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It is an instinct with Dr. Oberholtzer to minimize all appearances of high purpose and noble ardor. Lincoln's concessions to the anti-slavery spirit he reduces to their lowest terms. "He issued his edict of freedom as a war measure and on no ethical or sentimental grounds." Certainly none that were avowed; but Lincoln had not forgotten his parable of "the divided house," and it seems not unlikely that when he grasped emancipation as a war measure he made the exigency an excuse for striking at the rebellion's inmost heart. Touching the feelings of the slaves on their emancipation, we have another minimizing view:

"Their grief at Lincoln's death more fittingly expressed the loss they would feel because of their too hasty introduction to all the responsibilities of citizenship by other men when Lincoln's commanding grasp relaxed, than the regret inspired by anything he had positively done in the act of emancipation."

It is improbable that any signs of a grief so constituted ever existed beyond the pale of Dr. Oberholtzer's ingenious imagination.

The "Bibliography" of this volume is remarkable for its inadequacy. If it had included a good biography of Garrison, there might have been clear gain in some particulars—notably on page 167, where "Garrison and the Abolitionists" figure "on the floor of Congress" denouncing slaveholders in terms more accurate than soft, and on page 169, where we read of "the Garrisonian-Giddings-Lovejoy-John Brown method, which contemplated the sending of emissaries among the slaves to incite them to murder and insurrection"; a mixture of incongruous names, suggestive of Carlyle's "Heaven and Hell Amalgamation Society." It is pitiful that Dr. Oberholtzer should need to be informed of what every intelligent reader of his book should know, that Garrison was absolutely opposed to John Brown's method, and to any and every attempt to stir up slave insurrection.

Dr. Oberholtzer's predilection is for such memoirs as serve the more sordid and vulgarizing conception of Lincoln's character. Herndon's, and even Lamon's, baser insinuations are sweet morsels for his tongue. The ghastly Mary Owens episode is presented baldly enough, while the Anne Rutledge story is told with grudging sympathy. The chapter on the Lincoln-Douglas debate of 1858 exhibits a judicious use of the biographer's best material. That on the nomination of 1860 is calculated to make our contemporary political methods seem tolerably respectable. The war chapters are good, and bring out the larger elements of Lincoln's character in strong relief. There are three generalized chapters, "The Slave in the War," "Lincoln the Politician," and "Lincoln the Man." The first of these makes far too little of the sincere anti-slavery spirit pushing against manifold opposition to its glorious end. In "Lincoln the Politician," there are many lines that we would gladly blot, such justification will the baser sort find in them for their crooked ways; but that Lincoln did not always pursue virtue virtuously seems to be incontrovertible. The seamy side of his personal characteristics is needlessly paraded in "Lincoln the Man," but his great powers of sympathy and tenderness are permitted to shine with splendid radiance. Dr. Oberholtzer's book will do nothing to enhance

Lincoln's fame. Those will be most grateful for it who are tired of hearing Aristides called the Just, and those who enjoy the writing down of history to the level of the more sinister and sordid manifestations of the human spirit.

*The Preparation of the Child for Science.* By M. E. Boole. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: H. Frowde. 1904.

Mrs. Boole's little books, taken as a whole, have a certain unity, but their value does not lie there; and what is true of the whole is true of any one. The present volume is decidedly the best of the series thus far. Information and salutary wisdom are to be drawn from it everywhere. The very dedication informs us of a fact interesting for the history of science in England, that Sir George Everest, on his return from India about 1829, inflamed the minds of Babbage and John F. W. Herschel with "certain ideas about the nature of man's relation to Unknown Truth which underlay all science in ancient Asia, and which he had learned from Brahman teachers." It would be curious to peruse the books that Babbage, in 1830, and Herschel, in 1831, published about the general nature of science (a subject that had long been untouched in England) in the light of this information. Certainly, they two and Everest's son-in-law, Boole, are, as mathematicians, marked by their great predilection for what are called "symbolical" methods (that is, reasoning about operations as if they were things), to which English mathematicians generally, both before that day and since, have shown a marked aversion. The preface contains brief notices of ten writers whose thought pursued paths of the main lines of intellectual traffic. Two of them, Boole and Babbage, are famous; one, Nicolas Antoine Boulanger, once was so; Père Gratry is still read; and a fifth, Ramchundra, received aid from the British Government in his mathematical researches. The others, Thomas Wedgwood (who made a study of Genius), James Hinton (author of "Life in Nature," etc.), Dr. Charles Winslow (author of "Force and Nature"), "the late Dr. Wiltshire," and Benjamin Betts, never attracted much attention, but would seem to be worth some acquaintance.

The purpose of this little volume is to offer "suggestions as to means by which the scientific condition of mind can be induced" in children. The desirability of doing this is a topic distinctly excluded. In the first chapter, the scientific mind is portrayed, slightly, but with a rare fidelity to nature. "Scientific culture is the result of a steady, life-long habit of friendly and intimate, though reverent, intercourse with the Eternally Infinite Unknown." This might have been better expressed; yet, taken as it is, of many a man of science (especially of a passing generation) who might think the likeness execrable it is more true than he himself knows. "The typically scientific mind," says the authoress at the beginning of the chapter, "may be described as one which stands in a definite relation to As-Yet-Unknown Truth, and especially to that portion of As-Yet-Unknown which is just below the horizon of knowledge"; and she goes on to explain of what nature this relation is, laying much stress "upon the rhythmic alternation

of attitude" of such a mind toward phenomena.

