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mark a growing interest in Tacitus. Nearly as many of his titles bear date of the nineties as all that preceded in four decades; and the nineties show twice as many as the eighties.

—One of the least clearly understood productions of Goethe's early career—and not a few of these are somewhat obscure—are the fragments of his 'Wandering Jew.' Not only is it difficult to determine what the underlying conception of Goethe's treatment of this legend was—if, indeed, there was any such fundamental conception—but the individual fragments themselves offer many puzzling problems of interpretation and arrangement. No commentator thus far has done so much to shed light upon these problems as Prof. Jacob Minor in his recent book, 'Goethe's Fragmente vom ewigen Juden und vom wiederkelrenden Heiland' (Stuttgart: Cotta), which may well be called a model of searching literary analysis. Indeed, this book is much more than a commentary on Goethe's poem; it is an important contribution to the intellectual history of the eighteenth century. Professor Minor makes it abundantly evident that Goethe, in selecting this legend as a thread upon which to string his observations on the religious and ecclesiastical conditions of his time, fell in with a long and widespread literary tradition. Not only Ahasuerus and the Saviour revisiting the earth were in the eighteenth century frequently made witnesses and critics of the affairs of modern Christendom, but there existed, in Spain, France, England, and Denmark, no less than in Germany, a large popular literature of theological satire in the form of fictitious travels and adventures. A careful analysis of these religious novels, such as the anonymous 'Die Peripatetiker des 18. Jahrhunderts,' the 'Menozza,' by the Danish pastor Pontoppidan; 'The Spiritual Quixote,' by Graves; 'Sophien's Reise von Memel nach Sachsen,' Nicolai's 'Sebaldis Nothhanker,' and others, and a comparison of these with the theological satire of Goethe's poem, form the most conspicuous part of Professor Minor's work, and demonstrate beyond doubt that every one of the points on which Goethe's satire lingers, belonged to the most widely and eagerly discussed religious topics of the time. It is a pity that the question as to the way in which Goethe was to bring artistic unity into this mass of miscellaneous satire, and particularly as to the way in which the two central characters of the story, Ahasuerus and the Saviour, were to be brought face to face with each other, must largely be left to conjecture.

WUNDT'S PRINCIPLES OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Principles of Physiological Psychology. By Wilhelm Wundt. Translated from the Fifth German Edition (1902) by Edward Bradford Titchener. Vol. I. The Macmillan Co. 1904.

When, in 1862, two years after Fechner's 'Psychophysik,' Wundt emerged from the physiological laboratory with his 'Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung,' students in this country there were who saw in the little volume the harbinger of a new science of experimental psychology; and the next year their hopes seemed to be crowned in the same author's 'Vorlesun-

gen über die Menschen- und Thierseele,' concerning which, by the way, it had better be noted that, like other of Wundt's books, it has lost most of its original flavor in a second, reconsidered edition, and that the English translation represents this later edition. Without this explanation, the sensation it first caused would be incomprehensible. Its readers heard in it the promise that the new science should keep pace with the other strictly experimental sciences, and should quickly outstrip all those sciences (more numerous than than now) in which experimentation had not become practicable. Alas, to-day we are forty years wiser, and a chilling shade settles on hearts of enthusiasts of the sixties who now compare the advance that psychology has achieved—indisputable, but how modest!—with the unheard-of leaps that every other science has performed, be it an experimental one or not. Since 1860 the foundations of pure mathematics have been reconstructed; exact logic has been developed; physics has gained, an optico-electrical theory, and radically new conceptions of molecular forces have been established; organic chemistry has followed out the doctrine of the aromatic compounds, and has been enriched by the doctrine of the unsymmetrical carbon atom; in its inorganic division the classification of the elements has been laid bare, the group of helium-argon elements has been added, and Mme. Curie has pronounced her magical "Open, sesame!" Besides all that, a new and more scientific kind of chemistry has been opened up. Biology has been equally revolutionized; astronomy has its new astrophysics, and geognosy has kept pace with the other sciences. Even on the psychical wing, linguistics, ethnology, archaeology, the history of high antiquity, have all found and matured new methods. In short, there is not a science that has not left psychology lingering in the rear; and the burning question of to-day is, why this should be so? Who will diagnose the malady of psychology?

It has been remarked that, at present, there is nothing which for the psychical wing of science fulfils that function which the science of dynamics fulfils on the physical side. Everybody knows what that function is. Every attempt to explain any phenomenon physically consists in first proposing some hypothesis as to the existence of designated dynamical conditions from which, according to the principles of dynamics, phenomena such as have been observed would take place, and then going on to put the hypothesis to the test of making it the basis of predictions concerning untried experiments.

Now it is a circumstance most significant for the logic of science, that this science of dynamics, upon which all the physical sciences repose, when defined in the strict way in which its founders understood it, and not as embracing the law of the conservation of energy, neither is nor ever was one of the special sciences that aim at the discovery of novel phenomena, but merely consists in the analysis of truths which universal experience has compelled every man of us to acknowledge. Thus, the proof by Archimedes of the principle of the lever, upon which Lagrange substantially bases the whole statical branch of the science, consists in showing that that principle is virtually assumed in our ordinary concep-

tion of two bodies of equal weight. Such universal experiences may not be true to microscopical exactitude, but that they are true in the main is assumed by everybody who devises an experiment, and is therefore more certain than any result of a laboratory experiment.

The sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of *cnoscopy*, in opposition to *idioscopy*, which discovers new phenomena. But long before Bentham's day the situation was sufficiently understood to set up a movement in the more enlightened countries to supply the psychical sciences with an analogous analytical foundation. The innumerable grades in the distinctness of thought prevent us from assigning dates, but one may say that the idea is struggling to the light in Locke's 'Essay' of 1689, and that its development was the best fruit of the eighteenth century. It moved in Italy, in France, and especially in Scotland. The analytical economics of Adam Smith and of Ricardo were examples of it. The whole doctrine in its totality is properly termed the Philosophy of Common Sense, of which analytical mechanics and analytical economics are branches. That Pragmatism of which so much has been said of late years is only an endeavor to give the philosophy of common sense a more exact development, especially by emphasizing the point that there is no intellectual value in mere feeling *per se*, but that the whole function of thinking consists in the regulation of conduct. All this it is most needful to comprehend in order to assign to Wundt his proper rating in the history of philosophy.

The 'Physiological Psychology' is Wundt's most imposing and monumental work, but no man of science will call it his *chef-d'œuvre*. That rank can be accorded to one production alone, his 'Untersuchungen zur Mechanik der Nerven und Nervencentren,' of which the first part appeared in 1871; the second, which is less fundamental, but perhaps not less important, having been delayed by accidental causes until 1876, after the first edition of the 'Physiological Psychology' had appeared. Four traits of the 'Mechanik der Nerven' command admiration: One of them is a natural gift; two are results of scientific training; and one is a moral virtue. The gift is an astonishing sagacity about nerve-physiology—a subconscious susceptibility to the noetometeorological premonitions of a hailstorm of evidence that, when it bursts, will be cold, hard, and cutting enough.

Of the two scientific perfections the more striking is the mature prestudy of the methods that were or might have been pursued in the investigation. The other is the vigilant scrutiny of all details of the phenomena, especially of such as, being overlooked for, might easily have been overlooked. But the most admirable trait of all—that self-respecting quality of Wundt's which no foibles can obscure—is his genuine anxiety to correct the opinions which he at the time entertains, and to cast away his most brilliant theories the instant the dicta of experience seem to be against them—a quality in which he so contrasts with all the metaphysical charlatans and self-admirers and with every other quintessential extract of littleness. Wundt's great service to man, aside from that special research described

in the 'Mechanik der Nerven,' has consisted in teaching the students of *cnoscopy* the beauty of those virtues upon which the students of *idioscopy*, especially those on the physical wing, have always insisted—virtues that will necessarily result from any well-considered desire to know the truth. That such service has been Wundt's undoubtedly remains true, notwithstanding some lapses.

But the work of which Professor Titchener is publishing his translation is not to be classed as a performance of *idioscopy*, and little given is *idioscopy* to expressing itself in big books. It is not a work of heuristic science of any kind. It is a product of that useful industry of collecting, arranging, and digesting the deductions of mathematics, the analyses of *cnoscopy*, and the discoveries of *idioscopy*—a service of which the Germans have assumed the burden, and which, as being the "systematization of knowledge," they as well as the general public are too apt to mistake for the business of science. From the date of the publication of this work, Wundt has turned a corner in his career, and has pursued a course not determined by the intrinsic affinities of his previous work. His principal publications (aside from revisions and from papers in his periodical *Philosophische Studien*) have consisted in an extensive treatise on logic, another on ethics, and a 'System der Philosophie.' These are, subjects to which the majority of their devotees have been led by a desire to settle their beliefs about God, freedom, and immortality. But students of science are a good deal given to thinking that high theory is more apt to lead men wrong than right about religion, while religion has never done theory more good than harm. The doubts which impelled the few men of science who have been led to any thorough study of philosophy have almost always been concerned with the limits of trustworthiness of scientific results. But Wundt has never entertained any such general doubts. He explicitly says that whatever is not based upon the results of the special sciences has no real basis at all. He makes no exception in favor of dynamics, or the truth of which all his own work reposes. But, for him, common sense is nothing but an imperfect kind of science; and it is remarkable that his physiology recognizes no very fundamental difference between the functions of the cerebral cortex and those of the organs at the base of the brain. To the question what could have been Wundt's motive in putting himself forward as a leader in philosophy, for which he had never displayed any genius, but rather the reverse, the answer to which the study of his writings must lead is that the results of experimental psychology, meagre though they be as compared with those of other sciences, so dazzled the imagination of Wundt as to make him think that that study alone must be set up as the queen of the sciences, and prompted him to try to prove that logic, ethics, and philosophy could be securely based on that special science.

