

With the Coöperation of Members and Fellows of the Department of Philosophy. (The Decennial Publications, Second Series, Volume XI.) University of Chicago Press. 1903. 8vo. Pp. 378.

The metaphysical and logical philosophy of Charles Bernard Renouvier, who died on the first day of last September, aged eighty-eight years and eight months, is the most highly esteemed of any by the average Frenchman of to-day; or, as Renouvier himself perhaps more accurately put it, "il est entendu que Renouvier est très fort, mais on ne le lit pas." Considering that the proper date of it is 1848, or earlier, its style and method being those of that period, and its determinative elements having been fixed not long after that date, its reasonings must be praised for their strictness, in comparison with those of metaphysicians generally. Indeed, had their author, instead of coming from the arena of political journalism to take up philosophy when the *Coup d'État* had shut his mouth to the socialism he had been talking, only received a sound training in any successful branch of scientific research, his native vigor of intellect would have shaped those reasonings to rise above the level of other metaphysical argumentations, and would have caused them to prove something—or, at any rate, to go towards proving something. He himself maintained that the fundamentals of his system were as perfectly demonstrated as the theorems of mathematics, if not more so. When, at last, he came to perceive that a senile ossification of his tissues had advanced so far as to leave him now but a few days more to live—a week or a fortnight, he imagined—with a tremendous effort he gathered all his forces in order to pour into the ear of his devoted disciple and bosom friend, M. Louis Prat, some last philosophical injunctions that to him seemed precious above rubies.

Beginning appropriately (though he may not have noticed the coincidence) on the feast of St. Augustine, August 28—it fell upon a Friday—he spoke continuously from one o'clock till three, and then, after half an hour's intermission, for near two hours longer, M. Prat taking notes, stenographic or other. On the morrow, a very long forenoon discourse was supplemented by a shorter one before sunset. Sunday brought another lecture; Monday two—one in the afternoon, the other from nine to eleven in the evening. At 8:45 the next morning he expired. So undeniable was his earnestness. Apostle and martyr of the gospel of work, he was determined to expend his energy to its last grain in doing his duty. Another philosopher in his place might have thought that, since his doctrine was capable of demonstration, it must eventually be acknowledged, no matter with what contumely it was received at first, and that his business should be confined to presenting once for all a demonstration of it that any vaporous supplement could only mar; decency, indeed, forbidding that a priest of divine philosophy should put her into a position of mendicancy for a lodging. But (singular scepticism!) this continuator of the great optimist, Leibniz, had no confidence in his own doctrine's ever coming to be generally received, for all its scientific and demonstrative truth. He had reckoned up the chances and found them adverse.

He hated to die; and in these talks—not "entretiens," by the way, since there were no interlocutors, nor any subject agreed upon at the outset—we cannot detect any marked falling off of intellectual powers as compared with the *Essais de Critique Générale*, the *Science de la Morale*, and *La Nouvelle Monadologie*, to say nothing of last year's *Le Personnalisme*. Being in such possession of his faculties, and in no great bodily pain as long as he kept still, it would have seemed unnatural if he had relished the idea of death. He said: "Je m'en vais. Il me semble que je glisse sur une pente, et je dois, par moments, faire un effort pour me retenir. C'est étrange! ce glissement dans l'inconnu a comme une espèce d'attrait pour moi." He was interested in his own interesting personality; and the little volume is far better worth reading for its human elements than for any utility to a scientific philosophy. It gives two portraits.

