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quences, also required a fuller treatment, especially to show the importance of the Northern movement supported by the Ulster Presbyterians.

Germany is handled not as a separate department, but in connection with the successive Napoleonic wars, a method perhaps inevitable, but not conducive to a clear view of the internal changes which went on, and which were specially fruitful in the Prussian Kingdom. Nothing is more remarkable than the contrast between the apparent want of national feeling in the first years of the revolutionary wars, and the passionate outburst of patriotism which marked the close of the conflict. When the French annexed the left bank of the Rhine, Görres, one of the most conspicuous German public writers of the time, accepted the severance from Germany of a large German population with the words, "The Rhine was created by nature to serve as the boundary of France" (p. 91). This indifference soon disappeared; and every year that passed after the battle of Jena stirred the spirit of the nation more and more. The arrangements of the old Romano-Germanic Empire were practically knocked to pieces by the treaty of Lunéville, in 1801, and the Empire itself virtually extinguished by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, in 1806, close upon which followed the renunciation by the Emperor Francis II. of the Imperial title itself. New combinations were formed, and territories transferred from one province to be bestowed on another. Thus, respect for antiquity and legal right was impaired, while at the same time the anger of the people was roused by the insolence with which the French conquerors abused their predominance. Napoleon created anew the sentiment of German nationality, and may almost be called the creator of the new German Empire.

This volume, which is entitled "Napoleon," might equally well be entitled "The French Revolution at Work Outside France." It records two immense and far-reaching changes in world history. One is in a sort of sense "change chiefly material." It is the destruction of a whole congeries of institutions which had come down from the end of the Middle Ages, along with the disappearance of old boundary lines and the substitution of new ones. This was primarily the work of Napoleon's conquering activity, which spared no country south of the Baltic. The other change lay in the intellectual and moral attitude of men towards their institutions. The enunciation of those general principles which were deemed to be summed up in the words, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the decline of respect for tradition and for authority, the assertion of the right of the individual to pursue happiness, or at any rate, his own purposes in his own way—all these notions which had found their first and most vehement expression in France followed round Europe the battalions of the man who was doing his best to stamp them down in the country whence those battalions came. They have taken a long time to permeate men's minds in the lands traversed by the French armies, and in some of those lands the progress was at first so slow that one can hardly connect it with any French influence. Only within the last two years has the revolutionary spirit shown its power

in Russia. But that breaking up of the hard soil which was needed before the seed of the revolution could germinate was accomplished in Napoleon's days.

He was in no sense the author of this great movement of change; nor indeed can any man or group of men be called the authors of what was a result of a long series of disintegrating events and (in a sense) of the general progress of the human mind. But his personality is so much the most striking, his action was so much the most pervasive, that he seems to fill the canvas in any picture of those times. We find in this volume no attempt to present a full and exact view of his character and gifts, nor to give any general estimate of what revolutionary France did for mankind. But the record of his activities in so many different fields conveys the most forcible impression of his extraordinary powers. His pure capacity for thinking hard and thinking swiftly has been seldom equalled and never surpassed. He who would find a parallel for it is inclined to go back as far as Julius Cæsar, the man who most deserves to be called, like Napoleon, at once a destroyer and a creator. When we read of the work Napoleon did in so many different fields at once, and remember that he rose to the summit of his power while still a youth, with no advantages of family or wealth, we see in him something that seems unlike the ordinary sons of men, something that may be called not human at all but demonic. To account for such a rise one is obliged to remember what the conditions of the time were. Within France the old institutions and habits had been so completely broken to pieces that there was no obstacle left to bar the progress of an adventurer. The path lay open to intellect and audacity. When intellect and audacity bring a man to the top in his youth, their force is intensified in a two-fold way. The impression made on the world is greater, and that impression disposes people to rally round the rising hero, to acclaim him, to abase themselves before him. The rising hero is himself confirmed in his own self-confidence, and ventures on bolder steps, whose very boldness, by terrifying his opponents, goes far to insure his success. Such a swift career of victory as Napoleon's so struck the imagination of men as of itself to sweep obstacles out of his way. There is thus a solid truth in the proverb that Fortune favors the young as well as the bold.

It may seem more extraordinary still that the master of France became so soon the master of Continental Europe. But it must be remembered what Europe then was. The old monarchies had gone on in their old ways, with old-fashioned administrations, old-fashioned armies, officers and generals mostly incompetent, because appointed from an aristocratic class within which merit counted for little toward promotion. The First Consul found to his hand armies already accustomed to victory. He found capable officers who had themselves risen by their capacity. Add to these facts the still more decisive fact that there was as little political genius among the statesmen of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Spain as there was military genius among the soldiers (Suvorov is, perhaps, the chief exception, and Suvorov never faced Napoleon on a battlefield), and the dazzling triumphs

of Napoleon become more intelligible. The presence in Prussia of a Bismarck or a Moltke might have made a great difference. Nevertheless, when all has been said, Napoleon's personality remains a unique one not only in his own generation, but in the modern world. Had he not become intoxicated by the faith in his own star which led him to attempt the conquest of Spain and Portugal before his hold on Central Europe had been further strengthened, and had his physical condition remained after 1810 what it was in before he had reached forty, he might have continued master of Europe till the malady which had carried off his father carried him off also.

#### ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

*Aristotle's Theory of Conduct.* By Thomas Marshall. London: T. Fisher Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Co.

During the past hundred years more books have been written about Aristotle's "Ethics," and mainly the Nicomachean treatise, than any other work of Aristotle; but they have not, on the whole, been distinguished for intellectual power. Minds of more than ordinary force have endeavored to give truthful representations of the Stagirite's moral views; but their accounts have been pretty uniformly tinged with their authors' own opinions. For anybody who may resort to the original, the most useful aid will be J. A. Stewart's "Notes." The presumption that the reader of Mr. Stewart's work has the original text before his eyes may perhaps palliate its ceaseless and glaring misrepresentations. It is, in fact, not Aristotle's ideas of morality, but those of Mr. Stewart, that are there to be found. Often they involve conceptions that no dweller in Athens in Alexander's time could be supposed to have; sometimes they are the most modern ideas; often they are simply the doctrines of Kant or of a Kantianized Platonism. There are not wanting cases in which Aristotle is represented as saying what in other passages, or even in the very passage interpreted, he categorically denies. Moreover, Mr. Stewart's work, although almost indispensable to the student of the Greek text, is too narrow in scope to answer the purpose either of the student of philosophy or of the general reader. He never, for example, except in the most desultory manner, touches upon the question when and how the existing text came into being. We speak of the general reader, because Aristotle's work, unlike modern treatises, is not chiefly occupied with the theory of morality. Its main purpose is practical; namely, to aid men to behave on all occasions with moderation and good sense. In that respect it is certainly one of the most interesting and improving books that ever was written. Mr. Marshall gives a skilful paraphrase of the whole treatise, intermingled with explanatory remarks showing the relation of what is said to the state of Athenian society at the time, etc., while at the bottom of his pages he skims the cream of the Greek text, for the benefit of those who though they can enjoy that language in bits, would lose patience on being asked to read long passages.

The plan is admirable, and is well carried out. The practical parts of the work

could not have been rendered more judiciously; so that the volume makes agreeable and profitable reading.

The work has, however, certain shortcomings. Mr. Marshall is capable of making somewhat sweeping assertions that seem to be supported but by the slenderest of premises. We do not know how he has ascertained that the Athenians of Aristotle's day did not regard the great works of sculpture and architecture as worthy of any deep admiration; but (p. 217) he gives us his word that "to regard them as ennobling agencies for the education of mankind would have seemed nonsense to an educated Athenian." . . . To admire art is not vicious; it is a permissible relaxation; it relieves moodiness and low spirits—so Aristotle and Pericles seem to have thought, but their admiration did not go much further." In like manner, it seems to us that Mr. Marshall is over-confident of the completeness of the historical record, when he avers (p. 174) that the problem of free will was not raised as a serious difficulty until the fifth century of our era.

For, not to speak of the fact that the debates on that subject mentioned in Saint Augustine's "Confessions" took place in the fourth century, it is difficult to believe, when the Stoics, from Zeno down, insisted on Destiny, while Epicurus and his followers were emphatically for free will, that the endless disputes between these sects on every other conceivable question should never have touched this one; especially after Parmenides had asserted the universality of Necessity, and Socrates that the man who knew virtue would inevitably pursue it, while Aristotle puts forth the doctrine of free will with no hint of its being a novel idea, but rather the reverse.

The whole volume is more or less tinged with the author's attribution to Aristotle of an opinion to which he himself happens to be personally predisposed. This opinion is that the distinction of right and wrong is an artificial creation of men, or at any rate that their bounds are so. His only formidable reason for attributing the opinion to Aristotle lies in a single sentence which that philosopher set down on the first sheet of papyrus of his manuscript. Namely, having remarked that the whole inquiry is a political one (which was the natural point of view to a Hellenic), and that, as such, it cannot be expected to do more than to render the matter clear, since scientific exactitude does not belong equally to all subjects of reasoning any more than to all handicrafts, he adds: "The ideas of the honorable and right, as politics treats of them, present so much divergence and anomaly (*ἀνισότης καὶ πλάγιος*) that they seem due to instituted law alone, and not to nature" (*ὅτι οὕτως νόμος μόνος ἐστὶν ὁρᾶν δὲ μὴ*). This sentence arrests attention, and at first sight appears to support Mr. Marshall's view. But on re-reading it we remark that it is not a categorical assertion; that Aristotle does not even use the expression, "it seems to me," but merely says that so it seems from the point of view of politics (*περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται*). Moreover, the utterance stands quite alone. Mr. Marshall is able to bring no other passages to its support, except those in which it is said that conduct is the subject of praise or blame, as if this were not true on any ethical theory, and more so on almost any other than on

the one he attributes to Aristotle. Finally, in the fifth book, we come upon a categorical and emphatic denial of the truth of the doctrine in question. What does Mr. Marshall say to that? He simply uses the higher critic's routine method of dismissing difficulties, by supposing that the reporter of the particular lecture represented in that part of the fifth book misunderstood what Aristotle had said. If we suppose, he says, that such utter misunderstanding took place, and that Aristotle never revised the report, there is nothing to prevent our believing that Aristotle said just the opposite of what we read in the text. He is quite right there: on such terms, we can give any interpretation we like to any passage.