Rudiments of all the scientific features begin to appear in the mind of every child, in one more strongly, in another less so. It is possible, however, to extirpate them. "That delicate sensitiveness to the touch of the illogical, to the limits of knowledge, and to the Presence of the As-Yet-Unknown . . . is often destroyed in the human brain by rough-and-ready processes, adopted sometimes for the purpose of fixing the opinions of young people, sometimes for that of enabling them to pass examinations successfully in subjects which they do not understand." When it first dawned upon "the advanced section of educationalists" that the rules of Latin grammar are not sufficient aliment for the mind, the first step was to substitute facts of natural science regarded as dead truth, just as the rules of grammar were regarded. Next, when it was forced upon the attention of the advanced that the scientific truth of one generation does not altogether accord with that of the next, "they substituted up-to-dateness, instead of endeavoring to induce the habit of true scientific method." Mrs. Boole herself embraces an "eternal truth" of mental pulsation, which she otherwise phrases as "alternation of opposites." Perhaps the scientific mind may alternate as to the truth of this doctrine.

We continue culling specimens of the volume's contents. The authoress protests that the spirit of inquisitive destructiveness brings more poison than pabulum to the scientific character, and, being naturally excessive in the child, ought to be restrained rather than stimulated. She thinks that "a good deal might be done by teaching children, when they see a flower, not to touch it till they have learned all they can of its poise and mode of growth, so as to be able, after dissecting it, to reconstruct in their minds an accurate picture of how it looked before they disturbed it." One of the points that must receive sedulous care from the earliest lessons of the child is that the line of demarcation shall be clearly preserved between what he has experienced and what he has learned at second hand. To this end, children must be drilled in the power of reproducing exactly what it is that one or another person has said; and from this point of view no study is more wholesome than that of Latin. "Give no more time to science than you can afford to let the children spend in the really scientific manner."

Chapter II. is about the unconscious mind, and particularly about those intervals when the current of thought almost or altogether comes to a standstill, so that the ideas that float in it have time to settle and to compact themselves. "We are sterile for lack of repose far more than from lack of work." "It is curious and painful to observe how many things have been proposed by true educationalists simply for the purpose of ministering to the action of the unconscious mind, and afterwards perverted, by persons possessed with the teaching mania, to the purpose of stuffing into children's minds some idea which is in the teacher's mind." Let children alone to their own thoughts or absence of thoughts during a good part of their time. Let them bother a carpenter, and pick up what skill

they can; and on no account pay the man for the loss of time they occasion, for then he will feel obliged to show them how to work.

Chapter III., on hygienic sequence in development, has much to say of the same color. Chapter IV., on mathematical imagination, deals with a subject of the utmost importance in education. The last chapter, on ethical and logical preparation, is perhaps the very best and most practical in the book; but we believe our readers now have some idea of what to anticipate from the reading of this and of the whole book.

*Farmington.* By Clarence S. Darrow. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1904.

Farmington is the Pennsylvania village in which Mr. Darrow's childhood was spent. His publishers call this autobiography of a boy an "idyl," and it is certainly a "little picture," with human beings in a rural setting. There ends its idyllic quality. An idyl is not complex nor psychological, and Mr. Darrow's recollections are curiously and sadly analytic. On its lighter side the picture is charming enough. The boy's life centred round his father's old mill and all its associations:

"The sleepy pool above the dam,  
The pool beneath it never still,  
The meal-sacks on the whiten'd floor,  
The dark round of the dripping wheel,  
The very air about the door  
Made misty through the floating meal."

His father, though, like Tennyson's miller, he must have had a "slow, wise smile," was, in the essential interest of his life, a thwarted man. Books were his passion, the mill was his necessity, not his choice; and, once the day's work done, he would retreat to his little study and read far into the night Latin, Greek and Hebrew. He would even carry his books with him to the dusty mill and snatch a moment's forgetfulness of his uncongenial toil. "To his dying day he lived in a walking trance; and his books and their wondrous stories were more real to him than the turning water-wheel, the sacks of wheat and corn, and the cunning, soulless farmers who flickered and haggled about his hard-earned toll."