The volume of which Professor Dewey is the father forms a part of the University of Chicago's exhibit of an impressive decade's work, and is a worthy part of it; being the monument of what he has done in his own department. Here are eleven essays, four by himself, defining his conception of the business of the logician, seven by the students whom he has helped to form and set upon their own intellectual legs. It affords conclusive proof of the service he has rendered to these accomplished thinkers and, no doubt, to others; and they in their turn will render to another generation services of the same nature. Whatever there was to be gained by contact with a sincere student of philosophy, as such, they have manifestly gained. Are there any further services that logic could be expected to perform? Are any logical questions now being agitated in the different sciences? Is there any such question as to the constitution of matter, the value of mechanical hypotheses, now open in physics? Are there any methods as to more or less statistical methods of philological and historical criticism? If there are such questions, has past experience gone to show that there was any help to be had from broader sweeps of study than specialists can make? Is it worth while to examine at all into the questions here asked; and if it be, is it best to carry to them vague impressions, or the exactest conceptions that studies specially directed to them have been able to evoke?

There are specialists who are disposed to think any inquiries from the outside into their methods are impertinent. They say, with perfect justice, that they understand fully their own business, and wish to be let alone. Unquestionably, they must be right. There is, however, another class of specialists whose aims are of such a nature that they can sometimes make good use of ideas which have grown up in other studies. Such specialists, when they have created, say, physical chemistry, the new astronomy, physiological psychology, stylometry, etc., have sometimes gained a certain measure of esteem even from those of straiter sects. It has often happened that general studies of logic have resulted in such applications of one science to another. Analytical geometry was first conferred upon the human race as an illustrative example of the *Discours de la Méthode*. The group of writers

whom, abandoning all attempt at finding a descriptive designation, we may roughly call the English school of logicians, meaning, for example, Boole, DeMorgan, Whewell, J. S. Mill, Jevons, Venn, Pearson, MacColl, etc., while pursuing studies often purely theoretical, are nevertheless taking a road which may be expected to lead to results of high value for the positive sciences. Those whom we may as roughly call the German school of logicians, meaning such writers as Christoph Sigwart, Wundt, Schuppe, Benno Erdmann, Julius Bergmann, Glogau, Husserl, etc., are engaged upon problems which must be acknowledged to underlie the others, but attack them in a manner which the exact logicians regard as entirely irrelevant, because they make *truth*, which is a matter of fact, to be a matter of a way of thinking or even of linguistic expression. The Chicago school or group are manifestly in radical opposition to the exact logicians, and are not making any studies which anybody in his senses can expect, directly or indirectly, in any considerable degree, to influence twentieth-century science.

Prof. Dewey regards himself as radically opposed to the German school, and explains how he is so. We must confess that had he not put so much emphasis upon it, we should hardly have deemed the point of difference so important; but we suppose he must know what his own affiliations are and are not. He seems to regard what he calls "logic" as a natural history of thought. If such a natural history can be worked out, it will undoubtedly form valuable knowledge; and with all our heart we wish the Chicago school godspeed in their enterprise of discovery. But their task will call for such extreme subtlety, precision, and definiteness of thought that we hope their new science will not disdain to take a lesson, if not from any of the older logicians of the country, nor from that American thinker who first essayed to use his great powers of observation to establish a natural history of mental products—we mean Dr. James Rush—at least from the well-established natural history of Nature, chemistry, botany and zoology; the lesson, to wit, that a natural history can hope to begin a successful course of discovery only from the day when it abandons altogether the trivial language of practical life, and sets up a thoroughly new glossary of words exclusively its own, thereby not confusing our meagre philosophical vocabulary with the burden of added meanings to old words. If calling the new natural history by the name of "logic" (a suspicious beginning) is to be a way of prejudging the question of whether or not there be a logic which is more than a mere natural history, inasmuch as it would pronounce one proceeding of thought to be sound and valid and another to be otherwise, then we should regard this appropriation of that name to be itself fresh confirmation of our opinion of the urgent need of such a normative science at this day.

*The Life of Horace Binney.* With selections from his letters. By Charles Chauncey Binney. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.

Horace Binney was a great lawyer in a generation of great lawyers; in fact, professionally he was a leader among the eminent men who have made our law famous.