For our own part, we entertain no doubt that the manuscript of the Nicomachean "Ethics," though assuredly not intended for publication, was prepared by the hand of Aristotle himself. One of several valid reasons is suggested by the title of the longer exposition, "Nicomachean." Nicomachus was the name of Aristotle's father and of his son. Half a dozen ancient authorities tell us that the work was

dedicated to the latter by Aristotle. It is altogether probable that this was the case. But surely Aristotle would not have dedicated a work he had not himself written. During the many years through which the manuscript was in use in the school it is natural to suppose that annotations, such as cross-references, would have been inserted in it; but that any change of its main doctrine should have been permitted is quite incredible. The history of the Aristotelian texts ought to be investigated by a comprehensive, objective, thoroughly scientific and well-considered method; and that done, the present practice among even eminent critics of suggesting inconsiderately that this or that sentence, or even chapter, is spurious, should be discredited.

As for the present question of whether Aristotle regarded the distinction of right and wrong as wholly conventional or not, we have only to read the text just as it stands, and we obtain a result that is consistent and intelligible in every particular. He would have shown himself a poor rhetorician if he had planted himself upon immovable ground in his opening lecture. It was far better to let the mixed audience understand that every theory would receive fair examination at his hands. Mr. Marshall's method, however (if such it can be called), leads him into such a slough of contradictions that he is at length obliged to declare that Aristotle addresses his treatise to the kind of people who do not care to carry their beliefs to their logical consequences.

The weak spot in Aristotle's treatise considered as an aid to the practice of virtue is that he assumes man to have an immediate power of will which, without any previous preparation, can be summoned upon emergency to overcome any temptation. It is the usual error of the partisans of free will. He recognizes, indeed, that a given virtue can be acquired only by habituation; but he seems to think that a person who does not possess the virtue in question is able, on occasion, to behave as if he had acquired it. Great as his discoveries in psychology were, he had never found out that repeated performances of any action in vivid and detailed imagination—say, for

example, in imagining that one moves one's right foot round a horizontal circle clockwise, while one moves one's right hand round a parallel circle counter-clockwise—is almost as effectual in creating a habit of so acting, as if the outward acts were really performed. We now know that that same action—the same in quality, if not equal in intensity—that is performed when we really act, is also performed when we vividly imagine we act; only, in the latter case, we add to that exertion an opposite exertion inhibiting it. This principle could not be directly applied to the cultivation of a habit of activity, since along with the habit of making the desired exertion one would equally be growing a habit of inhibiting the exertion. But in a self-warfare against any of the innumerable vices for the cure of which a habit of inhibition is alone required, this method is advantageous.

#### RECENT FICTION.

*The Treasure of Heaven.* By Marie Corelli. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.

To give the lady her due, Miss Corelli's latest story is by no means lacking in power. Lacking in distinction, it of course is; but it has more dignity of substance and less indignity of style than anything of hers we have hitherto seen. The opening chapters move on stilts. The people are wooden people, speaking in the dialect of melodrama. But when the real narrative gets into its stride, forgetting about Miss Corelli and her theories, matters are different. The central motive is a strong one: an old man, and a very rich one, wearying of the emptiness of his life, setting out, disguised, afoot, and nearly penniless, in quest of the treasure of Heaven—love. How by great pain he achieves at the eleventh hour the quest constitutes a theme of really epic quality. Not that the power of "The Treasure of Heaven" is an epic power; but the book has, unlike most current novels, a certain animus, a suggestion, at least, of something large and sound. It contains also good characters and episodes. David Helmsley, the aged millionaire tramp, is himself an appealing figure. The pathos of his lonely pilgrimage is, if obvious, not more so than it would have been in the hands of the Gadshill romancer whom Miss Corelli's audience, at least, does not pretend to have outgrown. The character of Matthew Peke, herbalist and born wayfarer, asks no favors of anybody; nor do Miss Tranter, Featherly Joltram, and the rest of the rustic crew at the "Trusty Man." More doubtful persons appear, notably one Arbnoath, a bigoted, meddling, and immoral parson, whose selection as arch-rascal of the story would seem to indicate that the author regards a parson as a little more dangerous member of society than a reviewer—toward the latter unfortunate she directs a number of incidental thrusts, intercalated here and there, somewhat gratuitously, it should seem, and yet with fell purpose. All the poor people met by Helmsley in his wandering treat him with uncalculating kindness; it remains for him to be brought back from death and nursed to happiness by the good angel from whom (but not in the way of matrimony) he is to win the longed-for love, and

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