The boy, went to the district school outside the little town. Of that school, of the teachers, who were changed every season and were always unpopular; of the school readers, which we hope have long since been superseded, if we are to judge them from Mr. Darrow's quotations; of all the relations of boys and girls that grew out of the school life, Mr. Darrow gives an unsparing and unsoftened picture. It is not that he had a peculiarly unhappy childhood; all the accessories were there, all that a country-bred boy can extract from life in such a community was his. But it is obvious that what strikes him with most force, as he reviews those years before his teens, is the lack of knowledge of the childish mind, the lack of sympathy with childish pains and pleasures that most children have to endure from their elders. The path of the child is not smooth. Like the dog in Maeterlinck's essay, he is surrounded by problems and riddles which those who know have not the time or the kindness to explain. Life for both is full of humiliations and hostile forces, shadowed by incomprehensible suppressions of instinct, a continual disillusion. All about him are bent on his doing what he dislikes:

"It seemed to us as if our elders were in a universal conspiracy against us children; and we in turn combined to defeat their plans. I wonder where my little playmates have strayed on the great round world, and if they have grown as unreasonable as our fathers and mothers used to be. Reasonable or unreasonable, it is certain that our parents never knew what was best for us to do. . . . The very fact that we wanted to do things seemed ample reason why we should not. I venture to say that at least nine-tenths of our requests were denied; and when consent was granted, it was given in the most grudging way. The one great word that always stood straight across our path was 'No,' and I am sure that the first instinct of our elders, on hearing of our desires, was to refuse."

Mr. Darrow's chapter on "Rules of Conduct" should be read by all parents. The book is not one that lends itself to quotation. It should be read in the leisurely mood in which it was composed. Its simplicity, its monosyllabic, wholly unornamented style, almost amount to preciousness; but it is written with a sincerity impossible to question.

*Arbitration and the Hague Court.* By John W. Foster. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1904.

This book deserves all the attention that its author can ask. Mr. Foster writes with great knowledge and facility, and has made what he has to say about a subject inherently dry much more attractive than it might have been expected to prove. His publication, important in more than one respect, is, so far as we know, the first to give, in a small compass and an interesting way, the present status of arbitration and its practice under the Hague convention. This has already become of more consequence to the world at large than is generally understood—more, too, than was anticipated by many of the strongest friends of arbitration at the time of the assembling of the conference of 1899. When the Hague Court was established it was an experiment, such as had never been tried before. Treaties which should bind nations to arbitrate some, or all, of their differences, were one thing; it was demonstrable that such treaties were, wherever ratified, additional guarantees of peace; but not only would the establishment of an international court effect nothing unless the tribunal were resorted to—the mere fact of non-resort to it would throw a cloud over the cause of arbitration, and tend to the desuetude of arbitration itself. This doubt has been partly dissipated by the resort to the court in the "Plous Fund" and the Venezuela cases; while, apart from the tribunal itself, the machinery of inquiry provided for in Title III. of the Hague convention seems to have been adopted by Russia and England to arrive at a basis of settlement of the very dangerous questions growing out of the Dogger Bank disaster.

These are good instances of the weight which the mere existence of permanent international judicial machinery has in disposing quarrelling nations to peaceful ways of settling their disputes; but, outside of this, we have now in actual operation several treaties of general arbitration, e. g., that between Spain and Mexico of 1902, the Netherlands-Denmark treaty of 1904, and the Anglo-French treaty of 1903, which

may be said to have been called into existence by the Hague convention. These in substance provide, following the declaration of article xvi., either for the arbitration of all questions whatever (especially those of a "judicial order" and relating to the interpretation of treaties) which cannot be settled diplomatically, or for the arbitration of all such questions, provided they do not involve the honor, independence or vital interests of either nation. Further treaties of the same sort have been negotiated by Mr. Hay between the United States and European countries, which are awaiting the action of our Senate. To support the ratification of these the aid of the press and public is much needed. The enemies of arbitration, it may be expected, will do all in their power to defeat them, notwithstanding the insertion of the clauses excepting questions involving honor, independence, and vital interests, for they now perceive—what was not clear at first—that this exception is not likely in the long run to prove a serious obstacle to the settlement of any question by arbitration which is in itself capable of such settlement.

That there will always be questions which neither diplomacy nor arbitration will prove competent to settle, may be assumed; and it may also be assumed that such questions will come to appear, to one side or both, to involve honor, or vital interests, or independence, and will be settled by war. But such questions will probably be settled by war whether the right to go to war over them is reserved in a treaty or not. The reason, of course, is that in such cases one party or the other will not endure the arbitrament of a third Power, it may be because independence is really involved (and this cause is by common consent a justification), or it may equally be from a base determination to force a war upon an unwilling foe. It is impossible to imagine the Franco-German dispute of 1870 settled without war; our civil war had to be fought out to the end; no one has yet been able to reach a belief that the "good offices" of any third Power would have been tolerated by Russia or Japan. In all those cases no paper agreement could have affected the result, and, to our minds at least, it would not have made the smallest difference whether or not there had been a paper agreement, conventional or even constitutional, providing on the one hand that there should be no war at all, or on the other that war should be resorted to only if honor, independence or vital interests were affected. "Honor" and "vital interests," moreover, are very elastic phrases, and may mean much or little according to circumstances. It should never be forgotten that Lord Russell refused to entertain the idea of the arbitration of the *Alabama* claims on the precise grounds that honor and vital interests were affected; yet the *Alabama* claims were successfully arbitrated exactly as all our other differences with England have been since the war of 1812.

The great point is, that, a general treaty of arbitration once signed, when a new difference arises which cannot be settled diplomatically, the treaty, whether it contains this clause or not, interposes a serious obstacle which must be surmounted before war can begin. If the treaty contains no exception, the treaty at least must be fla-