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might have proved permanently disastrous. and, without control of the sea, the British victory could not have been won in 1759. Yet, considering the disparity of resources which existed between New England and New France, and the rooted hostility of the two populations, we are unable to perceive how control of the sea could long have prevented the English colonies from mastering their rivals, whether along the St. Lawrence or to the west of the Alleghenies. The colonial contingents that accompanied Amherst were not destined to play a spectacular part in terminating the war, but in any exhaustive discussion of the issues at stake it would seem desirable to give greater prominence to the purely American aspects of the question than is given here. Major Wood is perfectly familiar with Peter Schuyler and the "Glorious Enterprise," but he does not adjust his perspective to the idea that in all probability there would have been an English supremacy of some sort upon this continent whatever the fate of Wolfe's expedition. In offering this criticism we see that before us lie long vistas of historical conjecture. Our only purpose is to accentuate one issue of capital importance which might to advantage be placed in higher relief.

Major Wood avoids a display of pedantry and uses graphic language. In a word, he writes for the public, and there seems to be need that the public—even the literary public—should be instructed on matters relating to the siege of Quebec. Not long ago the *Boston Transcript* favored its readers with an account of the large hotel which recently has been erected in Toronto, and, in describing the frescoes, the writer observed (we quote from memory, but with sufficient accuracy): "One of the subjects is that famous scene in Canadian history where Wolfe, as he crossed the St. Lawrence, recited Grey's [sic] Eulogy [sic] to his troops before scaling the heights of Alabama [sic]." These lines were probably penned within five miles of Parkman's old study in Jamaica Plain—a circumstance which proves that Major Wood's stirring and accurate book is a work of utility, and not of supererogation.

*Outlines of Psychology.* By Josiah Royce. The Macmillan Co. 8vo, pp. 392.

An unpretending little volume, designed for a short text-book for students of sixteen and indefinitely upwards, the antipode of a cram book is this. It will not distend the mental stomach with bran, nor even impart much glow of repletion. Yet it will always interest every reader and often charm him. It will seduce a young person into close observation and close reasoning; and it will only be long after it has been laid aside that the learner will come to appreciate all the benefit he has derived from it. As an effective text-book it is necessarily an outline treatise, stating each point in explicit terms. Yet it is at the same time an essay in the sense of being animated throughout by a central idea, that of the essential unity of conduct and of cognition. We must not be understood to imply that it is a one-sided book, far less a book of one idea. It is a picture of the mind whose lights and shades are due to an evident centre of illumination.

The first result of this is that all the ex-

planatory theories in it are such as physiological psychology propounds, albeit less than the usual proportion of space is given up to physiology. The strictness with which the author confines elucidation to that direction is marked, and, to our thinking, excessive. No doubt, that method is as thoroughly proved as can be; but that does not in itself in the least disprove the method of explaining one state of mind as caused by another state of mind. It may be that Professor Royce would admit this, but that he deems it needless and confusing to insist upon ideas to which common sense clings so tenaciously. On the other hand, it may very well be that he is an automatist; for there is nothing in his idealism to forbid his being so. It will be as an automatist that his readers will mostly understand him.

The author's unification of conduct and cognition cuts deep into the theories of psychology. An instance of this, that will interest everybody on account of its practical bearings, is his proposal of a substitute for that division of mentality into Feeling, Volition, and Cognition, which was brought into vogue by Kant, and which has been so generally employed ever since, in spite of the derision that has been poured upon it by almost all the writers who have availed themselves of it. The fact that no other division has been proposed that has proved convenient in half so many relations, would seem to show that, crude as it is, there must be "something in it"—that there must be some truth of which it is an ungainly and ill-fitting vesture. In place of Cognition, Professor Royce puts the phenomena of forming habits, whether of cognition or of conduct, giving to this the name of "Docility." Another thinker more than twenty years ago used the same word, "Docility," for one of three departments of mind, and with the same signification, except for a detail that we shall mention presently. We believe that this feature, at any rate, of Professor Royce's division will soon commend itself to all psychologists.

