strange thinker led to his works being studied more generally, more carefully, and more impartially than ever before. They were many times republished in the original Dutch and Latin—upon which latter Spinoza so set his own stamp—not to speak of translations following one another like waves on a beach. We would that the 1895 edition of the edition of Van Vloten and Land could give place to a third issue which, retaining the commodious form, should correct misprints and should confront each page of the Dutch with an English, or even German, translation. Meantime, commentaries have appeared in such numbers that the mere perusal of the principal of them has become a great task, and their study a specialty. But the principal question is the very reverse of a minute one. In regard to another philosopher, say Kant, we compare the three versions of the deduction of the categories to see how they gibe, we ask whether the refutation of Berkeley accords with the first edition of the "Critik," how far the Critique of the Judgment is in harmony with that of Pure Reason, and the like. But in reference to Spinoza, it is the general attitude of his mind that is in question; and the general lesson we derive from the leading discussions is that the commentators have been apt to restrict their studies too much to the one book that is so formal, that they consider Spinoza too exclusively as a metaphysician, and that they have not paid sufficient attention to his extraordinary approaches toward pragmatism. Such had been the conviction of the present reviewer before he took up this volume of Mr. Duff's, who presses the same opinions much further than the reviewer had conceived them to be warranted.

Mr. Duff surveys the works of Spinoza as a whole; and his remarkable acquaintance with them enables him at each point to cite chapter and verse in support of his interpretations. Confining himself strictly to interpretation without criticism, and putting aside Spinoza's metaphysics, so far as it is possible to do so, he forces us to acknowledge what we venture to think will be a novel idea to most of our readers, that Spinoza regarded philosophy from an intensely practical point of view. Mr. Duff makes no reference to pragmatism. For aught there is in his volume, he may never have read a page of James, or Schiller, or any other pragmatist. Of course, he could not say that Spinoza ever enunciated the principle of pragmatism, which is that even the abstractest of our conceptions has absolutely no meaning otherwise than in so far as it has a conceivable bearing upon human conduct. But he brings before us a Spinoza so far on the road to that opinion that we cannot help guessing that if, instead of dying at the age of forty-four years and three months (all but one day), he had lived to the age at which men commonly come to philosophical maturity, he might very likely have conferred upon philosophy the inestimable advantage of a formulation that vindicates so many judgments of common sense and of anthropomorphism. Already, as Mr. Duff points out, Spinoza had thoroughly recognized, as a fundamental truth, that the substance of what one believes does not consist in any mere sensuous representation, but in how one would be disposed to behave. How long, then, could it be before he would come to ask

himself, "If that is what belief is, how can a belief relate to anything but behavior?"

Spinoza, according to Mr. Duff's presentation of him, was the last man in the world to care for abstract speculation. He was animated with the desire to do his practical part in making men better. How men were practically to be made better was his problem. In order to solve this problem, it was necessary to begin by analyzing it, and this drove him perforce to metaphysics. His real study, however, was ethics; and he understood by ethics an infinitely more practical science than many writers upon the subject do in the twentieth century.

Of certain faults in Mr. Duff's work we shall say nothing, for, as long as metaphysics is avoided, they are of no consequence. The book is by no means a mere study of the history of philosophy. The author expects his reader to be interested, not solely in the fact that Spinoza thought so and so, but in the substance of his cogitations as well. The reviewer, individually, will frankly confess that, in going through the volume, he has had a difficulty in repressing an occasional movement of impatience at this. On the other hand, this is about the only Spinoza book that is not handicapped by the weight of technicalities. Its style is as comfortable as one's favorite easy-chair can be, and receives every aid that beautiful printing and delicious paper can render. It is the only book we know of that considers Spinoza from the most comprehensive single point of view.

*Physical Training For Children by Japanese Methods.* By H. Irving Hancock. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

It seems a pity that the author in his third volume should uselessly overwork his main contention concerning the excellence of jū-jutsu, by advertising it as having been "practised for twenty-five hundred years," which antedates just about a thousand years any real Japanese history. The very word jū-jutsu was unknown until introduced, like pretty nearly everything else in Japan that is worth anything, from China, while the samurai class, of whom Mr. Hancock talks so airily as existing in the prehistoric ages, had its origin as late as the ninth or tenth century. Nor is it fair to say, without considering all the circumstances, that the Japanese in the Pekin campaign of 1900 were able "day after day to outmarch our troops by 50 per cent." As a matter of simple fact, the Japanese, already practically acclimatized, most numerous and best equipped with cavalry, horses, and artillery, were given the van. Being ahead of the Russians, who were exceedingly slow marchers, they were able to select always the umbrageous villages and to rest in the shade, utilizing the best and coolest hours of the day to march in. Not being allowed to outstrip the Russians, they had even more rest than they wanted. The Americans, on the contrary, were kept behind the slow-footed Russians, and were compelled to do the heaviest marching in the hottest hours of the day. Had the Japanese been obliged to take the American place, the story would have been very different. As for the early days of the campaign of 1904, the Japanese, despite the difficulties of nature and the weather, were provided with porters and laborers beyond

P 1056