Wundt's philosophical publications have not met the acclamations that he undoubtedly at first expected; nor can it be said that the two scientific merits above mentioned are here one whit better exemplified than in the general run of sec-

ond-rate philosophical treatises of the time. They rather fall below that average. In the matter of the deliberate preselection of methods, for example, one will not often meet with anything weaker than Wundt's admission that it seems self-evident that metaphysics should not be made to depend on the results of special science, while defending himself by saying that, having come to philosophy from physical science by the route of experimental psychology, it is natural that he should be unable to pursue philosophical investigations by any other method than that which his own sequence of study suggested to him. ("Ship ahoy!—Where are you bound?" "For the port of Philosophy." "Then why, in Heaven's name, are you sailing on that course, Captain Wundt?" "Well, the truth is, this is the way the vessel was heading at the time it occurred to me to make that port.") Other equally gross departures from the two scientific ideals could easily be pointed out. Whether or not, if Wundt had possessed any analytical strength, it would have been possible for him to imagine that he could base such matters as dynamics, geometry, and arithmetic upon his physiological experiments, or whether in that case he could have failed to perceive the value of the pragmatist analysis in binding together nerve-physiology and psychology, must remain matters of opinion. But, unfortunately for his good fame, there exist departments of logic upon which he has touched that no more fall within the marches of opinion than does the principle of the lever or the doctrine of limits; and here he simply places himself where Hobbes placed himself by his attempts at reasoning on exact subjects; and those who, nevertheless, talk of Hobbes as a "great logician" will be free to entertain the same opinion of Wundt—and of Lord Timothy Dexter.

As for the 'Ethics' and the 'System of Philosophy,' we shall simply say that no person of discrimination would prove that quality by ranking them among works of the first order. We say no more, because such deviations from a great career are top unpleasant to contemplate. Of course, even in the 'Logic' there are brilliant chapters; it could not be otherwise, their author having achieved such things as he had, though in a distant field. As to the 'Physiological Psychology,' there will probably be no break in the unanimity that it is the most important monument of the new experimental psychology. Professor Titchener's translation has been eagerly awaited for long years. He explains the delay in his preface. It appears that he has made three complete translations of the work which have twice been superseded by revisions of the original. He is himself of opinion that his third is the least good of the three, but one does not see how that could possibly be. His unusual skill in making agreeable English of a faithful rendering from disagreeable German had already been proved—a psychological accomplishment which Oxford training, the experience of the psychological laboratory, and practice in this very thing have perfected. It is not comprised in the verbal expression. Unerring judgment has been exercised in the editing both of the present volume and of others. The author's slips, if not too numerous, have to be corrected, with or without mention, according to cir-

cumstances. Whether the lettering of diagrams shall continue to represent German words or not, whether or not bad figures shall be replaced by better ones, etc., are questions about which the least talent for judging wrong would have betrayed itself if it had lurked in the translator. The present volume, the first of three, includes only the first and perhaps the most interesting of the six divisions of the original work. It relates to the subject in which Wundt's opinions have the greatest weight; and it is a subject whose practical corollaries will be obvious to every reader—"the bodily substrate of the mental life."

CUTLER'S LYNCH LAW.

Lynch-Law: An Investigation into the History of Lynching in the United States. By James Elbert Cutler, Ph.D. Longmans, Green & Co. 1905.

As we write, the morning paper reports, among other minor happenings, that a mob last night broke into a Georgia jail, lynched a white man and three negroes accused of murder (their guilt at least doubtful), and three other negroes, apparently on general principles. As usual, the sheriff refused to give up the keys until he was told that it would be expected; presumably, as usual, the mob included "some of our best citizens."

This episode once for all decisively disposes of several of the most familiar assertions with regard to lynching. First, a white man was killed as well as negroes—lynching was not, therefore, a penalty becoming necessary in order to maintain race supremacy; the charge made was that of murder, and had nothing to do with violence to women; the mob hung men who appear to have been guilty or suspected of minor offences, so that it has not a kind of last appeal in protection of life; there is no evidence that there would have been any trouble in securing a proper trial and conviction of all the criminals by the regular process of the courts. The affair was simply a variant of the English sportsman's inspiration, "What a beautiful day! Let's go out and kill something."

Inferences from a single case prove little, but the careful study of Dr. Cutler not only confirms such obvious generalizations, but for the first time furnishes a body of authentic material from which to draw more far-reaching and important deductions. In his preface, Dr. Cutler acknowledges his indebtedness to the generosity of Mr. Albert Matthews, whose researches into the origins and early instances of this practice are well known to readers of the *Nation*. It is not every scholar who for years has made such a subject his special interest, yet will cheerfully put his material at the disposal of a later writer. That early material has been supplemented by Dr. Cutler's own researches, and he has worked out for himself the question of lynching in the half-century before the civil war, and also the awful growth and spread of the practice during the past forty years. Dr. Cutler devotes an interesting chapter to the origin of the term lynch-law, and comes to the conclusion that "at some time between 1780 and 1817 the term Lynch's law became a localism in Virginia in the region of the James River. By the year 1819 it had