For what is habit-taking? We can conceive, and do observe, three kinds of direct effects of causation. There are, first, transitory effects which come into existence with the causal action, disappearing the instant it ceases. Such are the accelerations of motion produced by forces. We do not say that power is expended in producing such effects, since by expenditure we mean a transfer of something, not an annihilation. An effect upon which power is expended may either remain after the cause is removed without any tendency to change, when we may say that the subject upon which the change is wrought is *inert* in respect to that effect; or else, when the power is expended, the effect may at once begin to undo itself, the subject of the change showing a tendency towards change of a definite kind, when we may say that it is *elective* with reference to such changes. Thus, the law of inertia may be expressed by saying that all bodies are *inert* in respect to their velocity. That is, if an expenditure of exertion imparts a certain velocity to a body, it will retain that velocity unchanged after the cause ceases to act. The law of the conservation of energy may be expressed by saying that all effects of physical force consist in bodies being *inert* in respect to velocity, but *elective* in re-

spect to certain changes of relative position. Thus, if a missile were thrown up into a vacuum, then, as soon as the energy of its upward motion was expended, the body would begin to return to earth, while, its horizontal displacement being a change of position in respect to which it is not elective, the energy of horizontal velocity remains in that form. To say that a nerve-track is capable of habit is to say that it is *inert* in respect to changes wrought in it by the passage of a nervous discharge along it. A physicist will hardly hesitate to believe that this is due to particles of the nerve being displaced by the passage in ways to which they are *inert*. If so, the phenomenon closely resembles that of a stream of water wearing itself a channel—a faculty on which every skilled ditcher relies.

Simpler things take habits—that is, behave as they have before behaved. On a cold winter morning, the sheet of ice on the countryman's ewer that offers considerable resistance to his first poking a stick to the bottom, will offer hardly any to a second poke, and none at all to a third. Any new behavior of any object whatever must be due to some new condition of that object; and ordinarily this will persist and cause the new behavior to be repeated. Thus, that which distinguishes the water-course, and still more the nerve, is not that it acts as it has acted, but on the contrary is these two features: first, that the number of particles whose displacement will facilitate the current is very great, so that many repetitions of the action continue to become easier and easier, and thus the habits slow in its development, instead of being fully formed from the beginning; and, secondly, that in the case of the nerve the new positions of the displaced particles appear to have at first little stability, so that new habits are apt to be easily destroyed. The earlier user of the term *Docility* included under it not only the tendency to the formation of habits, but also the liability of habits to get broken up, which is certainly a most important characteristic of the intellectual man. It is probably his physiological point of view which prevents Professor Royce from once mentioning the consequences of surprise at the unexpected and the counterexpected, where an apparent rupture in Nature's habit produces a real rupture of our associations.

For the Feeling and Volition of the old triad, Prof. Royce would substitute respectively "Sensitiveness" and "Initiative"; and here we cannot think his proposals happy. "Initiative," according to his own analysis of it, consists simply in motiveless persistence in repeating an action. But this differs from *Docility* only as acting from a habit differs from forming a habit. Now, acting from a habit is just like acting from any other disposition, so that "Initiative" is nothing but *Docility* plus *Volition*. The author's unification of conduct and cognition should, however, have led him to regard volition and sensation, or the action of sensitiveness, as simply two species of one genus of mentality, that of reaction. For there can be little doubt that sensations react upon the stimulating causes as we know that volitions react upon the willer.

If we once accept *docility* and *reaction* as two categories of mentality, we shall forthwith be obliged to recognize a third. For, as is generally admitted, all formations of habit take place entirely outside of consci-

ousness. We can only know that we have formed a habit by some experiment, although it may be an involuntary experiment or may be an experiment in the imagination. What we call pleasures and pains are nothing but sensations of any kind that are significant to us of our having favorable or unfavorable dispositions, of one or another of several kinds; and therefore when a sensation acquires a pleasurable or painful cast, or both, which it had not before, that is a sign of our having formed a habit. But, then, this is a case of becoming aware of a habit by experiment. Sensation and volition take place upon the very edge of consciousness. We have no direct knowledge of them as processes; we know them only by comparing what went before with what comes after.

This is generally acknowledged by psychologists in reference to volition. If there were any kind of sensation which we might expect to take in the act, it would be the case of the emergence of an idea into consciousness by a suggestion addressed to an association. But we cannot catch even this in the process of emerging. To a man standing between the rails of a track on which a locomotive is approaching, it is successive sudden enlargements that he perceives. The sense of continuous change is an affair of quasi-inference. Thus we have no immediate consciousness either of facts of docility or of facts of reaction. Since, then, we are conscious, we must admit immediate consciousness, or feeling, as a third category of mentality.

What we have said must be taken as a small sample of the stimuli to reflection that are richly strewn upon these pages. We regret that we should have left ourselves no space to illustrate the skill with which the reader of them will be taught to draw practical corollaries from the truths of the new science.

*Machiavelli and the Modern State.* By Louis Dyer. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1904.

This little book is based on three lectures which Mr. Dyer gave at the Royal Institution several years ago. They rarely seem to grapple with the main subject, while they discuss elaborately side issues. We are not quite sure what Mr. Dyer wishes us to infer from his demonstration that Machiavelli had no very accurate understanding, in the modern scientific sense, of Roman history; or that he did not invent a code of morals; or that when he discoursed on the Romans, he was really thinking of the Swiss; or that he was a poor judge of men; or that he drew an imaginary portrait of Castruccio Castracani to illustrate some of his own political views; or that he was so hypnotized by Caesar Borgia that he regarded him as the model prince. If all these allegations were proved, which we can hardly concede, how would they explain the immense power which Machiavelli's masterpiece has had, and will long continue to have, over statesmen and governments? If he was the simple soul Mr. Dyer hints of, all the more wonder that he went literally to the very bedrock of statecraft.

Because Machiavelli happens to make an allusion only three lines long to Lorenzo de' Medici, Mr. Dyer argues that "such a failure [to portray] must serve to warn the readers of 'The Prince' that its gifted writer was no reader of human character." Surely

a sweeping conclusion to draw from a small premise! The truth is, that Machiavelli did not intend to paint Lorenzo's character in detail. Again, why should the fact that "Machiavelli never had anything like an intimate intercourse with any of the great personalities of his day—excepting only Caesar Borgia, and, at a much later time, Guicciardini," unfit him for writing "The Prince"? Mr. Dyer explains further that Machiavelli was too unaristocratic by birth to understand his "social superiors"—an argument which, with equal validity, might be brought against most of the world's great men. How could Napoleon "understand" the attitudes and profundities of the Bourbon nobles, or Bismarck, the incorrigible Junker, fathom the subtleties of the Prussian Kings whom he served?

These instances, which might be multiplied, awaken distrust in the soundness of Mr. Dyer's judgment, and our distrust is confirmed when we compare his translations from Machiavelli with the originals. Take, for example, the reference to Lorenzo just mentioned. Machiavelli wrote: "So that if we consider his gay life and his grave, there appeared in him two almost different persons joined by an impossible joining." Mr. Dyer translates: "Take into account his two prevailing moods, the grave and the gay, and you shall discover in him not one but two persons, marked by contradictory notes that blend into an impossible union of incongruous opposites." This is paraphrasing—with a vengeance; and it is all the more unwarranted because Machiavelli is the tersest of modern writers. To represent him by such a very flowing version does him as much injustice as it would do Tacitus. Again, Dante's "un solo principe" Mr. Dyer renders "one sole prince and potentate" (p. 59), and he transforms Dante's simple "de jure" into "by divine right" (p. 51), using a technical political phrase which Dante never intended; likewise, Machiavelli's dictum, "The chief foundations of all states . . . are good laws and good arms," into "The indispensable foundations upon which are built all states . . . are steadfast laws and steadfast arms"—a very different proposition. The laws which have perpetuated despotism in Russia are "steadfast" enough, but they are not "good."

On the whole, we must confess to disappointment, and this is keener because, in his preface, Mr. Dyer led us to expect just such a study of Machiavelli as is needed. He has worked industriously over his material, as his collating shows, but he has an unhappy knack of hunting down unprofitable clues. It matters little whether Machiavelli was thinking of the Swiss when he discoursed on the Romans; what we need to know is how he came to formulate his terrific treatise, and why, if Caesar Borgia was his model, the Machiavellian principles have cropped out in all modern States and nearly all rulers since his time. Frederick, Napoleon, Bismarck, Beaconsfield, Rhodes, Chamberlain, were true Machiavellians; and President Roosevelt, in his letter of acceptance the other day, revealed himself an apt disciple.

*Geschichte des Möbels;* unter Berücksichtigung der Architektonischen und Tektonischen Formen: Eine Stillehre für Bau- und Möbeltischler. Die Entwicklung des

Möbels von den Anfängen des menschlichen Wohnhaus bis zur römischen Kaiserzeit, unter Einbeziehung des Möbels in den ostasiatischen Ländern. Von Dr. Alfred Koeppen und Carl Breuer. Mit 423 Abbildungen. Berlin und New York: Bruno Hessling. 1904. Pp. viii, 309.

This quarto volume is announced as the first of a series, a general work on the history of that which we cannot express in English by one word or compound term. *Mobilier* in French, *Möbiliar* in modernized German, express and describe everything that is useful and portable—kitchen utensils and costumes, tools and weapons, metal and pottery vessels, furniture of wood, bronze, and marble. An examination of the present volume shows that it is intended to explain the history of furniture. *Möbel*, the smaller thing, by an examination of *Möbiliar*, the larger one; and that it is in every respect as general in its purpose as might be indicated by the above list of minor subjects. The inquiry ranges over antiquity, prehistoric and of the classical epoch, the aboriginal life of America and Africa, the world of India, China, and Japan. Mediaeval Europe and the European peoples of later times are to be treated in future volumes. The purpose of the work and the system adopted are set forth in a preface signed by Dr. Koeppen, and in this he gives credit to his associated author, Mr. Breuer, for his part, which seems to be that of travel and observation in many lands, and later the preparation of the treatise, correspondence, and the selection of material. A very interesting table of contents occupies four of the large pages, each separate title of chapter or section being followed by the bibliography of that department. This is an unusual feature, and should be welcome to every student, presenting, as it does, in a very accessible form, the material for wider study.

In order to explain the full significance of the movable objects, our authors have gone so far back into the origin of things that the immovable also is treated. The peculiarities of ancient Persian architecture, with the bull-head capitals, the doorways decorated with rosettes, the slender colonnades, and the massive portals, are all treated in text and in illustration, that the facts concerning the little-known subject of movable furniture among the Persians may be the better understood. The same disposition is noticeable with regard to the arts of ancient Egypt; and the almost unseizable *Möbiliar* of the Aztecs is explained as well as may be by sculptures of façades, taken in connection with a few articles of wood and of hard stone found in Peruvian and other tombs. So in the absorbingly interesting subject, the furniture of the Greeks of classical times, the authors have been compelled to draw their material from medallions, vase-paintings, bas-reliefs of funereal and memorial character, and decorative statuettes and groups, to which are to be added a few pieces of actually existing furniture, such as the marble chairs in the front row of the Theatre of Bacchus at Athens, and a very few wooden chests and caskets found in the Crimea and in Egypt. Plans of Grecian and Roman houses are given, though with great reserve, in order the better to explain the placing and utilization of pieces of furniture. With the Roman times more freedom is possible, for there is much more material at hand,